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The historic International Law Studies ("Blue Book") series was initiated by
the Naval War College in 1901 to publish essays, treaties and articles that
contribute to the broader understanding ofinternational law. This, the eighty-seventh
volume ofthe "Blue Book" series, is a compilation of scholarly papers and remarks
derived from the proceedings of a conference hosted at the Naval War College
on June 22-24, 2010 entitled "International Law and the Changing Character
ofWar."
The June 2010 International Law Conference participants examined the inter-
national law challenges presented by the changing character ofwar. The objectives
of the conference were to catalogue the extent to which existing international law
governs these changing aspects of warfare and to assess whether these develop-
ments warrant revision of existing international law. Five panels of presenters ad-
dressed topics that spanned the entire spectrum of armed conflict and focused on
several emerging legal issues. Specifically, the panelists undertook an examination
of the legal issues associated with the use of force in cyberspace, the civilianization
of war fighting and the concept of "direct participation in hostilities," the use of
unmanned systems, lawfare in asymmetrical conflicts, and legal issues associated
with the investigation and enforcement of violations of the law in asymmetrical
conflicts.
Renowned international academics and legal advisers, both military and civil-
ian, representing military, diplomatic, and non-governmental and academic insti-
tutions from the global community contributed to the conference and this volume.
Readers and researchers will find within this volume a detailed study ofthe emerg-
ing international law challenges to be had as the character ofwar evolves, as well as
their potential impact on the ongoing development of international law, the law of
armed conflict and military operations.
The conference and the "Blue Book" were made possible with generous support
from the Naval War College Foundation, the University of Texas School of Law
and the Israel Yearbook on Human Rights. The International Law Department of
the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College cosponsored the event
with the International Institute ofHumanitarian Law and the Lieber Society on the
Law ofArmed Conflict, American Society of International Law.
On behalf of the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations and the
Commandant of the Marine Corps, I extend our thanks and gratitude to all the
participants, contributing authors and editors for their invaluable contributions to
this project and to the future understanding of the law of armed conflict.
JAMES P. WISECUP
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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Introduction
During the last several years we have witnessed impacts on, and changes in,
modern warfare, to include cyber operations in Estonia and Georgia,
civilianization ofthe battlefield in Iraq and Afghanistan, use ofunmanned systems
in Yemen and Pakistan, a lawless enemy invoking "lawfare"—particularly as it
relates to civilian deaths and injuries incurred during lawful attacks on enemy
targets—to undermine military operations and an enhanced level of public and
judicial scrutiny of military actions. Legal practitioners, both military and civilian,
and legal academics have worked to identify how international law governs these
changing aspects of warfare and to determine if there are any shortfalls requiring
changes to the existing legal framework. The legal debate on these matters has been
both vexing and fruitful: but a number of unanswered questions remain, making
these topics ripe for discourse.
Following its tradition of the in-depth study and teaching of the manner in
which the law impacts military operations, the Naval War College hosted a 2010
conference entitled "International Law and the Changing Character ofWar." The
conference brought together distinguished international law scholars and practi-
tioners to examine the challenge to international law posed by the changing
character of war.
Dr. Nicholas Rostow, a former Legal Adviser to the National Security Council,
opened the conference by setting the stage for the discussions to follow using as his
scene setter the "Study on Targeted Killings" report authored by Professor Philip
Alston for theUN Human Rights Council. Although Dr. Rostow, like many others,
does not agree entirely with Alston's conclusions on the applicability of human
rights law in armed conflict, and on the lack oftransparency and accountability, he
noted that this report, like many others, raises questions that pose a challenge to in-
ternational law. Over the next two and a halfdays in five thematic panels the speak-
ers presented their analyses of some of those challenges.
As a conference highlight, the attendees were privileged to attend a luncheon
address delivered by Professor Robert "Bobby" Chesney, the Charles J. Francis
Professor in Law at University of Texas School of Law, who provided an overview
of the emerging federal habeas corpus case law involving detainees held at Guan-
tanamo Bay. He highlighted the differing detention standards used by the execu-
tive branch and the federal courts' diverging assessments of the applicability of the
law of armed conflict in these cases.
Introduction
In closing the conference Professor Yoram Dinstein reflected that changes in
modern warfare have put legal scholars and practitioners representing nations that
abide by the law of armed conflict unnecessarily on the defensive in the face of
"modern barbarians" who conduct hostilities in an utterly unlawful fashion. He
urged those scholars and practitioners to no longer remain silent, but to go on the
legal offensive against those who resort to methods that violate the most basic prin-
ciples of the law ofarmed conflict Professor Dinstein also encouraged resistance to
those human rights activists who have erroneously and perilously asserted that
during armed conflict human rights law should supplant the law ofarmed conflict,
warning that should they prevail it would be impossible to effectively engage in
hostilities.
This edition of the International Law Studies ("Blue Book") series encapsulates
the incredibly thoughtful insights and lessons learned that each presenter brought
to the conference, including many gained from personal experience while serving
in a variety of conflict zones. The product of their scholarship and roundtable dis-
cussions are found within this volume.
The conference was organized by Major Michael D. Carsten, US Marine Corps,
of the International Law Department (ILD), with the invaluable assistance of Ms.
Jayne Van Petten and other ILD faculty and staff. The conference was made possi-
ble through the support of the Naval War College Foundation, the International
Institute of Humanitarian Law, the University of Texas School of Law and the Is-
rael Yearbook on Human Rights. Without the dedicated efforts and support of these
individuals and organizations, the conference would not have been the exceptional
success that it was.
I would like to thank Professor Raul A. "Pete" Pedrozo and Colonel Daria P.
Wollschlaeger, US Army, for serving as co-editors for this volume, Captain Ralph
Thomas, JAGC, US Navy (Ret.), for his meticulous work during the editing pro-
cess, and the staff of the College's Desktop Publishing Division, particularly Susan
Meyer, Albert Fassbender and Shannon Cole. I also extend thanks to Captain
Rymn Parsons, JAGC, US Navy, the Commanding Officer of Navy Reserve, Naval
War College (Law), the reserve unit that directly supports the International Law
Department. The unit's willingness to assist with the project and make personnel
available to facilitate timely publication of this "Blue Book" was essential. I am
grateful to all of the reserve officers, but specifically appreciate the exceptional
work of Commander James W. Caley, JAGC, US Navy, for his comprehensive and
painstaking work on the index. This publication is the culmination of the tireless
effort of each of the previously named individuals, as well as numerous others, and




Special thanks go to Rear Admiral James P. "Phil" Wisecup, the President of the
Naval War College, and Professor Robert "Barney" Rubel, Dean of the Center for
Naval Warfare Studies, for their leadership and support in the planning and con-
duct of the conference, and in the publication of this eighty-seventh volume of
the "Blue Book" series. This "Blue Book" continues the Naval War College's long
tradition of compiling the highest quality of scholarly inquiry into the most con-
temporary and challenging legal issues arising from the entire hierarchy of mili-
tary operations.
The International Law Studies series is published by the Naval War College and
distributed worldwide to US and international military organizations, academic
institutions and libraries. A catalogue of all previous "Blue Books" appears after the
table of contents. Volumes 59-87 of the International Law Studies series are avail-
able electronically at http://www.usnwc.edu/ild.
DENNIS MANDSAGER





From June 22 to 24, 2010 the Naval War College hosted over one hundred and
eighty renowned international scholars and practitioners, military and civil-
ian, and students representing government and academic institutions to partici-
pate in a conference examining a number of international law issues arising from
the changing character of war. The conference featured opening, luncheon and
closing addresses, as well as five panel discussions addressing specific legal issues
that relate to the changing character of war. Panelist comments were summarized
by a commentator, followed by questions from attendees. These discussions re-
sulted in detailed examinations of key issues.
The following conference summary was prepared by Commander James Caley,
JAGC, US Navy, a member of the Navy Reserve unit that supports the Naval War
College's International Law Department. The summary recapitulates the high-
lights of each of the conference speakers' presentations. As co-editors, we are
deeply indebted to Commander Caley for his attention to detail and assistance in
facilitating the publication of this "Blue Book." We would also be remiss ifwe did
not thank Captain Ralph Thomas, JAGC, US Navy (Ret.), for his outstanding sup-
port and dedication in editing the submissions for this volume ofthe International
Law Studies series. We also extend our sincere appreciation to Susan Meyer of the
Naval War College's Desktop Publishing Division for expertly preparing the page
proofs. Additionally, we would like to thank Albert Fassbender and Shannon Cole
for their excellent work in proofreading the conference papers. The quality of this
volume is a reflection of their professionalism and outstanding expertise.
OpeningAddress
Dr. Nicholas Rostow, a former Legal Adviser to the National Security Council, de-
livered the opening address. Focusing on what some refer to as targeted killings and
others call extrajudicial executions, Dr. Rostow critically examined the interplay
between the law of armed conflict (or international humanitarian law) and the
burgeoning body ofhuman rights law. Dr. Rostow's remarks suggested that the in-
terjection ofhuman rights law into armed conflict has created dangerous and divi-
sive ambiguity in, and uncertainty as to, what law should apply and how, the effect
of which will be to worsen, not ameliorate, the nature of war.
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After first highlighting the agenda and identifying issues dividing the interna-
tional community, Dr. Rostow critiqued the report, released in May 2010, entitled
"Study of Targeted Killings" prepared by United Nations Special Rapporteur Philip
Alston. In the report, Alston challenges the legality of targeted killings through the
use of drones in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Critical of nations such as the United
States, Russia and Israel that authorize drone attacks based on self-defense, Alston
questions the credibility of that justification and notes that, even if such action
could be justified, targeting of individuals still requires compliance with the law of
armed conflict and human rights law.
Dr. Rostow argued that Alston fails to examine individual actions or apply the
correct law, furnishes no explanation as to whether his analysis was predicated
upon international humanitarian law or human rights law, and fails to articulate
what he means by human rights law. Dr. Rostow also questioned Alston's views
that direct participation in hostilities, as defined in Common Article 3 of the 1949
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I, should be narrowly construed, ap-
plying only to persons observed to be actively engaged in hostilities. Dr. Rostow
urged a broader interpretation, tempering his view with the caveat that "the United
States has no interest in catching people in counterterrorism nets that have nothing
to do with terrorism."
Dr. Rostow rejected Alston's views that the decision to employ force in self-
defense should hinge on the availability of "smart" weapons, and that Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) officers who operate drones are unlawful combatants
because they do not wear uniforms. In closing, Dr. Rostow exhorted the attendees
to seek greater clarity and certainty in the challenging issues to be addressed dur-
ing the conference.
Panel I: The Changing Character ofthe Battlefield:
The Use ofForce in Cyberspace
Panel I tackled the complex legal issues underlying this potent and growing form of
warfare. Moderated by Captain Stacy Pedrozo, JAGC, US Navy, of the Naval Jus-
tice School faculty, the panel, consisting of Columbia Law School professor Mat-
thew Waxman, Durham University Law School professor Michael Schmitt and
Professor Derek Jinks, current Stockton Chairholder at the Naval War College,
used recent large-scale cyber attacks in the countries of Estonia and Georgia to il-
lustrate how cyber warfare may be conducted and how difficult it is to combat, es-
pecially with regard to the issues of identification and attribution. Other significant
issues explored included when does a cyber attack constitute use of force, what ave-
nues of response (kinetic v. non-kinetic) may exist and what is the responsibility of
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States for attacks launched by non-State actors from within those States. Professor
Jinks raised additional questions as to the appropriate burden ofproof for State re-
sponsibility, noting that three competing standards (clear and convincing, beyond
a reasonable doubt and fully conclusive) have been advanced.
Captain Pedrozo opened the panel with a summary of the April 2007 cyber at-
tacks in Estonia, which resulted in defacement of, and denial of service from,
websites belonging to the Estonian Parliament, banks, ministries, schools, newspa-
pers and broadcasters. Several websites were forced to shut down for a few hours or
in some instances even longer when these sites, which typically received one thou-
sand visits a day, were flooded with two thousand visits per second. Estonia ac-
cused Russia of direct involvement but failed to furnish proof, and no clear picture
has ever been produced as to whether this was ever a State-sponsored event. Esto-
nia charged only one person, an ethnic Russian Estonian, who was eventually con-
victed of attacking the website of the Estonian Reform Party. He was fined
approximately $1,640. Russian authorities refused to help with the investigation.
Professor Waxman commented that cyber attacks are both legally and factually
difficult to characterize. Legally speaking, Article 2(4) ofthe United Nations Char-
ter prohibits any State from using force against another, which, in the view of
many, means use of kinetic force and, hence, would not prohibit cyber attacks. In
the view of others, coercion alone—either by economic pressure or other mode
—
is enough to constitute a use of force. The problem is distinguishing lawful from
unlawful coercion. Factually, cyber attacks are difficult to identify and attribute,
making it hard to assign culpability. This is not a new problem for Article 2(4) anal-
ysis as there is much UN case history from the proxy conflicts of the Cold War.
Professor Schmitt observed that there is authority for the proposition that un-
less there is an armed attack, a State cannot respond in self-defense within the
meaning of Article 51 of the UN Charter without authority from the Security
Council. In Professor Schmitt's view, however, States have a right to defend them-
selves before an attack with a response authorized at the last opportunity to prevent
an attack. The self-defense right includes the right to respond kinetically to cyber
attacks so long as the response is proportional. With respect to non-State actors
(e.g., insurgent groups), a proper response to a cyber attack maybe to first demand
that the host State take action against the non-State actors and, ifunproductive, at-
tack only if the right of the host State to defend its sovereignty is weaker than the
right of the attacking State to self-defense.
A more difficult issue may be ascertaining the relevant standard of proof for
proving cyber attack liability. Clear and compelling evidence is the proposed stan-
dard, but maybe impossible to reach given current levels oftechnology, which can-
not overcome identity masking. Professor Jinks pointed out that identifying the
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cyber perpetrator is essential to any response in self-defense and that identification
is very difficult. Perpetrators operate in decentralized networks and can easily mask
their identities. Though Article 51 of the UN Charter requires proof of State action
in order to respond, there is widespread precedent of States responding to violent
attacks from non-State actors under justification of self-defense, to include the
Caroline case.
If States have a right to respond to non-State actors in the territory of another
State, they still must meet a high standard ofproofand perhaps the host State must
first given the opportunity to deal with the non-State actors. According to Profes-
sor Jinks the development of an accountability framework requires (i) establishing
a legal standard for State response and (ii) agreement on the appropriate standard
of proof. At this juncture, a State may respond if it is able to prove the host State
exercises "control," as is the case when a State employs contractors. An alternative
basis may exist under Article 51 if the State acknowledges and adopts the action of
the non-State actor, is unable to assist in neutralizing the threat or harbors the re-
sponsible group. The most appropriate standard of proof may be clear and con-
vincing evidence, though the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia uses the standard of"beyond a reasonable doubt" and the International
Court of Justice employs a standard of fully conclusive evidence. Given the varying
existing standards ofproof and the difficulty ofmeeting any one ofthem in a cyber
context, there may be a need to relax both the standard of State responsibility and
the standard of proof. To relax the standard of proof is to invite significant collat-
eral costs. The solution is to forge an international consensus on State obligations
and the consequences of breaches.
The cyber attacks in Estonia involved civilian targets. Can cyber attacks be di-
rected at civilians? To be sure, violent attacks are prohibited but non-violent cyber
attacks do not necessarily run afoul of international humanitarian law. Perhaps the
issue should turn on the consequences of the attack, the seriousness of which, in
the cyber arena, might justify an armed response. The objective of the attack also
raises issues. For example, the cyber attack on the Georgian Ministry of Defence
was directed at a military target. The indirect effects on commerce ofan attack on a
military target may also be deemed to be direct, if they are foreseeable. Finally,
those conducting the cyber attack are often civilian contractors. The "direct partic-
ipation in hostilities" standard should therefore apply.
Luncheon Address
University of Texas School of Law professor Robert Chesney delivered a thought-
provoking luncheon address that recounted the results of the thirty-three habeas
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corpus proceedings in US federal courts involving detainees held at Guantanamo
Bay. Professor Chesney explored the differing detention standards utilized by the
Bush and Obama administrations, the 2001 statute authorizing military force
against terrorists and the statutes pertaining to military commissions. Professor
Chesney also noted the widely diverging conclusions reached by trial and appellate
judges regarding the applicability of the law of armed conflict to these cases.
Beginning with the general observation that over the last several years great
interest has been taken in US detention operations in Guantanamo Bay but not
Iraq or Afghanistan, Professor Chesney suggested that the volume of habeas litiga-
tion by Guantanamo detainees is explained by the fact that these detainees are con-
fined outside the reach of the United Nations or other international body,
therefore in every practical sense held within the constant jurisdiction of the
United States alone.
Of the thirty-three decisions by Article III courts addressing the merits of
Guantanamo detainee petitions for habeas corpus, nineteen granted relief, result-
ing in the release of eleven detainees. Fourteen detainees have lost on the merits,
with two of these cases affirmed on appeal. The definition ofwho maybe detained
pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force for acts related to interna-
tional terrorism is still evolving. The current standard authorizes detention ofper-
sons who were members of—or substantially supported—Taliban or al-Qaida or
associated forces engaged in hostilities against the United States or coalition part-
ners. The definition is informed by law ofwar principles, yet the DC Circuit Court
ofAppeals opined that the law ofwar is irrelevant to this formulation, deciding that
domestic law, grounded in the Military Commissions Act, furnishes the relevant
statutory background. In Professor Chesney's view, the varied judicial opinions
make this area ripe for further legislative action.
Panel II: The Changing Character ofthe Participants in War: Civilianization
ofWarfightingand the Concept of "Direct Participation in Hostilities"
Panel II, which was moderated by Professor Charles Garraway, Associate Fellow of
the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) in the United King-
dom, wrestled with contentious issues surrounding the concept of direct participa-
tion in hostilities (DPH). Panel members Ryan Goodman, a New York University
law professor; Brigadier General Blaise Cathcart, Judge Advocate General of the
Canadian Forces; Francoise Hampson, an Essex University law professor; and Dr.
Nils Melzer, legal advisor to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
examined the ICRC's controversial 2009 Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of
Direct Participation in Hostilities (IG) and the extent to which the IG does or does
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not reflect international law. Among the salient issues considered were the con-
trasting and confusing status- and behavior-based approaches in international hu-
manitarian law and human rights law to determining when civilians are "directly
participating in hostilities," thereby losing protections against direct attack other-
wise provided to civilians under law.
Professor Garraway opened the panel by describing the 2009 IG as both un-
controversial and highly controversial. International humanitarian law hinges on
the principle of the distinction between combatants and non-combatants. Non-
combatants are presumed not to be directly participating in hostilities, and there-
fore are entitled to protection from attack. In the ICRC's view, Professor
Garraway noted, civilians lose this protection if—but only if, and only for so long
as—they directly participate in hostilities.
Professor Goodman disagreed with the ICRC interpretation of international
law in Section IX, "Restraints on the Use of Force," noting that the IG failed to
identify specific treaty law and State practice in support of its position. Professor
Goodman also noted the law ofwar already contains restrictions applicable to the
killing of an otherwise legitimate target, to include combatants who are hors de
combat, escaping prisoners ofwar; and actions taken in reprisal. He noted that such
restrictions may seemingly support the ICRC's position on restraints of the use of
force, but not to the extent which the IG suggests.
Professor Hampson discussed the ongoing debate regarding the interrelation-
ship between international humanitarian law and human rights law with respect to
targeting. Specifically, given the nature of a given conflict, she analyzed the applicable
law (Hague and Geneva treaty law and customary international law) and when
each might apply. She noted that the ICRC position relies on both human rights law
and the application of a law enforcement paradigm, which utilizes a behavior-
based approach to distinguish civilians from combatants. Hence, when a civilian
behaves like a combatant by engaging in hostilities, he loses the protection from at-
tack that is accorded civilians during that action only. In contrast, international
humanitarian law uses primarily a status-based approach for distinguishing civil-
ians from combatants. The ICRC in the IG now accepts that a member ofan armed
group exercising a continuous combat function creates a category that is status
based. Logically, then, for status-based targeting decisions to be lawful, LOAC has
to prevail over human rights law. Professor Hampson notes, however, that the
problem is a bit more complex depending on the nature of the conflict and, in fact,
she argued that in some limited circumstances human rights law may prevail.
Brigadier General Cathcart noted that distinguishing civilians from combatants
is intelligence driven, and therefore must be well established for purposes of target-
ing. Any doubt is resolved in favor of finding civilian status.
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Finally, Dr. Melzer remarked that the purpose of the IG is to encapsulate the
ICRC's interpretation of the current state of international law, and provide key
legal concepts that can be used by legal advisors to guide military commanders and
develop rules of engagement. Dr. Melzer also clarified that targeting should be
based on the combat function of the target. Persons who function as combatants,
and who are trained and have the capability, to participate in hostilities, are lawful
targets. It is the ICRC's view that the question ofwhether a person loses the protec-
tion of civilian status must be determined at the time oftargeting. If a civilian joins
an organized armed group, such person falls into a continuous combat function
and can be lawfully targeted. On the other hand, persons that only intermittently
participate in hostilities, without allegiance to any particular organized armed
group, can be lawfully targeted only when they are performing a combat function.
The intervening periods must be governed by law enforcement principles.
Panel III: The Changing Character ofWeapon Systems:
Unmanned Systems/Unmanned Vehicles
Panel III, moderated by Villanova University School of Law professor John
Murphy, was comprised of Professor Pete Pedrozo ofthe Naval War College, Hina
Shamsi ofNew York University School of Law, Colonel Darren Stewart of the San
Remo Institute and Professor Ken Anderson of American University's Washing-
ton School of Law. Its primary focus was unmanned (or remotely piloted) aerial
vehicle (UAV) operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Ms. Shamsi, Senior Advi-
sor to the Project on Extrajudicial Executions at New York University School of
Law and a contributor to a recent United Nations special report on targeted killings
(Alston Report), criticized recent UAV operations on multiple grounds, including
lack of transparency and accountability, and the extent to which targeted killing
destabilizes existing legal frameworks. Professor Pedrozo outlined the legal basis
on which CIA-controlled UAVs are operated in Pakistan, while Professor Ander-
son discussed whether geographic considerations delimit UAV use.
Professor Murphy opened the panel by lauding unmanned drones as systems
capable of precision targeting that minimize civilian casualties. In contrast, Ms.
Shamsi, a contributor to the Alston Report, criticized drone (UAV) operations, ar-
guing that they make it easier to kill and thereby facilitate an expansion of execu-
tions beyond those that are legally justified under international humanitarian law.
She further contended that the operation of drones by the CIA, though not illegal
under international humanitarian law, should nevertheless be halted because the
CIA is not capable ofcomplying with the law ofwar and is not sufficiently transpar-
ent in its operations to verify compliance. Moreover, she concluded, under human
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rights law, targeted killings are illegal because they are not designed to accomplish
an objective, but are merely to kill. She observed that while the United States, Rus-
sia and Israel have all justified drone attacks on the basis of self-defense, this justifi-
cation cannot stand where the resulting deaths occur in another State's territory,
such as in Pakistan.
Professor Pedrozo noted that special rapporteur Alston did not possess a man-
date to investigate or render conclusions with respect to international humanitar-
ian law, and thus his assertions should be understood only insofar as they relate to
human rights law. Additionally, he observed that CIA operations fully comport
with the law of war. He asserted that drone operations taking place in Pakistan
against Taliban and al-Qaida forces do not violate Pakistani sovereignty.
Professor Anderson summarized the general view of the international legal
community on drones, saying that they may be used in armed conflict or in law
enforcement operations, subject to geographic limitations, and are governed by
human rights law in those instances when human rights law is not superseded by
international humanitarian law. This is in contrast to the view of the United States
that drones may be deployed without geographic limitation against combatants
wherever they are located when the United States chooses to exercise its lawful
right of self-defense.
Colonel Stewart commented that UAVs are like any other weapon platform;
they have significant capabilities and vulnerabilities. As a result, to properly evalu-
ate the use ofUAVs they must be viewed in the context of the overall military plan
or strategy. Only in such context can the UAV targeting be truly determined to be
lawful or unlawful. Colonel Stewart also argued that evolving technologies, such as
autonomous weapon systems, while enhancing the ability to neutralize threats,
tend to replace human judgment with algorithms, a potentially unwise exchange.
The legal community must be the driving force to ensure the lawful application
and use of such emerging technologies.
Panel IV: The Changing Character of Tactics: Lawfare in
Asymmetrical Conflicts
Panel IV delved into the lawfare phenomenon and its growing impact on how war-
fare is conducted by the United States, Great Britain and Israel. The panel, moder-
ated by Mr. David Graham of The Army Judge Advocate General's Legal Center
and School, included Duke University School of Law professor Charles Dunlap,
Ms. Ashley Deeks of Columbia Law School, Tel Aviv University professor Pnina
Sharvit Baruch and Captain Dale Stephens of the Royal Australian Navy. Substan-
tial comment was made on the September 2009 Report of the United Nations Fact
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Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict prepared by Justice Richard Goldstone
(Goldstone Report), and the manner in which Hamas used the report in an effort
to discredit and thereby constrain Israel. Observations were also made on the unin-
tended consequences of recent attempts by military forces to limit civilian casual-
ties in Afghanistan, such as the trend by insurgents to embed themselves even more
closely and deeply within civilian populations. Professor Sharvit Baruch detailed
the lengths to which Israeli forces now go—far above and beyond the requirements
of international law—to avoid civilian casualties.
Mr. Graham opened the panel with a discussion of asymmetric urban fighting
with non-State actors, highlighting the Goldstone Report. The report discusses the
legality of Israeli operations against Hamas in Gaza and finds thirty instances in
which Israel purportedly violated the law of armed conflict, including reckless use
ofwhite phosphorus and flechette munitions. Mr. Graham questioned whether the
Goldstone Report portends—or reflects—a fundamental shift in the manner in
which principles of the law of armed conflict are applied in asymmetric armed
conflict.
Professor Sharvit Baruch discussed the exhaustive approach Israel takes to com-
ply with the law of armed conflict prior to target approval, to include intelligence
vetting, legal review of both preplanned and immediate targets, and extensive
warnings to civilian populations. She viewed Article 57 (Precautions in Attack) of
Additional Protocol I as being customary international law and focused her re-
marks on Israel's efforts to comply with its dictates.
Professor Dunlap, to whom the term "lawfare" is largely credited, described it as
a method of exploiting the law during armed conflict to achieve operational ends.
For instance, just prior to the first Gulf War, the United States purchased satellite
imagery of coalition forces from multiple commercial companies, thereby denying
that intelligence information to Iraq and obviating the need for military action to
keep Iraq from obtaining the imagery.
Professor Dunlap observed that insurgents are adept lawfare operators. He cited
as an example that the law of armed conflict does not prohibit civilian casualties
during combat operations; they are accepted as collateral damages under rules gov-
erning necessity, distinction and proportionality. But when a US official an-
nounces that the United States will not engage the Taliban if such engagement
would risk the life of civilians, the Taliban will start to embed with civilians. If an
attack occurs that kills or injures civilians, although the attack was lawful, media
reports are often adverse.
Ms. Deeks spoke on various court decisions and how they divide the United
States and its European coalition partners. She focused on four broad categories of
litigation: lawfulness of detention, lawfulness of treatment during detention,
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lawfulness of a transfer of custody from one State to another and lawfulness ofpar-
ticular intelligence activities. The differing decisions of the US and European
courts on such cases are causing tensions in the operational environment. The Eu-
ropean courts have provided less deference to the decisions ofthe executive branch
in military and international affairs matters as compared to courts in the United
States. As a result of such litigation risk, European military operations maybe cur-
tailed to avoid gray areas in the law. In addition, a change in policy brought about
by litigation can, over time, have a chilling effect on the willingness of coalition
partners to work together and share information. She cited potential steps that
could reduce the risk of litigation as including ensuring States' compliance with
counterinsurgency (COIN) principles in an effort to win the hearts and minds of
the affected population and the establishment of independent non-judicial
mechanisms designed to oversee the decisions of the executive branch.
Captain Stephens argued that lawfare is neither good nor bad. Laws by their na-
ture are indeterminate, thereby creating gaps that require filling. Lawfare attempts
to take advantage of such gaps. To fill such gaps, legal advisors attempt to use legal
principles, which are generally moral concepts. These legal principles, ifused prop-
erly, can effectively be used as a means ofcounter-lawfare. One such way is to apply
the COIN doctrine in asymmetric conflicts and to emphasize the rule of law in
COIN operations as a tool of war.
Panel V: The Changing Character ofInternational Legal Scrutiny:
Rule Set, Investigation and Enforcement in Asymmetrical Conflicts
Panel V considered the unprecedented levels of public and judicial scrutiny now
being given to the use of armed force. Panel moderator Captain Rob McLaughlin,
Royal Australian Navy, and panel members Professor Wolff Heintschel von
Heinegg of Europa-Universitat Viadrina, Commander Andrew Murdoch of the
Royal Navy, Dr. Roy Schondorf of the Israeli Ministry of Justice and Commander
James Kraska, JAGC, US Navy, a member of the Naval War College faculty, exam-
ined instances of internal and external scrutiny, such as that occurring as a result of
Israeli actions to enforce its naval blockade on Gaza. Concern was expressed that
this scrutiny has the potential to dissuade military commanders from militarily ap-
propriate and lawful actions due to the costs and burdens of such scrutiny, irre-
spective of liability.
Captain McLaughlin began by observing that all countries are subject to in-
tense legal scrutiny in the operational environment, with non-governmental or-
ganizations (NGOs), among others, well equipped to conduct independent
investigations. Key considerations are who is investigating and the body of law
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applied in the investigation. Legal scrutiny is especially significant in the asym-
metric context.
Professor Heintschel von Heinegg asserted that the law of armed conflict does
not recognize asymmetry. This law simply gives privileged status to certain per-
sons. In asymmetric conflicts, one party attempts to compensate for military weak-
nesses by taking advantage ofthe weaknesses imposed on the other party by the law
ofwar. Examples are perfidy and use ofhuman shields, though employing human
shields would not necessarily prevent an attack under law of war principles. He
maintained that the law ofarmed conflict is flexible, but often not helpful when ap-
plied to asymmetric conflict. He opined that perhaps new law needs to be forged.
With respect to investigations, nations must move quickly to publicly supply accu-
rate information as to what had occurred. Professor Heintschel von Heinegg ob-
served that enforcement in the asymmetric context is difficult. He indicated that
the International Criminal Court could be useful in this regard, although its value
may be overestimated by some.
Commander Murdoch reviewed three cases to demonstrate the manner in
which recent court decisions and related public scrutiny have negatively influ-
enced British operational commanders. In each case there has been some form of
military justice, civil proceeding, parliamentary review and/or public inquiry that
took years to complete. This level of scrutiny is very costly in time and resources. It
also exposes military and government personnel to personal and reputational risk.
To help offset such risk, the military requires a well-resourced operational capabil-
ity to respond to and, if possible, preempt a judicial challenge.
Dr. Schondorf offered the perspective that Hamas has engaged in lawfare by
routinely accusing Israel ofwar crimes. The purpose ofthe allegations was to dam-
age Israel's reputation and force investigations. These tactics can be very effective
for non-State actors because once an allegation is made, the reputation of the ac-
cused State is immediately compromised. The non-State actor does not face the
same risk. In addition, once an allegation is made a democratic State will take such
an allegation seriously and conduct an investigation. In contrast, a non-State actor
has no similar interest in conducting its own investigation and there is no public
expectation that it do so. As a result, to discredit these allegations, nations are
forced to expend enormous amounts of time and resources, but by the time the
results ofsuch investigations are completed the public is no longer concerned with
the incident.
Commander Kraska addressed the question of whether Israel's naval blockade
ofGaza is subject to the law ofnaval warfare or the law ofthe sea. While noting dis-
agreement, he argued that the law of naval warfare on blockade is applicable, even
if the hostilities do not constitute international armed conflict, because the area is
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one of continuous violence. This, he suggested, is consistent with the US Supreme
Court interpretation of international law involving the North's blockade of the
South in the American Civil War.
Closing Address
Professor Emeritus Yoram Dinstein of Tel Aviv University, the 1999 and 2002
Stockton Professor at the Naval War College, delivered the closing address. His re-
marks focused on the fact that scholars and military practitioners of the law of
armed conflict have become too defensive and apologetic in the face of both (i)
lawfare, which is used effectively by the adversaries of civilized nations, and (ii) in-
creased pressure brought to bear by overzealous human rights activists and NGOs
who desire a "regime change" from the law of armed conflict to human rights law.
His basic theme was that there is no reason to be defensive; in fact, the focus of the
discussion and the tone of the response need to be changed.
In Professor Dinstein's view, there are two modern phenomena that have led
civilized nations to become excessively apologetic and defensive when waging war.
The first is that the "barbarians at the gate"—rogue States and terrorist organiza-
tions—are exploiting a lesson from armed conflict in Vietnam, that is, that a civi-
lized nation's warfighting effort can be effectively impeded by eroding public
support for pursuing victory. In the war in Afghanistan, public support for con-
fronting the enemy is eroded by highlighting civilian casualties as collateral dam-
age in the course of hostilities. "We" (whom he defined as the scholars and military
practitioners of civilized nations) have, in fact, allowed false notions about the
unacceptability of civilian casualties, under the law of armed conflict, to take root
and unnecessarily hamper our military operations. He stressed that the law of
armed conflict takes civilian casualties as collateral damage for granted, and only
requires belligerent parties to minimize them.
The second phenomenon is that NGOs and others assert—wrongly and danger-
ously—that human rights law supplants the law of armed conflict. The human
rights NGOs have contributed to a misperception that lawful State action is unlaw-
ful. Undeniably, human rights law can fill gaps in the law of armed conflict, where
such gaps exist. The crux of the matter, however, is that the law of armed conflict
constitutes lex specialis. It has been recognized as such by consistent State practice
and by judicial opinions.
Professor Dinstein believes that, if civilized nations are to prevail, scholars and
military practitioners need to change the tone and tenor of the debate, making sure
that the response to spurious criticisms is widely heard and understood.
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Conclusion
We hope that the thought-provoking articles published in this "Blue Book" will
add to—and help shape—the debate on the multiple complex emerging legal is-
sues presented by the changing character of war. The legal insights offered here to
legal practitioners and scholars should assist them as they address these and other
issues that may evolve in future conflicts.
This "Blue Book" would not have come to fruition had it not been for the enor-
mously successful conference made possible in large measure by the conference
committee under the leadership ofMajor Mike Carsten, US Marine Corps, working
with Mrs. Jayne Van Petten ofthe International Law Department, and the support
provided by the Naval War College Foundation, the University of Texas School of
Law, the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, the Lieber Society on the
Law of Armed Conflict (American Society of International Law) and the Israel
Yearbook on Human Rights. We thank these individuals and organizations for their
enduring support and generosity.
RAUL A. "PETE" PEDROZO DARIA P. WOLLSCHLAEGER
Associate Professor Colonel, US Army











It is a great pleasure to be back at the Naval War College and an extraordinary
honor to be opening this conference. As I look out, I see colleagues of long
standing. More important than that, although that fact is important, I see col-
leagues who have been my teachers as I have pursued my own work.
The annual International Law Department conferences famously address the
most difficult and contentious topics in the field known variously as the law of
armed conflict, laws ofwar and international humanitarian law (IHL). (While I re-
gard these terms as coextensive, not everyone does, which itself is a source of con-
fusion and controversy.) The coverage of this conference is equally broad and
challenging: detention, civilianization of warfighting, the meaning of "direct par-
ticipation in hostilities," the impact of drones, asymmetric warfare, and issues of
enforcement and accountability. I imagine discussion also will touch on embar-
goes and blockades. These topics are of operational, not just academic, interest.
Participants here are well known for taking real-world concerns into account. This
fact alone sets the conference apart.
* Former Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law, US Naval War College. The views
expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views ofthe US government or any other
entity with which I am or have been associated.
Combating Terrorists: Legal Challenges in the Post-9/11 World
The themes to be examined over the next few days highlight different perspec-
tives within the legal and political communities worldwide. While Americans may
have fewer difficulties with seeing terrorists in the context of armed conflict than
Europeans and others, this phenomenon is only a shorthand way of referring to
differences ofview that are of legal, political and social significance. At a conference
in England recently, a US official was surprised to discover that the health ofthe In-
ternational Criminal Court was the thermometer for gauging the health of the en-
tire international legal system.
I thought therefore to begin our conference with some thoughts about the UN
Human Rights Council Report, dated May 28, 2010, of Professor Philip Alston of
the New York University School of Law on "extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary
executions," including "targeted killings." 1 It merits attention because the subject
is at the center of debate about the lawful use of lethal force against terrorists and
those who support, harbor, direct or finance them. It takes us back to September
2001 and the rejection of a law enforcement-only—or mainly law enforcement
—
approach to combating terrorism.
Alston's approach raises a number of questions and highlights a number of is-
sues. I shall therefore begin with a summary of the argument and then note some
questions about its assumptions and conclusions.
The Alston Report
Legal questions in armed conflict turn most often on the weapon chosen, the target
and collateral damage. Lately, the extent and definition of the battlefield, particu-
larly when combating terrorists, also are issues for analysis and debate. In addition,
as a result of the International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the Israeli
"wall," 2 whether or not a State has a right of self-defense under international law
against attacks—either planned or executed—by terrorist groups, that is, non-
State actors, continues to concern policymakers and commentators alike. To begin, I
should make clear my views on this issue: terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and
others are engaged in hostilities with the United States and other States even
though they are not themselves States. States from which they operate have an obli-
gation under international law, whether customary or derived from binding UN
Security Council resolutions, such as Resolution 1373 (200 1),
3 or treaties, to pre-
vent terrorist groups from engaging in attacks and to put a stop to active and pas-
sive support for terrorism. When a State is unable to carry out this duty, the State
suffering attack is not without recourse, including an inherent right to use force if
necessary and proportionate in self-defense. The necessity requirement is hardly
trivial. Nor is the proportionality requirement: that quantum of force reasonably
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necessary to bring an end to the condition giving rise to the right to use force in
self-defense in the first instance. The use of force must conform to requirements in
the law of armed conflict as well. 4
Alston's Report has stimulated much interest because it addresses subjects of
current concern. He begins by focusing on unmanned aerial vehicles and weapons
fired from them as among the most controversial instruments in the conflict with
terrorists. He asserts that "a missile fired from a drone is no different from any
other commonly used weapon, including a gun fired by a soldier or a helicopter or
gunship that fires missiles. The critical legal question is the same for each weapon:
whether its specific use complies with IHL." 5 Alston concludes that assessment of
each use of force to ensure compliance with the requirement of proportionality
must be made with respect to "each attack individually, and not for an overall mili-
tary operation."6 He thus elides the jus ad bellum and thejws in hello. Each operates
in different contexts and with different understandings; treating them as one leads
to confusion, mistake oflaw and uncertainty. Recognizing that the proportionality
standard must be met for a use of force to be lawful and that the principle of dis-
crimination between military and civilian targets is at the core ofthe modern law of
armed conflict, Yoram Dinstein put it better than Alston: those who plan attacks
need to take into account the duty to minimize civilian casualties. 7
Perhaps because his audience is the UN Human Rights Council and perhaps
because the focus of his own work is international human rights law, Alston looks at
uses of force with international human rights concerns foremost in his mind. (This
observation in no way suggests that I do not share his aspirations for a world that re-
spects and protects human rights.) Let us see what Alston does with his perspective.
First, he takes a more limited view than I suspect would be shared in this audito-
rium ofwhat constitutes a legitimate target for killing in armed conflict: "'combat-
ant' or 'fighter' or, in the case of a civilian, only for such time as the person 'directly
participates in hostilities.'"8 Alston states, without analysis,
It is not easy to arrive at a definition of direct participation that protects civilians and at
the same time does not "reward" an enemy that may fail to distinguish between civil-
ians and lawful military targets, that may deliberately hide among civilian populations
and put them at risk, or that may force civilians to engage in hostilities. The key, how-
ever, is to recognize that regardless of the enemy's tactics, in order to protect the vast
majority of civilians, direct participation may only include conduct close to that of a
fighter, or conduct that directly supports combat. More attenuated acts, such as pro-
viding financial support, advocacy, or other non-combat aid, does [sic] not constitute
direct participation. 9
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Alston asserts that "direct participation" excludes activities that may support "the
general war effort," e.g., "political advocacy, supplying food or shelter, or economic
support and propaganda." 10 He adopts what he calls the "farmer by day, fighter by
night" 11 distinction to protect the daytime farmer from being a legitimate target.
Such an approach, which is included in Additional Protocol I 12 (and one ofthe rea-
sons the United States is not a party), favors the terrorist. (My lawyer would have
me say "arguably favors.") Alston prefers the guidance of the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross with respect to direct participation in hostilities—it may
stop and start on a continuing basis. One becomes a legitimate target only when
engaged in a targetable activity. 13 This is not a position that will win many advo-
cates among those engaged in combating terrorists and their attacks. Further, if his
goal is "to protect the vast majority of civilians," 14 then one might have thought he
would have emphasized the importance of suppressing terrorism. Thus, Alston's
Report suffers by seeming not to take terrorism so seriously as governments and
publics do.
The UN Security Council has suggested that one take a broader view. In Resolu-
tion 1373, adopted following the 9/11 attacks, the Security Council "decided" that
all States shall
[ejnsure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or
perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice and en-
sure that, in addition to any other measures against them, such terrorist acts are estab-
lished as serious criminal offences in domestic laws and regulations and that the
punishment duly reflects the seriousness of such terrorist acts. 15
While engaging in criminal support for terrorism may not per se make one a lawful
target, it does suggest that Alston is rather too quick to narrow the categories of
legitimate military targets. I assume that he would regard command and control,
training and supplying of materiel as putting one in the category of legitimate tar-
get, but the fact that he excludes financiers raises a question. By not evaluating the
impact of UN Security Council resolutions on his assumptions, Alston under-
mines the usefulness of his work.
Achieving a general definition ofterrorism has bedeviled the international com-
munity. At the same time, through a series ofUN Security Council resolutions and
multilateral treaties, the same community has narrowed the definitional gap for
disagreement about whether a particular act is, or is not, terrorist by defining acts
usually committed by terrorists as "terrorist." Alston seems to define "terrorist" in
such a way as to make status severable, as Professor Harvey Rishikof likes to say.
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Thus, for Alston, the terrorist can be many things at once, each one separable from
the other, with different legal consequences for each.
Second, Alston's emphasis on international human rights law in the fight
against terrorists creates a legal unreality for those who combat terrorism. UN Se-
curity Council resolutions are both more inclusive and more vague. Their language
reflects political compromises achieved through the drafting process, compro-
mises that allow unanimous adoption of counterterrorist resolutions. Thus, UN
Security Council resolutions routinely reaffirm
that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious
threats to international peace and security . . . [and] the need to combat by all means, in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and international law, including
applicable international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law, threats to inter-
national peace and security caused by terrorist acts. 16
Those engaged in combating terrorism can use this Security Council language as a
standard against which to evaluate plans. Alston's failure to consider the impact of
Resolution 1373 and other Security Council counterterrorism resolutions limits
the operational utility of his work.
Alston insists that the laws of war and international human rights law apply in
the context of armed conflict without analyzing either how they do or the conse-
quences for military operations. Thus, Alston asserts, where the law ofarmed con-
flict is unclear or uncertain, "it is appropriate to draw guidance from human rights
law." 17 He does not specify the content of such law and whether, to the extent it de-
rives from treaties, all or just some States are parties. The same is true in his treat-
ment of the law of armed conflict as his references to the 1977 Geneva Additional
Protocols show.
Alston's operational concern is procedural. He argues that, as a result of failing
to disclose the legal basis for individual targeting decisions and who has been killed
with what collateral consequences, "clear legal standards [have been displaced]
with a vaguely defined license to kill, and the creation of a major accountability
vacuum." 18 As Alston notes, targeted killings have taken place in a variety of con-
texts—Russia's war in Chechnya, the US war with Al Qaeda, Sri Lanka's war with
rebel groups, and Israel's wars with Arab States, quasi-States and groups are a few
examples. Alston sums up the situation as follows:
Although in most circumstances targeted killings violate the right to life, in the excep-
tional circumstance of armed conflict, they may be legal. This is in contrast to other
terms with which "targeted killing" has sometimes been interchangeably used, such as
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"extrajudicial execution," "summary execution", and "assassination", all ofwhich are,
by definition, illegal. 19
This approach to conceptually distinct acts reflects a rush to conclusion based on in-
sufficient and imprecise analysis. The US official position, for example, is different.
The US View
Harold Koh, the State Department Legal Adviser, gave the Obama administration
position in a speech in March 2010 to the American Society of International Law. 20
He made a number of significant points that assist in deciding who is and who is
not a lawful target. First, Mr. Koh said that the United States is engaged in a num-
ber of armed conflicts simultaneously: "In the conflict occurring in Afghanistan
and elsewhere, we continue to fight the perpetrators of 9/1 1: a non-state actor, al-
Qaeda (as well as the Taliban forces that harbored al-Qaeda)." With respect to tar-
geting, he stated, "U.S. targeting practices, including lethal operations conducted
with the use ofunmanned aerial vehicles, comply with all applicable law, including
the laws of war."
With regard to the authority to use force, Mr. Koh stated, "As a matter of inter-
national law, the United States is in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, as well as the
Taliban and associated forces, in response to the horrific 9/11 attacks, and may use
force consistent with its inherent right to self-defense under international law." He
continued, "[I]n this ongoing armed conflict, the United States has the authority
under international law, and the responsibility to its citizens, to use force, includ-
ing lethal force, to defend itself, including by targeting persons such as high-level
al-Qaeda leaders who are planning attacks." This point is important as all decisions
about targeting, the location ofthe conflict and treatment ofprisoners flow from it.
Mr. Koh stated that the United States recognizes the applicability of the law of
armed conflict, and the core principles of distinction and proportionality. Target-
ing individuals who are legitimate military objectives, such as commanders, plan-
ners, supporters and the like, is within international law. Killing such persons is not
to deprive them of judicial due process, for none is due, and does not violate US
legal prohibitions on assassination for the same reason: legitimate and lawful acts
of self-defense are not crimes. Finally, Koh defends the use of unmanned vehicles
as increasing the precision of attacks and limiting collateral damage. In this respect,
Alston shares the US view.
The US position raises questions just as the Human Rights Council report does.
The question of the use of precision weapons is one such issue. What legal conse-
quences flow from possession ofthem? Do they affect the way a State, as a matter of
8
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law, must conduct military operations, including those in exercise of the inherent
right of self-defense codified in Article 51 of the UN Charter? Do precision weap-
ons eliminate recognition that error is endemic to warfare and mean that civilian
casualties, if they occur, must be intended (as the Goldstone Report suggests)?21
How does the requirement to distinguish between military and civilian targets af-
fect, if it does, the right to use force in self-defense when the State with the right
does not possess precision weapons, and its enemy hides among, or otherwise ex-
ploits, civilians?
These and other questions spring to mind in the course of studying the Alston
Report and such other Human Rights Council documents as the Goldstone Re-
port.22 Each of them raises more questions than it answers. Alston raises a further
issue: the status of Central Intelligence Agency officers engaging in armed conflict
with Al Qaeda and its allies. Do they, as Alston asserts, not enjoy combatant status
even ifthey meet the requirements ofthe Geneva Conventions? Should one distin-
guish between the CIA officer engaged in cloak and dagger and those who engage
in military operations and look and behave like the regular armed forces except for
the source of their paychecks?
Conclusion
We shall be discussing these and other issues in the next few days. Their impor-
tance to success in the effort to combat terrorism and terrorists is hard to overstate.
Other issues are significant as well. They include the fact, which seems often to be
forgotten, that the use of force is a political act aimed at political objectives. This is
true whether the goal is capitulation or change of policy. For the United States, the
goals invariably include persuading the adversary to comply with international legal
standards ofbehavior. At the same time, the tactical choices made also have politi-
cal consequences. These need to be considered as one goes forward with a use of
force. In addition, calls for the introduction of judicial process into military
decisions, not just the detention of prisoners, seem to be growing louder. Is such
involvement of the judiciary necessary or wise? And what are the consequences of
introducing judicial process as a routine part of military operations?
As the war with Al Qaeda and its associates continues with no end in sight and
with some groups pressing for criminal prosecutions of those fighting terrorists,
getting the analysis and argument right is a political and legal necessity. Professor
Alston's Report is not wrong in every respect; neither is it right—therefore more
and better needs to be done. This conference will do some of that work.
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Mission Impossible? International Law and
the Changing Character ofWar
John F. Murphy*
As a participant in the conference "International Law and the Changing
Character ofWar," in this article I hope to present and support the thesis re-
flected in the title to this essay, i.e., that the use and abuse of international law and
the changing character ofwar have combined to place major obstacles in the way of
the successful prosecution of armed conflict by US forces and their allies. In sup-
port of this thesis, I shall be drawing extensively on examples arising out of "the
changing character ofweapon systems" panel, but I shall also be exploring other
dimensions of "the changing character of war" to buttress this support.
I. Challenges Posed by the Changing Character ofWeapon Systems
In the panel "The Changing Character of Weapon Systems: Unmanned Systems/
Unmanned Vehicles," an overarching theme was the issue whether the use of these
new weapon systems was compatible with international law. As noted in particular
in Professor Pedrozo's article, 1 the criticisms ofthe use ofunmanned systems to at-
tack adversaries outside oftraditional combat zones like Afghanistan and Iraq have
* Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. I want to acknowledge the excellent re-
search assistance of John (Sean) E. Jennings III and Carolyn (Carly) Studer, third-year students
at Villanova University School of Law, on this article.
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been especially sharp. The primary focus of the critics has been on the Central In-
telligence Agency's (CIA) use of armed drones, a prime example of an unmanned
aerial system or unmanned aerial vehicle, to kill leaders of the Taliban or Al-Qaeda
in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan.
I make no attempt to address all of the numerous arguments advanced by the
critics of the drone attacks, but rather limit my discussion to two closely related ar-
guments: first, that the civilian nature of the CIA personnel utilizing the armed
drones precludes them from engaging in armed conflict, and if they engage in
armed conflict, this renders them "unlawful combatants"; and second, outside of
Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States is not engaged in an armed conflict with
the Taliban, Al-Qaeda or any other militant or terrorist group. Ifsuch attacks occur
outside of an armed conflict, they must be treated as criminal acts and not armed
attacks that give rise to the right to use military force in self-defense. Rather, they
must be combated by law enforcement measures and governed by international
human rights law, not the law of armed conflict, or, as some prefer to call it, inter-
national humanitarian law. Because armed drones are not law enforcement tools,
the critics contend, they may not be used outside of combat zones.
The Effect of the CIA's Status as a Civilian Government Agency
One of the most persistent critics of the CIA's use of armed drones has been Mary
Ellen O'Connell, holder ofthe Robert & Marion Short Chair in Law at Notre Dame
University. According to Professor O'Connell, the CIA is not bound by the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice of the United States to respect the laws and customs
of war and therefore it does not. 2 Moreover, according to O'Connell:
Under the law of armed conflict, only lawful combatants have the right to use force
during an armed conflict. Lawful combatants are the members of a state's regular
armed forces. The CIA are not members of the U.S. armed forces. They do not wear
uniforms. They are not subject to the military chain ofcommand. They are not trained
in the laws ofwar, including the fundamental targeting principles of distinction, neces-
sity, proportionality, and humanity. 3
O'Connell's remarks presume that the law of armed conflict governs the CIA's
use ofarmed drones in the FATA in Pakistan. This is a debatable point; we shall re-
turn to the issue below. But assuming arguendo that it does, the law of armed con-
flict does not prohibit civilians, including intelligence agents, from participating in
hostilities. As Pedrozo points out,4 even Philip Alston, the UN Special Rapporteur
on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, in his study on targeted killings,
has conceded this point. 5 Moreover, the use of armed drones by CIA personnel
does not necessarily constitute a war crime if it results in a death in the FATA.6
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Only if the killing itself is conducted in a manner prohibited by the law of armed
conflict, e.g., it involves the deliberate targeting of civilians not directly participat-
ing in hostilities, does it constitute a war crime. Under such circumstances, it is ir-
relevant who conducts the targeted killing, intelligence personnel or State armed
forces; the actor who committed the killing, plus those who authorized it, can be
prosecuted for war crimes. 7
The civilian status of the CIA personnel does have other significant conse-
quences. First, ifthey are captured by the enemy, they are not entitled to prisoner of
war status. It is a matter ofsome debate whether they are to be treated as civilians or
as unlawful combatants while they are detained. 8 Second, they may be attacked, ei-
ther as members of an organized armed group or as civilian direct participants in
hostilities. Third, they enjoy no belligerent immunity for their actions and thus
maybe prosecuted, either for war crimes (e.g., deliberately killing civilians) or do-
mestic crimes (e.g., murder) in a national court.9 In other words, the absence ofthe
right on the part of CIA personnel to participate directly in hostilities within the
meaning ofArticle 43(2) ofAdditional Protocol I 10 has consequences, but is not in
itself a violation of the law of armed conflict.
At this writing, the media are full ofcommentary on the release of75,000 US mili-
tary documents on the war in Afghanistan by WikiLeaks. Although much of the
commentary has focused on reports in the documents of Pakistan's Inter-Services
Intelligence Directorate assisting the Taliban in Afghanistan in their use of impro-
vised explosive devices (IEDs) against members ofthe Afghan government and co-
alition forces, there are also many reports in the documents of the fallibility of
aerial drones. For example, one document reported that communications were
lost with a Reaper drone, armed with Hellfire missiles and 500-pound bombs, and
an F-15 fighter plane had to be ordered to shoot it down before it crossed into
Tajikistan. 11 These documents also reportedly indicate that some reports of civilian
casualties were never made public. 12
At this writing there are also conflicting reports about an attack by coalition
forces occurring on July 23, 2010 that Afghan sources claim killed fifty-two civil-
ians, a claim that has been denied byNATO officials, who stated that an investiga-
tion NATO was conducting "has thus far revealed no evidence of civilians injured
or killed." 13 To be sure, reports of large numbers of civilians killed in Afghanistan
are not something new. Indeed, tensions between the Karzai government and the
US government over civilian casualties allegedly caused by airstrikes have been a
long-standing problem. As I stated on another occasion:
Although the law ofarmed conflict clearly prohibits an intentional direct attack against
the civilian population as such, and indeed categorizes it as a war crime, "there can be
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no assurance attacks against combatants and other military objectives will not result in
civilian casualties in or near such military objectives." In the latter case, the civilian ca-
sualties are known as "collateral damage" and do not give rise to accountability of the
attacker. Nonetheless, as the sovereign government of Afghanistan, President Karzai
can order the complete cessation of airstrikes (he has done so on occasion), and as a
matter of international law, the United States and its allies are bound to comply—even
though such airstrikes are a crucially important factor in the battle against the Taliban,
and the Taliban regularly intermingle among the civilian population in order to use
them as human shields (itself a violation ofthe law ofarmed conflict) and then use ci-
vilian casualties as part of their war propaganda effort. In short, the Taliban has been
successfully engaging in so-called "lawfare," using false accusations of violations ofthe
jus in hello in order to win public opinion to their side. 14
Although the documents released by WikiLeaks apparently do not report the in-
tentional targeting of civilians by CIA personnel in either Afghanistan or Pakistan,
they do "suggest that the CIA has sharply increased its use of paramilitary units in
Afghanistan, and provide details of unintended killings of civilians by Task Force
373, a secret unit set up to kill or capture militant leaders." 15 Such unintended kill-
ings do not constitute war crimes but they greatly undermine the war effort and in-
crease the pressure on the Afghan government to prevent their recurrence, 16 as well
as provide material for the Taliban war propaganda effort.
The civilian status of the CIA drones also has legal significance. Rule 17 (a) of
the air and missile warfare manual, 17 which, while it has no official status, is the
product ofa team ofexperts on the law ofarmed conflict and has been well received
by governments, provides that only military aircraft are entitled to engage in armed
attacks. There is no question that CIA drones are not military aircraft. It is arguable
that rule 17 (a) ofthe manual reflects customary international law. Ifthis argument
is valid, the use ofCIA drones in an international armed conflict would be a viola-
tion of the customary law of armed conflict. 18
There is a serious issue, however, as to whether the CIA drones are being used in
an "international armed conflict," because of the ambiguity of the concept as ap-
plied to current circumstances. In his leading treatise on the law of international
armed conflict, Yoram Dinstein defines an international armed conflict as limited
to conflicts "raging between two or more sovereign States." 19 As Dinstein acknowl-
edges, however, "drawing a line of demarcation between inter-State and intra-
state armed conflicts is not as simple as it appears to be at a cursory glance." 20 He
points to Afghanistan in 2001 as an example. Prior to 2001 the Taliban regime
fought a long-standing civil war with the Northern Alliance, which clearly consti-
tuted solely an internal armed conflict. In 2001, however, the Taliban regime,
which because of its control over most of the territory of Afghanistan constituted
the de facto government of Afghanistan, "got itselfembroiled in an inter-State war
16
John F. Murphy
with an American-led Coalition as a result of providing shelter and support to the
Al-Qaeda terrorists who had launched the notorious attack against the US on
11 September of that year . . . ."21
Under current circumstances, however, the Taliban are no longer the de facto
government of Afghanistan. Rather, the Karzai government is both the de facto
and de jure government ofAfghanistan. For their part the Taliban are involved in
an insurgency against the Karzai government and use the FATA as a safe haven
from which their forces and Al-Qaeda forces launch cross-border attacks into Af-
ghanistan. Moreover, because ofthe deteriorating situation between the Taliban in
Pakistan and the Pakistan government, it is arguable that the Taliban in Pakistan
have launched an insurgency against the Pakistan government.
If this scenario has some plausibility, then some further comments by Dinstein
may be apposite:
A non-international armed conflict arising in State A may also have spillover horizon-
tal effects within a neighboring country (State B). ... In this scenario, insurgents
against the Government of State A find temporary shelter within State B and ignite an-
other "civil war," this time against the Government of State B. As long as the two gov-
ernments of States A and B (acting separately or in cooperation with each other) wage
hostilities against the insurgents, the two simultaneous conflicts—despite their cross-
border effect—remain non-international in character. But ifthe two Governments be-
come embroiled in combat against each other, the armed conflict changes its character
and becomes inter-State.22
One may plausibly argue that Afghanistan and Pakistan are currently in the
same position as States A and B in Dinstein's hypothetical. If so, it needs to be
noted further that, although there are tensions between the Pakistan and Karzai
governments, there is at present no armed combat between them. It well may be,
then, that the conflicts in both Afghanistan and Pakistan should be classified as
non-international in character.
If it is correct to classify both ofthese conflicts as non-international, the civil sta-
tus of CIA personnel or of CIA drones becomes irrelevant. This is because there is
no counterpart in the law of non-international armed conflicts to Article 43(2) of
Additional Protocol I. To the contrary, States often use their police and intelligence
services in the fight against rebels. As to the status of aircraft, rule 17 (a) of the air
and missile warfare manual's requirement that only military aircraft are entitled to
engage in armed attacks expressly does not apply to non-international armed
conflicts.
Parenthetically, it may be noted that in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,23 the US Supreme
Court rejected the assertion by the US government that since Al-Qaeda was not a
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State and had not accepted to be governed by the rules set forth in the Geneva Con-
ventions, its affiliates could not invoke their protections. Rather, the Court held
that the so-called "war on terror" was a non-international armed conflict, and
therefore that at a minimum Article 3, which is common to all the Geneva Conven-
tions, applies to the conflict with Al-Qaeda. The validity of this holding as a matter
of international law is debatable, however, since, as Dinstein has argued, "from the
vantage point of international law ... a non-international armed conflict cannot
possibly assume global dimensions."24 Michael Schmitt buttresses this conclusion
by noting that Common Article 3 itself defines the conflict to which it applies as
"not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties."25
Even the language Schmitt quotes from Common Article 3, however, has been
subject to different interpretations. On the one hand, it can be interpreted as refer-
ring only to "internal" armed conflicts, that is, civil wars or insurgencies. This ap-
pears to be the interpretation Schmitt favors. On the other hand, it can be
interpreted as referring more broadly to any armed conflict that is not between
States. This appears to be the interpretation that the US Supreme Court in Hamdan
favors. Under the latter approach the phrase means occurring in the territory of "at
least one of the High Contracting Parties."26
These arguments favoring conflicting interpretations of Common Article 3,
while interesting, need not be resolved for purposes of resolving the issue ofthe ef-
fect of the CIA's civilian status, because neither interpretation would support the
proposition that the "war on terror" is an international armed conflict. In this case,
then, the civilian status of the CIA is irrelevant for determining whether the CIA's
use of drones is compatible with international law.
As Schmitt has noted, however, the Supreme Court in Hamdan "neglected to
explain how it arrived at the determination that the 'war' with Al Qaeda qualified as
an 'armed conflict,' a term of art in the law ofwar"27 and the "condition precedent
for applicability of the law of war." 28 We now turn to this issue.
Is the United States Engaged in an Armed Conflict with Al-Qaeda or Any
Other Militant or Terrorist Group?
Neither the Geneva Conventions nor Additional Protocol I contains a definition of
an "armed conflict." In contrast, Additional Protocol II defines non-international
armed conflicts in such a way as to sharply limit the scope of the Protocol. 29 Para-
graph 1 of Article 1 of Additional Protocol II applies to all armed conflicts not cov-
ered by Additional Protocol I and
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which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces
and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible
command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry
out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.
Paragraph 2 ofAdditional Protocol II then provides that "[t]this Protocol shall not
apply to situations ofinternal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and
sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed
conflicts."
In the 1995 Tadic Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction,30 the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia addressed the preliminary issue ofthe
existence of an armed conflict in response to a contention by the defendant that
there had been no active hostilities in the area of the alleged crimes at the relevant
time:
[W]e find that an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force be-
tween States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and or-
ganized armed groups or between such groups within a State. International
humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends be-
yond the cessation ofhostilities until a general conclusion ofpeace is reached; or, in the
case ofinternal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that moment, interna-
tional humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory ofthe warring States
or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party,
whether or not actual combat takes place there. 31
The question whether the US conflict with Al-Qaeda qualifies as an armed con-
flict is not easily answered. The only time this conflict could have qualified as an in-
ternational armed conflict would have been when the United States invaded
Afghanistan in 2001 and then only to the extent that Al-Qaeda forces were inte-
grated into the Taliban forces, the de facto army of Afghanistan. At present, as
noted previously, both the Taliban and Al-Qaeda are fighting as insurgents in Af-
ghanistan, and it is arguable that the conflict there now is an internal armed con-
flict. The conflict in Afghanistan may even be within the scope of Additional
Protocol II because arguably the Taliban and Al-Qaeda exercise such control over
parts of southern Afghanistan as to enable them "to carry out sustained and con-
certed military operations." These operations, the argument would continue, con-
stitute "protracted" internal armed violence rather than just "isolated and
sporadic" armed violence.
Assuming arguendo the validity of these arguments, they do not pertain outside
of Afghanistan, and Al-Qaeda violence in other places would not seem to fall
within the scope of Additional Protocol II. It must be noted, however, that the
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United States is not a party to Additional Protocol II, and it is debatable whether
the Protocol's definition ofan internal armed conflict is part ofcustomary interna-
tional law. Alternatively, some commentators have argued that the law of armed
conflict, or international humanitarian law, is a "living" body of doctrine that aims
to protect people to the maximum extent possible and thus should be interpreted
in a way that fills gaps. They point to the Appeals Chamber decision in the Tadic
case to support the proposition that for purposes of Common Article 3, "armed
conflict" should be broadly interpreted to cover as many people as possible. 32
Even if the conflict between the United States and Al-Qaeda and other militant
or terrorist groups is not an "armed conflict" within the meaning of the law of
armed conflict, it does not necessarily follow that the drone attacks in Pakistan vio-
late international law. As discussed at some length in Professor Pedrozo's article,
the drone attacks in Pakistan are compatible with the United Nations Charter, spe-
cifically Article 2(4) and Article 51, as an exercise of the right of self-defense. 33 For
my purposes, I will comment on only one aspect ofthe debate over self-defense: Article
51's requirement that the use of armed force be in response to an armed attack.34
The proper interpretation and application ofArticle 51 have been the subject of
much debate. 35 One of the most hotly debated issues has been whether Article 51
simply preserves the right of self-defense as it existed under customary interna-
tional law prior to adoption of the Charter or places further limits on that right.
Prior to the adoption of the Charter, the test most cited by the commentators for
judging whether the use of force was justified as an act of self-defense was that of
US Secretary of State Daniel Webster in the Caroline case, i.e., whether the "neces-
sity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means,
and no moment for deliberation."36
The words "if an armed attack occurs" have raised the issue as to whether
Article 51 has limited the scope ofthe self-defense doctrine. Some have argued that
the words should be read narrowly so as to eliminate the possibility of anticipatory
self-defense that other commentators have argued is available under the Caroline
criteria. 37 There is no need to try to resolve this debate for present purposes, be-
cause there is no doubt that US and coalition forces have been subject to numerous
and continuous armed attacks by Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces based in the FATA
and that the use of armed force in the form of drones is necessary to try to prevent
the continuation of such attacks. Moreover, as President Obama has recognized,
the United States "cannot tolerate a safe-haven for terrorists whose location is
known, and whose intentions are clear,"38 because it is difficult, if not impossible,




In sum, then, it appears that the claim that the CIA use ofdrones in Afghanistan
and Pakistan is incompatible with international law is not well-founded. But
merely having the better legal case in this argument may constitute a pyrrhic vic-
tory if the use of drones results in Al-Qaeda and the Taliban gaining more popular
support in Afghanistan and Pakistan and increased recruits for their forces.
In his article Professor Pedrozo denies that the use of drones has resulted in
more popular support for Al-Qaeda and the Taliban or has in any way assisted Al-
Qaeda recruitment efforts. To support his contention, Pedrozo points out that the
arguments ofopponents are based on exaggerated civilian casualty figures and use-
fully notes the results of various independent studies indicating, inter alia, that
drone strikes have effectively impaired Al-Qaeda operations and have not aided Al-
Qaeda recruitment efforts.39
Although the results of these studies are encouraging, I am not entirely con-
vinced that they demonstrate the ineffectiveness of Al-Qaeda and Taliban propa-
ganda. For example, although they demonstrate that civilian casualty figures are
exaggerated, it is not clear that this message is effectively bought home to either the
Afghan or Pakistani government or, more important, the large coterie of young
Muslim men who are the primary target of Al-Qaeda and Taliban propaganda.
General Stanley A. McChrystal, who was in charge ofUS forces in Afghanistan
until he was removed by President Obama in June 2010 because of unacceptable
remarks made about the President's national security team to a journalist writing
for Rolling Stone magazine, responded to pressure from the Karzai government
and human rights advocates who claimed that US drone and other armed attacks
were resulting in unacceptable numbers of Afghan civilian deaths by issuing a di-
rective that placed significant restrictions on US troops attacking people suspected
ofbeing militants or destroying buildings used to harbor insurgents. Troops widely
complained that the restrictions exposed them to excess risk by limiting their right
to use force in self-defense. When General David H. Petraeus, who was appointed
to replace McChrystal, took over command ofAmerican and NATO forces on July
4, 2010, he was faced with a difficult choice. On the one hand, he was sensitive to
the need of his troops to protect themselves. On the other, the restrictions were re-
portedly popular with Afghan officials and human rights advocates who claimed
that the restrictions had led to a significant reduction in Afghan civilian deaths.40
At this writing Petraeus is reportedly ready to issue a new tactical directive that will
expand restrictions on artillery strikes and aerial bombardment but clarify that
troops have the right to self-defense. His goal will reportedly be to "persuade the
troops that the unpopular rules will pay off in trust won on the ground."41
On August 1, 2010, Petraeus distributed counterinsurgency guidelines to
troops. Reportedly, a large part of these guidelines, written by General Petraeus, is
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aimed at the information side of the war. For example, he writes, "Be first with the
truth. Beat the insurgents and malign actors to the headlines." "Avoid premature
declarations of success." "Strive to underpromise and overdeliver." When things
go wrong, he says, tell the truth: "Avoid spinning, and don't try to 'dress up' an ugly
situation. Acknowledge setbacks and failures, including civilian casualties, and
then state how we'll respond and what we've learned." "Live our values," he writes.
"This is what distinguishes us from our enemies."42
As was the case when he was in command of US and coalition forces in Iraq,
General Petraeus has long understood that there is no purely military solution to
the conflict in Afghanistan, and that success on the information side is crucial to a
political resolution. One hopes that this does not prove to be a mission impossible
in Afghanistan.43
Before turning away from drones to other examples of unmanned systems and
unmanned vehicles, it should be noted that on August 3, 2010, the American Civil
Liberties Union and the Center for Constitutional Rights filed a suit in a US district
court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against alleged improper US gov-
ernmental interference with the right of legal representation. 44 According to the
complaint, the plaintiffs were retained by Nasser Al-Aulaqi to provide legal repre-
sentation in connection with the government's reported decision to add his son,
US citizen Anwar Al-Aulaqi, to its list of suspected terrorists approved for targeted
killings. Regulations of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) make it illegal
for attorneys to provide legal services to any individual whose assets have been
blocked on the basis of his being a terrorist without a license from OFAC. In the
absence ofsuch a license it would be a criminal offense under OFAC regulations for
the plaintiffs to file a lawsuit on Anwar Al-Aulaqi's father's behalf seeking to pro-
tect the constitutional rights of his US citizen son.
On July 23, 2010, the plaintiffs submitted to OFAC an application to provide
"uncompensated legal representation to Nasser al-Aulaqi as representative of the
interests of his son, Anwar al-Aulaqi, who remains in hiding" in Yemen.45 OFAC
refused to grant the requested license. The plaintiffs contend, among other things,
that they have a First Amendment right to represent clients in litigation consistent
with their organizational missions.
Elsewhere in their complaint the plaintiffs make it clear that they wish to "repre-
sent Nasser al-Aulaqi in connection with the government's reported decision to
add his son to its list of suspected terrorists approved for targeted killings"46 and
plan to file a lawsuit to block the government's plan.
On August 30, 2010, the American Civil Liberties Union and the Center for
Constitutional Rights filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia on behalf of Nasser Al-Aulaqi, on his own behalf, and as "Next
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Friend" of his son Anwar Al-Aulaqi seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
against the US government.47 In particular, the plaintiff sought a declaration from
the court that the US Constitution and international law prohibit the government
from
carrying out targeted killings outside ofarmed conflict except as a last resort to protect
against concrete, specific and imminent threats ofdeath or serious physical injury; and
an injunction prohibiting the targeted killing of US citizen Anwar Al-Aulaqi outside
this narrow context. Plaintiff also sought an injunction requiring the government to
disclose the standards under which it determines whether US citizens can be targeted
for death.48
The American Civil Liberties Union and the Center for Constitutional Rights were
able to file this lawsuit on Mr. Al-Aulaqi' s behalf because the Treasury Depart-
ment, reversing its earlier position, granted them a license to do so. The lawsuit
challenging the Treasury's regulations is, at this writing, still pending.49
On December 7, 2010, the District Court for the District ofColumbia dismissed
Nasser Al-Aulaqi's suit in an eighty-three-page opinion on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. 50 The court ruled that the plaintiff did not have standing to bring the
suit and that the political question doctrine barred the court from considering the
merits of the plaintiffs suit.
Other Unmanned Systems/Unmanned Vehicles: The Rise of Robotics
Most, some would say too much, ofthe present focus on the changing character of
weapon systems has been on drones. It is arguable that drones are the tip ofthe ice-
berg and that in the not too distant future they will be replaced by new technologi-
cal marvels created by the rising science of robotics. Because of the exponential
growth of robots and their use in armed conflict, the line between science and sci-
ence fiction has become ever more blurred.
Although drones are unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, it is noteworthy that
they are controlled by human operators, many of them located in Nevada—or at
least normally they are controlled. As noted previously, one of the documents re-
leased by WikiLeaks reported that communications were lost with a Reaper drone,
armed with Hellfire missiles and 500-pound bombs, in Afghanistan and it was nec-
essary to order an F-15 fighter aircraft to shoot it down to prevent it from crossing
into Tajikistan. 51 There are other examples of military technology running amok.
For example, in his groundbreaking book, Wiredfor War, P.W. Singer describes
the following incident:
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Just before nine in the morning on October 12, 2007, the 10th Anti-Aircraft Regiment
began its role in the South African military's annual Seboka training exercise. The op-
eration involved some five-thousand troops from seventeen other units, so the pres-
sure was on to get everything right. But the unit's automated MK5 antiaircraft system,
sporting two 35 mm cannons linked up to a computer, appeared to jam. As a follow-up
report recounts, this apparently "caused a 'runaway.'" The description of what hap-
pened next is chilling. "There was nowhere to hide. The rogue gun began firing wildly,
spraying high-explosive shells at a rate of 550 a minute, swinging around through 360
degrees like a high-pressure hose."
The young female officer in charge rushed forward to try to shut down the robotic gun,
but, continues the report, "she couldn't, because the computer gremlin had taken
over." The automated gun shot her and she collapsed to the ground. The gun's auto-
loading magazines held five hundred high-explosive rounds. By the time they were
emptied, nine soldiers were dead (including the officer) and fourteen seriously injured,
all because of what was later called a "software glitch."52
As Singer's tour de force makes clear, robots are now operating in the air, on
land, and in and under the sea. An early, and crucially important, use of robots on
land was as part of an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team that was responsi-
ble for disarming and disposing of IEDs. The robots involved in this exercise are
called PackBots. They have proven to be very efficient at their jobs, and as a team's
commander quoted by Singer reportedly put it, "when a robot dies, you don't have
to write a letter to his mother." 53
The use of robots has increased exponentially. For example, in Iraq in 2003,
when the US and coalition forces invaded, there were no robotic units on the
ground. By the end of 2005, they numbered 2,400, and by 2008, they were esti-
mated to reach 1 2,000. 54 Initially, they were used for non-killing purposes, such as
disabling or destroying IEDs or for surveillance, but increasingly, like the aerial
drones, they have been used to kill enemies and destroy enemy property.
For example, the TALON is a robot used in Iraq as part of an EOD team. But its
manufacturer, Foster-Miller Inc., remodeled the TALON into a "killer app," the
Special Weapons Observation Reconnaissance Detection System, or SWORDS.
The new design allows soldiers to mount various weapons on the robot, including
"an M- 16 rifle, a machine gun, and a grenade or rocket launcher." Another example
is the MARCBOT (Multi-Function Agile Remote-Controlled Robot). According
to Singer:
One of the smallest but most commonly used robots in Iraq, the MARCBOT looks like
a toy truck with a video camera mounted on a tiny, antenna-like mast. Costing only
$5,000, this miniscule bot is used to scout for enemies and to search under cars for
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hidden explosives. The MARCBOT isn't just notable for its small size; it was the first
ground robot to draw blood in Iraq. One unit of U.S. soldiers jury-rigged their
MARCBOTs to carry Claymore anti-personnel mines. Ifthey thought an insurgent was
hiding in an alley, they would send a MARCBOT down first and, if they found some-
one waiting in ambush, take him out with the Claymore.55
As Singer makes exhaustively clear, there are numerous kinds of military robots in
use, including those with the capacity to kill, on land, in the air, and on or under the
sea.
56
It is clear, moreover, that their numbers will continue to increase. As Singer
notes,
[a]t a congressional hearing on February 8, 2000, it finally all came together for military
robotics on the "demand" side. Senator John Warner from Virginia, the powerful
chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, laid down a gauntlet, mandating
into the Pentagon's budget that by 2010, one-third of all the aircraft designed to attack
behind enemy lines be unmanned, and that by 2015, one-third of all ground combat
vehicles be driverless.57
After the Al-Qaeda terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, according to Singer, one
robotics executive was told by his Pentagon buyers that his company should "make
'em [robots] as fast as you can."58
For purposes of legal analysis of the legal issues these robots currently or might
in the future raise, Darren Stewart has usefully broken them down into two catego-
ries: automated and autonomous. 59 "Automated" has been defined thus: "[a] soci-
ety is automated when its production is dominated by machines to the extent that
machines are given priority over men in the performance ofhuman tasks."60 This
clearly is the situation envisaged by Senator Warner's mandate to the Pentagon of
2000. "Autonomous" is defined as "self-governing, independent."61
The crucial difference between the two categories of robots would seem to be
that the automated robots are, at least theoretically, fully under the control of a hu-
man being, or to use the military term, there is a "human in the loop." By contrast,
autonomous robots are independent of human control and, some would argue,
because of artificial intelligence have become more intelligent, more capable than
humans and, as a result, are better positioned to make crucial life-and-death deci-
sions in war.62
The problem, as noted by Stewart, is that at present there are no autonomous
weapon systems in use, with the exception ofone South Korean system used in the
demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas.63 Hence, only the automated robots
currently raise issues of the legality of their use. For their part, possible legal issues
involving the use ofautonomous robots are currently a matter ofpure speculation.
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By definition, automated robots have a human in the loop who has the ultimate
responsibility for what the automated robot does. The human in the loop would
therefore have the responsibility to ensure that in selecting its targets a military kill-
ing robot adhered to the principles of the law ofarmed conflict, including military
necessity, proportionality and distinction, and would suffer the consequences of a
failure on the part of the robot to do so. It is important to note decisions to shoot
cannot be delegated to a computer.
Perhaps the most tragic example of a failure to rely on human judgment, rather
than that of a computer, was the July 3, 1988 incident involving a patrol mission of
the USS Vincennes in the Persian Gulf. On that day the radar system of the
Vincennes, called Aegis, spotted Iran Air Flight 655, an Airbus passenger jet, flying
on a consistent course and speed and broadcasting a radar and radio signal that
showed it to be a civilian aircraft. The automated radar system of the Vincennes,
however, had been designed for use against attacking Soviet bombers in the open
ocean of the North Atlantic, not for dealing with skies crowded with civilian air-
craft like those over the Gulf. The computer system assigned the plane an icon that
on the screen made it appear to be an Iranian F-14 fighter. Singer recounts the
tragic denouement of this incident:
Though the hard data were telling the human crew that the plane wasn't a fighter jet,
they trusted the computer more. Aegis was in semi-automatic mode, giving it the least
amount of autonomy, but not one of the 18 sailors and officers in the command crew
challenged the computer's wisdom. They authorized it to fire. (That they even had the
authority to do so without seeking permission from more senior officers in the fleet, as
their counterparts on any other ship would have had to do, was itself a product of the
fact that the Navy had greater confidence in Aegis than in a human-crewed ship with-
out it.) Only after the fact did the crew members realize that they had accidentally shot
down an airliner, killing all 290 passengers and crew, including 66 children.64
As Yoram Dinstein notes, civilian airliners carrying civilian passengers are "sin-
gled out for special protection."65 He cites the Vincennes incident, however, as an
example of the reality that "the speed of modern electronics often creates grave
problems oferroneous identification."66 Singer adds, quoting retired Army colonel
Thomas Adams, that the coming weapons "will be too fast, too small, too numer-
ous, and will create an environment too complex for humans to direct."67
Ifthe "coming weapons" will be too complex for humans to direct, someone, or,
more precisely perhaps, something, will have to take over the job. Here we enter
into the murky world of artificial intelligence, or AI. And here also we move from
automated robotics to autonomous robotics.
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It is, however, debatable, to say the least, whether artificial intelligence will ever
progress to the point where robots will be in a position to apply, on their own, such
vital principles ofarmed conflict as military necessity, proportionality and distinc-
tion. The argument against artificial intelligence ever progressing to this point is
based, at least in part, on the reality that robots lack the moral sense that humans
possess, the capacity to make an empathic response, and in general the ability to
draw on their humanity.
In his book, Singer quotes a senior military analyst at Human Rights Watch, a
leading human rights non-governmental organization, to illustrate the problems
that would be caused by the complete absence of a human element in the targeted
killing environment:
"You can't just download international law into a computer. The situations are com-
plicated; it goes beyond black-and-white decisions." He explains how figuring out le-
gitimate military targets is getting more difficult in war, especially as conflict actors
increasingly fight in the midst of civilian areas like cities and even use civilians for
cover. Citing examples he dealt with in his own career, he asks, if a tank is parked inside
a schoolyard, is it legitimate to strike? How about if it is driving out ofthe village and a
group of children catch a ride on top?68
There is also the tricky issue of accountability for war crimes. As Dinstein notes
in his treatise, "War crimes, like all other international crimes, have two constitu-
ent elements: (a) the criminal act {acteus reus) and (b) a criminal intent or at least a
criminal consciousness (mens red).'"69 But a robot has no capacity for either a crim-
inal intent or a criminal consciousness. Moreover, as a practical matter, it would
make no sense to apply criminal penalties to robots. Accordingly, even if the day
may come when it will be possible to have fully autonomous robots, it will still be
necessary to have a human in the loop, at least in a position ofcommand responsi-
bility. In other words, the robots would not be totally autonomous but subject to
the commands of a human commander. As Dinstein has instructed:
A commander bears criminal responsibility not only for orders that he issues to his
subordinates to commit war crimes. He is answerable for his acts of omission as much
as for his acts ofcommission. These acts ofomission relate to failure ofproper supervi-
sion and control by a commander, designed to ensure that his subordinates do not per-
petrate war crimes on their own initiative. Of course, the same commander may be
individually accountable twice: once for having given orders to his subordinates to
commit certain war crimes, and additionally for knowingly allowing them to commit
other war crimes which go beyond those orders.70
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To be sure, a commander would not be responsible for a robot deciding on its
own to commit a violation of the law ofarmed conflict, unless he or she was aware
that such violations were taking place and was in a position to take steps to exercise
the necessary effective command and control to prevent or at least bring to a halt
such violations. If the robot's actions were caused by a design defect, the remedy
might be a civil action in tort against the manufacturer of the robot or perhaps the
software engineer involved in the manufacturing process rather than a criminal
proceeding. 71
II. Challenges Posed by the Use ofForce in Cyberspace
One challenge posed by the use of force in cyberspace may be similar to a primary
issue arising out ofthe so-called war on terror: what is the appropriate legal regime
to apply, criminal law and procedure or the law of armed conflict?72 In an essay,
"Computer Network Attacks by Terrorists: Some Legal Dimensions," published in
2002, 1 suggested that "the applicable legal regime becomes international criminal
law rather than provisions of the UN Charter governing the use of force and the
maintenance of international peace and security." 73 My conclusion at that time,
however, was premised on the assumption that the use of force in cyberspace did
not involve State sponsorship of the terrorist attack or any other kind of State in-
volvement in the attack. Recent developments call into question the validity of this
assumption.
To be sure, another conclusion I reached in my 2002 essay remains true today:
the majority of computer network attacks "may cause disruption of vital systems
leading to widespread inconvenience, possibly to some degree of public alarm, but
... do not directly threaten life." 74 But recent computer network attacks have been
very disruptive indeed. For example, Google, the world's largest Internet search en-
gine, announced in January 2010 that it had been targeted by hackers in 2009, and
that the attacks resulted in breaches of its security infrastructure and theft of
Google's intellectual property and other data. 75 What made this attack especially
disturbing for the US government was that Google traced the attacks to hackers op-
erating out ofChina. 76 Many have insinuated that the Chinese government partici-
pated in the attacks, especially because the attacks included the hacking of e-mail
accounts belonging to Tibetan human rights activists and journalists,77 but there is
no conclusive evidence of the Chinese government's involvement in the attacks.
China is not the only traditional economic and military adversary of the United
States that has been linked to cyber attacks in recent years. Hackers located in Rus-
sia carried out an attack on several of Estonia's government websites in 2007,
prompting many to conclude that the Russian government was either formally or
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informally behind the attacks. 78 The attacks came in successive waves, first com-
promising the Estonian government sites, then infiltrating newspapers, television
stations, schools and banks within the country. 79 The Russian government denied
any involvement in the cyber disruptions, but the timing was very suspicious be-
cause the attacks occurred the same day that Estonia removed a Soviet-era war
monument from the center of its capital city, Tallinn, a controversial move that
was preceded by months of diplomatic tensions between the two countries and
caused protestors in Moscow to stage several protests. 80 The Russian government
was again implicated in computer attacks in 2008 when Georgia's Internet infra-
structure was barraged with "denial of service" attacks that crippled many of its
main governmental websites. 81 As the timing ofthe cyber attacks coincided exactly
with Russia's military incursion into Georgia, the Georgia government accused
Russia of carrying out the cyber attacks in coordination with its physical military
operations.82
In addition to US businesses, vital US national defense agencies have been at-
tacked in recent years.83 For example, the Department ofDefense was the target of
computer network attacks in 1998, 2003 and 2007, when classified information
was stolen.84 The perpetrators of these attacks were deemed "unknown foreign in-
truders," but many commentators suggested the presence of Chinese or Russian
footprints, especially since these types of attacks on US national defense systems
are thought to be possible only through foreign State participation. 85
It is, however, difficult to respond to cyber attacks when it is uncertain who or
what has engaged in the attack. Hence, the current emphasis appears to be on bol-
stering US cyber security and protecting US infrastructure from intrusions from
criminal hackers, State actors and terrorists. For example, President Barack
Obama is continuing to implement the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity
Initiative that was created by the George W. Bush administration. 86 This program
is intended to unify the efforts of various government agencies to protect
commercial and governmental cyber security, and increase our preparedness for
potential attacks. Goals for this initiative include building an international frame-
work to address computer network attacks and the creation of an identity man-
agement strategy that would balance the privacy and security interests of
individual Internet users.
Despite these efforts, current evidence indicates that the United States is not up
to the task of preventing or mitigating the damage of a large-scale computer net-
work attack. In early 2010 the Pentagon conducted a simulated computer attack
aimed at paralyzing the country's power grids, communications systems and fi-
nancial networks to see how the government might respond; the results were not
encouraging. 87 According to military officers who participated in the simulation,
29
Mission Impossible? International Law and the Changing Character ofWar
the "enemy had all the advantages: stealth, anonymity and unpredictability."88 No
one could pinpoint which country the attack originated from, thus eliminating the
possibility of any retaliatory action, and the legal authorization to respond to the
attack was unclear because no one could determine "if the attack was an act ofvan-
dalism, an attempt at commercial theft, or a State-sponsored effort to cripple the
United States, perhaps as a prelude to a conventional war."89
If, and this is a big if, it proves possible to prove that the cyber attack was State-
sponsored, the issue ofwhether it constituted an "armed attack" within the mean-
ing of Article 51 of the UN Charter may arise and, even if it amounts to an armed
attack, the kind of response that would meet the criteria of necessity and propor-
tionality could be difficult to determine. Presumably, if the attack resulted in
bringing down power stations, refineries, banks and air traffic control systems with
resultant loss of life and property, this would constitute an armed attack, but ab-
sent such destructive effect, the case is less clear. In his article in this volume, Mi-
chael Schmitt has pointed out that in the cyber attack on Georgia there was no loss
of life or property.90
As the Economist has recently noted, "there are few, if any, rules in cyberspace of
the kind that govern behavior, even warfare, in other domains."91 To remedy this
lacuna, the Economist suggests that States start talking about arms control on the
Internet. Talks have already begun, but it is not clear how successful they will be. In
another forum I have tried to identify some of the dimensions of the problem:
In the introduction to this study, it is suggested that the rapidity of change in modern
life creates great instability and even chaos in some situations. The rapidity ofchange is
particularly pronounced in the technological and scientific arenas whose considerable
complexity makes it difficult for the slow-moving treaty process to adapt. A recent ex-
ample of this problem is the dispute between the United States and Russia over how to
counter cyberwar attacks that could wreak havoc on computer systems and the
Internet. Russia favors an international treaty along the lines of those negotiated for
chemical weapons and has pushed hard for that approach. The United States, however,
argues that a treaty is unnecessary and instead advocates improved cooperation among
international law enforcement groups. In the U.S. view, if these groups cooperate to
make cyberspace more secure against criminal intrusions, this will also make
cyberspace more secure against military campaigns. Trying to reach common ground
over an approach is complicated, given that a significant proportion of the attacks
against American targets are coming from China and Russia. Also, Russian calls for
broader international oversight of the Internet have met strong U.S. resistance to
agreements that would allow governments to censor the Internet because they would
provide cover for totalitarian regimes. The United States argues further that a treaty
would be ineffective because it can be impossible to determine if an Internet attack
originated from a government, a hacker loyal to that government, or a rogue acting
independently. The unique challenge of cyberspace is that governments can carry out
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deceptive attacks to which they cannot be linked. After computer attacks in Estonia in
April 2007 and in the nation of Georgia in August 2008, the Russian government de-
nied involvement and independent observers said the attacks could have been carried
out by nationalist sympathizers or by criminal gangs. Although the United States and
Russia have failed to reach agreement on the proper approach to counter cyberwar at-
tacks, arms control experts say that major governments are reaching a point ofno re-
turn in heading off a cyberwar arms race.92
The United States and Russia have been talking about the possibility of entering
into a bilateral agreement. Even ifthey are able to overcome the obstacles to reach-
ing agreement between them, it is highly unlikely it would prove possible to con-
clude a global agreement. This is because since the early 1990s it has proven almost
impossible to get agreement among the now almost two hundred member States of
the world community on global treaties to deal with the severest problems facing
humanity, such as climate change, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, pandemics,
trade protectionism and many more.93 Perhaps reflecting an awareness of this dif-
ficulty, the Economist has suggested "more modest accords, or even just informal
'rules of the road' that would raise the political cost of cyber-attacks." Examples
might include
a deal to prevent the crude "denial-of-service" assaults that brought down Estonian
and Georgian websites with a mass ofbogus requests for information; NATO and the
European Union could make it clear that attacks in cyberspace, as in the real world, will
provoke a response; the UN or signatories of the Geneva Conventions could declare
that cyber-attacks on civilian facilities are, like physical attacks with bomb and bullet,
out ofbounds in war 94
Whether these or other more "modest" steps would be effective or lead to formal,
"legal" arrangements to establish an arms control regime for cyberspace is
debatable.
Moreover, it is important to recognize that although terrorist groups such as
Al-Qaeda are not thought to possess enough technological capability at present
(without State support) to carry out a major cyber attack that would result in loss
of life and property, it is envisioned that within the next decade they could pose
such a threat.95 Al-Qaeda and its ilk, of course, will not recognize the legitimacy of
either modest, informal or formal legal arrangements to establish an arms control
regime for cyberspace. They also will enjoy certain advantages because of the
asymmetric nature of armed conflict in cyberspace. They will be able to launch a
cyber attack from any place they may be located while disguising their location
through various computer moves. Applying the principles of military necessity,
proportionality and distinction against terrorist cyber attacks will be especially
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challenging since the terrorists may be even more heavily embedded in the civilian
population than usual when launching attacks. William J. Lynn III, US Deputy
Secretary of Defense, recently pointed out some of the advantages enemies of the
United States enjoy in asymmetric cyber warfare:
The low cost ofcomputing devices means that U.S. adversaries do not have to build ex-
pensive weapons, such as stealth fighters or aircraft carriers, to pose a significant threat
to U.S. military capabilities. A dozen determined computer programmers can, if they
find a vulnerability to exploit, threaten the United States' global logistics network, steal
its operational plans, blind its intelligence capabilities, or hinder its ability to deliver
weapons on target. Knowing this, many militaries are developing offensive capabilities
in cyberspace, and more than 100 foreign intelligence organizations are trying to break
into U.S. networks. Some governments already have the capacity to disrupt elements of
the U.S. information infrastructure.
In cyberspace, the offense has the upper hand. The Internet was designed to be collabo-
rative and rapidly expandable and to have low barriers to technological innovation;
security and identity management were lower priorities. For these structural reasons,
the U.S. government's ability to defend its networks always lags behind its adversaries'
ability to exploit U.S. networks' weaknesses. Adept programmers will find vulnerabili-
ties and overcome security measures put in place to prevent intrusions. In an offense-
dominant environment, a fortress mentality will not work. The United States cannot
retreat behind a Maginot Line of firewalls or it will risk being overrun. Cyberwarfare is
like maneuver warfare, in that speed and agility matter most. To stay ahead of its pur-
suers, the United States must constantly adjust and improve its defenses.96
Later in his essay Lynn notes that it will be necessary to adopt a new approach to
deterrence, expresses doubts about the feasibility oftraditional arms control regimes,
and suggests the need for a new approach to international behavior in qi^erspace:
Given these circumstances, deterrence will necessarily be based more on denying any
benefit to attackers than on imposing costs through retaliation. The challenge is to
make the defenses effective enough to deny an adversary the benefit ofan attack despite
the strength of offensive tools in cyberspace. (Traditional arms regimes wrould likely
fail to deter cyberattacks because of the challenges of attribution, which make verifica-
tion of compliance almost impossible. If there are to be international norms of behav-
ior in cyberspace, they may have to follow a different model, such as that of public
health or law enforcement.)97
In short the legal and technological challenges the United States faces in re-
sponding effectively to the asymmetric nature of cyber warfare are daunting, and
success is not assured. Meeting these challenges is especially difficult when US
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forces are forced to adopt a purely defensive posture. In traditional armed conflict,
it is the offensive power of the US military that affords it such a marked advantage.
As the various panels at the conference demonstrated, however, in asymmetric
warfare the United States, more often than not, finds itself on the defensive. The
next, and concluding, section ofthis article considers a few more dimensions ofthe
asymmetry problem and the impact they have on the chances ofUS forces succeed-
ing in their mission.
III. The Multifaceted Nature ofAsymmetric Warfare
As Professor WolffHeintschel von Heinegg points out,98 one of a number ofpossi-
ble definitions ofasymmetric warfare is that it is warfare where one ofthe parties to
the armed conflict tries to compensate for its perceived disadvantages vis-a-vis the
other party or parties by adopting methods and strategies that are clear violations
of the law of armed conflict, e.g., perfidy, suicide bombings and the use ofhuman
shields, especially civilians. What is particularly disturbing about asymmetric war-
fare is that violators of the law ofarmed conflict gain considerable military advan-
tage in many instances by the adoption of such tactics because they can be
extremely effective in countering the normally vastly superior military capabilities
of the other party.
Both in Iraq and in Afghanistan the enemy consists of insurgents who embed
themselves into the civilian populations, a clear violation of the law of armed con-
flict. In Iraq a standard tactic ofthe insurgents was to use children as human shields
in firefights with US and coalition forces. In Afghanistan, as noted earlier in this ar-
ticle, there have been sharp factual disputes between NATO and local residents
over whetherNATO air raids have resulted in civilian deaths, as alleged by the local
residents, or, as contended by NATO, in the deaths of insurgents who had opened
fire on NATO forces before they were killed." Regardless ofwhich side is correct in
this debate, the result has been a substantial reduction in the number of airstrikes.
General Charles Dunlap, a retired US Air Force judge advocate, regards the de-
cision in Afghanistan to sharply reduce the number of airstrikes as a serious mis-
take. He contends that "it is often overlooked that during the surge [in Iraq],
thousands of insurgents were captured or killed by American special operation
forces and airstrikes. I do believe, firmly, that the much-derided killing and captur-
ing actually was the key to success." 100 In support ofhis argument Dunlap adds that
during the Iraq surge, airstrikes increased to five times previous levels.
US military officers in Afghanistan counter these arguments by claiming that
special operations raids in 2010 resulted in the deaths of hundreds of militant
leaders, while the restrictions on airpower saved Afghan lives and improved
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relations with the government. Others argue that the Iraqis themselves were re-
sponsible for the reduction of violence: Sunni insurgents who turned against Al-
Qaeda, and Shiite militias who embraced a ceasefire with the Sunni. 101 For his
part, James Dubik, a retired lieutenant general who oversaw the training of the
Iraqi military during the surge, reportedly stated: "The decisiveness of the surge
came from an aggregate of factors—more like a thunderstorm than a single cause
and effect." 102 He believes that General Petraeus will look for the same aggregate
effect in Afghanistan.
In both Iraq and Afghanistan, however, as well as more generally in the world-
wide conflict (no longer "war") with Al-Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups, the
struggle for "hearts and minds" or, if one prefers, the "propaganda war" is of cru-
cial importance. And as indicated earlier in this article, it appears that the enemy
has been able to counter the advantages that the United States and its allies would
normally enjoy. Perhaps the most recent example of this is the apparent impact of
the current debate in the United States over whether a mosque should be permit-
ted to be built in the vicinity of where the Twin Towers were destroyed on 9/1 1.
Some exceedingly inflammatory negative remarks about Islam made by some op-
ponents of building the mosque in that vicinity have reportedly resulted in signifi-
cant increases in the number of recruits for Al-Qaeda. The First Amendment
protects such remarks, but unwittingly they constitute grist for Al-Qaeda's propa-
ganda mill.
At this writing, the papers are full of still another dispute between NATO and
Afghan officials over the results of a NATO airstrike. 103 According to Afghan offi-
cials, the airstrike hit the election convoy of an Afghan parliamentary candidate,
wounding him and killing as many as ten campaign aides. But the NATO version is
that the strike killed a senior militant leader. US Secretary ofDefense Robert Gates,
who was visiting Afghanistan at the time, reportedly stated that the airstrike tar-
geted and killed a "very senior official" from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan,
or IMU, a militant group the United States has designated as a terrorist organiza-
tion. 104 NATO officials said that the airstrike killed and injured up to twelve insur-
gents after NATO forces identified several armed men in a sedan that was part of a
six-car convoy. Only the sedan was hit, they said.
There seems to be no current mechanism in Afghanistan for resolving these dis-
putes over the results of NATO airstrikes. But there also seems to be little doubt
that, regardless of their veracity, frequent reports of attacks resulting in civilian
casualties are undermining the counterinsurgency effort, which is aimed at pro-
tecting the population and shoring up support for the Afghan government.
Two other factors loom large when one is considering the problem of civilian
deaths arising from the armed conflict in Afghanistan. The first, as noted before, is
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the difficulty in distinguishing between combatants and civilians in asymmetric
warfare. The second, it is important to note, is that the United Nations has re-
ported that 70 percent of civilians who die in violence in Afghanistan are killed by
insurgents. 105
Yet it is always the United States and NATO who are on the defensive when
claims of civilian casualties are raised. In his concluding remarks at the conference,
Yoram Dinstein deplored this constantly defensive posture. As he pointed out, the
enemy has successfully engaged in lawfare, the use and abuse of legal argument, to
leave the impression that the law of armed conflict demands there be no civilian
casualties. It does not, of course, and this reality should be aggressively brought
home to the people ofAfghanistan and elsewhere. It should also be brought home
to them that the enemy constantly engages in lawless behavior and, as pointed out
by the United Nations, consistently kills its own civilians in armed conflict.
Dinstein's call for the United States and its allies to abandon their defensive posture
and take the offense to demonstrate, stressing their own efforts to comply with the
law of armed conflict, the lawlessness and brutality of Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and
their ilk is compelling. 106
The enemies in both Iraq and Afghanistan are insurgents, and the United States
and its allies are involved in counterinsurgency in both countries. General Petraeus
was in charge ofthe counterinsurgency in Iraq and has now assumed a similar role
in Afghanistan. He was, moreover, the primary architect of the 2006 U.S. Army/
Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 107 The Manual, regarded as the
"bible" of counterinsurgency, raises the crucial issue of the time required for a
well-run counterinsurgency strategy to work. Sara Sewall, a former Pentagon offi-
cial who wrote the introduction to the University ofChicago edition ofthe manual,
for one is skeptical that the US public will be willing to "supply greater concentra-
tions of forces, accept higher casualties, fund serious nation-building and stay
many long years to conduct counterinsurgency by the book." 108 In light of current
developments, with the withdrawal of all US combat troops from Iraq—amid indi-
cations that the Iraqi army and police may not be able to provide adequate security
on their own 109—and a plan to start withdrawing combat troops from Afghanistan
in the summer of 201 1, Sewall's skepticism would appear well justified.
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Cyber Attacks as "Force" under UN Charter
Article 2(4)
Matthew C. Waxman*
In a 2010 article in Foreign Affairs, Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn
revealed that in 2008 the Department ofDefense suffered "the most significant
breach ofU.S. military computers ever" when a flash drive inserted into a US mili-
tary laptop surreptitiously introduced malicious software into US Central Com-
mand's classified and unclassified computer systems. 1 Lynn explains that the US
government is developing defensive systems to protect military and civilian
electronic infrastructure from intrusions and, potentially worse, disruptions and
destruction, and it is developing its own cyber-strategy "to defend the United
States in the digital age."2
To what extent is existing international law, including the UN Charter, ade-
quate to regulate cyber attacks and related offensive and defensive activities today
and in the future? By "cyber attacks" I mean efforts to alter, disrupt, degrade or de-
stroy computer systems or networks or the information or programs on them. 3
This article examines one slice of that legal puzzle: the UN Charter's prohibi-
tions ofthe threat or use of "force" contained in Article 2(4).4 Other writings in this
volume deal with questions such as Article 51's self-defense provisions and ques-
tions of State responsibility, and there are other international legal prohibitions
and regulations that are relevant as well. But Article 2(4) is a good place to start
* Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
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because it establishes or reflects foundational principles upon which most interna-
tional law regulating international security sits. As a general matter, military at-
tacks are prohibited by Article 2(4) except in self-defense or when authorized by
the UN Security Council. Also as a general matter, most economic and diplomatic
assaults or pressure, even if they exact tremendous costs on a target State, are not
barred in the same way. Where along the spectrum in between might cyber attacks
—
which have some attributes of military attacks and some attributes of non-military
pressure—lie?
Almost a decade ago, in a previous volume of this series, Professor Yoram
Dinstein observed of cyber attacks: "The novelty of a weapon—any weapon
always baffles statesmen and lawyers, many ofwhom are perplexed by technologi-
cal innovation [A]fter a period ofgestation, it usually dawns on belligerent par-
ties that there is no insuperable difficulty in applying the general principles of
international law to the novel weapon
" 5 This article takes up that claim in ex-
amining how US officials, scholars and policy experts have sought to adapt the UN
Charter's basic principles.
This analysis yields two descriptive insights. First, it shows that American think-
ing (both inside and outside the government) inclines toward reading prohibited
"force" broadly enough to include some hostile actions that might be carried out
with bits of data in cyberspace. Although not necessarily inconsistent with inter-
pretations previously dominating American thinking, this recent inclination re-
flects a shift away from the stricter readings of Article 2(4) and related principles
that the United States government defended in the past when it was often the
United States and its allies resisting efforts by some other States to read "force"
broadly or flexibly.
Second, any legal line drawing with respect to force and modes of conflict has
distributive effects on power, and it is therefore likely to be shaped by power rela-
tions. Because States have different strategic cyber-capabilities and different vul-
nerabilities to those capabilities, it will be difficult to reach international consensus
with regard to the UN Charter's application to this problem.
Article 2(4) and the Meaning of "Force"
Modern legal regulation of force and conflict begins with the UN Charter, and
specifically Article 2(4), which mandates that "[a] 11 Members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsis-
tent with the Purposes of the United Nations."6 Article 51 then provides that
'[n]othing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
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collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations." 7 Although significant debate exists about the scope of self-defensive
rights to resort to military force, it is generally agreed that the use of military force
authorized under Article 51 is not prohibited under Article 2(4). 8
With respect to offensive cyber-capabilities and the UN Charter, then, these
provisions raise several major questions: In terms of Article 2(4), might a cyber
attack constitute a prohibited "use offorce"? If so, might a cyber attack give rise to a
right to use military force in self-defensive response pursuant to the rights reserved
in Article 51?9 The latter question is taken up in more detail in another article in
this volume, but because the two provisions operate in tandem it is important to
bear in mind self-defense remedies here as well.
Global interconnectedness brought about through information technology
gives States and non-State actors a powerful potential weapon. Military defense
networks can be remotely disabled or degraded. Flooding an Internet site, server or
router with data requests to overwhelm its capacity to function—so-called "denial
of service" attacks—can be used to take down major information networks, as
demonstrated by an attack on Estonia (a country especially reliant on Internet
communications) during 2007 diplomatic tensions with Russia. 10 Private-sector
networks can be infiltrated, damaged or destroyed. 11
Some experts speculate that the United States is at particularly heightened risk
because of its tremendous economic and military dependency on networked infor-
mation technology. 12 As the Obama administration's 2010 National Security Strat-
egy acknowledged,
[t]he very technologies that empower us to lead and create also empower those who
would disrupt and destroy. They enable our military superiority, and . . . [o]ur daily
lives and public safety depend on power and electric grids, but potential adversaries
could use cyber vulnerabilities to disrupt them on a massive scale. 13
Such possibility that massive harm could be perpetrated in cyberspace, rather than
physical space, raises questions whether the UN Charter's foundational prohibi-
tions and authorities—which were drafted with conventional warfare in mind
—
apply or should apply to such conduct.
The dominant view in the United States and among its allies has long been that
Article 2(4)'s prohibition of force and the complementary Article 51 right of self-
defense apply to military attacks or armed violence. 14 The plain meaning of the text
supports this view, as do other structural aspects of the UN Charter. For example,
Articles 41 and 42 authorize, respectively, the Security Council to take actions not
involving armed force and, only should those measures be inadequate, to escalate
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to armed force. There are textual counterarguments, such as that Article 5 l's more
specific limit to "armed attacks" suggests that drafters envisioned prohibited
"force" as a broader category not limited to particular methods, but the discussions
of means throughout the document suggests an intention to regulate armed force
more strictly than other instruments of power, and this narrow interpretation has
generally prevailed.
An alternative view of Article 2(4) looks not at the instrument used but its pur-
pose and general effect: that it prohibits coercion. Kinetic military force is but one
instrument of coercion, and often the easiest to observe. At various times some
States—usually those of the developing world or, during the Cold War, the "Third
World"—have pushed the notion that "force" includes other forms of pressure,
such as political and economic coercion that threatens State autonomy. 15 During
the Charter's early years, debates similar to that over Article 2(4)'s definition of
"force" also played out in the UN General Assembly over how to define prohibited
"aggression." The United States and its Western allies pushed a narrow definition
of "aggression," focused on military attacks, while developing States advocated an
expansive definition to include other forms of coercion or economic pressure. 16 A
problem with the latter approach has always been the difficulty ofdrawing lines be-
tween unlawful coercion and lawful pressure, since coercion in a general sense is
ever-present in international affairs and a part of everyday inter-State relations. 17
A third possible approach toward interpreting Article 2(4) and related princi-
ples focuses on the violation and defense of rights; specifically, that it protects
States' rights to freedom from interference. Such an approach might tie the con-
cept of force to improper meddling or intrusion of the internal affairs of other
States, rather than a narrow set of means. Again, during the Charter's early years it
was often the Third World pushing this view, as expressed in UN General Assem-
bly resolutions. 18 Aside from the weak textual support for this approach, pragmatic
considerations precluded the much wider interpretation, though this approach
brings to mind possible analogies of cyber attacks to other covert efforts to under-
mine political or economic systems, such as propaganda efforts.
To whatever extent Article 2(4)'s meaning was settled and stable by the end of
the Cold War in favor of a narrow focus on military force, cyber warfare poses chal-
lenges and tests the Charter's bounds. Offensive cyber attack capabilities such as
taking down government or private computer systems share some similarities with
kinetic military force, economic coercion and subversion, yet also have unique
characteristics and are evolving rapidly. The possibility of cyber attacks therefore
raises difficult line-drawing questions and requires re-examination of previous US




The examples ofcompeting interpretations drawn from early legal debates over the
UN Charter are useful for two reasons. First, they help show that some fundamen-
tal issues involved in current discussions of cyber attacks are not entirely new or
unique to cyber-technology. Modes and technologies of conflict change, and the
law adjusts with varying degrees of success to deal with them. Second, they high-
light some subtle but important realignments ofUS legal-strategic interests.
The United States government has not articulated publicly a general position on
cyber attacks and Articles 2(4) and 51, though no doubt internally the US govern-
ment's actions are guided by extant legal determinations developed through inter-
agency deliberation. There is, in the meantime, considerable momentum among
American scholars and experts toward finding that some cyber attacks ought to fall
within Article 2(4) 's prohibition on "force" or could constitute an "armed attack,"
insofar as those terms should be interpreted to cover attacks with features and con-
sequences closely resembling conventional military attacks or kinetic force. The
National Research Council convened a committee to study cyber warfare. It con-
cluded that cyber attacks should be judged under the UN Charter and customary
jus ad helium principles by considering whether the effects of cyber attacks are tan-
tamount to a military attack. 19 Michael Schmitt, in a seminal article on the topic,
proposes that whether a cyber attack constitutes force depends on multiple factors
that characterize military attacks, including severity, immediacy, directness,
invasiveness, measurability and presumptive legitimacy.20 Other legal experts
have proposed similar tests emphasizing effects,21 and some policy experts have
come to similar conclusions in terms ofUS defensive doctrine against cyber attacks.
Richard Clarke, for example, proposes a doctrine of "cyber equivalency^ in which
cyber attacks are to be judged by their effects not their means. They would be
judged as if they were kinetic attacks, and may be responded to by kinetic attacks,
or other means."22
Statements by senior US government officials have either hinted that the United
States would regard some cyber attacks as prohibited force or declined to rule out
that possibility. In 1999, the Defense Department's Office of the General Counsel
produced an Assessment of International Legal Issues in Information Operations.
That report noted:
Ifwe focused on the means used, we might conclude that electronic signals impercepti-
ble to human senses don't closely resemble bombs, bullets or troops. On the other
hand, it seems likely that the international community will be more interested in the
consequences of a computer network attack than its mechanism.23
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It further suggested that cyber attacks could constitute armed attacks giving rise to
the right of military self-defense. 24
Recent statements by senior US government officials appear consistent with
that view. In a 2010 address, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared US inten-
tions to defend its cybersecurity in terms similar to those usually used to discuss
military security:
States, terrorists, and those who would act as their proxies must know that the United
States will protect our networks. . . . Countries or individuals that engage in cyber at-
tacks should face consequences and international condemnation. In an interconnected
world, an attack on one nation's networks can be an attack on all. 25
In testifying before the Senate committee considering his nomination to head
the new Pentagon Cyber Command, Lieutenant General Keith Alexander ex-
plained that "[t]here is no international consensus on a precise definition of a use
of force, in or out of cyberspace. Consequently, individual nations may assert dif-
ferent definitions, and may apply different thresholds for what constitutes a use of
force."26 He went on, however, to suggest that "[i]f the President determines a
cyber event does meet the threshold of a use of force/armed attack, he may deter-
mine that the activity is of such scope, duration, or intensity that it warrants exer-
cising our right to self-defense and/or the initiation of hostilities as an appropriate
response."27 Implicit here seems to be a notion that "force" is, to some extent,
about effects or consequences of hostile actions.
The United States government probably prefers an effects-based or consequences-
based interpretation of "force" or "armed attack" with respect to cyber attacks for
what it prohibits, as well as for what it does not prohibit. Under such an approach,
for example, computer-based espionage, intelligence collection or perhaps even
preemptive cyber-operations to disable hostile systems would not constitute prohib-
ited force, because they do not produce direct or indirect destructive consequences
analogous to a military attack. 28 As former National Security Agency Director
Michael Hayden recently remarked, "Without going into great detail, we're
actually pretty good at [cyber-espionage]."29 Hayden's comment helps illustrate
also a reason why it will be difficult for the United States government to develop
and articulate clear legal positions on what sorts of actions in cyberspace constitute
illicit force: because the key agencies have divergent policy priorities amid a rapidly
evolving strategic environment. Some agencies are charged with protecting the
integrity ofUS military capabilities; some are dedicated to intelligence collection, often
involving infiltration of foreign computer networks and information systems;
some prioritize protecting US civilian infrastructure, including the private sector's;
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and others are focused on transnational law enforcement and enhancing interna-
tional cooperation. These divergent policy priorities probably make it difficult to
agree on how broadly or narrowly to draw legal lines, whether to drive toward legal
clarity at all, and whether to engage publicly or diplomatically on these points.
Challenges ofRegulating Cyber-"Force"
Even ifArticle 2(4) is interpreted to prohibit some forms ofoffensive cyber attacks,
it would prove difficult to apply and enforce that prohibition. The difficulties of
regulating certain types of conflicts in earlier eras ofUN history help demonstrate
these challenges.
Lamenting in 1970 the "death" of Article 2(4), Professor Thomas Franck as-
sessed that rapid changes in the way conflict was waged had made its prohibitions
of force obsolete. Whereas "[t]he great wars of the past, up to the time of the San
Francisco Conference, were generally initiated by organized incursions of large
military formations of one state onto the territory of another, incursions usually
preceded by mobilization and massing oftroops and underscored by formal decla-
rations of war," Franck observed that "[mjodern warfare . . . has inconveniently
by-passed these Queensberry-like practices."30 Superpowers routinely supported
insurgencies, rebel movements and coups against States supporting the other
power with various forms of assistance, including arms. Small-scale wars and sub-
version and counter-subversion waged through local proxies became a common
mode ofsuperpower conflict, rather than direct, conventional military action. 31 The
UN Charter regime was ill equipped to handle conflict that unfolded in these ways.
Franck's concern was that modes of conflict had outstripped the UN Charter
regime's ability to impose costs on purported violators. Indeed, whatever costs
Article 2(4) imposed on conventional military attacks across borders may even have
pushed antagonists toward other modes of conflict. In another volume of this series
dedicated to what was often referred to as "low-intensity conflict," Alberto Coll
remarked in 1995 that "[t]he high political, military, and economic risks increas-
ingly associated through the course of the twentieth century with open, conven-
tional war have led many States and non-State entities to shift to other forms of
violence as instruments of foreign policy."32 Robert Turner agreed, noting that
"the low-intensity conflict scenario is selected because it provides a colorable claim
of legitimacy (being less obvious)."33
Questions for conflict in cyberspace then follow: Can Article 2(4)'s constraints
adjust to cyber-capabilities in ways that differentiate illicit conduct from legal, and
in ways that help impose costs for non-compliance? Can such interpretations com-
mand the respect of powerful actors in the international system?
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One reason why cyber attacks will be difficult to regulate is that the factual bases
for asserting a violation of 2(4)—or a right of armed self-defense under Article
51—will be subject to great uncertainty and difficult to verify. Some technologies
or modes of conflict pose special challenges for international legal regulation be-
cause their attributes match poorly with the enforcement mechanisms, which
sometimes include formal processes like UN Security Council review but more of-
ten involve decentralized assessment and evaluation by individual States, interna-
tional bodies and other influential international actors. 34
Those who study the problem of legally regulating cyber attacks usually point to
the tricky problem of attribution. That is, it will often be difficult to discern quickly
and accurately who launched or directed an attack. 35 The nature of electronic in-
formational infrastructure and the limits of forensic capabilities are such that it
may be impossible technically to link an attack to the party ultimately
responsible.36 As Deputy Secretary Lynn put it, "It is difficult and time consuming to
identify an attack's perpetrator. Whereas a missile comes with a return address, a
computer virus generally does not. The forensic work necessary to identify an at-
tacker may take months, if identification is possible at all."37
Again, though, this is not an entirely new problem for Article 2(4), because
similar attribution issues arose in the context of Cold War proxy warfare and
low-intensity conflict. "The small-scale and diffuse but significant and frequent
new wars of insurgency have," explained Franck in 1970, "made clear-cut distinc-
tions between aggression and self-defense, which are better adapted to conven-
tional military warfare, exceedingly difficult." 38 Furthermore, "[w]ith the hit-and-
run tactics ofwars of national liberation, on the other hand, it is often difficult even
to establish convincingly, from a pattern of isolated, gradually cumulative events,
when or where the first round began, let alone at whose instigation, or who won
it."
39 Unconventional warfare and support for insurgencies and counterinsurgen-
cies often by design featured inconclusive evidence of foreign involvement or hos-
tile action, and foreign State antagonists worked to mask, conceal or obscure their
participation.40 This legal-factual murkiness helps explain why Article 2(4) seemed
so impotent in addressing that form of conflict and why that mode of conflict
offered an appealing option to the Cold War antagonists: "The covert nature and
elusive instrumentalities of unconventional warfare make it difficult for societies
under attack to identify the source of the threat and to rally domestic and interna-
tional opinion."41 In other words, once conflict was waged through proxies, it was
difficult to develop international consensus about the relevant facts, let alone legal
violation or justification.
Like proxy conflicts of the Cold War, but to a much larger extent, cyber-conflict
is likely to feature ambiguous or disputed facts about what exactly occurred,
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including who committed the electronic intrusion or disruption, and on whose be-
half they were doing it.42 Consider again the case of Estonia, in which it took
months to compile still murky information about the source ofattacks on Estonian
computer networks, and many key facts—including ultimate responsibility for
directing or encouraging them—remain subject to debate.43 Evidence of Russian
involvement was mostly circumstantial and Russian officials denied involvement.44
There is also evidence suggesting that the Russian government may have encouraged
non-government "patriotic hackers" to conduct attacks, and that other countries, like
China, may be relying similarly on legions of quasi-private hackers.45
The factual haze that plagued efforts to regulate Cold War proxy conflicts will be
significantly exacerbated in the cyber-conflict context because ofthe greater ability
of participants to anonymize or mask their identities and because actions in cyber
warfare can be so decentralized and dispersed, and often conducted on private
infrastructure.46 Even if forensic processes can trace a cyber attack to its source,
States may be unable to publicize that information in a timely and convincing way,
especially when those States are likely to have strong incentive not to discuss the
technical details of informational security breaches or reveal their own capabilities
to intruders.47 These are among the reasons that the National Research Council
study concluded that "[wjhile in most conflicts, both sides claim that they are act-
ing in self-defense, cyberconflicts are a particularly messy domain in which to air
and judge such claims."48
Like unconventional conflicts of the Cold War but to an even greater degree,
cyber warfare may lack clearly discernable starting and end points or easily visible
or verifiable actions and countermoves. This does not mean that drawing legal
boundaries is impossible. It does suggest, however, that efforts to promote clear in-
ternational legal prohibitions, or the accretion of interpretive practice command-
ing broad consensus, will likely be especially protracted and uncertain.
Power Relations and Regulating Cyber Attacks
The early history of and debates about Article 2(4) also illustrate that competing
interpretations of the UN Charter have always reflected allocations of power.
Those with more power have greater ability to promote through State practice their
preferred interpretation. Moreover, efforts to revise the legal rules may have
redistributive effects on power, by affecting the costs and benefits of using certain
capabilities.
As described above, a fundamental dispute about Article 2(4) has from the be-
ginning concerned the prohibition's breadth: does Article 2(4) ban military vio-
lence only, or does it also ban other forms of coercion, including economic
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coercion? Although weak States of the developing world often argued that Article
2(4) prohibited a much broader category ofcoercion than just military force,49 that
position never took hold. The more restrictive interpretation generally confined to
military means and pushed by the United States largely prevailed.
This interpretation suited the United States well during most of the Charter's
history. The costs it placed on States of resorting first to conventional armed force
in a crisis were high, thereby generally helping to preserve territorial stability and
prevent escalation. Meanwhile, the United States could build its defenses beneath
the umbrella of nuclear deterrence, grow its economy and expand its influence, all
the while relatively free to wield its tremendous economic and diplomatic power
without the fear of reciprocal coercion. 50
Against that historical backdrop, a reason that the United States has an interest
in regulating cyber attacks but why it will probably be difficult to do so through in-
ternational law, whether interpreting existing treaties or custom or negotiating
new legal agreements, is because the distribution of emerging cyber-capabilities
(offensive and defensive) and vulnerabilities (in terms of ability to block actions as
well as ability to withstand or tolerate attacks) may not correspond to the previous
or present distribution of power composed of older forms of military and
economic might.
Indeed, some US strengths rely on informational interconnectedness and infra-
structure that is global, mostly private and rapidly evolving, but these strengths are
also therefore inextricably linked to emerging vulnerabilities. 51 Although many ex-
perts assess that the United States is currently strong relative to others in terms of
some offensive capabilities, 52 several factors make the United States especially vul-
nerable to cyber attacks, including the extensive interconnectivity of its military
and critical infrastructure and its political aversion to heavy regulation of private-
sector networks. 53
Rapidly evolving cyber-capabilities have the potential to alter power balances
among States because some are more vulnerable than others, and attacks could
have disproportionately large impacts on some countries or their military capa-
bilities.
54 Developing an offensive cyber warfare capability is likely to be less costly
than competing economically or militarily with much stronger States. 55 It is
therefore not surprising to see some regional rogues or aspirants for power devel-
oping offensive cyber warfare capabilities. 56
As for other major powers, such as Russia and China, they may calculate their
strategic interests with respect to cyber warfare and possible legal restrictions on it
differently than the United States in light of their own capabilities and vulnerabili-
ties, as well as the degree to which international law constrains their actions. 57 Rus-
sia, for example, has proposed to the United Nations a draft statement of principles
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that would prohibit the development of cyber attack capabilities, but in the mean-
time it is investing in the development of such tools. 58 Some analysts are therefore
skeptical of Russia's sincerity in proposing such agreements, especially given the
difficulties of verification in this arena. 59 China likely sees cyber warfare capabili-
ties as a way of equalizing the conventional military superiority of the United
States, and the extent to which public and private lines in China blur may provide
China additional advantages in the cyber-conflict realm.60
Again, though, consideration of any proposed UN Charter interpretation must
account for the processes by which the Charter is interpreted, applied and en-
forced. The likely factual uncertainty of alleged cyber attacks and the pressures to
launch responsive strokes more quickly than those facts can be resolved may require
urgent policy decision making amid legal ambiguity. The United States may prefer
relatively clear standards with respect to cyber-actions that have immediate de-
structive effects (at least clear enough to justify military responses or deterrent
threats to some scenarios), while at the same time it may prefer some flexibility or
permissive vagueness with respect to intelligence collection or some other intru-
sive measures in cyberspace, so as not to seriously inhibit those activities in which
it holds comparative advantages.61 Other States, however, may see benefits in a
different mix of doctrinal line drawing and clarity, in some cases because they are
less constrained internally by law than the United States, or because they contem-
plate using a different mix of cyber-capabilities, or because they see themselves as
potential victims (or innocent bystanders) of actions in cyberspace that they
would hope to paint legally and diplomatically as impermissible aggression.
In this strategic context, emergent US legal interpretations and declaratory pos-
tures may be seen as part ofan effort to sustain a legal order that preserves US com-
parative advantages. In moving toward a view of Article 2(4) that would prohibit
some cyber attacks by emphasizing their comparable effects to conventional mili-
tary attacks, such interpretations help deny that arsenal to others, by raising the
costs of its use. At the same time, by casting that prohibition in terms that would in
some circumstances help justify resort to military force in self-defense under Arti-
cle 51, this interpretation lowers the costs to the United States of using or
threatening its vast military edge.
That any drawing or redrawing of legal lines creates strategic winners and losers
will make it difficult to reach agreement on legal prohibitions, whether through in-
terpretive evolution ofthe UN Charter or through new legal agreements.62 Success
therefore depends on the ability ofproponents not only to articulate but to defend
those legal lines using various forms ofinfluence. That is, the strength ofa new legal
regime to regulate cyber attacks will, as always, depend to a large extent on the allo-
cation of power that cyber-technological developments are reshaping.
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Conclusion
As Professor Michael Reisman reminds us,
[international law is still largely a decentralized process, in which much lawmaking
(particularly for the most innovative matters) is initiated by unilateral claim, whether
explicit or behavioral. Claims to change inherited security arrangements . . . ignite a
process of counterclaims, responses, replies, and rejoinders until stable expectations of
right behavior emerge.63
It is possible, but unlikely, that States will soon come together and clarify through
new legal instruments the permissible bounds of actions in cyberspace. More likely
is a slow accretion of interpretation as crises unfold and claims and counterclaims,
reflecting distributions of power in their content and strength, remold the UN
Charter regime's contours around new forms of conflict. A policy upshot of this
analysis is that, to be effective, legal strategy must be integrated with cyber warfare
strategy, including efforts to promote offensive, defensive, preemptive, deterrent
and intelligence capabilities amid a security environment that is evolving rapidly
and unpredictably.
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In May 2010, the United States Department of Defense activated the US Cyber
Command, 1 consolidating leadership of six previously dispersed military orga-
nizations devoted to cyber operations.2 To its supporters, Cyber Command repre-
sented a significant accomplishment as congressional misgivings over the
command's mission, its effects on American citizens' privacy and ambiguous lim-
its on its authority had delayed activation for nearly a year.3
These concerns featured prominently in the confirmation of Lieutenant Gen-
eral Keith Alexander, the President's nominee to lead Cyber Command. In written
interrogatories, the Senate Armed Services Committee asked, "Is there a substan-
tial mismatch between the ability of the United States to conduct operations in
cyberspace and the level of development of policies governing such operations?"4
General Alexander's response identified a gap "between our technical capabilities
to conduct operations and the governing laws . . . ."5 However, he later observed,
"Given current operations, there are sufficient law, policy, and authorities to gov-
ern DOD cyberspace operations."6
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General Alexander's responses often struck such dissonant tones. And while his
unclassified responses generally offered little legal reflection, he commented in de-
tail on international self-defense law and cyber operations. 7 His responses por-
trayed existing law under the UN Charter as adequate to defend US interests from
cyber attack. Further, he indicated the United States would evaluate threats and at-
tacks in the cyber domain exactly as it would in other security realms. 8 Yet, the
same section of responses noted a lack of international legal consensus concerning
which cyber events violate the prohibition on the use of force or activate the right
of self-defense, suggesting a less than coherent structure to this important interna-
tional legal regime. 9
Meanwhile, cyber attacks have rapidly migrated from the realm of tech-sawy
doomsayers to the forefront of national security consciousness. 10 One need no lon-
ger be an experienced programmer or use much imagination to appreciate the
threat posed by cyber attacks. Incidents such as the disruptions experienced in Es-
tonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008 provide concrete examples of practices, trends
and potential harm posed by future cyber events. 11
Similarly, cyber conflict theorists paint an increasingly lucid picture ofthe strat-
egy and tactics that will inspire future attacks and shape defensive efforts. Cyber
strategy is evolving rapidly, as threat capabilities and tactics shift to exploit newly
discovered vulnerabilities. While defending against massive cyber catastrophes re-
mains a priority for planners, a growing contingent of cyber theorists concludes
that campaigns of diffuse, low-intensity attacks offer an increasingly effective strat-
egy for cyber insurgents and State actors alike. Operating below both the focus of
defensive schemes and the legal threshold of States' authority to respond with
force, low-intensity cyber attacks may prove to be a future attack strategy of choice
in cyberspace.
The confluence of Cyber Command's activation with publication of details of
recent cyber incidents, as well as insight into emerging cyber strategy, provides an
opportunity to critically evaluate General Alexander's assessment of the interna-
tional law of self-defense as well as the overall significance of the events in Estonia
and Georgia. Specifically, it is worthwhile to consider whether the bargain govern-
ing use of force reflected in the 1945 UN Charter is adequate for the threats facing
States today and for the future of cyberspace. Put differently, will the letter of the
Charter's use-of-force regime operate as an effective regulation of States' efforts to
secure cyberspace from one another and from non-State threats?
This article argues that the above-mentioned developments in cyber conflict
will greatly strain the existing self-defense legal regime and cast past computer net-
work attacks (CNA), such as the Estonian and Georgian incidents, in a new light.
First, gaps in the law's response structure will prove highly susceptible to
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low-intensity cyber attacks, leaving victim States to chose between enduring dam-
aging intrusions and disruptions or undertaking arguably unlawful unilateral re-
sponses. Second, and related, CNA will produce a significantly expanded cast of
players, creating a complex and uncontrollable multipolar environment compris-
ing far more States and non-State actors pursuing far more disparate interests than
in previous security settings. CNA are unprecedented conflict levelers. CNA tech-
nology is inexpensive, easy to acquire and use, and capable of masking identity.
CNA permit otherwise weak States and actors to challenge security hegemony at
low economic and security cost. Ultimately, these developments will test States'
commitment to the collective security arrangement of the Charter and its
accompanying restraints on unilateral uses of force to a far greater extent than
previously experienced.
Efforts to prevent or defeat massive, debilitating CNA surely warrant attention
and resources. However, if such incidents represent aberrations from the majority
of cyber hostilities, exclusive legal attention to such catastrophes is surely mis-
placed. Accounting for and addressing low-intensity CNA are equally—if not
more—important to maintaining international order and a place for law in
securing cyberspace.
The inquiry begins with a snapshot of the law governing resort to self-defense.
II. Self-Defense under the UN Charter
Legal accounts of self-defense doctrine vary greatly. Debates on preemptive and
anticipatory self-defense, 12 collective self-defense, 13 armed retribution or repri-
sal,
14 and burdens of proof15 remain highly contentious and relevant to CNA. At
times it seems each examination of these self-defense subtopics generates as many
aspects as authors. This section will focus on two distinct but related issues con-
cerning the doctrine of self-defense: first, the relevance of the right of self-defense
to interactions with non-State actors and, second, the threshold of "armed attack"
which gives rise to the right to exercise self-defense. The unsettled and evolving
nature of these issues will prevent a definitive account of either, yet will set the
stage for an illustration ofhow low-intensity CNA may influence the development
of each.
Self-Defense against Non-State Actors
The plainest and most widely accepted understanding of the UN Charter por-
trays self-defense as an exception to the nearly comprehensive ban on the use of
force by States. 16 Article 2(4) forbids the threat or use of force by States in their
international relations. 17 Meanwhile, Article 51 provides one of two enumerated
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exceptions, permitting Member States to take measures in self-defense in response
to "armed attack." 18 The relevance of the self-defense exception to interactions be-
tween States is obvious. If Article 2(4) regulates the use of force "in . . . interna-
tional relations" and Article 51 is intended as a legal exception, then the event that
most obviously activates the right is armed attack by other States, the only entities
traditionally capable of conducting international relations under the Charter. 19
Less clear, at least as a legal matter, is how, if at all, the self-defense exception
applies to "armed attack" by non-State actors. Traditionally, law enforcement
models, not directly influenced by the Charter, have guided State responses to
non-State actors. 20 Yet current international and transnational security environ-
ments, shaped by a dramatic rise in the destructive capacity of violent non-State
actors,21 strongly suggest a role for self-defense beyond interactions between States.22
While as a legal matter the UN Charter security regime is inapposite to State re-
sponses to non-State actors without links to State actors, such as attacks launched
from terra nullius or international waters, such situations seem unlikely or at least
exceedingly rare. 23 Far more prevalent are hostile activities by non-State actors
based on or launched from UN Member States' sovereign territories, where the
Charter's use-of-force regime operates clearly in theory if not so clearly in prac-
tice. A fractured and incomplete jurisprudence has emerged to cover the issue.
Two International Court of Justice (ICJ) opinions address self-defense and non-
State actors under the Charter.
Confronted by decades of attacks from outside its territory, Israel, in 2002, be-
gan work on a 450-mile barrier comprised alternately of concrete walls, fencing,
wire and electronic sensors.24 Encroaching on Palestinian territory, the barrier
greatly restricted vehicle and pedestrian traffic. In its filings for the 2004 Wall advi-
sory opinion, Israel justified construction of the wall on Palestinian territory as an
exercise of self-defense under Article 51. 25 The argument was consistent with prior
Israeli assertions to the General Assembly that self-defense included "the right of
States to use force in self-defence against terrorist attacks."26
In a split decision, the Court rejected the Israeli claim. The Court asserted Arti-
cle 51 had "no relevance" to interactions with non-State actors such as Palestine. 27
The advisory opinion is nearly summary in this regard, providing no interpretive
support, citations to travaux preparatories or examples of State practice. The Court
also left unaddressed a point raised in Judge Higgins's separate opinion that the
text of Article 5 1 does not include any indication "that self-defense is only available
when armed attack is made by a State."28 In his declaration, Judge Buergenthal ex-
pressed similar objection to the Court's opinion. He argued the Court gave inade-
quate weight to the fact the attacks originated outside Israeli borders, whatever the
international legal status of that territory. 29
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Further criticism of the advisory opinion30 focused on the Court's failure to
consider State practice since adoption of the Charter. 31 States have routinely in-
voked self-defense doctrine, and Article 51 specifically, to justify the use of force
against non-State actors. Several commentators have catalogued States' post-Charter
resort to measures in self-defense against non-State actors, including actions taken
by the United States, Israel, Portugal, Russia, Ethiopia and South Africa. 32 These
accounts, and Security Council reactions thereto, paint a portrait ofself-defense far
more relevant to efforts against hostile non-State actors. 33
The majority of State practice cited in opposition to the Wall Court's work
showcases measures of self-defense alleging varying degrees of host-State support
to the attacking non-State actor. Yet not all purported exercises ofself-defense have
included such links. In 1976, a series of South African intrusions into the territory
ofneighboring States to pursue non-State actors were distinct from other exercises
in this important respect. South Africa asserted a right of self-defense absent such
State involvement.34 The South African government conceded that the States from
which rebels operated were not complicit; however, it defended its territorial intru-
sions as justified in self-defense to continue its pursuit of rebel forces.35 While the
Security Council condemned36 South Africa's acts and appeared to denounce the
"hot pursuit"37 theory of self-defense, disapproval may be attributable in greater
part to the racist policies underlying these measures than to the legality of the
theory itself.
Ultimately, the most convincing effort to reconcile the Wall Court's account of
self-defense with its critics' competing claims emphasizes that the Israeli-Palestinian
situation involved no transnational interactions. That is, owing to Palestine's fail-
ure to attain statehood, the Wall advisory opinion might be read not to reach the is-
sue of valid State responses to non-State actors' armed attacks that originate from
another State's territory. One might then plausibly cabin the opinion to situations
not involving State actors or their territories, leaving open the issue of exercises of
self-defense against non-State actors operating from sovereign territory. Yet the
critique persists that a stronger analytical effort by the Court to identify the opera-
tive legal framework would have included an exploration of customary norms reg-
ulating the exercise of self-defense against purely non-State actors.
Only a year after the Wall advisory opinion, the ICJ had an opportunity to revisit
and clarify the issue of transnational self-defense against non-State actors. In
Armed Activities on the Territory ofthe Congo, Uganda defended its military opera-
tions against rebel groups operating from eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC). 38 Uganda offered two justifications for the attacks, both grounded
in self-defense. First, it argued that DRC support for anti-Ugandan rebels triggered
Uganda's right of self-defense, including the use offorce on DRC territory. Second,
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and alternatively, Uganda argued that the DRC's inability to control the territory
from which anti-Ugandan rebels operated permitted Ugandan measures in self-
defense on DRC territory. 39 Thus in some respects, the Ugandan claims were not
unlike the earlier South African arguments rejected by the Security Council.
Surprisingly, the Armed Activities Court did not rule on the lawfulness of
Uganda's self-defense against non-State actors. Instead, the Court declined to ac-
cept Uganda's characterization ofthe operations as defensive in nature, noting that
the invasion far exceeded in scale and scope what would have been necessary to
counter the rebel threat.40 Curiously, the Court skipped over the traditional thresh-
old analysis of whether the right to self-defense had been activated, reaching in-
stead the issue of whether the use of force in question constituted a proportionate
response. Thus the case left unaddressed the issue of States exercising self-defense
in the context of transnational operations against non-State actors.
Once again, the Court attracted criticism for its failure to elaborate on the issue
of self-defense against non-State actors. 41 In particular, critics argued the Court
should have used the Armed Activities case to better explain how self-defense doc-
trine relates to issues of State responsibility generally. To some members of the
Court, the opinion missed an opportunity to clarify the distinct but related stan-
dard of State responsibility for non-State actors' conduct within sovereign terri-
tory, a matter left uncertain by a prior decision but closely related to the exercise of
self-defense. 42
In 1986, the Court's Nicaragua judgment announced a standard for attributing
non-State actors' conduct to States for purposes of self-defense. 43 The Nicaragua
Court ruled that States exerting "effective control" over non-State actors launching
armed attacks within or from their territories were subject to lawful measures in
self-defense from victim States.44 However, the Nicaragua effective control stan-
dard did not fare well in practice, leaving too much ambiguity to operate as a work-
able limit on States' exercise of self-defense.45 Later, a separate UN-created court,
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, offered a com-
peting standard for State responsibility. 46 The Armed Activities judgment, how-
ever, did little to clarify or adapt the Nicaragua standard. The case offers no
substantive clarity concerning the level of State support for hostile non-State actors
that would give rise to a lawful exercise of self-defense by a victim State.
Critics of the Armed Activities decision also point to evidence of States' views on
self-defense in response to non-State actors. Many regard the Security Council res-
olutions and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) response to the 9/11
terrorist attacks on the United States as authoritative in this respect.47 Unquestion-
ably sufficient in intensity and effect to qualify as armed attacks,48 the 9/11 attacks
prompted both the Security Council and NATO explicitly to recite Charter-based
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self-defense as a lawful response. Condemning the attacks as international
terrorism, as well as threats to international peace and security, UN Security Council
Resolutions 136849 and 1373 50 each reaffirmed the United States' right to exercise
self-defense. Recalling efforts to muster Security Council support, William
Howard Taft IV, then State Department Legal Adviser, recalls, "[We] had no diffi-
culty in establishing that we had a right to use force in self-defense against Al-
Qaeda and any government supporting it." 51 With similar dispatch, NATO in-
voked, for the first time, Article 5 of its organizing treaty with references to collec-
tive self-defense, as well as the UN Charter self-defense regime.52 The legal effect of
invoking Article 5 was to regard 9/ 1 1 as an attack upon allNATO member States. 53
Clearer political statements in favor of applying self-defense doctrine to attacks
by non-State actors are difficult to imagine. Scholars have seized on the 9/11 Secu-
rity Council resolutions in particular as definitive State support for the exercise of
self-defense under the Charter against non-State actors. 54
Yet the legal import ofthe 9/11 political responses is debatable. 55 Security Coun-
cil resolutions undoubtedly wield legal force. Under the Charter, States are bound
to carry out the provisions of resolutions. 56 However, the extent to which they in-
fluence and shape legal doctrine or operate as independent legal precedent is ques-
tionable.57 On one hand, Security Council voting presents States an opportunity to
voice positions concerning resort to self-defense. 58 Discussion preceding votes on
resolutions frequently generates detailed expression of opinio juris on issues con-
cerning resort to self-defense. 59
On the other hand, debate and voting are axiomatically political manifestations,
reflecting economic, security and strategic self-interest as much as deliberate and
principled legal thought. Use or threat of the veto by permanent members fre-
quently prevents resolutions from reflecting comprehensive, majority State views
on legal issues. Further undermining claims to status as law, Security Council prac-
tice with respect to self-defense lacks uniformity or regard for precedent. Examin-
ing Security Council self-defense practice, Professor Franck identified strong
patterns of inconsistency.60 Franck observes, "The actual practice ofthe UN organs
has tended to be more calibrated, manifesting a situational ethic rather than doctri-
naire consistency either prohibiting or permitting all [self-defense] actions."61
As promised, the picture ofself-defense against non-State actors remains cloudy
despite codified law, abundant State rhetoric and significant proliferation in attacks.
The ICJ seized neither of two recent opportunities to elaborate on the conditions
under which self-defense operates in States' interactions with non-State actors.
Nor did the Court on either occasion see fit to account for widely recognized State
practice in the area. Thus, a widening rift has become apparent between positive
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law and the Court's work on the one hand and State practice on the other. Unfortu-
nately, this ambiguity is not unique to the issue.
The Threshold of "Armed Attack"
The UN Charter identifies "armed attack" as the event which gives rise to Member
States' right of self-defense.62 Accounts of the Charter's diplomatic conference in-
dicate the term provoked considerable back-channel maneuvering. 63 Although
still subject to substantial interpretation, the term "armed attack" is thought to of-
fer a comparative advantage over vague customary notions of self-defense. In the
words of Professor Stone, "armed attack" at least limits reference to "an observable
phenomenon against which [the victim State] reacts."64
The prevailing view characterizes armed attacks as a subset of violent acts
within a broader grouping of acts that qualify as uses of force.65 Though perhaps
tempting, drawing precise parallels between the Article 2(4) prohibition on "use
of force" and the Article 5 1 threshold of "armed attack" is flawed. 66 The modifier
"armed" appears intended to eliminate lower levels of force from consideration.
Mere coercion does not activate the right of self-defense, 67 if such activities even
qualify as uses of force. 68 Classically understood, "armed attack" envisions uses of
force producing destruction to property or lethal force against persons.69 As Pro-
fessor Stone asserts, the term also ensures a level of definition to prevent aggres-
sors from fraudulently pleading self-defense to excuse offensive operations. 70
Graphically portrayed, one might imagine a Venn diagram with a large circle en-
compassing uses of force and a smaller circle within representing armed attacks.
Thus, all armed attacks constitute uses of force, whereas not all uses of force rise to
the level of armed attack.
Again, the ICJ has weighed in. In the Nicaragua case, the Court suggested the
threshold of armed attack involved not merely destruction or invasion but also
consideration of "scale and effects." 71 In addition to armed invasion by regular
forces, the Court observed, "the sending by a State of armed bands to the terri-
tory of another State" to conduct similar armed activities would classify as an
armed attack. 72 It is important to note that the Court did not examine instances
where such bands carried out activities not involving arms or failing to produce
destructive consequences usually associated with armed activity. Rather, the Court
distinguished invasions from mere assistance "in the form of the provision of
weapons or logistical or other support." 73 While conceding that such activities
perhaps constituted a threat or use of force, perhaps implicating Article 2(4), the
Court concluded routine logistical activities would generally not give rise to the
right of self-defense. 74
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The practical significance of the Charter's—and the Court's—distinction be-
tween mere uses of force and more extreme armed attacks is a gap in response
structure.75 The plainest understanding of the distinction concludes that while
States may respond to armed attacks with force, including armed measures of
self-defense, States may not respond with armed violence or even force to mere
uses of force. That is, the Charter's Article 2(4) general prohibition on the use of
force by States continues to operate, even against States that have suffered an un-
lawful threat or use of force. Only armed attack frees a State from the prohibition
on the use of force. In this respect, Article 51 operates as an incomplete exception
to the prohibition on the use of force. The prevailing view holds that the Charter
permits States to respond to mere uses of force only with measures of self-help
not themselves rising to a use of force.76 Thus the Charter reserves reciprocal uses
of force in response to mere violations of Article 2(4) short of armed attack to the
Security Council's response regime. 77
While seemingly a sound textual interpretation, the gap has not aged well. Cer-
tainly, removing States' authority to respond with unilateral force to all but the
most serious and violent events is in keeping with the spirit and intent of the
Dumbarton Oaks drafting conference of 1945. Yet time and events have proved the
Security Council unable to respond to many apparent violations of Article 2(4),
leaving victims of acts falling within the gap either hostage to the flawed Security
Council regime or faced with violating the letter and spirit ofthe Charter. 78 The gap
proves particularly troubling to States underrepresented, either themselves or by
allies, at the Security Council.
The recurring issue of so-called frontier incidents and self-defense illustrates
well the contours of the ICJ's struggle to reconcile practice with text. Typically,
frontier incidents are small-scale skirmishes of limited duration between States'
armed forces. Christine Gray describes frontier incidents as "the most common
form of force between States."79 The ICJ has endorsed the legal concept of a fron-
tier incident as falling short of "armed attack." In the same passage of the Nicara-
gua case cited above to describe the intensity element of"armed attack," the Court
distinguished an armed attack from "a mere frontier incident."80 Yet the Court of-
fered almost no elaboration and did not revisit the issue in its factual examination
of the parties' respective territorial violations. Critics of the frontier-incident dis-
tinction disparage its apparent toleration of "protracted and low-intensity con-
flict."
81
Still, there are signs that important State actors accept frontier incidents as
part of the spectrum of uses of force outside armed attack and thus not giving rise
to a broader exercise of self-defense, confirming the Charter's response gap. 82
The gap theory is not a universally held view.83 In a separate opinion to the Oil
Platforms judgment, Judge Simma called the gap theory into question. 84 He posited
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that lawful responses to armed force should generally track the acts that provoke
them. While he agreed that only force amounting to armed attack opened the
door to full-fledged self-defense, he argued that States are permitted to respond to
force short of armed attack with "defensive military action 'short of full-scale
self-defence." 85 Rather than embrace the gap theory's all-or-nothing approach to
defensive responses to force, Judge Simma advocated a spectrum of proportional-
ity. In some ways like the Court's approach to the Ugandan operations in Armed
Activities, Judge Simma would seemingly supplant the Charter's "armed attack"
threshold with a floating scale of proportionality of action in States' international
relations. It seems his standard is satisfied so long as a State's response to a use of
force matches the intensity, scale and duration of the force suffered initially. In-
terestingly, a passage of the Nicaragua case seems to reinforce Judge Simma's
view, supporting proportionate countermeasures in response to uses of force not
amounting to armed attack.86
A further response to the gap attempts to shrink the conceptual space between
the use of force and armed attack by simultaneously raising the threshold of acts
qualifying as uses of force under Article 2(4), while lowering the bar for acts quali-
fying as armed attack under Article 51. 87 Returning to the previously imagined
Venn diagram, this approach would shrink the circle representing use of force
while expanding the circle representing armed attack. Such understandings mini-
mize, if not eliminate, the situations in which States are unable to respond to uses
of force unilaterally while greatly increasing the realm of situations in which they
may employ force in self-defense.
The gap-shrinking effort and Judge Simma's approach may be useful as efforts
to sustain the relevance of the Charter to modern international relations. Casual
reviews of State practice seem to support them. Yet gap shrinking surely demands a
better explanation of the distinct phrasing of the Charter's respective articles. And
ultimately, in some sense, the gap-shrinking approach appears merely to shift in-
terpretive debate back to the meaning of the term "armed attack."
In this way, gap shrinking makes no contribution to resolving the persistent am-
biguities surrounding "armed attack," namely the intensity, duration and scope
components of the term. And while Judge Simma's approach appeals to intuitive
senses of equity and self-preservation, it is similarly difficult to reconcile with the
letter of the Charter's concessions of sovereignty, no matter their practical flaws.
Despite their utilitarian merits, neither approach is particularly satisfying as a mat-
ter of textual interpretation, setting up a conflict between principled interpretation
and realistic practice in the law of self-defense.
Ultimately, perhaps even committed positivists must entertain a certain
amount of sympathy for views that tolerate a broader range of coercive or forceful
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responses from State victims ofunlawful uses of force. New operational norms, not
precisely consistent with the formal security regime of the Charter, may have
emerged through subsequent State practice. It has been argued, "The Charter is not
a commercial contract but a constitution."88 But surely some level of determinism
is appropriate, just as it is surely true that the bargain struck by States through the
Charter reflected meaningful cessions of sovereignty.
Bearing in mind the contestable legal issues in self-defense, what is happening
meanwhile in cyber conflict?
III. The Estonian and Georgian Incidents
Because ofthe highly classified nature of States' CNA practices and their past infre-
quency, the earliest legal analyses of CNA resorted to hypothetical or speculative
events. Considering how few practical examples these writers had to work with,
early forecasts of the operation of self-defense in CNA, if partly speculative, are
nonetheless impressive.89 Examples of CNA have since proliferated, providing
ready grist for the mills ofcyber security and cyber law analysts alike. Details oftwo
recent events in particular, the 2007 Estonian and 2008 Georgian cyber incidents,
have guided a great deal of discussion and policy.
Estonia 2007
In April of 2007, after relocating a Soviet-era World War II memorial from its
prominent place in the capital city of Tallinn, Estonia suffered uncharacteristically
violent protests by ethnic Russians.90 Immediately afterward, a series of distributed
denial of service (DDoS) attacks swept Estonian government and banking
websites.91 Lasting approximately one month, the DDoS92 attacks prevented access
to and defaced government websites and halted government e-mail traffic.93 The
DDoS attacks also interrupted Estonian Internet banking for portions of several
business days.
The perpetrators ofthe DDoS attacks found a target-rich environment in Estonia.
More than any other nation of its size, Estonia reflects an information systems soci-
ety.94 Wireless Internet, e-banking and web-based government services abound in
Estonia. Internet access is available in a remarkable 98 percent of Estonian terri-
tory.95 Home to the popular web-based voice call service Skype, Estonia boasts high
rates of personal Internet usage and claims to have been the first country to con-
duct Internet elections. 96 Over 500,000 people, nearly half its citizens, have used
government e-services. 97
At its outset, the 2007 Estonian event generated strong emotional reactions. Es-
tonian politicians immediately compared the incident to an invasion and to
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conventional military activity.98 However, quickly after the true nature of the inci-
dent became apparent, Estonian authorities realized that by accepted metrics the
event did not amount to armed attack. Although widespread within Estonia and of
nearly a month's duration, the event produced chiefly economic and communica-
tions disruptions. Public confidence in government and electronic services likely
suffered as well, but certainly not on the scale or in the nature anticipated by armed
attack. Additionally, because the DDoS attacks transited as many as 178 coun-
tries," Estonia never traced responsibility for the events to another State, despite
lingering suspicion of Russian government involvement. 100 In the final analysis,
Estonia attributed the disruptions to patriotic teams of ethnic Russian hackers,
only loosely affiliated with one another. 101
The Estonian response seems to confirm that an armed attack did not occur as
well. Estonian countermeasures were entirely passive in nature. Estonian techni-
cians replied largely by expanding network bandwidth to diffuse the effects of the
DDoS attacks. 102 The government focused its later responses on criminal investiga-
tions and also developing its domestic penal law to better account for cyber terror-
ism and intrusions. 103 Estonia seems at no point to have given serious thought to
resorting to measures of self-defense under either the Charter or the NATO Wash-
ington Treaty. 104 Nor, given its difficulties attributing the attacks, does it seem it
could have.
The Estonian cyber incident undoubtedly sounded an alarm for the interna-
tional community. But while the event provoked calls for cooperative cyber foren-
sics and criminal law enforcement, very little of the incident generated lessons or
insights with respect to self-defense. Legal analyses conclude almost unanimously
that the event did not give rise to the right of self-defense. 105 Only a year later, a
similar incident would sound the same alarm and inspire comparable discussion,
yet would immediately shed no greater light on self-defense and CNA.
Georgia 2008
Although in a de facto sense independent since 1991, the Caucasus region of South
Ossetia has remained all the while part of the Republic of Georgia in a legal sense.
In 2008, after an increase in Ossetian separatist activity, Georgia attempted to reas-
sert control of the region. 106 These operations provoked a swift and militarily deci-
sive intervention by Russian air and armored forces. 107
Before the physical invasion, Georgian government websites suffered a series of
DDoS attacks. 108 The Georgian presidential website was out of service for more
than 24 hours, then experienced manipulation including defacement of the Presi-
dent's image. 109 By the date of the Russian physical invasion, websites belonging to
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, the National Bank and several
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Georgian news outlets had already suffered DDoS attacks. 110 The day following the
invasion, Georgia's largest bank was also struck. All told, the DDoS operations con-
tinued for nearly a month, long outlasting kinetic hostilities and even postdating a
ceasefire. 111
In terms of information technology, Georgia was no Estonia. In fact, the rela-
tively underdeveloped Georgian information infrastructure may have mitigated
the impact, economic and otherwise, of the incident. 112 While Georgia's highly
concentrated distribution nodes simplified the attackers' task, Georgians did not
rely heavily on government web-based or e-services. The greatest impact ofthe in-
cident appears to have been reputational and related to restricting information
flow between the government and its citizens during the invasion crisis. 113
For purposes of characterizing the Georgian cyber incident as an armed attack,
coincidence with the Russian physical invasion complicates legal analysis. The in-
cident preceded, or more likely constituted part of, a conventional military inva-
sion that undoubtedly qualified as an armed attack. 114 Yet isolated from the
succeeding kinetic measures, the cyber aspects of the Georgian incident were of
minimal scope and intensity. At its worst, the cyber incident disrupted banking ac-
tivities and limited communications between the Georgian government and the
population. No loss of life, physical injury or destruction of property was directly
attributable to the cyber operations. Perhaps the most interesting legal issues aris-
ing from the Georgian cyber incident concern timing of self-defense and whether
the cyber disruptions could have been interpreted as an indication of imminent
armed attack.
But the conclusions one can draw regarding the exercise of self-defense in the
realm ofpure cyber operations are limited. Similar to the Estonian episode, Geor-
gia never identified conclusive evidence of Russian government responsibility for
conduct of the disruptions. Also, the cyber incidents alone do not seem to have
risen to the level ofarmed attack. Had the physical invasion not followed, the Geor-
gian cyber incidents would likely have left Georgia in much the same place as 2007
Estonia: inconvenienced (though comparatively less so), vulnerable, angry and
embarrassed. And while, at first impression, neither incident appears useful to
elaborate on the details ofself-defense doctrine, each maybe a useful foreboding of
future trends in CNA likely at some point to implicate self-defense.
While neither incident reached the threshold of armed attack, the costs of each
in terms of security seem real. Classifying these events as mere communications
disruptions or interference seems not to capture the function and importance of
computer networks in the information age. 115 If the Estonian and Georgian DDoS
attacks did not cripple either State or produce damage to property or persons, they
certainly reduced public confidence and exposed critical vulnerabilities. The chaos
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and confusion of the Georgian cyber attacks may even have facilitated or set favor-
able conditions for Russian physical attacks. After these incidents, one might fairly
ask whether failure to produce physical damage or injury really justifies placing
these incidents on the lower end of a conflict spectrum and whether such events are
aberrations or indications of the future of cyber conflict. One might also seriously
ask whether more powerful States would have exercised similar restraint.
IV. Low-Intensity Cyber Strategy
A growing strand of cyber scholarship suggests the Estonian and Georgian inci-
dents are harbingers of future cyber conflict. Within a broader spectrum of cyber
attack, strategists highlight low-intensity cyber warfare as an increasingly prevalent
and threatening form of conflict. By exploiting intrinsic tactical advantages, as well
as weaknesses in Western military thinking, low-intensity CNA have great poten-
tial to abuse narrowly conceived models of conflict to the advantage ofcyber insur-
gencies and States. Failing to perceive and treat the threats posed by low-intensity
attacks hampers targets' long-term security and plays into the hands of the at-
tacker. This section briefly explains how such attacks not only exploit tactical and
strategic advantages but may also leverage the legal gaps identified previously.
Military doctrine commonly uses a conflict spectrum keyed to levels of
violence. 116 Along the cyber variant of the spectrum, low-intensity CNA distin-
guish themselves from their high-intensity counterparts in two important respects.
First, low-intensity CNA add a dimension of concealment not apparent in high-
intensity CNA. Specifically, in addition to masking the identity of the attacker,
low-intensity CNA conceal their effects. They accomplish this largely through
restraint in scale and scope. In the attacker's ideal scenario, the victim of low-intensity
CNA is unaware ofthe damage to the target system. In other words, successful low-
intensity CNA never awaken a sleeping giant.
Low-intensity CNA also differ from the majority of high-intensity CNA in their
ability to frustrate correlation. In the event they are detected, successful low-intensity
CNA should appear to the victim as unrelated or isolated events. ! 1 7 Selecting varied
targets, spreading effects and timing attacks in apparently random sequences pre-
vent the target from perceiving the larger-scale, more threateningly coordinated
effort ofthe attacker. Inability to correlate reduces the likelihood of response by the
victim, despite cumulative reductions in capacity and efficiency. The analogy to
the "death by a thousand cuts" is apt. 118
In addition to being distinct from other CNA, low-intensity CNA are tactically
and strategically attractive for several reasons. Tactically, low-intensity CNA are
less likely to provoke debilitating responses from targets. Because the target is often
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unaware the attack has happened at all, low-intensity CNA may provoke no re-
sponse. Even ifthe victim becomes aware ofthe attack's effect, the isolated damage
may be so limited that a response is simply not worthwhile. As a kinetic
counterexample, the immense scale ofthe Al-Qaeda 9/11 attacks forfeited this tac-
tical advantage, greatly compromising the organization's long-term capacity. 119
Operating below the target's response threshold, low-intensity attacks avoid this
blunder, simultaneously enjoying relative impunity and preserving the utility of
the attacker's cyber tools for future operations.
Strategically, low-intensity CNA may also prove a wise effort. Low-visibility,
low-intensity CNA may be effective to retard a target's economic, social and tech-
nological development. Such developmental constraint might easily yield long-
term payouts in strategic competition. In a struggle for technological and military
supremacy, even a slight advantage in efficiency or conversion capability may
prove decisive. 120
Low-intensity CNA are also highly feasible. In general, cyber operations are often
far less expensive than traditional military operations. 121 The technology required
is widely available and relies to a great extent on automation rather than person-
nel. 122 Low-intensity CNA compound these advantages that CNA enjoy as a gen-
eral matter. As one theorist observes, "You can do a simple attack against a lot of
computers. Or you can do a sophisticated attack against a few computers. But it is
really hard to do a sophisticated attack against a lot of computers, especially an at-
tack that would achieve a meaningful military objective." 123
Further enhancing feasibility, low-intensityCNA permit incorporation ofunaf-
filiated or even unsophisticated actors. Non-State actors such as cyber militias in-
creasingly populate cyberspace, offering services for profit or political sympathy. 124
Enlistment maybe as simple as offering a personal computer, Internet access and
a web browser. 125 "Hacktivist" involvement in low-intensityCNA not only diffuses
effects but also strengthens efforts to launder the sponsor's identity as the source of
attack. 126 A victim might easily misinterpret well-masked hacktivist attacks as un-
related acts of vandalism rather than a concerted effort to degrade capacity or
security.
In addition to these very practical advantages, advocates of low-intensity CNA
base their arguments on flaws in military theory. Modern Western military
thought has long rested on bifurcations of peace and war, notions of military and
civilian separation. 127 Classic military theory reserves military action to escalations
ofhostile conduct between parties above recognized thresholds ofviolence. 128 Mil-
itary legal disciplines reinforce the war-peace and military-civilian distinctions.
The law governing the conduct of hostilities, or jus in hello, captures the military-
civilian bifurcation through the targeting principle of distinction. 129 Similarly, the
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law of war reflects the war-peace distinction through pervasive chapeau or
application threshold provisions as prerequisites to operation of the law. 130 The
vast majority of the positive jus in bello only operates in armed conflict between
States. Recalling thejus ad helium outlined in section I, one detects a similar bipolar
assumption with respect to hostilities and self-defense. Under the Charter regime,
either armed attack has occurred, unleashing the use of force, or something short
of armed attack has occurred, restricting responses to peaceful means short of
force.
Cyber theorists contrast these Western traditions with notions of conflict that
understand military action as part of a general and continuous strategic competi-
tion between powers rather than as an exception to peace. 131 IfWestern powers re-
gard as legally extinct Clausewitz's characterization of war as a continuation of
politics, competing views continue to carry Clausewitz's torch. Consistent with
this tradition, work by two Chinese People's Liberation Army officers urges an ap-
preciation of an unrestricted understanding of warfare extending into informa-
tional, commercial, currency and media realms. 132
Cyber conflict theorists argue that Western military thought's blind spot for un-
conventional and low-intensity hostilities renders States susceptible to abuse. Fail-
ing to perceive pinprick attacks as part of an enemy's expanded conception of
conflict frustrates correlation and delays defensive efforts. Actors acquainted with
States' military response thresholds and willing to extend their activities into tradi-
tionally civilian realms, such as strategic communication, currency exchange, trade
and media, gain crucial strategic and tactical advantages. Low-intensity CNA are
ideally suited to pursuing such advantages.
Finally, low-intensity CNA are attractive because they leverage seams in devel-
oped States' national security response structures. Particularly if directed at private
enterprise, low-intensity CNA may successfully evade government computer net-
work defenses. Moreover, private sector victims may not report attacks to public
sector authorities to preserve investor and consumer confidence. Industries con-
cerned with maintaining client privacy or trade secrets may be especially inclined
to underreport low-intensity CNA.
The operational environment of cyberspace may not be the only incentive to
low-intensity non-State actors' tactics. The law may incentivize such operations as
well. Cyber operations just below the "use of force" threshold or even in the space
between "use of force" and "armed attack" become attractive considering views
that limit States' lawful responses to the latter. The Wall advisory opinion's view
that self-defense is irrelevant to attacks by non-State actors surely fosters a sense of
impunity or insulation from retribution or response. For example, one might
imagine a protracted and diffuse campaign of cyber frontier incidents, designed to
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harass and frustrate a target but also designed to remain below the legal threshold
for measures in self-defense. If economic, communications and psychological ef-
fects, no matter how profound, don't trigger the right to respond with force, much
less the armed attack threshold for use of self-defense, CNA seem a particularly apt
means for imposing such effects to harm or at least harass and weaken States. This
is especially the case if the strict legal view that limits the use of force to "armed
attack" holds true.
In the end, coupled with emerging cyber doctrine, the Estonian and Georgian
incidents might take on important new meaning. The arguments for low-intensity,
low-impact cyber operations suggest they may no longer be the realm of criminals
and economic saboteurs but rather deliberate strategies to influence the interna-
tional security environment. Informed by a broader conception of cyber strategy
and conflict theory, the Estonian and Georgian incidents might indeed mean
something more to States and implicate self-defense and security in ways not obvi-
ous at the time of each, with important implications for the Charter's doctrine of
self-defense. States may no longer be able to afford to treat such incidents as mere
criminal acts or communications disruptions. States may very well look to mea-
sures in self-defense as a response to such events, notwithstanding their failure to
comport with traditional understandings of "armed attack." The implications for
the future of the UN Charter self-defense regime maybe grim.
V. Conclusion: The Impact ofLow-Intensity CNA on the Self-Defense
Legal Regime
Scholars have built impressive careers predicting the demise ofthe Charter's security
regime. 133 In 1970, Professor Thomas Franck argued that the Article 2(4) use of
force regime mocked States from its grave. 134 He asserted that new forms of attack
made the notions ofwar on which the Charter was based obsolete, while State prac-
tice eroded States' mutual confidence in the system. 135 Addressing self-defense,
Franck presciently identified wars too small and wars too large to fit within Article
51. 136 Ultimately, Franck indicted incongruence between the norms of the interna-
tional security system and the national interests of States as the perpetrator of his
imagined legicide 137—perhaps the very same concerns that motivated the Senate's
question to General Alexander. 138
So, are the laws regulating resort to force, and specifically self-defense, out of
synch with planned cyber capabilities and strategies? Or more precisely, does the
Charter's self-defense doctrine leave States adequate authority to respond to the
full range ofCNA threats they face?
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The answer depends, in large part, on the version of self-defense one adopts. As
section II demonstrated, despite a universally adopted codification and decades of
jurisprudence and State practice, the doctrine of self-defense remains highly inde-
terminate. If General Alexander expressed satisfaction with the state of the law, his
was likely a confidence grounded in a very broad and permissive understanding of
the doctrine. Informed by views that regard the Charter's response gap skeptically
or seek to define it away, one might indeed express satisfaction with the range of re-
sponses available to State victims of CNA. Espousing a similar view, the US State
Department Legal Adviser recently offered a vote of confidence in self-defense
doctrine as it relates to lethal overseas counterterrorism efforts. 139
Yet such permissive views of self-defense suffer the textual shortcomings of
their forebears. 140 Christine Gray asserts that States rarely speak of self-defense in
purely legal terms. 141 Her evaluation is difficult to square with claims that in the
post-Charter world States defend nearly all uses of force as self-defense. 142 Yet the
future may prove Gray's observation increasingly accurate. Recent State expres-
sions appear particularly vague and open-textured, grounded in notions of in-
stinct, rights of survival and natural law rather than positivist models of conflict
regulation. 143 Increasingly, it seems States have resurrected pre-Charter notions
that self-defense includes all means necessary for self-preservation against all
threats. Practice is offered to the exclusion of positivist expressions of law, rather
than as a vehicle for elucidating or understanding it. Even committed international
law sovereigntists must detect discomfiting, pre-Charter realist tones.
On the other hand, if one adopts the narrower view of self-defense, including
the apparent textual response gap between use of force and armed attack, the gen-
eral's proffered mismatch between law and capacity may indeed be real. Particu-
larly with respect to low-intensity CNA, State victims appear hostage to law that
would deny resort to proportionate countermeasures and restrict effective action
to a security regime paralyzed by politics.
What emerges appears to be a choice of threats. Either one accepts a real threat
to the positive jus ad heliums claim to law, or one accepts very real threats to States'
security as a trade-off for preserving legal idealism. Neither reflects well on the fu-
ture of the law. Each constitutes a mismatch in its own sense.
If past predictions of the demise of the Charter's security regime, such as
Franck's, have proved exaggerated, 144 low-intensity CNA may vindicate them yet.
As Franck's critics point out, the international security environment ofthe twentieth
century likely profited from the Charter's limits through undetectable instances of
restraint. 145 The argument claims the Charter regularly influenced decisions to re-
frain from resort to force but unlike decisions to use force, restraint leaves little in
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the way of observable evidence. Yet the prospect of low-intensity CNA is likely to
change the calculus of these decisions.
With these cheap, anonymous and effective weapons, States find a greatly al-
tered international security game. The low barriers to entry into CNA, and particu-
larly low-intensity CNA, greatly increase the number of potential players. 146 Just in
terms of frequency of occurrence, the number of instances in which States will be
called upon to evaluate whether resort to force or measures in self-defense is justi-
fied or necessary increases.
Further, as the Estonian and Georgian episodes still suggest to many, non-State
actors may be effective proxies for States in CNA. It appears non-State actors will
be a persistent feature of future CNA. And for non-State actors operating on their
own behalf, modern hostilities offer few levelers on the order ofCNA. CNA are tre-
mendous force multipliers and are abundantly available. Low-intensity CNA offer
the potential for catastrophic effects against asymmetrically developed and
resourced States. Conversely, many non-State actors are simply retaliation- and
even deterrence-proof, offering defenders little in the way of targets.
Thus, low-intensity CNA not only increase the population of attackers but also
the pool of potential defenders. This is true in two senses. First, as the Georgian
event shows, even States with rudimentary information systems capacity present
ripe targets for CNA. More States present themselves as potential targets of hostile
acts, increasing in absolute terms the opportunity and likelihood that hostilities
will erupt. Second, more States are likely to participate themselves in CNA for the
same reasons that more non-State actors are. Thus in a CNA security environment,
more States will possess means to respond to attacks or, more important, to events
short of armed attack yet sufficiently disruptive or annoying to provoke a hostile
response.
On a related note, and equally disruptive to restraint in the exercise of self-
defense, CNA may permit more States to "go it alone." As a more attainable
means of self-defense, CNA may free States from reliance on collective security
arrangements. In contrast to the twentieth century's bipolar security environ-
ment, CNA's low barriers to entry may lead to a multipolar system of lone actors.
Decisions whether to resort to self-defense will lack the temperance and restraint
that collective security arrangements have offered. Thus, low-intensity CNA may
topple preexisting vertical arrangements of States into a level or horizontal array
of power.
Finally, CNA rearrange the cast of actors in the security environment in a more
literal way. CNA render geography largely meaningless. States previously insulated
from armed attack by distance or terrain enjoy no such benefits in cyberspace. Bor-
ders and neighbors do not determine one's cyber security. Rather, in an ironic
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sense, susceptibility to attack may be a function of the extent to which a State relies
on the very information technology that is targeted. As information systems prolif-
erate the target environment becomes richer, increasing the frequency with which
States must make decisions about exercising self-defense.
The preceding factors suggest critical consequences for the viability of self-
defense doctrine. As low-intensity CNA increase the pool of defenders, attackers
and targets, opportunities for disparate or even idiosyncratic views or approaches
to self-defense will also proliferate. Low-intensity CNA will generate conflicting
accounts of self-defense doctrine with respect to applicability to non-State actors
and the "armed attack" threshold, as well as other issues such as anticipatory and
collective self-defense. It is ominously clear that the phenomena that prompted
Franck to pronounce the death of the Charter security regime are not merely also
present in CNA; they are present in far greater degrees.
Few of the developments, legal or technical, outlined in this article portend a
stable or effective international self-defense regime. Rather than evince satisfaction
with the bargain struck in 1945, emerging views on self-defense, such as that ex-
pressed by General Alexander, likely reflect altered understandings of limits on
States' freedom ofaction. The effects on the integrity and viability ofthe law of self-
defense are compounded ifone extrapolates the opportunity to interpret and apply
self-defense doctrine to the vast cast of actors, State and non-State, in cyberspace.
While surely motivated in part by legitimate perceptions of very real threats, these
views are highly susceptible to producing a chaotic, dangerous and multipolar se-
curity environment. Faced with the daunting prospect of persistent low-intensity
CNA, ruling views on self-defense may quickly become in fact entirely untethered
from the Charter's security regime. Understood in light of emerging low-intensity
CNA doctrine, the Estonian and Georgian events become highly relevant to the de-
velopment of self-defense law. One can easily imagine, and might already conjure,
a law of self-defense that resorts to the Charter's regime in name only, revealing it
to have been as Stone posited, one of many "vain attempts to abolish power." 147
Notes
1 . Initial orders to create the command date to mid-2009. See Ellen Nakashima, Gates Cre-
ates Cyber-Defense Command, WASHINGTON POST, June 24, 2009, at A08, available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/23/AR2009062303492.htmI. Appro-
priately enough, information on Cyber Command, often referred to as CYBERCOM, is available
from a US Department of Defense website. See http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2010/0410
_cybersec (last visited Sept. 20, 2010).
78
Sean Watts
2. William J. Lynn III, Introducing U.S. Cyber Command, WALL STREET JOURNAL, June 3,
2010, § A, at 15, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487048756045752
80881128276448.html.
3. Ellen Nakashima, Cyber Command ChiefSays Military Computer Networks Are Vulnerable
to Attack; U.S. military networks in war zones could be targeted, Alexander says, WASHINGTON POST,
June 4, 2010, at A02, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/
06/03/AR2010060302355.html.
4. Advance Questions for Lieutenant General Keith Alexander, USA, Nominee for Com-
mander, United States Cyber Command 9 (on file with author) [hereinafter General Alexander
Advance Questions]. See Nominations ofVADMJames A. Winnefeld, Jr., USN, to be Admiral and
Commander, U.S. Northern Command/Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Com-
mand; and LTG Keith B. Alexander, USA, to be General and Director, National Security Agency/
Chief, Central Security Service/Commander, U.S. Cyber Command: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Armed Services, 111th Cong. (2010), http://armed-services.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?wit_id
=93678rid=4505.
5. General Alexander Advance Questions, supra note 4, at 9.
6. Id. One might easily imagine, especially considering General Alexander's additional po-
sition as Director of the National Security Agency, that his response had in mind domestic legal
limitations as much as international law.
7. Mat 11-12.
8. Id. at 12.
9. Id. at 1 1. General Alexander submitted a portion of his response on the topic of interna-
tional law on the use of force in a classified supplement. See id.
10. See Bill Lambrecht, U.S. is Busy Thwarting Cyber Terrorism, LATlMES.COM (June 24,
2010), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-cyber-terrorism-20 100624,0,3306751.story. Early
in the current president's tenure, cyber security took a prominent place in national security strat-




See infra section III.
12. See David Sadoff,A Question ofDeterminacy: The Legal Status ofAnticipatory Self-Defense,
40 Georgetown Journal of International Law 523 (2009) (concluding no legal consensus
exists on anticipatory self-defense); W. Michael Reisman & Andrea Armstrong, The Past and
Future of the Claim of Preemptive Self-Defense, 100 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 525 (2006) (predicting the possibility of future invocations of preemptive self-defense);
Sean D. Murphy, The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defense, 50 VlLLANOVA LAW REVIEW 699
(2005) (identifying methodological differences as the source of divergence in international law-
yers' disagreements over preemptive self-defense); Thomas M. Franck, Preemption, Prevention
and Anticipatory Self-Defense: New Law Regarding Recourse to Force?, 27 HASTINGS INTER-
NATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW 425 (2004) (advocating abandonment of preemp-
tive self-defense as inconsistent with the UN Charter).
13. See Carsten Stahn, Collective Security and Self-Defense after the September 1 1 Attacks,
10 TlLBURG FOREIGN LAW REVIEW 10 (2002); George K. Walker, Anticipatory Collective Self-
Defense in the Charter Era: What the Treaties Have Said, 31 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW
JOURNAL 321 (1998); Hans Kelsen, Collective Security and Collective Self-Defense under the
Charter of the United Nations, 42 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 783 (1948).
14. See Roberto Barsotti, Armed Reprisal, in THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE
OF FORCE 79 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1986) (identifying "radical change" in the doctrine of self-
defense as regards resort to armed reprisal); Michael A. Newton, Reconsidering Reprisals, 20
79
Low-Intensity Computer Network Attack and Self-Defense
Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 361 (2010) (arguing that a refined
doctrine of reprisal might produce clearer limiting criteria than strained resorts to self-defense).
15. See Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161,11 67-77 (Nov. 6) (rejecting US justi-
fication for use of force as self-defense on failure to meet burden of proof); Geoffrey Corn &
Dennis Gyllensporre, International Legality, the Use ofMilitary Force, and Burdens ofPersuasion:
Self-Defense, the Initiation ofHostilities, and the Impact of the Choice between Two Evils on the
Perception ofInternational Legitimacy, 30 PACE LAW REVIEW 484 (2010) (identifying incentive
structures resulting from comparative burdens ofproof required of self-defense versus collective
security action).
16. Professor Dinstein is perhaps best known for this characterization of self-defense. See
YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION & SELF-DEFENCE (4th ed. 2005). See also ANTHONY
Clark arend & Robert J. Beck, International Law and the Use of Force 3 1 (1993). Pro-
fessor Dinstein observes, "Only when the universal liberty to go to war was eliminated, could
self-defence emerge as a right of signal importance in international law." DINSTEIN, supra at 177.
A competing characterization asserts that the right of self-defense preceded the UN Charter use-
of-force regime and thus stands as an autonomous legal right rather than an exception. See
Myres S. McDougal & Florentino P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public
ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION 217-20, 232-41 (1961);
JULIUS STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER 99-101 (1958) (identifying "absurdities"
through extreme examples of a strict reading ofArticle 51 ); Sean D. Murphy, Self-Defense and the
Israeli Wall Opinion: An Ipse Dixitfrom the Court?, 99 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 62, 64 (2005) (emphasizing that the Charter includes an "inherent" right of self-defense)
(emphasis in original). The United States' understanding of self-defense also appears to empha-
size the inherent rather than exceptional nature of self-defense under international law. US
Navy, US Marine Corps & US Coast Guard, The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval
Operations NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, 4-4-4-5 (2007) [hereinafter
Commander's Handbook] (citing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3121.01B,
Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces (2005)).
17. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4
18. Id., art. 51. Articles 39 and 42, in conjunction, form the second exception to the Article
2(4) prohibition, permitting States to use force when authorized by the Security Council.
19. See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 57-58 (7th ed. 2008)
(admitting, however, the possibility of limited international personality for some international
organizations); 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERSCH
LAUTERPACHT 136-37 (Elihu Lauterpacht ed., 1970).
20. Indeed, the 9/1 1 terror attacks on the United States provoked a significant legislative ef-
fort to strengthen domestic law enforcement. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Provid-
ing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA
PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 1 1 5 Stat. 272 (2001 ); Claude d'Estree & Luke Andrew Busby,
U.S. Response to the Events ofSeptember 1 1, 2001: The USA PATRIOTAct, Title III, in LAW IN THE
WAR ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 107 (Ved P. Nanda ed., 2005) (analyzing and forecasting
consequences of the Act).
21. See John Arquilla, The New Rules of War, FOREIGN POLICY, Mar./Apr. 2010, at 60, avail-
able at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/the_new_rules_of_war (Arquilla ob-
serves, "[Terrorists and transnational criminals have embraced connectivity to coordinate
global operations in ways that simply were not possible in the past. Before the Internet and the
80
Sean Watts
World Wide Web, a terrorist network operating cohesively in more than 60 countries could not
have existed. Today, a world full ofUmar Farouk Abdulmutallabs awaits—and not all of them
will fail").
22. LINDSAY MOIR, REAPPRAISING THE RESORT TO FORCE: INTERNATIONAL LAW, JUS AD
BELLUM, AND THE WAR ON TERROR 150 (2010) (noting the novelty of the Taliban/Al-Qaeda re-
lationship, where "the government of a State had apparently been inferior to, or dependent
upon, a terrorist organization within its territory").
23. However, international shipping and naval forces have suffered increased attacks by
Somali pirates in the western Indian Ocean. See Piracy at Sea, NYTlMES.COM, http://topics
.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/p/piracy_at_sea/index.html?scp=28csq=somalia
%20pirates&st=cse (last updated Nov. 10, 2010) (noting a record number of pirate attacks in
2009); Borzou Daragahi & Edmund Sanders, Pirates Show Range and Daring, LATlMES.COM
(Nov. 18, 2008), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/nov/18/world/fg-piracyl8.
24. See Legal Consequences ofthe Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Terri-
tory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, | 80 (July 9) [hereinafter Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall]. Israel has since removed portions of the wall in response to improving
security. See Sheera Frenkel, Israel Removes Wall, Palestinians Remain Wary, NPR.COM (Aug. 18,
2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId= 1292798 14.
25. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, supra note 24, fflj 138-39.
26. Id., 1| 138 (citing U.N. Doc. A/ES-10/PV.21 at 6 (Oct. 20, 2003)).
27. Jd.,1jl39.
28. Id., f 33 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins).
29. Id., J 6 (declaration of Judge Buergenthal).
30. See Murphy, supra note 16, at 62 (describing the opinion as "startling in its brevity and,
upon analysis, unsatisfactory"); Ruth Wedgwood, The IC] Advisory Opinion on the Israeli Secu-
rity Fence and the Limits of Self-Defense, 99 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 52, 58
(2005). But see Iain Scobbie, Words My Mother Never Taught Me—"In Defense of the Interna-
tional Court," 99 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 76, 77 (2005) (regarding the
opinion's statements on self-defense as "well-founded").
31. Murphy, supra note 16, at 67-70.
32. MOIR, supra note 22, at 140-47. CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE
OF FORCE 136 (3d ed. 2008).
33. See Murphy, supra note 16, at 67.
34. GRAY, supra note 32, at 137 (citing SC 1944th meeting (1976)).
35. Id.
36. S.C. Res. 568, ffl[ 1, 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/568 (June 21, 1985).
37. See Commander's Handbook, supra note 16, at 3-10 (permitting US Navy vessels to ex-
ercise authority beyond territorial waters where pursuit is initiated in internal waters).
38. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005
I.C.J. 1 (Dec. 19) [hereinafter Armed Activities].
39. See Phoebe N. Okowa, Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), 55 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW
QUARTERLY 742, 747-48 (2006) (citing Position of the High Command of Uganda on the Pres-
ence of the Uganda Peoples Defence Forces in the DRC (Sept. 11, 1998). Counter-Memorial of
the Government of Uganda, vol. I, annex 27 & ch. 3 (Apr. 21, 2001)).
40. Armed Activities, supra note 38, 1f 147. The Court identified "no need to respond to the
contentions of the Parties as to whether and under what conditions contemporary interna-
tional law provides for a right of self-defence against large-scale attacks by irregular forces." Id.
81
Low-Intensity Computer Network Attack and Self-Defense
Reinforcing its skepticism of the Ugandan self-defense claim, the Court added, "The Court can-
not fail to observe, however, that the taking of airports and towns many hundreds of kilometres
from Uganda's border would not seem proportionate to the series of transborder attacks it
claimed had given rise to the right of self-defence, nor to be necessary to that end." Id.
41. Okowa, supra note 39, at 749; Stephanie A. Barbour & Zoe A. Salzman, "The Tangled
Web": The Right of Self-Defense against Non-State Actors in the Armed Activities Case, 40 NEW
York University Journal of International Law and Politics 53 (2007) (concluding the
Armed Activities case left an understanding of self-defense ill-prepared for threats posed by non-
State actors in control of State territory).
42. Armed Activities, supra note 38, J 8 (separate opinion of Judge Simma).
43. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, J 195 (June 27). It
should be noted that for jurisdictional reasons, the Nicaragua Court analyzed the customary
rather than purely-Charter-based body of law.
44. Id.
45. See Christopher J. Le Mon, Unilateral Intervention by Invitation in Civil Wars: The Effective
Control Test Tested, 35 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS
741 (2003) (charting operation of the effective control test as a limit on State interventions).
46. Although not addressing self-defense specifically, the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia developed an alternative standard for State responsibility in the 1999
Tadic case. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, % 120 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) (determining that to attribute actions of rebels to a State "it is
sufficient that the group as a whole be under the overall control of a State") (emphasis added).
47. See DlNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 207-8; Christian J. Tarns, The Use ofForce against Terror-
ists, 20 European Journal of International Law 359, 377 (2009).
48. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE
9/n Commission Report (2004).
49. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001).
50. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
5 1
.
William Howard Taft IV, The Bush (43rd) Administration, in SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY
IN TIMES OF CRISIS: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT LEGAL
ADVISER 127, 128-29 (Michael P. Scharf 8c Paul R. Williams eds., 2010).
52. Press Release, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Statement by the North Atlantic
Council (Sept. 12, 2001), available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm.
53. North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, available at
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm.
54. See DlNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 207-8; Barbour 8c Salzman, supra note 41, at 65 (noting
that Resolutions 1368 and 1373 compound uncertainty whether non-State actors can rise to the
level of armed attack).
55. GRAY, supra note 32, at 18-20.
56. U.N. Charter art. 25.
57. Even ICJ decisions only bind parties to the case. See Statute of the International Court of
Justice art. 59, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993. Louis Sohn has written impressively
on the issue of which and how UN agents should interpret the Charter. Louis B. Sohn, The UN
System as Authoritative Interpreter of Its Law, in 1 UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER 169 (Oskar
Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner eds., 1995).
58. U.N. Charter art. 31 (permitting non-members of the Security Council to participate in
discussions where the latter considers their interests to be "specially affected").
82
Sean Watts
59. See, e.g., THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 676 n.141 (Bruno
Simma et al. eds., 1995) (recounting Security Council debate of the lawfulness of Israeli strikes
initiating the 1967 Six-Day War) [hereinafter UN CHARTER COMMENTARY].
60. THOMAS FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE 77 (2002) (surveyingUN Security Council reac-
tions to use of force in self-defense by Belgium, Turkey, Israel and, on six separate occasions, the
United States).
61. Id.
62. U.N. Charter art. 51. Scholars generally recognize two schools of thought on the thresh-
old of self-defense: a narrow understanding, viewing "armed attack" as the exclusive trigger for
the right of self-defense, and a broad understanding, viewing "armed attack" as but one ofmany
events capable of justifying resort to self-defense. See Natalino Ronzitti, The Expanding Law of
Self-Defense, 11 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 343, 344-45 (2006); Norman M.
Feder, Reading the UN Charter Connotatively: Toward a New Definition ofArmed Attack, 19
New York University Journal of International Law and Policy 395, 403-4 (1987)
(evaluating both views and advocating the narrow variant).
63. Professor Brownlie notes that the records ofthe San Francisco diplomatic conference in-
clude no explanation of the term "armed attack." IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 279 (1963). However, a historical account of the creation of the
United Nations provides some background and parole evidence. See STEPHEN C. SCHLESINGER,
ACT OF CREATION: THE FOUNDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS 181-83 (2003) (offering a narra-
tive account of diplomatic efforts to draft Article 51).
64. STONE, supra note 16, at 72.
65. See UN CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 59, at 663 n.l 1 (citing exclusively German-
language authors).
66. See id. at 663 ("It is to be emphasized that Arts. 51 and 2(4) do not exactly correspond to
one another in scope, i.e. [,] not every use offorce contrary to Art. 2(4) may be responded to with
armed self-defence").
67. The records of the Charter's drafting conference suggest strongly that economic coer-
cion would also not qualify as a use offorce. See UN CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 59, at
112 (noting States' rejection of a Brazilian proposal to include economic coercion within the
scope of the Article 2(4) prohibition).
68. See STONE, supra note 16, at 72 n.l 68 (quoting Netherlands delegate M. Roling).
69. See Michael Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use ofForce in International Law:
Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 885, 934
(1999).
70. STONE, supra note 16, at 72.
71. Military and Paramilitary Activities, supra note 43, \ 195.
72. Id. The Court relied on the General Assembly's Definition of Aggression in significant
part. Id. (relying on G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974)).
73. Id.
74. Id. With respect to these findings, Gray observes, "The Court gave no authority for this
Statement and was criticized for its failure to do so by some commentators." CHRISTINE GRAY,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 143 (2d ed. 2004).
75. See UN CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 59, at 664.
76. See DlNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 193-96 (confirming the gap theory of the Charter's re-
sponse structure); BROWNLIE, supra note 63, at 279 (observing, "Indirect aggression and the in-
cursions ofarmed bands can be countered by measures of defence which do not involve military
operations across frontiers"). For discussion of the topic in the context ofCNA specifically, see
83
Low-Intensity Computer Network Attack and Self-Defense
Thomas C. Wingfield, The Law of Information Conflict: National Security Law in
CYBERSPACE 47-49 (2000); Schmitt, supra note 69, at 929 (observing that only CNA intended to
directly cause physical destruction or injury authorize forcible responses under the Charter).
77. Further support for the gap theory may be found in the International Court of Justice
Nicaragua and Oil Platforms cases. See DlNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 193-94; Military and Paramil-
itary Activities, supra note 43, 1 191; Oil Platforms, supra note 15, ^ 51.
78. See David J. Scheffer, Commentary on Collective Security, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL ORDER 101-4 (Lori Fisler Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds., 1991) [hereinaf-
ter Damrosch & Scheffer].
79. GRAY, supra note 32, at 177.
80. See discussion supra p. 66 (citing Military and Paramilitary Activities, supra note 43, J
195).
81. See W. Michael Reisman, Allocating Competences to Use Coercion in the Post-Cold War
World, in Damrosch & Scheffer, supra note 78, at 39.
82. See GRAY, supra note 32, at 1 8 1 (citing William Howard Taft IV, Self-Defense and the Oil
Platforms Decision, 29 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 295, 302 (2004)).
83. Taft, supra note 82, at 295.
84. Oil Platforms, supra note 15, ^ 12 (separate opinion of Judge Simma). I am grateful to
Professor Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg for alerting an audience to this passage at a recent inter-
national law symposium.
85. Id.
86. See Military and Paramilitary Activities, supra note 43, ^ 249. Curiously, however, the
Court restricted forcible countermeasures to the victim State, ruling out collective use thereof.
Id.
87. SeeUN CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 59, at 664 (citing Julius Stone, Force and the
Charter in the Seventies, 2 SYRACUSE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMMERCE 1,11-
12 (1974); ALFRED VERDROSS & BRUNO SlMMA, UNIVERSELLES VOLKERRECHT: THEORIE UND
PRAXIS U 472 (3d ed. 1984)).
88. Reisman, supra note 81, at 43.
89. See, e.g., WALTER GARY SHARP, CYBERSPACE AND THE USE OF FORCE (1999);
WINGFIELD, supra note 76; Eric Jensen, Computer Attacks on Critical National Infrastructure: A
Use ofForce Invoking the Right ofSelf-Defense, 38 STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
207 (2002); Schmitt, supra note 69 (developing the most influential model for assessing the legal
significance of cyber events).
90. For an excellent account ofthe Estonian incident, see ENEKEN TlKK, KADRI KASKA & LlIS
VlHUL, INTERNATIONAL CYBER INCIDENTS: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 14-25 (2010) [hereinafter
TlKKETAL.].
91. See id. at 20.
92. DDoS describes the use of masses of bogus access requests to websites to flood commu-
nications channels, inducing shutdown. See Herbert S. Lin, Offensive Cyber Operations and the
Use ofForce, 4 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND POLICY 63, 70 (2010).
93. See TlKK ET AL., supra note 90, at 20-21, 24-25.
94. See id. at 16-18.
95. See id. at 17.
96. See id. at 17-18 (citing Estonia First Country in the World to Introduce Internet Voting,
EURACTIV, http://www.euractiv.com/en/egovernment/estonia-country-world-introduce-internet
-voting/article- 145735 (last updated June 15, 2007)).
97. See TlKK ET AL, supra note 90, at 1 8.
84
Sean Watts
98. Ian Traynor, Russia Accused of Unleashing Cyberwar to Disable Estonia: Parliament, min-
istries, banks, media targeted: Nato experts sent in to strengthen defences, GUARDIAN (London),
May 17, 2007, Home Pages at 1, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/may/17/
topstories3.russia.
99. Charles Clover, Kremlin-backed Group Behind Estonia Cyber Blitz, FT.COM (Mar. 11,
2009), http://www.ft.eom/cms/s/0/57536d5a-0ddc-llde-8ea3-0000779fd2ac.html.
100. Noah Schactman, Kremlin Kids: We Launched the Estonian Cyber War, WIRED (Mar. 11,
2009), http://blog.wired.com/defense/2009/03/pro-kremlin-gro.html. An Internet security con-
sultant speculates the Russian government employed an organization known as the Russian
Business Network (RBN) to carry out the attacks on its behalfin exchange for immunity for prior
criminal acts. See Linton Chiswick, CyberAttack Casts New Light on Georgia Invasion, THE FIRST
POST (Aug. 15, 2008), http://www.thefirstpost.co.uk/45 135,features,cyber-attack-casts-new
-light-on-georgia-invasion. The consultant describes the RBN as
a shadowy, St Petersburg-based internet company . . . believed to provide secure host-
ing for much of the world's online crime, from illicit pornography to credit card fraud
and phishing. It is also believed to control the world's biggest and most powerful
"botnet"—a network of infected zombie computers of a scale necessary to perform de-
structive cyber-terrorism or cyber-warfare on an entire State.
Id.
101. See TlKK ET AL., supra note 90, at 23.
102. See id. at 24.
103. See id. at 26-29.
104. Id. at 25-26.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See Michael Schwirtz, Anne Barnard & C. J. Chivers, Russia and Georgia Clash Over
Separatist Region, NYTlMES.COM (Aug. 8, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/09/world/
europe/09georgia.html?hp (offering a same-day account of the invasion); Peter Finn, A Two-
Sided Descent Into Full-Scale War, WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 17, 2008, at Al, available at http://www
.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/16/AR200808 1600502_pf.html (offering ex-
panded, day-by-day accounts of events leading up to and the conduct of the invasion).
108. See TlKK ET AL., supra note 90, at 70; John Markoff, Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks, NEW
YORK TIMES, Aug. 13, 2008, at Al.
109. See TlKK ET AL., supra note 90, at 70.
110. See id. at 70-72.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 78.
113. See id.
114. Not surprisingly, Russia defended the invasion as an exercise of self-defense to address
Georgian maltreatment ofRussian citizens in South Ossetia. Yet under the traditional view, only
one side may lawfully claim self-defense. As Dinstein suggests, "There is no self-defence from
self-defence." DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 178.
115. See ALVIN TOFFLER, The THIRD WAVE (1984) (describing transition from an industrial-
centric to an information-centric age).
1 16. Headquarters, Department ofthe Army, FM 3-0, Operations, at 2-2 (2008) (describing sit-
uations ofincreasing violence, including stable peace, unstable peace, insurgency and general war).
85
Low-Intensity Computer Network Attack and Self-Defense
117. Antoine Lemay, Jose M. Fernandeza & Scott Knight, Pinprick attacks, a lesser included
case?, in CONFERENCE ON CYBER CONFLICT, PROCEEDINGS 2010, at 183, 191 (Christian
Czosseck & Karlis Podins eds., 2010) [hereinafter Lemay et al.].
118. See id. at 190.
1 1 9. Gustavo De Las Casas, Destroying al-Qaeda Is Not an Option (Yet), FOREIGN POLICY.COM
(Nov. 10, 2009), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/ll/10/the_case_for_keeping_al
_qaeda?page=0,0 (noting that since 2001 40 percent of Al-Qaeda leadership has been killed or
captured).
120. See Lemay et al., supra note 1 17, at 190. Lemay and his co-authors describe conversion
capability as the ability of a State to transform strategic resources, such as knowledge and money,
into military advantage, usually through a military-industrial complex. Id.
121. See Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use
OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 2-2 (William A. Owens, Kenneth W. Dam & Herbert S. Lin eds.,
2009).
122. See id.
123. See Samuel Liles, Cyber Warfare: As a Form ofLow-Intensity Conflict and Insurgency, in
Conference on Cyber Conflict, supra note 1 17, at 47, 53 (quoting Bruce D. Berkowitz,
The New Face of War: How War Will Be Fought in the 2 1st Century 147 (2003)).
1 24. See Rain Ottis, From Pitchforks to Laptops: Volunteers in Cyber Conflicts, in CONFERENCE
on Cyber Conflict, supra note 1 17, at 97.
125. See id.
126. One wonders, however, whether unorganized or undisciplined hacktivists might
compromise the relative advantage ofdenying the target correlation through overly enthusias-
tic attacks.
127. DAVID A. BELL, THE FIRST TOTALWAR 24-25 (2007) (noting the eighteenth-century ad-
vent of a Western conceptual separation of military and civilian).
128. Lemay et al., supra note 1 17, at 188.
129. See LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK 166 (Keith E. Puis ed., 2005) (this publication of the US
Army's Judge Advocate General's School describes distinction as the "grandfather of all princi-
ples" of the law of war).
1 30. See, e.g., Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 31 14, 75 U.N.T.S. 3 1 ; Convention for the
Amelioration ofthe Condition ofWounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members ofArmed Forces at
Sea art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners ofWar art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time ofWar art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S.
287; Convention No. II with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 2, July 29,
1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247.
131. See Lemay et al., supra note 1 17, at 189; Liles, supra note 123, at 48-49.
1 32. Qiao Liang & Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (1999).
133. Thomas Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)?, 64 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 809 (1970).
134. Id. at 809.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 812.
137. Id. at 836.
1 38. See supra p. 59.
86
Sean Watts
139. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, US Department of State, Remarks at the Annual
Meeting ofthe American Society of International Law: The Obama Administration and Interna-
tional Law (Mar. 25, 2010), http://www.state.gOv/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm.
140. See supra pp. 68-69.
141. GRAY, supra note 32, at 28.
142. See DlNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 178; WlNGFIELD, supra note 76, at 40-41; UN CHARTER
COMMENTARY, supra note 59, at 663.
143. See Koh, supra note 139 (reciting the inherent right to self-defense to justify targeting
ofterror suspects). In a recently published account ofhis experience as State Department Legal
Adviser, Abraham Sofaer observes that no US president has ever accepted or is ever likely to ac-
cept a restrictive view of the right to self-defense. Sofaer explicitly rejects the notion "that a State
may exercise its right of self-defense only ifthe 'attack' is carried out by another State and occurs
on the territory ofthe State claiming the right to defend itself." Abraham Sofaer, The Reagan and
Bush Administrations, in SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY IN TIMES OF CRISIS, supra note 5 1 , at 55, 83.
144. See Louis Henkin, The Reports of the Death ofArticle 2(4) Are Greatly Exaggerated, 65
American Journal of International Law 544 (1971).
145. See id.
146. See Ottis, supra note 124, at 99-101.
147. STONE, supra note 16, at 104 (characterizing ambiguity of resort to force terminology as




Cyber Operations and the Jus in Bello:
Key Issues
Michael N.Schmitt*
On August 7, 2008, Georgian forces launched attacks into South Ossetia, in-
cluding against Russian troops who were in the breakaway region as
"peacekeepers." The jus ad bellum issues surrounding the conflict remain contro-
versial. 1 However, it is incontrovertible that once Georgian and Russian forces
became embroiled in hostilities against each other, an international armed conflict
subject to the jus in bello (international humanitarian law (IHL) or the law of
armed conflict) had begun.
During the conflict, numerous defacement and denial of service cyber opera-
tions were directed against Georgian entities. 2 The cyber targets included the
websites of the President; Parliament; Foreign Affairs, Defence and Education
ministries; domestic and foreign media; banks; and private Internet servers and
blogs. For instance, defacement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website in-
cluded the posting of a collage of photos of Adolf Hitler and Georgian President
Mikheil Saakashvili. Similarly, the site of the National Bank of Georgia was re-
placed with one depicting twentieth-century dictators together with Saakashvili.
On average, each operation lasted two hours. Although no physical damage or in-
juries were reported, the disruption of services proved severe. In particular, the
Georgian government found itself unable to broadcast information about the
* Chair of Public International Law, Durham University, United Kingdom.
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conflict and Georgian banks went off-line, as a self-imposed precautionary mea-
sure, for ten days.
The identity of the originators of the operations remains uncertain. As with
those against Estonia the previous year, most of the operations were traceable to
Russia but there was no conclusive evidence that the Russian government con-
ducted the attacks or was otherwise involved therein. While certain of them were
traceable to Russian government computers, the possibility that they were
"pwned," that is, taken over for the purpose of mounting attacks, cannot be ruled
out. Nevertheless, that a website containing potential Georgian cyber targets and
malicious software, StopGeorgia.ru, came on line within hours of the commence-
ment of hostilities aroused suspicions of governmental involvement.
Foreign governments and private sources promptly assisted the Georgians.
Google provided hosting services for Georgian sites, an important contribution in
light of its advanced security. The Georgian Ministry of Defence and Ministry of
Foreign Affairs websites were moved to US and Estonian servers, while the Polish
President made his website available for posting Georgian government informa-
tion about the conflict. Despite these efforts, the attacks significantly disrupted the
operation of the Georgian cyber infrastructure.
As the Georgia case illustrates, cyber operations have become embedded in
modern warfare. This article examines three central IHL issues raised by cyber op-
erations mounted during armed conflicts: the principle of distinction, direct par-
ticipation by civilians in hostilities and classification of conflict. It makes no effort
to explore thejus ad bellum, which is addressed by companion contributions to this
volume of the International Law Studies. As the normative architecture governing
cyber operations remains indistinct, it must be cautioned that the conclusions
drawn are those ofthe author alone and somewhat tentative. However, attention is
drawn to the ongoing efforts of a group of international experts working under the
auspices of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence to craft a
Manual on the International Law of Cyber Warfare? Said manual, albeit soft law,
will help clear much of the legal fog of cyber warfare.
Cyber Operations and the Principle ofDistinction
Article 48 of Additional Protocol I requires the parties to a conflict to "at all times
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian
objects and military objectives and accordingly direct their operations only against
military objectives." 4 In doing so, it restates the customary law principle of distinc-
tion, which has been labeled by the International Court of Justice as one of two
"cardinal" principles of IHL (the other being the prohibition of unnecessary
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suffering). 5 It is incontrovertible that the principle applies to cyber operations con-
ducted during an armed conflict.
The devil, however, is in the details. Note the term "operation" in Article 48. Its
use would at first glance appear to prohibit any cyber activity directed against civil-
ians or civilian objects. Yet operations aimed at the civilian population are not un-
common during armed conflict, the paradigmatic example being psychological
operations, which are generally deemed lawful unless they cause physical harm or
human suffering.
Subsequent articles resident in Additional Protocol I shed light on the founda-
tional intent of the principle of distinction. In particular, they "operationalize"
Article 48 by setting forth restrictions, prohibitions and requirements that are typ-
ically framed in terms of "attacks." Article 51.1 exemplifies this operationaliza-
tion. It states that the "civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy
general protection against dangers arising from military operations," but goes on
to note that " [t] o give effect to this protection, the following rules . . . shall be
observed in all circumstances." The rules include the prohibitions on making
the civilian population or individual civilians the "object of attack,"6 conducting
"indiscriminate attacks"7 and engaging in "attacks against the civilian population
or civilians byway ofreprisal." 8 Article 51 also illustrates the notion of "indiscrim-
inate" by reference to two types of operations. The first is "an attack . . . which
treats as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct mili-
tary objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar
concentration of civilians or civilian objects."9 The second is an expression of the
principle of proportionality, which bars "an attack which may be expected to
cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects,
or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated." 10
Other articles take the same approach. Article 52, the property counterpart to
Article 51's protection of civilians, forbids making civilian items the "object of at-
tack" and limits attacks to military objectives. 11 Article 54 notes that it is "prohib-
ited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensible to the
survival of the civilian population," 12 whereas Article 55 prohibits
a
[a]ttacks
against the natural environment by way of reprisals." 13 Article 56 provides that
" [w]orks or installations containing dangerous forces . . . shall not be made the ob-
ject of attack, even where these objects are military objectives, if such attack may
cause the release ofdangerous forces and consequent severe loss among the civilian
population." 14 It further provides that "[o]ther military objectives located at or in
the vicinity of these works or installations shall not be made the object of attack" if
the attack may result in similar consequences. 15
91
Cyber Operations and the Jus in Bello: Key Issues
A central component of the principle of distinction is that "[i]n the conduct of
military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, ci-
vilians and civilian objects." 16 Despite the reference to "operations," the norma-
tively meaningful aspects of the attendant requirements are set forth in terms of
attacks. Indeed, the article itself is titled "precautions in attack." According to the
article, "those who plan or decide upon an attack" are required to "do everything
feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian
objects and are not subject to special protection," 17 "take all feasible precautions in
the choice of means and methods of attack" in order to minimize civilian harm 18
and "refrain from deciding to launch an attack" that maybe expected to violate the
rule of proportionality. 19 "Attacks must be canceled or suspended if it becomes ap-
parent" that the intended target is not a military objective or ifthe strike would run
counter to proportionality limitations,20 and "effective advance warning shall be
given of attacks which may affect the civilian population" should circumstances
permit. 21 When considering possible targets, and choice is possible between them
without forfeiting military advantage, "the objective to be selected shall be that the
attack on which may be expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives and civil-
ian objects."22 None ofthe provisions ofArticle 57 maybe interpreted as "authoriz-
ing any attacks against the civilian population, civilians or civilian objects."23 The
focus on attacks appears again in the following article, which imposes an obligation
on defending parties to take "precautions against the effect of attacks" in order to
safeguard civilians and civilian objects. 24
The emphasis on restricting military operations by reference to attacks appears
repeatedly in other chapters of Additional Protocol I. For example, medical units
are not to be made the "object of attack" may not be used to "shield military objec-
tives from attack" and must be located, whenever possible, so that "attacks against
military objectives do not imperil their safety."25 Prohibitions exist on making
those hors de combat due to wounds or surrender and individuals parachuting
from a disabled aircraft an object of attack. 26 Combatants are obligated to "distin-
guish themselves from the civilian population while they are engaged in an attack
or in a military operation preparatory to attack" 21 and "[i]t is prohibited ... to
attack, by any means whatsoever, non-defended localities."28
As should be apparent, the reference to operations in Article 48 must be inter-
preted as bearing on a particular type of operation, an attack. Operations not
amounting to an attack, such as psychological operations, are generally accepted as
lawful.
But what is an attack? Article 49 ofAdditional Protocol I, in a provision that cer-
tainly reflects customary understandings of the term, defines attacks as "acts ofvio-
lence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence."29 The linkage between
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operations and violence is further revealed in the International Committee of the
Red Cross's (ICRC) Commentary to Article 48, which notes that "the word opera-
tion should be understood in the context of the whole section; it refers to military
operations during which violence is used."30 That Additional Protocol I and its of-
ficial commentary define both operations and attacks by reference to the notion of
violence further strengthens the conclusion that application ofthe principle of dis-
tinction generally depends on an attack having occurred and that an attack is an ac-
tion during armed conflict that is violent in nature.
Since the plain text ofArticle 49 appears to require a violent act for qualification
as an attack, by a strict textual interpretation, non-kinetic operations, i.e., opera-
tions which themselves do not comprise physical force, would be excluded. This
appeared to have been the prevailing interpretation at the time the Additional Pro-
tocol was drafted. As noted in Bothe, Partsch and Solfs (all involved in drafting the
Protocol) respected commentary on the provision: "The term 'acts ofviolence' de-
notes physical force. Thus, the concept of 'attacks' does not include dissemination
of propaganda, embargoes, or other non-physical means of psychological or eco-
nomic warfare."31 Similarly, the ICRC Commentary on Article 49 suggests that "the
term 'attack' means 'combat action.'"32
It must be remembered that although treaties are to be interpreted "in accor-
dance with the ordinary meaning to be given to their terms," said interpretations
must be made in "context and in the light of [their] object and purpose."33 At the
time Additional Protocol I was drafted, cyber operations did not exist; virtually all
military "attacks" employed means that released kinetic energy, as through an
explosion or the force of a bullet striking an individual. While the text ofArticle 49
is framed in terms of the nature of the act amounting to an attack, the drafters
must have been primarily concerned with its consequences for the civilian popu-
lation. Protection of the population was the Protocol's central "object and pur-
pose" with regard to the rules of targeting. "Violence" merely constituted useful
prescriptive shorthand for use in rules designed to shield the population from
harmful effects. Despite being styled as act-based norms (violence), they are in fact
consequence-based.
The text ofAdditional Protocol I's various rules developing the principle of dis-
tinction supports this conclusion. Article 51 sets out the general premise that civil-
ians "enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military operations"
and bars those acts or threats of violence "the primary purpose of which is to
spread terror among the civilian population."34 It also frames the principle of pro-
portionality by reference to expected "incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civil-
ians, damage to civilian objects," a formula repeated in Article 57.35 During
attacks, the precautions requirements of Article 57 mandate selection of methods
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and means of warfare in order to minimize "incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians and damage to civilian objects," 36 the issuance of warnings if an attack
may "affect the civilian population," 37 and choosing among potential targets in
part based on the goal of causing "the least danger to civilian lives and to civilian
objects."
s With regard to aerial and naval operations, attacks must take all reason-
able precautions "to avoid losses of Chilian lives and damage to civilian objects." 39
In other articles, the environment is protected against "widespread, long-term and
severe damage"40 and dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations are
protected out of concern for "severe losses among the civilian population."41
As these examples clearly illustrate, it is not the violence of the act that consti-
tutes the condition precedent to limiting the occurrence of an attack, but the vio-
lence of the ensuing result. In other words, the legal prohibition is on attacking,
rather than targeting, protected persons and objects. This interpretation should
not be considered novel, for it has always been the case that operations employing
biological contagions or chemicals have been characterized as attacks, even though
non-kinetic in nature, because their consequences could prove harmful, even le-
thal. Thus, Bothe, Partsch and Solf, despite the extract above from their classic
work, correctly defined attacks in a consequence-based fashion by asserting that
the term referred to "those aspects of military operations that most directly affect
the safety of the civilian population and the integrity of civilian objects."42
Cyber operations can unquestionably generate such consequences even though
they launch no physical force themselves. For instance, a cyber operation against
an air traffic control system would place aircraft, whether military or civilian, at
risk. Or one targeting a dam could result in the release ofwaters, thereby endanger-
ing persons and property downstream. In neither case would the actual act be
destructive, but in both the consequences would be. Referring back to the require-
ment of violence, and its development in Additional Protocol I, cyber operations
can therefore qualify as "attacks," even though they are not themselves "violent,"
because they have "violent consequences." A cyber operation, like any other opera-
tion, is an attack when resulting in death or injury of individuals, whether civil-
ians or combatants, or damage to or destruction of objects, whether military
objectives or civilian objects.
A cyber operation that is intended, but fails, to generate such results would be
encompassed in the concept, in much the same way that a rifle shot that misses its
target is nevertheless an attack in IHL. Similarly, one expected to cause collateral
damage to civilian objects or incidental harm to civilians would qualify, even if no
harm befell the military objective targeted. This latter point is somewhat unique to
cyber operations since lawful kinetic operations are typically intended to cause the
requisite harm to the target, with incidental harm to civilians being a by-product of
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the attack, as with civilians caught within the blast radius of a bomb employed
against a military facility. In a cyber operation, however, the target may not be
physically harmed at all, yet the operation could nevertheless result in collateral
damage or incidental injury, as in simply opening the floodgates of a dam.
By this interpretation, the operations against Georgia were not attacks and
therefore not unlawful under international humanitarian law. They involved dis-
ruption and defacement, but no physical harm to objects or injury to persons.
There is an alternative approach, one suggested by Dr. Knut Dormann of the
ICRC's legal division.43 Dormann points to the definition of military objectives in
Article 52.2 ofAdditional Protocol I, one generally accepted as the correct articula-
tion of customary law, as support for his position: "military objectives are limited
to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military ad-
vantage."44 Noting that the definition includes "neutralization," he suggests that
"[i]t is irrelevant whether an object is disabled through destruction or in any other
way."45 In doing so, he dispenses with the requirement for damage, destruction,
death or injury for an action to qualify as an attack. Consequently, the prohibition
on "attacking" civilians and civilian objects extends to cyber operations "targeting"
them. By the Dormann approach, many ofthe cyber operations conducted against
Georgia would qualify as "attacks" and those targeting civilian systems would be
unlawful under IHL.
The approach is not unreasonable in light of the severe non-physical harm that
can be caused by cyber operations. It responds to concerns that the other approach
is under-inclusive. However, Dormann's poses the opposite risk, that of over-
inclusivity. It would encompass, for instance, all denial of service attacks, including
those in which mere inconvenience resulted, as in the case of blocking a television
broadcast or university website. State practice provides no support for the notion
that causation of inconvenience is intended to be prohibited in IHL. On the con-
trary, inconvenience and interference with the daily lives of civilians are a frequent
result of armed conflict and psychological operations directed against the civilian
population are common. Dormann is to be commended for identifying the unsat-
isfactory result of limiting "attacks" to those operations causing death, injury,
damage or destruction, but his proposed remedy goes too far.
It also relies on law that is not directly on point. Military objectives are those objects
that may be attacked. But the preliminary question is whether an attack is being
conducted or contemplated. Only when that question is answered in the affirma-
tive does the definition of military objective come into play. The issue with regard
to the definition of military objectives is what may be attacked, not how or with
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what consequences. Moreover, the drafters envisioned "neutralization" in the con-
text of an attack. The term was included to encompass cases involving "an attack
for the purpose ofdenying the use ofan object to the enemy without necessarily de-
stroying it."46 Examples include using landmines to render an area of land impass-
able or firing antipersonnel munitions at enemy surface-to-air missile sites to force
gun crews to take cover while an air attack against other targets is under way.47
By the principle of distinction, civilian objects may not be attacked during
armed conflict. With respect to cyber operations, one unsettled issue is whether
data resident in computers comprise an "object." The implications of the answer
are momentous. To the extent they do, direct operations against civilian data
would constitute an unlawful attack on a civilian object. Further, any harm caused
to civilian data during a cyber attack on a lawful military objective would have to be
considered in the proportionality calculation and when determining the nature of
the precautions required during attack.
No definitive answer to this question exists. It would appear overbroad to
characterize all data as "objects." Surely a cyber operation that deletes an innocu-
ous e-mail or temporarily disrupts a television broadcast does not amount to an
unlawful attack on a civilian object. For instance, it is well-settled that an operation
employing electronic warfare to disrupt civilian media is lawful. It would make no
sense to distinguish between such an operation and a cyber operation that destroys
data to achieve precisely the same result.
Absent an agreed-upon interpretation in the cyber context, it is perhaps best to
tread lightly in characterizing data as an object. Doing so might be appropriate in
two situations. First, some data are directly transferable into tangible objects. For
instance, banking account data are designed to be immediately transformable into
money at an automatic teller machine. To the extent the data are destroyed, so too
is the tangible equivalent, the money. There are few examples ofsuch data. Second,
some data have intrinsic value. An example would be digital art. If the data are de-
stroyed, the art is as well. Presumably, it should be protected as civilian property
and in some cases as cultural property. But again, such cases are rare.
Generally, data should not be characterized as an object in itself. Rather, the de-
terminative question is whether the consequences attendant to its destruction in-
volve the requisite level of harm to protected physical objects or persons. If so, the
cyber operation constitutes an unlawful attack.
Cyber operations also bear on certain issues regarding application of the concept
of military objectives. Networking means that there is a much higher likelihood
that cyber systems will be dual-use (used for both military and civilian purposes),
and thereby qualify as military objectives. Similarly, military reliance on software
and hardware produced for the civilian population arguably renders facilities
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that produce them lawfully targetable war-supporting military objectives. And,
since cyber systems are essential to the economy, certain of them may constitute
war-sustaining objects, which the United States, as distinct from most other coun-
tries, characterizes as military objectives.48
The cyber operations against Georgia illustrate these points. In no case did the
operations qualify as "attacks" under IHL, since no physical damage or injury re-
sulted. But assuming solely for the sake of analysis that they did, some, such as
those against Ministry of Defence servers, would have been lawful as directed
against military objectives (although the hacktivists enjoyed no belligerent right to
engage in hostilities in the first place). Others, such as those targeting the Ministry
of Education and media facilities, would have violated IHL proscriptions.
Additionally, the operations against Georgia illustrate two practical aspects of
cyber operations. First, it is likely that attackers will target "soft sites," that is, sites
that are not well-secured. The most vulnerable are those in the civilian or non-
security governmental sectors. In future conflicts, attacks on civilian cyber targets
are therefore highly likely. Second, the attacks on the banking system illustrate the
appeal of targeting objects that might fall into the contentious "war-sustaining"
category. For instance, it would be simpler and less risky to undermine a State's oil
export capacity with cyber attacks that disrupt storage and distribution than to
physically destroy the facilities and the transportation links upon which export de-
pends. This is especially so when a State is capable of effectively defending against
traditional kinetic attacks.
Cyber Operations and Direct Participation in Hostilities
Those who qualify as combatants enjoy the belligerent right of engaging in hostili-
ties; no reason exists to distinguish cyber from kinetic military operations in this
regard. However, cyber operations do present some difficulty as to application of
the rules regarding direct participation by civilians in hostilities. According to
Article 51.3 ofAdditional Protocol I, "civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded
by this Section [which addresses the conduct of hostilities], unless and for such
time as they take a direct part in hostilities." A comparable provision exists for
non-international armed conflict, and the notion is undoubtedly customary in
nature.49 The consequence of the rule is that civilians may be targeted while they
directly participate in hostilities. Additionally, such direct participants do not fac-
tor into either the proportionality analysis or precautions in attack requirements.
The question, then, is when do civilians who participate in cyber, as distinct
from kinetic, operations become direct participants in hostilities.
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Analysis begins by determining whether the individuals concerned qualify as
members ofthe armed forces. If so, the direct participation rules do not apply since
they may be targeted directly even when not participating in hostilities. In its Inter-
pretive Guidance on the Notion ofDirect Participation in Hostilities, the ICRC has in-
cluded organized armed groups belonging to a party to the conflict in the category
of armed forces. 50 Although the Guidance has proven controversial in other re-
spects, 51 consensus existed among the experts convened to develop the product
that it was appropriate to treat organized armed groups in the same manner as the
armed forces for the purposes of targeting law.
But when do hackers and non-military groups engaging in cyber operations
qualify as organized armed groups? By definition, an organized armed group must
be both organized and armed. With regard to the former criterion, the most trou-
blesome question is whether a group may be "organized virtually." In the virtual
domain, groups exist whose members never have any physical contact. Such
groups have many purposes—social, educational, financial, charitable and so
forth. In fact, it is not rare for dispersed military personnel to organize themselves
virtually, as in the case of intelligence sharing.
IHL does not develop the notion of organization to the degree necessary to
come to definitive conclusions regarding virtual organization. The ICRC's Com-
mentary to Additional Protocol I notes that
[t]he term "organized" is obviously rather flexible, as there are a large number of de-
grees of organization. In the first place, this should be interpreted in the sense that the
fighting should have a collective character, be conducted under proper control and ac-
cording to rules, as opposed to individuals operating in isolation with no correspond-
ing preparation or training.52
Drawing on this definition, at one end of the continuum would be those "groups"
consisting of autonomous actors who are simply all targeting a State, perhaps in
response to a broad call to do so from one or more sources. They do not operate
under the direction of a particular individual nor does the group have any formal
organizational structure. These groups cannot be deemed to be organized, and,
therefore, individuals involved therein remain civilians subject to the rules of di-
rect participation.
At the other end are those who act collectively and cooperatively. Albeit virtual,
an online group may have a defined command structure and coordinate its
activities—for instance, by allocating cyber targets, developing and sharing hacker
tools, cooperating in identifying target vulnerabilities and conducting postattack
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damage assessments. There is little justification for excluding groups of this nature
from "armed forces" on the basis of organization.
A possible counterargument is that the requirement of organization is intended
to allow for enforcement of IHL. However, such an assertion confuses a require-
ment of organization for the purposes of prisoner of war status and for qualifica-
tion as a party to the conflict with the norms applicable to targeting. As noted in the
Interpretive Guidance,
it would contradict the logic of the principle of distinction to place irregular armed
forces under the more protective legal regime afforded to the civilian population
merely because they fail to . . . conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and
customs of war. Therefore, even under the terms of the Hague Regulations and the
Geneva Conventions, all armed actors showing a sufficient degree ofmilitary organiza-
tion and belonging to a party to the conflict must be regarded as part of the armed
forces of that party.53
The difficult case lies between these extremes, that of an informal grouping of
individuals who act with shared purpose. For instance, they access a common
website containing tools and vulnerable targets but do not coordinate their attacks.
Whether a group of this nature meets the organization criterion should depend on
such context-specific factors as the existence of a formal or informal leadership en-
tity directing the group's activities in a general sense, identifying potential targets
and maintaining an inventory of effective hacker tools. In most cases, collective ac-
tion alone would not satisfy the organization criterion. However, as activities be-
gan to resemble those of a cooperative group, it is increasingly likely that States
would treat said group as an "armed force," rather than a collection of civilian
direct participants.
An organized group must also be "armed" to qualify as an armed force. The log-
ical construction of "armed" is that the group carries out "attacks," as that term is
understood in IHL. After all, while certain members of the armed forces, or even
certain components thereof, may have no "violent" function, the concept ofarmed
forces makes no sense in the absence of a group purpose ofviolence. This interpre-
tation is further supported by the notion of "combatants" (who enjoy the belliger-
ent privilege of attacking lawful targets) since they are also defined as members of
the armed forces.54 Without a group purpose of engaging in attacks, whether cyber
or kinetic, the members ofan organized virtual group remain civilians to whom the
rules of direct participation apply. Accordingly, a group that conducts cyber opera-
tions not amounting to attacks (whether directed at military or civilian targets) is
but a collection of civilians. To the extent the activities of individual members of
the group constitute direct participation in hostilities, they become targetable. Of
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course, the reach of the adjective "armed" depends on the interpretation adopted
vis-a-vis the term "attack."
The Interpretive Guidance adds two qualifiers to the notion of organized armed
groups, both ofwhich have proven controversial. First, in order to be treated as the
armed forces, the group must "belong to a party to the conflict," which requires "at
least a defacto relationship" between the group and a party to the conflict. 55 The re-
lationship can be either declared or "expressed through tacit agreement or conclu-
sive behaviour that makes it clear for which party the group is fighting."56 This
requirement has correctly been criticized on the basis that the critical issue in tar-
geting is not the entity for whom the potential target is fighting, but rather against
whom that group is engaged in hostilities. However, assuming for the sake of anal-
ysis that the requirement applies, it would exclude those organized armed groups
in an international armed conflict that might be directing cyber attacks against one
of the parties for reasons other than support of the opposing party. According to
the ICRC, such attacks might nevertheless amount to a separate non-international
armed conflict between the group and the target State, although this approach has
equally been the subject of criticism. 57 Presumably, the criterion would also ex-
clude patriotic hacker groups unaffiliated with one ofthe belligerent parties, even if
conducting cyber attacks for its benefit, because the group's activities would lack
the "agreement" of that party and its actions would in no other way be attributable
to the party under the law of State responsibility. 58
The second qualifier found in the Interpretive Guidance is that only members of
an organized armed group who have a "continuous combat function" qualify as
members of the armed forces for targeting purposes. 59 A continuous combat func-
tion is a duty that would meet the requirements of direct participation if the indi-
vidual concerned was not a group member. Whether group members engaged in
cyber operations have a continuous combat function depends on application ofthe
direct participation criteria set forth below.
This criterion is controversial, with critics arguing that it affords greater protec-
tion to members of organized armed groups, who enjoy no right to engage in hos-
tilities, than official members ofthe armed forces, who do. 60 As a general matter the
criterion is no more compelling in the cyber context than in that ofphysical opera-
tions. This is so because it derives from concern over the possible difficulty of dis-
tinguishing group members from civilians on the battlefield.61 This prospect is
especially likely during cyber operations, in which the identity of those who have
launched an operation may be uncertain or where the military and civilian cyber
communities share networks and transmission assets. Yet, difficult as distinction
may sometimes be, IHL already contains a presumption of civilian status in the
case of doubt, thereby obviating the need to impose the continuous combat
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function criterion.62 That presumption would apply equally to those engaging in
cyber hostilities.
In the case of Georgia, there appear to have been no organized armed cyber
groups. The attacks do not seem to have been coordinated, nor is there any com-
pelling evidence of an overarching group structure. Further, the attacks were not
"armed" in the sense that they did not cause physical damage to property or injury
to individuals. Therefore, individuals engaged in conducting them would at most
have qualified as direct participants in hostilities, who may have been targeted for
such time as they directly participated.
The key issues regarding direct participation surround 1 ) the nature of direct
participation and 2) the duration of the "for such time" window. The Interpretive
Guidance suggests three cumulative constitutive elements that must be present be-
fore an act amounts to direct, as distinct from indirect, participation in hostilities.
First, the act must "be likely to adversely affect the military operations or military
capacity of a party to an armed conflict, or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury or
destruction on persons or objects protected against direct attack" (threshold of
harm). Second, "there must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm
likely to result either from that act, or from a coordinated military operation of
which that act constitutes an integral part" (direct causation). Finally, the act must
be specifically designed to "directly cause the required threshold ofharm in support
of a party to the conflict and to the detriment of another" (belligerent nexus).63 In
the cyber context, any act that directly impedes a belligerent's military operations
or capabilities or constitutes an attack on protected persons or objects would qual-
ify as direct participation so long as a nexus existed between the act and the armed
conflict. Examples would include cyber military intelligence gathering, disrupting
enemy cyber networks and manipulating data in the enemy's military systems.
These requirements are generally deemed acceptable, although disagreement
does exist at their margins.64 For instance, it has been suggested that the "thresh-
old of harm" criterion be extended to include operations designed to enhance
one's own capabilities. An example would be developing cyber defenses or identi-
fying cyber vulnerabilities in military cyber systems. The second element, causal-
ity, is equally necessary, but many critics of the Guidance took issue with its
example of assembling improvised explosive devices as indirect causation. Similar
objections would be raised if the analogous case of developing software specific to
a particular cyber operation or enemy system were characterized as indirect, vice
direct, causation.
The major issue presented by the Interpretive Guidance centered on the meaning
of the phrase "for such time," referring to the period during which a direct partici-
pant is susceptible to lawful attack. The phrase has long been the subject of
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controversy, with critics alleging that it created a "revolving door."65 In other
words, while a direct participant is deploying to and from an operation, he may be
attacked. However, once he successfully returns home he regains the full immunity
from attack that civilians enjoy, at least until such time as he deploys again to di-
rectly participate in hostilities. Although the ICRC has argued that this dynamic is
not a malfunction of IHL,66 critics point out that it creates an imbalance between
the direct participant and the member ofthe regular armed forces, since the latter is
open to attack at any time based solely on his status. In the view of the critics, these
individuals should be deemed to be directly participating for such time as they reg-
ularly engage in acts of hostilities; there should be no periods ofimmunity from at-
tack between the qualifying acts.
Cyber operations bring this issue into even greater focus. First, there may be
no "deployment" at all since only a computer, and not proximity to the target, is
required to mount the operations. The restrictive interpretation of the for such
time criterion would suggest that the direct participant can only be attacked while
actually launching the operation. This is problematic in that many cyber opera-
tions last mere minutes, perhaps only seconds. Such a requirement would effec-
tively extinguish the right to strike at direct participants. Moreover, the effect of a
cyber operation may be long-delayed, as in the case of a surreptitiously emplaced
logic bomb. Would the target of such an operation only be entitled to attack the
direct participant while the logic bomb is being emplaced? The problem is that the
very point ofthese operations is to avoid detection. Therefore, from a practical per-
spective, there would appear to be no window of opportunity for the victim of an
attack to respond. In the cyber conflict environment, therefore, the only reason-
able interpretation of "for such time" is that it encompasses the entire period dur-
ing which the direct cyber participant is engaging in repeated cyber operations.
Cyber Operations as Armed Conflict
Cyber operations are a particularly attractive means of targeting an opponent, for
the technology necessary to conduct them is cheap and accessible. In particular,
they represent an effective method for a weaker State to strike at a technologically
more advanced, and therefore more vulnerable, adversary. But do cyber operations
comprise "armed conflict," as that term is used in IHL? This is "the" threshold
question, for IHL does not apply in the absence of armed conflict.
When cyber operations are merely one aspect of an ongoing armed conflict,
they must comport with the IHL applicable to that category of armed conflict. For
instance, because the conflict between Russia and Georgia was international in
character, the ensuing cyber operations were subject to the law of international
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armed conflict. Any operations qualifying as attacks under that body oflaw would,
if directed at civilians, constitute violations of IHL and war crimes.
The difficult case involves cyber operations that take place in the absence of
kinetic hostilities. Can they constitute an armed conflict, and, if so, what type? Un-
fortunately, IHL treaty law does not define the phrase "armed conflict" per se.
Rather, it only expands on the two subcategories of armed conflict, international
and non-international armed conflict.
As to international armed conflict, Common Article 2 to the four 1949 Geneva
Conventions is traditionally viewed as the proper articulation ofthe scope ofinter-
national armed conflict: "all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties."67 In ex-
plaining the article's reach, the ICRC's commentary thereon notes that
[a]ny difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention ofmembers
ofthe armed forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2, even ifone of
the Parties denies the existence of a state of war. It makes no difference how long the
conflict lasts, how much slaughter takes place, or how numerous are the participating
forces.
68
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has like-
wise opined that "an armed conflict exists whenever there is resort to force between
States."69
This threshold must not be confused with that ofan "armed attack," the condi-
tion precedent for acts in self-defense under the jus ad bellum. 70 The International
Court of Justice (ICJ) described armed attacks in the Nicaragua case as involving
certain "scale and effects," which excluded "a mere frontier incident."71 Under
IHL, however, an "international armed conflict" commences whenever an armed
exchange between States occurs, regardless ofthe scale and effects ofthe hostilities.
Applied to cyber operations, it is clear that any operation by or attributable to a
State that results in damage to or destruction of objects or injury to or death of in-
dividuals of another State would commence an international armed conflict. This
is because they constitute attacks under IHL. More problematic from a classifica-
tion of conflict point ofview are cyber operations causing no damage or injury, but
instead merely inconvenience, disruption, disorder or irritation. The results of
such operations might nevertheless be severe, as in significant interference with the
economy, transportation system or other critical infrastructure.
One possibility is to limit international armed conflict to situations in which
"attacks" have occurred. Since attacks are "acts of violence," 72 doing so would
comport with the fact that IHL only applies once a conflict is "armed," as well as
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with the ICRC Commentary's reference to intervention by the armed forces. Al-
though uncontested occupation and detention also constitute armed conflict while
harming neither persons nor objects, 73 they both rely on the possibility of enforce-
ment through the use of force. By this interpretation, non-destructive computer
network exploitation, espionage, denial of service attacks and other invasive but
non-destructive cyber operations would not initiate an armed conflict. The di-
lemma is that in practice States targeted by non-destructive, yet otherwise severe,
attacks might treat the operations as armed conflict that justified, for instance, ki-
netic attacks on their enemies' military objectives and combatants.
A second possibility for classification ofevents involving cyber operations is one
based on the more liberal Dormann definition of attacks, which includes opera-
tions targeting civilians and civilian objects irrespective ofwhether they were phys-
ically damaged or injured. Because directing operations against protected persons
or objects constitutes an attack by this interpretation, an international armed con-
flict would commence once a State or those under its control launched them. How-
ever, the position is arguably over-inclusive in that by focusing on the target of an
operation, it has no means to distinguish non-destructive "attacks" from non-
destructive military operations that fail to qualify as attacks, such as lawful psycho-
logical operations directed at the civilian population.
Both approaches have merit, the former in its fidelity to received understand-
ings of IHL, the latter in that it would respond to concerns that the traditional un-
derstanding is under-inclusive since it admits ofhighly disruptive cyber operations
to which IHL would not apply. As it stands, though, the former represents lex lata,
the latter lexferenda.
A major complication is the current prevalence of cyber operations by non-
State actors, as in the case ofthe Georgia-Russia conflict. Such actions will typically
take on the character ofthe kinetic conflict under way and be dealt with by the rele-
vant rules of targeting, especially those governing direct participation by civilians
in hostilities. However, a classification dilemma arises when cyber operations are
conducted by non-State actors in the absence of related kinetic operations.
The issue of attribution of a non-State actor's acts to a State is complex. The tra-
ditional test was set forth by the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua
case. There, the Court articulated the "effective control" test. It held that
United States participation, even ifpreponderant or decisive, in the financing, organiz-
ing, training, supplying and equipping of the contras [Nicaraguan guerrillas], the selec-
tion of its military or paramilitary targets, and the planning of the whole of its
operation, is still insufficient ... for the purpose of attributing to the United States the
acts committed by the contras .... All the forms of United States participation men-
tioned above, and even the general control by the respondent State over a force with a
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high degree of dependency on it, would not in themselves mean, without further evi-
dence, that the United States directed or enforced the perpetration ofthe acts contrary
to human rights and humanitarian law alleged by the applicant State. Such acts could
well be committed by members ofthe contras without the control ofthe United States.
For this conduct to give rise to legal responsibility of the United States, it would in
principle have to be proved that that State had effective control of the military or para-
military operations in the course ofwhich the alleged violations were committed.74
This test was reaffirmed by the Court in the Congo and Genocide cases. 75 However,
although the test is often cited with regard to conflict classification, the actual issue
in Nicaragua was State responsibility for alleged actions of the contras.
By contrast, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY dealt with the issue of conflict
classification directly in Tadic. Explicitly rejecting the effective control test, it held
that the authority ofthe Federal Republic ofYugoslavia over the Bosnian Serb armed
groups "required by international law for considering the armed conflict to be in-
ternational was overall control going beyond the mere financing and equipping of
such forces and involving also participation in the planning and supervision of
military operations."76
The debate over the applicable standard remains unsettled. Nevertheless, there
is no question but that a State may be responsible for the actions of non-State ac-
tors and that such responsibility may result in the existence of an international
armed conflict. Therefore, when a State directs particular cyber attacks by non-
State actors {Nicaragua) or (perhaps) participates in general planning and supervi-
sion (Tadic) of such attacks, an international armed conflict comes into being be-
tween the target State and the State exercising control over the attackers. By
contrast, no armed conflict commences when a State simply tolerates or sympa-
thizes with cyber attacks emanating from its territory, although the State may be in
breach of its international legal obligation to "police" its territory to ensure it is not
used to the detriment of other States. 77
Determining whether a cyber operation conducted in the absence of kinetic
operations comprises non-international armed conflict is more challenging still.
Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions styles non-international armed
conflicts as those that are "not of an international character."78 Specifically, non-
international armed conflict is that which occurs between a State and organized
armed groups or between such groups. Two criteria exist—organization and
intensity.
Organization has been dealt with earlier with regard to qualification as an orga-
nized armed group vis-a-vis the rules of direct participation. The criterion would
rule out any attacks mounted by either individual "hackers" or groups of hackers
who lack the necessary degree oforganization as non-international armed conflict.
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Such attacks would therefore be governed by domestic criminal law and human
rights norms, not IHL. As to "virtually" organized groups, the analysis set forth
above would apply. To the extent the group in question qualified as an organized
armed group, the first criterion for non-international armed conflict would be met.
Non-international armed conflicts must also evidence a certain degree of inten-
sity. Unlike international armed conflict, non-international armed conflict re-
quires more than mere limited hostilities. In particular, "internal disturbances and
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a
similar nature" are excluded from the ambit of such conflict. 79 According to the
ICTY in the Tadic case, non-international armed conflicts involve "protracted
armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or
between such groups within a State,"80 a definition embraced by the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and present in the Statute of the International
Criminal Court. 81
This criterion would keep most cyber attacks (in the absence of kinetic opera-
tions) from qualifying as non-international armed conflict. In particular, the pro-
tracted requirement would rule out individual or sporadic attacks irrespective of
their destructiveness. Moreover, non-destructive cyber operations would, as dis-
cussed, be unlikely to even qualify as armed conflict at all. Given the intensity crite-
rion, they certainly would not with regard to non-international armed conflict.
The result is that cyber attacks conducted against a State must be quite intense be-
fore constituting a non-international armed conflict.
It should finally be noted that, although Additional Protocol II also addresses
non-international armed conflict for States party thereto, it only applies when an
organized armed group involved in the conflict "exercise [s] such control over a
part of a State's territory that it can "carry out sustained and concerted military
operations."82 Obviously, a group conducting solely cyber operations against a
State would fail to meet this requirement.
Concluding Thoughts
This article has but scratched the surface ofthe many problematic issues surround-
ing application of IHL to cyber operations. Three were singled out for attention
and of these none was fully resolved. The dilemma is that IHL was crafted during a
period in which the cyber operations were but science fiction. However, today no
modern military enters the battlespace without at least some reliance on comput-
ers and computer networks. For the modern military, cyber capabilities represent
both force multipliers and vulnerabilities. And as demonstrated in the case of the
Georgia-Russia conflict, civilian cyber assets are an especially attractive target set,
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not only for militaries, but also for individuals or groups intent on involvement in
the conflict in question.
IHL must respond to the challenges posed by this new technology. The past de-
cade has witnessed numerous efforts, in particular by the Naval War College, to
identify challenges posed by cyber warfare to the extant norms ofIHL, and to inter-
national law more generally.83 Today, practitioners and scholars are increasingly
sensitive to the challenges, such as those set forth in this article, of applying IHL to
cyber operations.84 Hopefully, the next decade will witness their resolution by the
legal, operational and policy communities.
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Who May Be Held? Military Detention
through the Habeas Lens
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Who lawfully may be held in military custody without criminal charge? It
seems a simple question, and in some settings it is. But in the settings
that matter most at the moment—counterterrorism and counterinsurgency—it is
not simple at all. The very metrics of legality are disputed in those contexts, with
sharp disagreement regarding which bodies of law are relevant and what if any-
thing each actually says about the detention-scope issue.
This problem has been with us for some time. It has lurked in the background of
US detention operations in Afghanistan since 2001 l and in Iraq since 2003. 2 It is
central, of course, to the controversies surrounding the use of detention at Guan-
tanamo and in the United States itself.3 More than one hundred thousand individ-
uals have been detained without criminal charge across these settings,4 giving rise
to an immense amount of scholarship, advocacy and litigation along the way. Re-
markably, however, the question of who lawfully may be detained remains
unsettled in important respects.
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Who May Be Held? Military Detention through the Habeas Lens
The problem exists along two distinct dimensions, only one of which do I ad-
dress in this article. First, we have indeterminacy at the group level insofar as there
is disagreement with respect to whether any authority to use military detention
that the US government may currently possess extends to any entities other than al
Qaeda and the Taliban, and also insofar as there is disagreement regarding which
entities are sufficiently affiliated with al Qaeda or the Taliban so as to be indistin-
guishable from them for purposes of this inquiry. 5 Even if we had agreement re-
garding which groups are relevant for purposes of the detention issue, however,
indeterminacy also manifests at the individual level insofar as we also lack agree-
ment regarding the mix of conditions that are necessary or sufficient to justify the
detention of a particular person. My aim in this article is to shed light solely on this
individualized set of questions.
That we lack consensus with respect to individualized detention criteria and
constraints despite nearly a decade's worth of litigation and debate to some extent
reflects our preoccupation with other questions associated with military deten-
tion, above all the seven years' war over the habeas jurisdiction of federal courts
in relation to the Guantanamo detainees.6 Yet even prior to the resolution of that
jurisdictional dispute in the Supreme Court's 2008 decision in Boumediene v.
Bush, 7 courts did have several occasions to address the detention-scope issue; they
just did not develop a consensus as a result. On the contrary, they splintered
sharply in those cases, advancing an array of incompatible views regarding the ap-
plicable law. 8
Matters have improved to some extent in the aftermath of Boumediene.9 Many
district and circuit court judges have had a chance to address who lawfully may be
detained in the context of the Guantanamo habeas litigation. Their decisions re-
flect a consensus that the government does have authority to detain without crim-
inal charge in at least some circumstances, and that (at least for most ofthe judges)
these circumstances at a minimum include at least some scenarios involving per-
sons who are "part of al Qaeda or the Taliban (whether the consensus extends to
membership in other groups is much less clear). But beyond these points disagree-
ment reigns.
Whether a person is "part of a group may be an administrable inquiry in the
context of a regular armed force, but it does not map easily onto scenarios involv-
ing clandestine non-State actors with indistinct and unstable organizational struc-
tures. As a result, judges who agree that members of such groups may be detained
do not necessarily agree as to what conduct actually counts as membership in this
context. And the judges most definitely have not reached consensus with respect to
whether detention lawfully may be used in the distinct situation in which a non-
member provides support to these groups. Indeed, the executive branch itselfnow
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appears divided on the propriety ofusing support as a stand-alone detention predi-
cate. Perhaps most remarkably, an apparent consensus as to the relevance of the
laws of war to these questions recently came unglued, with a divided panel of the
D.C. Circuit Court ofAppeals declaring that the matter should turn exclusively on
domestic law considerations 10 and a subsequent assertion by a majority of the ac-
tive judges of that court in turn declaring that assertion to be dicta. 11
All ofwhich is interesting in the seminar setting, but does any of it actually mat-
ter in practice? That is not a frivolous question. By and large the merits determina-
tions in the Guantanamo habeas cases have turned on the sufficiency of the
government's evidence (or lack thereof), and not on the legal boundaries of the
government's notional detention authority. 12 For better or worse, moreover, habeas
jurisdiction has not (yet) been extended to overseas military detention operations
involving non-citizens at locations other than Guantanamo, 13 and thus one might
be tempted to conclude that any problems resulting from the judiciary's persistent
inability to resolve the detention-scope question will be confined to a finite and
shrinking set of cases.
In fact, the question ofwho lawfully maybe detained matters a great deal in ac-
tual practice. As a threshold matter, the two premises mentioned above may prove
to be incorrect. Much Guantanamo habeas litigation is yet to come, and it may well
be that future cases will turn on this very issue. Similarly, the precise boundaries of
habeas jurisdiction have not yet been fixed; though currently jurisdiction does not
extend to Afghanistan, that question remains the subject of live litigation. 14 Even if
those premises remain valid, however, other considerations ensure the relevance of
the detention-scope question.
First, the answers judges give to this question have spillover effects beyond the
immediate context of habeas. 15 They overhang any other detention operations
conducted under the rubric ofthe same underlying detention authority, regardless
ofwhether those operations are subject to judicial review; government and military
lawyers will not simply ignore judicial pronouncements regarding the scope ofthat
authority, and may be expected to advise commanders and policymakers accord-
ingly. By the same token, judicial decisions regarding the notional scope of deten-
tion authority may apply by extension to questions of targeting with lethal force in
the field pursuant to that same authority, notwithstanding that targeting decisions
ordinarily are not directly subject to judicial review. 16 Future conflicts unrelated to
9/11 may also be impacted. The judges in the habeas litigation at times have in-
cluded in their analyses interpretations ofkey terms and concepts from both inter-
national and domestic law—such as "direct participation in hostilities" and "all
necessary and appropriate force"—that will be relevant in most if not all future
armed conflicts.
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Taking all of this together, we can see that the judges in the habeas litigation are
not merely deciding whether to grant the writ in particular cases. They have be-
come, for better or worse, the central US government institution engaged in the
critical—and ultimately unavoidable—task of tailoring the laws governing mili-
tary activity to suit the increasingly important scenario in which States classify
clandestine non-State actors as strategic threats requiring a military response.
The paper proceeds in three parts. I begin at a high level of abstraction in Part I
by drawing attention to two strands ofdebate that greatly complicate the task ofde-
termining whether particular detention criteria are forbidden, required or permit-
ted by law: (i) disagreement regarding which bodies of law actually apply in a
particular instance, and (ii) disagreement as to what a particular body oflaw has to
say, if anything, when it comes to employing particular criteria in a detention
standard.
Against this backdrop, Part II provides a comprehensive descriptive account of
how judges since 2002 have addressed the question ofindividual detention criteria,
emphasizing that which has been settled and that which remains in dispute. In
brief, judges largely (though not entirely) agree that detention authority lawfully
extends to persons who are functional members of al Qaeda, the Taliban or associ-
ated forces, but they do not agree as to what membership means in this setting or
whether detention authority also extends to non-members who provide support to
such groups. Part III concludes with a discussion of whether this lingering uncer-
tainty truly matters (it does, on many levels) and, if so, what should be done about
it (legislation, preferably).
L Contested Metrics ofLegality
Nearly a decade has passed since the United States began employing military de-
tention without criminal charge in circumstances relating to al Qaeda and the
Taliban. Nonetheless, the question ofwho lawfully maybe held in that manner—if
anyone—remains the subject of bitter disagreement.
Before examining how litigants and judges have attempted to resolve these dis-
agreements in the habeas setting, it is worth pausing to describe why, at a high level
of abstraction, the parties to these debates so often appear to be speaking past one
another. There are two overarching problems that contribute to that state of affairs.
First, there is disagreement at the threshold with respect to which bodies of law
actually apply to this question. Should it be answered solely with reference to do-
mestic law? Law of armed conflict (LOAC)? International human rights law
(IHRL)? We might call this the "domain" debate. Second, with respect to each of
these potentially applicable bodies of law, there is disagreement as to what if
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anything it has to say regarding which detention predicates and constraints are
necessary or permissible. We might call this the "content" debate.
I do not propose to settle the domain and content debates here, nor even to en-
gage them in a comprehensive way. Rather, my goal simply is to orient the reader to
their basic features. Combined with the typology of detention predicates and con-
straints provided in the preceding Part, this will equip the reader to fully appreciate
the points of consensus and disagreement emerging from the habeas litigation
discussed in Part II.
A.The Domain Debate: Disagreement Regarding Which Bodies ofLaw Apply
Which bodies oflaw are relevant with respect to the detention-scope question? The
answer to this question of course may depend on the circumstances, and thus it
may be most accurate to say that there are many answers to it rather than just one.
But in any event, the candidate legal regimes include domestic law (statutory or
constitutional), LOAC (or international humanitarian law) and IHRL.
1. Domestic Law
At one extreme, the question of who lawfully may be held might require solely a
domestic law analysis. On this view, for example, one might first consider what the
September 18, 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force 17 (AUMF) has to say
about the topic—or, ifyou prefer, what might be gleaned from the Constitution as
a direct source of detention power 18—and then take note of any other limitations
that might be derived from the Constitution, other statutes, or prior US caselaw. If
the government's claim of detention authority is consistent with these sources, the
debate ends.
Of course, treaties are part of domestic law in the sense that the Constitution
makes them supreme law of the land. 19 Thus the "domestic-only" viewpoint does
not necessarily exclude consideration ofLOAC and IHRL instruments. Insofar as
those treaties are not self-executing or have been "unexecuted" by a subsequent
statute, however, some argue that they are relevant solely in a diplomatic sense. 20
At least with respect to IHRL instruments, moreover, the US government has long
maintained the position that they simply do not apply to US government conduct
occurring outside of formal US territory.21
In any event, the notion of a purely domestic approach to determining the legal
boundaries of detention authority is no mere academic invention. As we will see in
Part II below, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals adopted precisely this view in its
January 2010 decision Al-Bihani v. Obama. There are, however, other models.
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2. The Law ofArmed Conflict
The second model accepts the legal rather than just the diplomatic relevance of
LOAC. On this view, LOAC might matter in either of two ways, one weak and one
strong. First, on the weak view, LOAC must be considered when interpreting the
AUMF (or, for that matter, when interpreting the scope of authority conferred
directly by the Constitution). 22 Consistent with the Charming Betsy canon, for ex-
ample, one would look to LOAC in order to flesh out the meaning of the AUMF's
language "all necessary and appropriate force" as it relates to detention.23 Alterna-
tively, on the strong view, LOAC might be treated as a legally binding constraint in
its own right, independent of the best reading of the underlying domestic source
of authority.
It is not clear that the difference between the weak and strong models matters in
the context ofthe scope-of-detention issue. The difference might matter where the
underlying domestic source is so clear that there is no occasion for a LOAC-based
interpretation, thus making the weak but not the strong model inapplicable. But
that hardly seems to be the case here, given the relative lack of clarity ofthe domes-
tic sources involved. Applied in this setting, in other words, both the weak and
strong models would direct us to look to LOAC to define the scope of the
government's detention authority.
All that said, LOAC is not automatically relevant in in all circumstances. It is,
rather, applicable in circumstances of "armed conflict."24 In order to determine
LOAC's field of application, one must identify and define the scope of"armed con-
flict"—tasks that generate considerable disputes. Some scholars reference func-
tional criteria involving the duration, intensity and nature ofthe violence at issue,25
while others also emphasize the formal categorization of the asserted "enemy" in
terms of its status as a "state, nation, belligerent, or insurgent group."26 Even when
one accepts that a state of armed conflict justifying application of LOAC exists in
one particular location, moreover, there is considerable disagreement as to
whether and when any resulting rules can or must be applied in relation to persons
in geographically distinct locations.27 Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that the
most fundamental divide separating the legal positions ofthe Bush and Obama ad-
ministrations from the views of critics in the international law community has to
do with the propositions that (i) the activities of al Qaeda rise to the level ofarmed
conflict in places other than Afghanistan and (ii) in any event the existence of
armed conflict in Afghanistan permits reliance on LOAC concepts against al
Qaeda-related individuals in other locations. 28
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3. International Human Rights Law
The third model tracks the second, but looks to IHRL rather than LOAC. That is to
say, one can advance both a weak (interpretation-based) and strong (independent-
force) model of IHRL's relevance to the scope question.
Either way, the key point of departure for debate regarding the relevance of
IHRL involves the question of extraterritoriality. For present purposes, the most
relevant IHRL treaty is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR),29 which, as discussed below, contains language relating to detention.30
Article 2 of the ICCPR provides that a member State is bound to confer ICCPR
protections on persons "within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction."31 The
United States has long construed this language literally, such that ICCPR rules gov-
ern within the United States but not elsewhere. 32 Many other States (including
many European allies), in contrast, construe that same language to encompass any
person subject to a member State's practical control regardless of geographic loca-
tion, as does the UN Commission on Human Rights (now the Human Rights
Council). 33 An interpretive standoff results, with great risk of outright misunder-
standing insofar as either side fails to appreciate that the other simply does not
share its view.
Even ifone accepts the US position regarding the geographically bounded reach
ofthe ICCPR, however, IHRL issues might still arise. Not all detentions occur out-
side US territory, after all. On three occasions after 9/11, for example, the United
States held persons in military custody within the United States itself.34 And in the
wake of the Supreme Court's Rasul and Boumediene decisions emphasizing the
unique degree of US control at Guantanamo, debate may yet arise as to its status
vis-a-vis the ICCPR's jurisdictional provision. In any event, treaty law is not the
only possible source ofan IHRL obligation. Customary international law may con-
tain norms comparable to those found in the ICCPR. The question then becomes
whether any such norm entails a comparable geographic boundary, and this in
turn may require inquiry into the existence in the overseas setting of a pattern of
State practice supported by opinio juris. The room for debate—and hence for
misunderstanding—is ample.
4. Deconfliction
The discussion grows still more complicated once one accounts for the potential of
the LOAC and IHRL models to overlap and conflict with one another. This poten-
tial overlap has occasioned an immense amount of scholarship, with some charac-
terizing the situation as encroachment by IHRL—for good or ill—on the
traditional domain of LOAC. 35
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Here we confront the question of lex specialis. In brief, lexspecialis is a choice-of-
law concept in which the more specifically applicable body of law governs in the
event of overlap. 36 Unfortunately, a variety of views exists regarding just what that
concept means in practice—enough to prompt the International Law Commission
to undertake an effort to clarify the question. 37 The US government, for its part,
takes the view that LOAC constitutes lex specialis in all circumstances of armed
conflict, such that it entirely occupies the field to the exclusion of IHRL consider-
ations. 38 Some have taken a different view, treating lex specialis not as preempting
all reference to another body of law, but rather as requiring the provisions of a
competing body of law to be construed in harmony with the rules provided by the
dominant body of law; IHRL, on that view, would be applicable yet would be
conformed to LOAC in its particulars. 39 Some might argue for a third position,
moreover, a rights-maximizing approach in which the controlling rule is which-
ever one that most advantages the rights of individuals, as opposed to advantag-
ing the discretion of the State. One might also contend for a specificity-oriented
approach in which the governing rule is, literally, whichever rule speaks with
greater specificity to the fact pattern (whether it is more rights-protective or not).40
Deconfliction of LOAC and IHRL, in short, requires resolution of a complex and
entrenched debate.
As if this were not enough complexity, it is of course possible that the best an-
swer to the relevant-body-of-law inquiry will vary depending on the circum-
stances. That is, it may be that in one location LOAC plainly is relevant and IHRL is
not, while in other locations the reverse is true and in still another location it might
be that the question turns partially or entirely on domestic law instead.
B. The Content Debate: Disagreement Regarding the Rules Themselves
Unfortunately, the opportunities for confusion and disagreement are not confined
to the threshold determination of which body or bodies of law matter. Even if we
had consensus on that question, an equally intransigent set of disagreements
emerges within each domain when we turn to the question ofwhat that body oflaw
has to say, if anything, regarding the particular mix of detention predicates and
constraints that a State can or perhaps must use.
Note that in the abstract there are several possible outcomes when one seeks to
determine what rule a particular body oflaw supplies with respect to the detention-
scope issue. First, the body of law may provide a determinate and discernible rule
that is narrower than the scope of detention authority asserted by the government.
Or the reverse may be true; the rule may permit at least as much detention author-
ity as the government asserts. One can expect litigants to emphasize one or the
other of these positions. But there are other possibilities. Most notably, it may be
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that the body oflaw is simply indeterminate on the question of scope. In that case,
an important question arises regarding the default state of affairs. Does the absence
ofa rule constitute an absence of affirmative authority for the government to exer-
cise detention power? Or instead does it constitute an absence of constraint on the
government's exercise ofsuch powers? This too can be a point of disagreement. Fi-
nally, it may be that the most complete answer involves a blend of the
aforementioned possibilities depending on the circumstances.
1. Domestic Law
Consider first how these possibilities map onto the domestic law sources relevant
to the substantive-scope question. One might begin with the September 18, 2001
AUMF,41 which introduces a series of interpretive issues.
The AUMF does not refer expressly to detention. Of course, it also says nothing
express about killing or any other particular kind of military activity. What it does
authorize is the use of "all necessary and appropriate force."42 Thus there is a
threshold question as to whether it should be read to confer any detention author-
ity at all. In the case of citizens, moreover, that inquiry is complicated by the exis-
tence of a 1971 statute—the Non-Detention Act—providing that "[n]o citizen
shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to
an Act of Congress,"43 as well as the Civil War-era precedent Ex parte Milligan in
which the Supreme Court employed broad language in the course ofholding that a
civilian could not be subjected to a military commission trial where civilian courts
were open.44
Assuming this obstacle is overcome, the next task is to determine against whom
this authority may be directed. Here, the AUMF does a bit more of the work, as it
refers to "those nations, organizations, and persons" whom the President deter-
mines were responsible for the 9/11 attacks, as well as those who harbor such enti-
ties.
45 The Bush administration exercised this authority by identifying al Qaeda as
the entity responsible for the attacks and the Taliban as having harbored it, the
Obama administration has continued that position,46 and there does not appear to
be any serious doubt that it was appropriate to do so. Thus it seems settled that the
AUMF refers at least to al Qaeda and the Taliban. 47
Even ifwe had consensus regarding precisely which entities fall within the scope
of the AUMF, however, we would still have to grapple with disagreement at the
individual level. The AUMF is entirely silent with respect to the mix of detention
predicates and constraints that suffice to link a particular person to an AUMF-
covered group, for purposes of detention or otherwise.
This is, in fact, typical ofAUMFs (and declarations ofwar, for that matter).48 Yet
no one in prior conflicts thought such silence to be significant. Why does it matter
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so much now? First, most prior conflicts involved nation-States as the enemy;
hence the question of detention largely arose in relation to enemy soldiers who
were both readily identifiable (through uniforms and through their overt presence
on a conventional battlefield) and eager to actually be identified (in order to ensure
prisoner-of-war (POW) treatment and qualification for the combatant's privilege
to use force).49 Second, even where prior conflicts involved a substantial amount of
hostilities with guerrilla forces—as in Vietnam—the question of how the United
States resolved any incipient detention issues simply did not receive anything re-
motely resembling the scrutiny that arises today (let alone litigation). Matters are
otherwise in relation to the use of detention under the AUMF, to say the least, and
thus the question of individualized detention predicates and constraints is far
more significant than in the past.
No other domestic law sources suffice to prevent debate and disagreement on
these points. Congress, for its part, has not returned to the question of scope, at
least not directly. The first post-AUMF legislation to address detention in any sig-
nificant way was the Detainee Treatment Act of2005 (DTA),50 which among other
things addressed the jurisdiction of federal courts to hear challenges to individual
detention decisions at Guantanamo. 51 The DTA did not purport to define a sub-
stantive standard as to who maybe detained, however, but rather invited the D.C.
Circuit Court ofAppeals to consider in particular cases whether the government's
assertion ofdetention authority was compatible with the "Constitution and laws of
the United States."52
The Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA 2006) came closer. 53 It did not
purport to define the category of persons subject to detention without charge
under the AUMF (or otherwise). It did, however, define the personal jurisdiction
of the military commission system. Specifically, it stated that commissions could
try cases involving any alien constituting an "unlawful enemy combatant." 54 It
defined that phrase in turn to encompass any person who is not part of a State's
regular armed forces (or a militia-type group obeying the traditional conditions of
lawful belligerency), and who falls into one of three categories: (i) "has engaged in
hostilities . . . against the United States or its co-belligerents"; (ii) "has purpose-
fully and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its co-
belligerents"; or (iii) "is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces."55
The MCA 2006 thus introduced a series ofnecessary and sufficient conditions to
bring a person within the jurisdiction of the new war-crime trial system—condi-
tions that were narrowed only slightly with the subsequent passage of the Military
Commissions Act of 2009 (MCA 2009). 56 The MCA 2009 replaced the verbiage
"unlawful enemy combatant" with the less baggage-laden phrase "unprivileged en-
emy belligerent." 57 It kept the criteria relating to participation in hostilities and
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material support of hostilities. 58 It also kept the "part of test, but narrowed it to
pertain only to al Qaeda—thus omitting the alternative of establishing personal ju-
risdiction over an individual solely on the ground that he was part ofthe Taliban or
an associated force.59
The MCA 2006 and MCA 2009 arguably shed some light on the substantive-
scope question, but for at least two reasons they do not suffice to end debate. First,
neither statute actually purports to speak to that question.60 Perhaps they nonethe-
less do so by implication, on the theory that the boundaries ofpersonal jurisdiction
in the military commission system must extend at least as far as the boundaries of
the authority to detain without criminal charge. But it is not obvious that the two
questions have such a relationship to one another; one might expect the scope of
personal jurisdiction to be wider than baseline detention authority in some re-
spects and narrower in others.
Second, the MCA criteria themselves are underspecified. In terms of predicates,
the criteria include both past conduct considerations (including both personal in-
volvement in hostilities and the provision of support to AUMF-covered groups)
and an associational status test (the "part of test). The "part of test is not further
calibrated, however, leaving considerable room for disagreement. This is an im-
portant omission given the diffused, evolving and informal organizational struc-
ture ofnon-State actors such as al Qaeda.61 As for potential constraints, moreover,
theMCA criteria are silent with respect to considerations ofgeography and timing.
Complicating matters, some observers may take the position that the ambiguity
of these statutes constitutes an implied delegation of authority to the executive to
provide whatever further criteria maybe required—and perhaps also that the exec-
utive branch is entitled to deference from the judiciary in the event that its exercise
of that authority should become subject to judicial review.62 This too becomes a
point of departure for debate, as would any claim that the Constitution itself (via
some combination ofArticle II powers, presumably) confers some degree ofdeten-
tion authority independent of what may be conferred by the AUMF or any other
statute. As to the latter argument, it suffices to note that the problems ofambiguity
associated with the language of the AUMF surely arise in equal if not greater
measure under the Article II authority rubric.
2. The Law ofArmed Conflict
Assume for the sake of argument that LOAC is relevant in at least some post-9/1
1
circumstances involving detention. Unfortunately, it too is underspecified when it
comes to individual detention predicates and constraints.
When it comes to the scope-of-detention issue, LOAC is most determinate in
relation to international armed conflict—i.e., an armed conflict involving on each
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side at least one High Contracting Party to the Geneva Conventions. In that tradi-
tional setting, the full range ofGeneva Convention protections applies,63 including
a host of provisions that expressly contemplate the use of non-criminal modes of
detention in military custody.
Under the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
(GPW), for example, we find two articles confirming that a State may hold prison-
ers of war in custody without charge during hostilities.64 GPW, Article 4, more-
over, provides a detailed definition as to who qualifies for POW status (and hence
may be detained without much controversy). Among other things, this includes
any person who
(i) is a member of the armed forces of a party;
(ii) is a member of an irregular unit that obeys the four conditions of lawful
belligerency (having a command hierarchy, wearing a distinctive sign,
bearing arms openly and obeying the laws of war); or
(iii) is a member of regular armed forces belonging to a government that the
detaining State does not recognize. 65
The central concept in each instance is membership. And as noted above, the
concept of membership (or being "part of a group) at least in some contexts can
be a difficult concept to apply. Not so in this setting, however. The concept of
membership in structured armed forces presents few definitional issues. The use of
uniforms and the likelihood that a captured member of such a group willingly will
concede such status in order to obtain the benefits of POW treatment further
reinforce clarity.
When a person does not qualify for POW status in the context of an interna-
tional armed conflict, it does not follow that he or she cannot be detained without
criminal charge. On the contrary, the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time ofWar (GC) expressly contemplates a non-
criminal regime of "security internment" for persons who are not POWs, but
nonetheless pose a threat to security in relation to an armed conflict.66 And while
the security internment provisions of the GC are largely silent with respect to the
individualized criteria for triggering this authority, the International Committee of
the Red Cross's commentaries on the GC note that this omission was intentional
on the part of the drafters, who thought it best to leave the question of scope to the
discretion of the detaining State—though the commentaries themselves offer the
opinion that this authority might be applied, as one example, to intern individuals
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based on their membership in a dangerous organization.67 The GC framework, in
short, endorses something in the nature of a generalized future dangerousness in-
quiry, and does not demand particular forms of prior conduct or associational
status.
If the question of detention authority arose only in the context of international
armed conflict, then, the existence and scope of detention authority might gener-
ate little debate. Ofcourse we might still have debates regarding the labels to be ap-
plied to detainees, and the resulting benefits to be given them. In the event of a spy
or saboteur, for example, one might debate whether the person should be treated
as a POW or a security internee, or perhaps instead placed in an interstitial cate-
gory for unprivileged belligerents. 68 But there would be little doubt as to the basic
capacity to detain without charge given the existence of express and sweeping
treaty language.
For armed conflicts that are not international in the sense described above,
however, the situation is quite different. Prior to 1949, no LOAC treaty instrument
purported to apply beyond the confines of an international armed conflict. The
1949 Geneva Conventions broke new ground by including a single article—so-
called "Common Article 3"—imposing a handful of baseline humanitarian
protections for persons in the hands ofthe enemy during such conflicts. Additional
Protocol II subsequently expanded upon those protections (though the United
States is not party to that instrument). Neither instrument explicitly confers sub-
stantive detention authority, nor does either purport to limit or deny such
authority.
The resulting opportunities for disagreement are considerable. Some construe
the silence as fatal for any effort to rest the existence of detention authority on
LOAC, let alone to use LOAC to define the scope of that authority.69 On that
view, both authority and definitional scope must derive from other bodies of law
(domestic, IHRL or both).70 Others, however, contend that the absence of affir-
mative constraint is equivalent to an authorization by omission, on the theory
that LOAC on the whole is best understood to be a restraining body of law. 71 On
this view, anything that can be done in an international armed conflict a fortiori
can be done as well during non-international armed conflict—including use of
the detention principles noted above. 72 Alternatively, some might take the posi-
tion that some form of affirmative LOAC authority is needed, and that customary
LOAC supplies it (again by analogy to the forms recognized by treaty in the inter-
national setting). 73
For those drawn to either ofthe latter two arguments, further issues emerge. In-
sofar as a State seeks to bring to bear detention authority akin to the GPW-based
power to detain members of the enemy armed force, for example, applying the
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"membership" concept will not be a simple affair when used in connection with
relatively disorganized non-State actors such as insurgencies or terrorist networks.
The POW definition in GPW, Article 4 will not provide much assistance in that cir-
cumstance, predicated as it is on the assumption of an organized armed force with
a command hierarchy, uniforms and the like.
Of course, a State might seek to avoid such definitional difficulties by instead
analogizing to the more-sweeping detention authority associated with security
internment under the GC. But the very feature that might make this attractive
—
the lack of any particular substantive criteria—is sure to invite objections. Such
objections no doubt will be muted if the context involves sustained, large-scale,
combat violence; the United States employed security internment to detain tens of
thousands of individuals in Iraq over the years following the international armed
conflict and occupation phases in 2003 and 2004, without engendering any serious
objections regarding the existence and scope of its detention authority, and this
pattern continues on a small scale today long after the expiration of the UN Secu-
rity Council resolutions that for a time provided an ad hoc positive law blessing for
this arrangement. 74 But one should expect the opposite if instead the setting in-
volves only episodic violence of a type not as readily associated in the public's mind
with combat and an enemy "force" that is non-hierarchical or otherwise indeter-
minate in its structure and boundaries. In that case, arguments emerge as to
whether the threshold of "armed conflict" has been crossed in the first instance75
and, even if so, whether the broad discretion associated with the GC security in-
ternment system makes sense in the context of this particular form of violence.
3. International Human Rights Law
Though IHRL refers to a diverse array of treaties and international customary law
norms, for present purposes it suffices to focus attention on one treaty and one
norm in particular: the prohibition of arbitrary detention contained in Article 9 of
the ICCPR. 76 Article 9 provides that all persons have a "right to liberty" and thus a
State shall not deprive a person of liberty "except on such grounds and in accor-
dance with such procedure as are established by law." 77 That is to say, a State may
not hold a person in custody at its own whim as opposed to doing so based on a
claim that detention in that circumstance is authorized by law.
Or at least it may not do so ordinarily. The ICCPR also provides that in the event
of a public proclamation of an emergency "which threatens the life of the nation,"
States may "take measures derogating" from certain ICCPR obligations, including
the prohibition on arbitrary detention. 78 Then again, the United States has not in-
voked the derogation option (presumably because the US government position is
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that the ICCPR does not apply extraterritorially and that LOAC in any event con-
trols over the ICCPR by virtue of the lex specialis principle, as discussed above).
Assuming that Article 9 is applicable, then, the question arises whether US gov-
ernment claims of detention authority after 9/11 might violate that norm. The US
government presumablywould argue that military detention conducted under the
auspices oftheAUMF satisfies Article 9, on the theory that theAUMF is a "law" es-
tablishing the "grounds" for such detention. In response, one might contend that
Article 9 contemplates only criminal law as a source of detention authority, but
there is substantial reason to doubt that Article 9 requires such an approach. 79
Assuming that some degree ofnon-criminal detention is compatible with Article 9
(or, if one prefers, with an equivalent customary norm against arbitrary deten-
tion), we then reach the question whether the government's claim ofsome particu-
lar mix of detention predicates and constraints in some way violates IHRL. Here,
however, IHRL seems not to have anything particular to say; neither the ICCPR,
nor any other IHRL treaty to which the United States is a party, nor any customary
norm of IHRL purports to offer a substantive definition of non-criminal de-
tention authority.80
II. Habeas Litigation and the Scope ofthe Detention Power
Against the backdrop of uncertainty described in Part I, federal courts have strug-
gled for nine years to identify the mix of detention predicates and constraints per-
missibly defining the substantive scope of the government's military detention
authority at the level of the individual. The range of resulting disagreements is
remarkable.
My aim in this Part is to provide a relatively comprehensive descriptive account
of these doctrinal disputes. I proceed in semi-chronological fashion, beginning
with the often-overlooked habeas opinions associated with the three individuals
who were held as "enemy combatants" within the United States after 9/11 and then
moving on to a review ofthe pre- and post-Boumediene Guantanamo habeas opin-
ions. The survey documents considerable and persistent points of disagreement.
A. The First Wave of Detention Criteria Caselaw: Hamdiy Padilla and Al-Marri
For several years following 9/11, the judiciary largely was preoccupied with ques-
tions of jurisdiction, not substantive law. Most detainees were non-citizens cap-
tured abroad and held outside the United States, after all, and as a result did not
have a clearly established right to seek judicial review until the Supreme Court con-
clusively resolved that question in its 2008 decision in Boumediene v. Bush. None-
theless, judges did have occasion to address the matter of individual detention
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predicates and constraints in a handful of cases in the pre-Boumediene era, including
a trio of cases involving detainees held in the United States (one originally captured
in a combat setting abroad, and two captured in the United States itself).
1. The Scope ofDetention Authority in Relation to Conventional Battlefield
Captures Involving the Taliban
The sole post-9/1 1 instance in which the Supreme Court of the United States has
addressed the substantive-scope issue to any serious extent is Hamdi v. Rumsfeldy
in which a majority of the Court concluded that (i) associational status—in partic-
ular, serving as an arms-bearing member of a Taliban military unit—sufficed as a
detention predicate at least where the detention occurred on the field in Afghani-
stan and while combat operations continue in that location, and (ii) being a US cit-
izen does not exempt a person from being subject to such detention authority.
Yaser Hamdi had come into US custody in Afghanistan after being captured by
Northern Alliance forces in the fall of 2001. The United States initially believed that
Hamdi was a citizen of Saudi Arabia, but learned after bringing him to Guan-
tanamo that he had been born in Louisiana and hence could claim to be a US
citizen as well. As a result he was moved to a detention facility inside the United
States, and he no longer faced the jurisdictional hurdles then preventing other
Guantanamo detainees from obtaining habeas review.
Hamdi's case presented a relatively easy fact pattern from the viewpoint of the
substantive-scope issue. He was not alleged to be an al Qaeda member or asso-
ciate, and he was not captured in circumstances seemingly unrelated to conven-
tional armed conflict. Rather, the government claimed, he was an arms-bearing
fighter for the Taliban who had been captured with his unit and his weapon while
fleeing the battlefield in Afghanistan. Hamdi denied that this was true, but for
present purposes the important point is that the allegations cleanly presented the
question whether a person meeting that description lawfully could be held with-
out criminal charge.
The fact pattern actually posed two distinct substantive-scope questions. First,
did the government have authority to detain any person in this situation—i.e.,
bearing arms for the Taliban in Afghanistan? Second, if the government did have
such authority as a general proposition, would the answer change if the person
happened to be a US citizen? The Supreme Court splintered in response to these
questions.
A plurality of the Court in an opinion by Justice O'Connor upheld both the gov-
ernment's notional assertion ofsome authority to detain, as well as its claim that such
authority extended at least to Hamdi's alleged circumstances—and Justice Thomas
provided a fifth vote for these conclusions in a separate opinion. 81 To begin with, the
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plurality framed the issue as turning on a question of domestic law informed by
reference to international law—i.e., the plurality focused on the meaning of the
AUMF as construed in light of the law of armed conflict. 82 As to the existence of
some authority to detain, no treaty-based detention provision appeared directly
applicable; Hamdi was not held as a prisoner of war or security internee, and the
conflict in Afghanistan by 2004 no longer appeared to be an international armed
conflict in any event. Nonetheless, the plurality concluded that detention was a
traditional "incident" of warfare and thus, presumably, a necessary part of what-
ever body ofcustomaryLOAC principles might govern in this setting.83 As for who
precisely might be detained as a result, the plurality concluded that detention
authority at least extended to persons who engaged in a particular combination of
past conduct and associational status: bearing arms as part of a Taliban military
unit in Afghanistan.84 Emphasizing that the point of military detention is preven-
tive incapacitation, moreover, the plurality expressly rejected the idea that deten-
tion might be justified on the collateral ground that a person may possess useful
intelligence.
The plurality pointedly did not express any view as to the existence or scope of
detention authority in other settings. It did not say whether detention authority ex-
tended beyond the Taliban to al Qaeda. It did not address the power to detain per-
sons captured outside ofAfghanistan, or persons who did not literally bear arms on
a conventional battlefield. It merely observed that the "legal category of enemy
combatant has not been elaborated upon in great detail," and that the "permissible
bounds of the category will be defined by the lower courts as subsequent cases are
presented to them."85 The plurality did caution, however, that its "understanding
is based on longstanding law-of-war principles," and that "[i]f the practical cir-
cumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that in-
formed the development of the law of war, that understanding may unravel."86
2. The Scope ofDetention Authority in Relation to Domestic Captures Involving
al Qaeda
The Hamdi decision left open more questions than it answered. What conduct
other than bearing arms on the battlefield might count as membership in an
AUMF-covered group justifying detention? Would membership continue to be
sufficient if a person were to be captured outside Afghanistan, or if the linkage was
to al Qaeda rather than the Taliban? Could conduct aside from membership
—
especially providing material support—provide an independent sufficient condi-
tion for detention in any location?
The cases of Jose Padilla and Ali Salah Kahleh al-Marri provided an early oppor-
tunity to address some of these loose ends. Unlike Guantanamo detainees, but like
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Yaser Hamdi, both were in a position to seek habeas review with little in the way of
jurisdictional disputes. Padilla was an American citizen captured in Chicago and
eventually taken into military custody on the ground that he was an al Qaeda
sleeper agent who had come back to the United States to assist or even personally
participate in terrorist attacks. Al-Marri, a Qatari citizen, likewise was arrested in-
side the United States and then later transferred to military custody based on his al-
leged role as an al Qaeda sleeper agent. Neither, it initially appeared, was directly
connected to the conventional battlefield in Afghanistan or to the Taliban.
The Padilla litigation moved forward quickly. Indeed, the substantive detention
authority question was before Judge Michael Mukasey of the Southern District of
New York by December of 2002. 87 As an initial matter, he found that the President
had general authority to use military force against al Qaeda as a result of both the
AUMF and Article II of the Constitution, and that the substantive scope of the re-
sulting detention authority could be determined at least in part by reference to
LOAC (at least insofar as LOAC takes the form of treaties to which the United
States is a party, such as GPW).88 LOAC, Judge Mukasey concluded, permits the
detention without charge of persons who qualify as either lawful or unlawful com-
batants. 89 He did not elaborate the conditions necessary to show that a person fits
into one or the other category; that is, he did not specify whether lawful and unlaw-
ful combatancy turns on conduct, status or both. He did, however, expressly reject
the notion that Padilla should be exempt from detention simply because he was a
citizen or because he was captured within the United States, and he implicitly re-
jected the notion that detention authority extends only to persons who actually
bore arms on a conventional battlefield.90
Padilla appealed, and in late 2003 prevailed in a decision from a divided panel of
the Second Circuit. 91 For Judges Pooler and Parker, the critical facts were Padilla's
status as a citizen and his arrest within the United States—i.e., away from a conven-
tional battlefield. 92 In that specific scenario, they concluded, the Constitution re-
quires that any power to detain be conferred expressly by statute, not implicitly.93
The AUMF, in this view, lacked sufficient clarity. 94
This set the stage for Supreme Court review, or so it appeared. In the end, how-
ever, the Court avoided the issue. In an opinion issued simultaneously with the
Court's Hamdi ruling, the Court held that the petition in Padilla's case should have
been filed in South Carolina (the state in which Padilla was held at the time he filed)
rather than in New York (the state in which he initially had been held). 95 Litigation
thus had to begin anew at the district court level.
On remand to the District of South Carolina, Judge Floyd adopted the Second
Circuit's view that detention authority did not apply to an American captured in
the United States (absent a clear statement from Congress of its intention to convey
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such authority), and then added an additional reason to believe Padilla in particu-
lar could not be detained.96 The phrase "all necessary and appropriate force" in the
AUMF, he argued, should be construed rather literally; any exercise of force must
be "necessary" in the strict sense that no adequate non-military alternative is avail-
able. Padilla could not be detained militarily, on this view, because he could be
(and indeed for a time had been) incapacitated instead through the civilian crimi-
nal justice system.97
A few months later, a Fourth Circuit panel reversed, albeit on somewhat unex-
pected grounds.98 Referencing the Hamdi plurality opinion, Judge Luttig ex-
plained that the ultimate question is whether the AUMF, as construed in light of
LOAC, confers detention authority in a particular case.99 Hamdi had settled the
point as to a Taliban member captured in the field in Afghanistan, whereas the
Padilla litigation had seemed to present the question whether the same result ob-
tained for an al Qaeda member captured far from conventional combat. But as re-
stated in the Fourth Circuit's opinion, Padilla's fact pattern looked much more like
that in Hamdi after all. Padilla, Judge Luttig emphasized, had received military
training at an al Qaeda facility in Afghanistan and was present there as part of an
armed al Qaeda unit serving the Taliban at the time ofthe US military intervention
after 9/1 1. 100 The only notable difference between Hamdi and Padilla, in this view,
was that the latter managed to evade capture until far from the battlefield. 101 This
was no reason to deny the government's detention authority in the panel's view,
even when the capture occurred within the United States. 102
Once more the stage seemed set for Supreme Court review. What would have
occurred next remains a mystery, however, as the government soon transferred
Padilla back to civilian custody in order to prosecute him in Florida. The move pre-
cipitated criticism in some quarters, and prompted a manifestly unhappy Judge
Luttig to vacate his earlier opinion on the merits. Nonetheless, Padilla's special role
as the vehicle for fleshing out the substantive law of detention had come to an end.
Going forward, it seemed that it would be the contemporaneous al-Marri litigation
that tested the boundaries of detention authority.
Like Padilla, Ali Salah Kahleh al-Marri initially pursued habeas relief in the
wrong jurisdiction, and as a result no judge addressed the merits in his case until
2005. 103 Eventually he refiled his petition in South Carolina, and like Padilla his
case came before Judge Floyd. As noted above, Judge Floyd in early 2005 had con-
strued theAUMF not to provide detention authority in Padilla's case, and since his
opinion addressing the same issue in al-Marri's case came down just a few months
later—before the Fourth Circuit reversed Judge Floyd's Padilla ruling—al-Marri no
doubt expected a similar result. But it turned out otherwise. Judge Floyd drew a
sharp distinction between citizens such as Padilla and non-citizens such as al-Marri,
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notwithstanding the latter's lawful residence in the United States. 104 Citizenship,
on this view, had been not just an important but a necessary condition of Judge
Floyd's earlier, strict reading of the AUMF. For non-citizens, Judge Floyd would
insist on neither express statutory language conferring detention authority nor a
strict reading of "necessity" such that military detention is not available when
criminal prosecution suffices as an alternative. 105 Judge Floyd's Al-Marri opinion
thus emerged alongside that ofJudge Mukasey in Padilla as broad endorsements of
detention authority away from the conventional battlefield.
Approximately one year later, a divided panel of the Fourth Circuit yet again re-
versed. 106 The panel majority, written by Judge Motz, framed its analysis, at least at
the outset, in terms of a domestic law consideration that would not necessarily ap-
ply to non-citizens captured outside the United States. Specifically, Judge Motz
emphasized that al-Marri, though a non-citizen, was lawfully present in the United
States at the time of his arrest and hence able to invoke the protections of the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause. 107 The manner in which she elaborated the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment in this context, however, had sweeping implica-
tions for the scope ofthe government's detention power even in other settings. The
Fifth Amendment, she explained, generally precludes detention other than pursu-
ant to criminal conviction, subject only to a fixed number of narrowly defined ex-
ceptions. 108 One such exception is the power to detain an enemy combatant during
war, 109 and the boundaries of that category must be ascertained by reference to
LOAC. 1 10 The court's analysis of the Fifth Amendment issue thus became a vehicle
for staking out a position regarding LOAC's general approach to the substantive-
scope issue—a position that would carry implications for any detention carried out
under color of LOAC, regardless of whether the detainee had Fifth Amendment
rights or access to judicial review.
What precisely did the panel conclude with respect to LOAC's treatment of the
detention question? The opinion began by asserting that LOAC "provides clear
rules for determining an individual's status" as either a "combatant" or a "civilian"
in the context of international armed conflict. The panel asserted that civilians
were categorically immune from military detention without criminal charge, fail-
ing to account for the security internment regime provided in the GC. 111 LOAC,
the panel concluded, contemplated detention solely for combatants.
As to who constituted a combatant, the panel looked to GPW, Article 4, which
defines eligibility for POW status. 112 That is to say, the panel equated eligibility for
detention with eligibility for POW status, adding that LOAC treats as "combat-
ants" only those who fight for the military arm ofa nation-State, not just any armed
group. 1 ,3 Indeed, the panel added, there simply was no such thing as "combatant"
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status—and hence no LOAC-based detention authority—outside the context of
international armed conflict. 114
This was fatal to the attempt to detain al-Marri. Hamdi had been detainable in
theory because of his alleged affiliation with the military arm of the Taliban, with
the Taliban functioning as the de facto government ofAfghanistan. Padilla's eligi-
bility ultimately rested on the same ground (according to the Fourth Circuit at
least, even if not Judge Floyd). 115 Al-Marri, in contrast, was a "mere" al Qaeda
member with no alleged prior role as a de facto Taliban battlefield fighter. At most
he was someone associated with the enemy in a ^on-international armed conflict in
which there simply was no LOAC-based detention authority. No al Qaeda member
could be detained, on this view, absent the coincidence of having been in the field
in Afghanistan in a context that could be described as bearing arms for the
Taliban—whether later captured in the United States or not.
But the al-Marri litigation was not over. The government successfully sought
en banc review, resulting in a reversal ofthe panel by a narrow margin—and a pro-
found splintering of opinion regarding the substantive bounds of the govern-
ment's detention authority. 116 Four judges, in a new opinion by Judge Motz,
endorsed the panel's original rationale. 117 Five other judges disagreed, albeit for
different reasons.
Judge Traxler, in an opinion joined in relevant part by Judge Niemeyer, concen-
trated on the language of the AUMF itself, and in particular on its reference to the
use of force against "organizations" as well as "nations" found to be linked to the
9/11 attacks. 118 In their view, the AUMF reflects a legislative intent to permit mili-
tary force against al Qaeda, above all. 119 They did not dispute that LOAC defined
limits on how such force might be employed, but rejected the panel's conclusion
that LOAC permitted detention only when dealing with members of the military
arm of an actual nation-State. 120
Judge Williams, in a separate opinion joined by Judge Duncan, offered a view
that was simultaneously broad and narrow. Like Judge Traxler, Judge Williams re-
jected the claim that the detention authority conferred by the AUMF should be
read to apply only to members of the military arm of a government. But whereas
Judge Traxler suggested that LOAC imposed no such limitation, Judge Williams
accepted that the panel's approach "may very well be correct" as a statement of
LOAC; he simply did not think that any such LOAC-based restraints survived the
AUMF's explicit reference to the use offorce against "organizations" as well as "na-
tions" linked to the 9/11 attacks. 121 Interestingly, however, Judge Williams in an-
other sense did define detention authority narrowly. Rather than refer to mere
membership in or association with an enemy force as sufficient to justify detention
under the AUMF, he advanced a conduct-based criterion: one must "attempt [] or
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cngage[] in belligerent acts against the United States" on "behalf of an enemy
force" in order to be subject to detention on this model. 122 Further complicating
matters, moreover, Judge Williams (somewhat inconsistently) held open the pos-
sibility that detention authority might not continue to exist when the United States
was no longer engaged in conventional combat operations in Afghanistan. 123
Then we have the distinctive opinion of Judge Wilkinson. 124 His analysis began
relatively conventionally, exploring whether the AUMF on its own terms plausibly
could be read to limit detention authority to members of government-sponsored
armed forces or persons who literally fought on a conventional battlefield. 125 Nei-
ther its broad terms nor the legislative intent giving rise to it could be squared with
such limits, he concluded. 126
Next, Judge Wilkinson considered whether the broad scope of detention au-
thority seemingly conferred by the AUMF could be reconciled with any applicable
constitutional limitations given that al-Marri had been lawfully resident in the
United States. 127 Citing Hamdi, Judge Wilkinson observed that the government
constitutionally may detain persons who count as "enemy combatants." 128 The
task at the heart of the constitutional inquiry, therefore, was to identify the con-
tours of the "enemy combatant" category. 129 Toward that end, Judge Wilkinson
reasoned that one must look to "traditional law of war principles." 130 LOAC was
"not binding of its own force," he cautioned. But it mattered nonetheless because it
"informs our understanding ofthe war powers in Articles I and II and ofthe enemy
combatant category." 131
Having clarified his motivation for doing so, Judge Wilkinson proceeded to a
lengthy discussion of LOAC's treatment of the detention question. 132 In accord
with Judge Motz—and likewise without reference to the security internment
framework in the GC—Judge Wilkinson accepted that LOAC permitted detention
without criminal charge solely for combatants, not for civilians. 133 He differed
sharply from Judge Motz, however, with respect to the scope of the combatant cat-
egory. Whereas Judge Motz effectively equated combatancy with eligibility for
POW status, Judge Wilkinson accepted the government's contention that some in-
dividuals lose their eligibility for POW status by flouting LOAC yet nonetheless re-
main "combatants" subject to targeting and detention. 134 On that view, POW
status is not the measure of combatancy, nor was any "single factor" a necessary or
sufficient condition to establish that status. 135 The most one could say, Judge
Wilkinson argued, was that the category "traditionally included 'most members of
the armed forces'" as well as "those 'who associate themselves with the military arm
of the enemy government,'" 136 and that key indicia included self-identification
through the wearing of uniforms, involvement in the command structure of a
party to the conflict or presence on the battlefield. 137
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At this point in his analysis, however, Judge Wilkinson introduced a distin-
guishing proposition: that LOAC is evolving in the face of asymmetric warfare
and mass-casualty terrorism, bringing with it corresponding change to the con-
cept of combatancy. 138 He expressly embraced the proposition that law and stra-
tegic context exist in dynamic relationship, 139 and argued that LOAC in particular
had "consistently accommodated changes in the conduct of war and in interna-
tional relations." 140 In our own era, he observed, war was becoming "less a state-
based enterprise," with the diffusion of destructive technologies enabling super-
empowered non-State actors to pose a strategic threat to States. 141 "Thus," he
concluded, "while the principle of discrimination and the category of enemy
combatant surely remain a vital part of the law of war, they most definitely must
accommodate the new threats to the security of nations." 142
All of which raised two questions. Precisely how should LOAC evolve? And
through which institutional mechanisms should such evolution be effectuated or
recognized?
As to the latter point, Judge Wilkinson contended that the elected branches of
the government already had expressed their opinion of the matter by expressly in-
cluding "organizations" in addition to States in the AUMF's text. But he also stated
at the outset ofthe opinion that the time had come to "develop" a new, tailored le-
gal framework to accommodate LOAC to the evolving strategic climate, 143 and he
proceeded at this point in his analysis to offer his own perspective as to how best
this could be done. 144 Going forward, he argued, the inquiry into combatant status
ought to turn on a three-step inquiry: a combatant is a person who is
(1) ... a member of (2) an organization or nation against whom Congress has declared
war or authorized the use of military force, and (3) [who] knowingly plans or engages
in conduct that harms or aims to harm persons or property for the purpose of further-
ing military goals of the enemy nation or organization. 145
The Wilkinson test, in short, combines a membership inquiry with a conduct
test, thus arriving at a result not unlike that advanced by Judge Williams. As to
membership, Judge Wilkinson conceded that identifying a sufficient degree of
association with a non-State actor would be more difficult than, say, ascertaining
citizenship. 146 Nonetheless, he argued, the concept could be measured with refer-
ence to criteria such as "self-identification with the organization through verbal
or written statements; participation in the group's hierarchy or command struc-
ture; or knowingly taking overt steps to aid or participate in the organization's ac-
tivities." 147 As for the additional requirement of involvement in hostile conduct,
Judge Wilkinson suggested that this criterion would encompass both those who
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literally engage in hostilities and those who merely engage in preliminary steps to-
ward such acts (as with a "sleeper cell"), but that it would not also reach the
members of an enemy organization otherwise (and hence would not encompass
an al Qaeda doctor, for example). 148
The net result of the Traxler, Williams and Wilkinson opinions was a five-vote
majority rejecting the proposition that the AUMF conferred detention authority
solely as to those who fought for the armed forces of a government or those who
had fought on a conventional battlefield. The five-vote block did not agree, how-
ever, with respect to whether membership in a non-State organization such as al
Qaeda must be joined with hostile individual conduct in order for detention au-
thority to attach, and it was unclear what the four-vote block associated with the
opinion of Judge Motz might think of that proposition.
The al-Marri litigation would shed no further light on these questions. The Su-
preme Court did grant certiorari in the case, but as had happened with Padilla pre-
viously, the government at that point mooted the case by transferring al-Marri to
civilian custody to face criminal prosecution—prompting the Supreme Court to
vacate the Fourth Circuit's judgment and remand the case to be dismissed as
moot. 149 Thus ended the last of the suits challenging the government's detention
authority in the exceptionally complicated—and exceptionally uncommon—con-
text ofUS citizen detainees and other persons captured inside the United States.
Some things seemed to have been settled along the way, others not. The judges
uniformly agreed that the AUMF conferred some detention authority, including at
least the authority to reach Taliban fighters—even US citizens—captured on the
battlefield in Afghanistan. Beyond this, however, the judges disagreed sharply.
Some rejected the proposition that the authority could extend to al Qaeda-linked
individuals, while others took the contrary view. Among those accepting that de-
tention authority could extend to the context of al Qaeda-related captures, some
thought membership in al Qaeda a sufficient condition for detention, while others
argued that membership was necessary but not sufficient, and that some showing
ofknowing conduct associated with violence was also required. Among those who
found membership sufficient or at least relevant to the analysis, moreover, there
was relatively little discussion ofjust what the indicia ofmembership in a non-State
actor like al Qaeda might be. None of the judges, finally, had occasion to address
the scenario in which a person was not a member of an AUMF-covered group but
had provided material support to one.
B. The Second Wave of Detention Criteria Caselaw: The Guantanamo Cases
The end of domestic-detention litigation did not mean that courts going forward
would have no further opportunity to consider these debates. The same questions
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ofcourse arise in relation to the vastly more frequent scenario in which the military
has detained non-citizens captured and held overseas.
1. Contesting the Substantive Scope ofDetention Authority in Boumediene
Between the opening of detention operations at Guantanamo in January 2002 and
the summer of 2004, the ability of non-citizens held there to obtain judicial review
via habeas corpus was sharply contested. That contest ended for a brief period in
June 2004, however, when the Supreme Court in Rasul v. Bush held that the federal
habeas corpus statute conferred jurisdiction as to the claims of the Guantanamo
detainees. Not long thereafter, Congress enacted the first of two statutes designed
in part to overturn the statutory holding in Rasul, thus reviving the debate over ju-
risdiction that stood between the Guantanamo detainees and judicial consider-
ation ofany merits issues they might present—including arguments about the legal
boundaries ofdetention authority. 150 Yet in the months before Congress acted, ha-
beas litigation had moved forward in federal court in Washington, D.C., with two
cases proceeding to the merits.
Ultimately, these cases would come together in the Supreme Court under the
name Boumediene v. Bush. At the district court level, however, they remained
quite distinct. One came before Judge Leon, who resolved the petition in the gov-
ernment's favor without addressing the substantive scope of the government's
detention authority. 151 The other came before Judge Green, who took the con-
trary view.
In a January 2005 decision titled In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, Judge Green
concluded that the detainees held at Guantanamo were entitled to the protections
ofthe Fifth Amendment notwithstanding their status as non-citizens captured and
held outside the United States. 152 This of course raised constitutional questions re-
garding the actual process the detainees had been afforded. But it also raised a con-
stitutional question regarding the substantive scope of detention authority
asserted by the government in the following sense. 153 One group ofdetainees in the
litigation had argued that the Fifth Amendment precludes detention "based solely
on . . . membership in anti-American organizations rather than on actual activities
supporting the use of violence or harm against the United States." 154 Judge Green
agreed, writing that it would violate due process if the government were to hold a
person "solely because of his contacts with individuals or organizations tied to ter-
rorism and not because of any terrorist activities that the detainee aided, abetted,
or undertook himself." 155 In that respect, Judge Green's opinion was akin to the
view expressed by Judge Wilkinson in Al-Marri; for both judges, detention could
not be predicated on membership alone, but must include some showing of
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knowing involvement in violent activities (though not necessarily direct participa-
tion in violence). 156
It would be some time before another judge would address the substantive
scope of detention authority in the context of a Guantanamo habeas claim. By the
time the decisions by Judges Leon and Green were before the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals, Congress had enacted the Detainee Treatment Act, which purported to
eliminate statutory habeas jurisdiction—thus reviving the pre-Rasul jurisdictional
debate, albeit with a twist. Instead of eliminating all judicial review, the DTA cre-
ated an exclusive mechanism pursuant to which the D.C. Circuit Court ofAppeals
could review individual detention decisions at Guantanamo in order to determine
whether the military's screening system complied with the "Constitution and laws
of the United States" and whether the military had actually complied with its own
screening rules in a particular case. This model appeared to leave the D.C. Circuit
in a position to consider the legal boundaries of the government's detention au-
thority, but at the same time the DTA appeared to eliminate the habeas review
system that had provided Judge Green the occasion for her ruling.
Several detainees—including many of the individuals involved in the cases be-
fore Judges Leon and Green—argued that this arrangement was unconstitutional,
reasoning that the Constitution required the existence of habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion at Guantanamo and that the D.C. Circuit review alternative was not an ade-
quate substitute. That much is widely appreciated, as their arguments did
ultimately prevail in Boumediene. Many are not aware, however, that these litigants
simultaneously pressed the substantive question ofwho lawfully may be detained,
and that this question was briefed and argued to the Supreme Court alongside the
jurisdictional issue.
The lead petitioners in Boumediene did not focus their arguments on Judge
Green's determination that the Due Process Clause required a conduct-based
rather than a membership-based test for detainability. 157 Instead, they concen-
trated on LOAC-based arguments that would constrain the government's deten-
tion authority irrespective of whether a particular detainee could claim Fifth
Amendment protections. Their argument began with the premise that LOAC de-
fined the outer boundaries of whatever detention authority the United States
had. 158 Next, the petitioners argued that LOAC does not recognize combatant sta-
tus in relation to armed conflicts between States and non-State actors; in that set-
ting, they contended, everyone counts as a civilian. 159
One might have expected them to stop at this point, echoing the view of Judge
Motz in the Al-Marri panel decision to the effect that civilians simply are not sub-
ject to military detention. But they did not do so. On the contrary, they conceded
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that some civilians could indeed be detained consistent with LOAC. 160 But which
ones?
The petitioners invoked the "direct participation in hostilities" (DPH) test, ar-
guing that any civilian could be detained to the extent that he or she had engaged in
DPH. 161 DPH is a LOAC principle associated with the question ofwho maybe tar-
geted with lethal force, reflecting the notion that whereas a "combatant" may be
targeted at all times so long as not hors de combat, a "civilian" may never intention-
ally be targeted unless that person is engaged in DPH. DPH is not, in other words, a
concept traditionally associated with detention authority. Nonetheless, in the con-
text of a non-international armed conflict involving a clandestine network the
members ofwhich sought to obscure their identity, the idea ofusing DPH as a sort-
ing standard had a certain appeal as a limiting principle for detention authority.
From this point of view, their argument was rather in the spirit of Judge Wilkin-
son's effort to craft a more-tailored understanding of "combatant" for use in the
same setting, except that in this case the argument was framed as a description of
what LOAC already requires as a binding rule of international law in this
context. 162
Even assuming the Supreme Court was amenable in principle to using the DPH
standard as the measure of detainability, a problem remained. Famously, the pre-
cise meaning ofDPH is the subject of fierce and protracted disagreement. 163
The petitioners would have to tread carefully in crafting their position on this
point. If they pushed for too narrow a definition, they might alienate those mem-
bers of the Court inclined to recognize a relatively broad amount of detention au-
thority. If they advanced too broad a conception, on the other hand, they might
confirm their own detainability. Ultimately, and perhaps surprisingly, they erred
on the side of a broad definition.
As an initial matter, they conceded that immediate personal involvement in
conventional battlefield-type actions counts as direct participation. 164 That much
is common ground for most, if not all, participants in the larger DPH debate. They
did not stop there, however. They also endorsed the view that a person can be
deemed perpetually engaged in DPH—in effect, waiving the protections of civilian
status—insofar as he engages in DPH on a repeated basis (a position rather like the
"continuous combat function" theory of DPH advanced by the International
Committee ofthe Red Cross, among others). 165 The petitioners added that this sta-
tus would extend to leadership figures in al Qaeda, moreover, and most remark-
ably of all they suggested it might even extend to those actual members of al Qaeda
who are subject to the group's direction and control. 166 In short, the petitioners
offered a test that would leave the government with a substantial amount of deten-
tion—and targeting—authority, while excluding those who at most provide
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support on a relatively independent basis to al Qaeda or the Taliban (presumably
the petitioners reasoned that the government at most could prove them to be in
the latter category). 167
Notwithstanding this invitation, the Supreme Court in Boumediene ultimately
chose to say nothing at all about the question of detention standards, neither en-
dorsing nor rejecting Judge Green's objection to membership-based detention or
the Boumediene petitioner's DPH-based argument. 168 All of this instead would be
left for the district courts to sort out in the coming wave of habeas litigation.
2. Contesting the Substantive Scope ofDetention Authority after Boumediene
Much has occurred in the Guantanamo habeas litigation during the two and a half
years since the Supreme Court's decision in Boumediene. The federal district court
in Washington, D.C. has resolved the merits in habeas cases involving forty indi-
vidual Guantanamo detainees, rinding for the government in nineteen instances
and for the detainee in twenty-one. 169 Many of these rulings have been or may yet
be appealed. Of the nineteen cases won by the government at the district court
level, the D.C. Circuit has reached the merits in five, affirming in four instances
and reversing and remanding for further consideration in one other. 170 Of the
twenty-one cases won by the detainee at the district court level, the D.C. Circuit has
reached the merits in two, reversing with instructions to deny the writ in one in-
stance 171 and reversing and remanding for further consideration in another. 172
Many of these appellate decisions are themselves now the subjects of unresolved
petitions for certiorari, and so the circumstances remain in flux. 173
In addition to all of this, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals very shortly after
Boumediene held that the government lacked authority to detain a group of seven-
teen Chinese Uighur detainees, because their alleged affiliation with the East
Turkistan Islamic Movement did not bring them within the scope ofthe AUMF. 174
That ruling came under the auspices of the DTA, rather than the habeas corpus re-
view mandated weeks earlier by Boumediene^ 75 but the result in any event was a
defeat for the government.
For the most part, these decisions have turned on evidentiary issues. That is,
they turn on questions such as whether and to what extent to credit certain kinds of
evidence, and above all whether the collective impact ofthe government's evidence
suffices in a particular case to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a de-
tainee is who the government claims him to be. 176 But along the way, the judges
have had several occasions to grapple with the substantive-scope questions left
open by the combination of Hamdi, Padilla, Al-Marri and Boumediene. Perhaps
predictably, they have disagreed on several key points.
140
Robert M. Chesney
The first section below surveys a handful of conflicting cases considering
whether future dangerousness should be treated as a necessary condition for de-
tention. For the time being at least, the answer to that question is no. The next sec-
tion takes up a line of cases illustrating a strong consensus to the effect that
membership counts as a sufficient condition for detention, but also revealing con-
siderable disagreement both as to the actual meaning ofmembership and whether
support independent of membership can serve as an alternative sufficient
condition.
a. Rejecting Personal Dangerousness as a Necessary Condition. On April 15, 2009,
Judge Ellen Huvelle held in Basardh v. Obama that the government may not con-
tinue to hold anyone in custody, regardless ofwhether he or she was a member or
supporter of a relevant group at the time of capture, where the person is not likely
to "rejoin the enemy" if released. 177 The September 18, 2001 AUMF "defines the
Executive's detention authority in plain and unambiguous terms," she asserted,
and "does not authorize the detention of individuals beyond that which is neces-
sary to prevent those individuals from rejoining the battle . . . ." 178 Reasoning that
Basardh had no prospect of rejoining any enemy of the United States as a result of
"widespread public disclosure" of his cooperation with American interrogators,
Judge Huvelle concluded that he must be released. 179
This approach amounts to the imposition ofa particular kind of"future danger-
ousness" condition, above and beyond whatever criteria might be required to jus-
tify detention in the first instance. It did not prove popular, however, among other
judges. Two district judges explicitly rejected this aspect of Basardh, 180 and more
significantly the D.C. Circuit eventually did the same. 181 For the time being, then,
this aspect of the substantive-scope issue has been settled.
b. Contesting Membership and Support as Sufficient Conditions. The bulk of
the post-Boumediene cases dealing with the substantive-scope question have fo-
cused on the role ofmembership and independent support as sufficient conditions
for detention. Notwithstanding earlier claims to the contrary by Judge Green in In re
Guantanamo Detainee Cases and Judge Wilkinson in Al-Marri, these opinions reflect
widespread agreement among the judges that associational status alone—i.e.,
membership in an AUMF-covered group—can serve as a sufficient condition to jus-
tify detention. Consensus breaks down, however, when it comes to fleshing out the
meaning of membership, and likewise when it comes to determining whether in-
dependent support—i.e., the provision of material support to an AUMF-covered
group by a non-member—can serve as an alternative sufficient condition.
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These issues arose initially before Judge Leon, presiding over the merits hearing
for the Boumediene petitioners themselves on remand from their Supreme Court
victory. 182 In October 2008, he issued an opinion characterizing both the petition-
ers and the government as having urged him to "draft" his own preferred legal
standard regarding the boundaries of detention authority. 183 This he refused to do,
arguing that his role instead was merely to determine whether the administration's
position was consistent with a pair of domesticlegal considerations: the AUMF, and
any further authority the President might have under the "war powers" ofArticle II
of the Constitution. 184 Without substantial elaboration, Judge Leon concluded
that the government's two-track standard was compatible with both. 185
There things stood when the Obama administration came into office in early
2009. On the second day of his administration, President Obama initiated a major
review of detention policy by giving an interagency task force six months to assess
the full range of options associated with the capture, detention, trial and disposi-
tion of persons in the context of combat and counterterrorism operations. 186 But
litigation deadlines pay no respect to plans for carefully paced policy deliberations,
particularly not when years of jurisdictional litigation precedes the merits. Long
before the mid-2009 deadline for completion ofthe interagency review, the admin-
istration was obliged to make clear not only whether it intended to defend its au-
thority to employ military detention without criminal charge at Guantanamo, but
also what substantive detention standard it believed it had a right to invoke.
It did this on March 13, 2009, when the Justice Department's Civil Division filed
a brief before Judge Bates in the Hamlily litigation. To the surprise of some, the
Obama administration continued to assert authority to detain without charge, and
to do so pursuant to a standard not much different from the Combatant Status
Review Tribunal standard of the Bush administration. To be sure, it eschewed
the baggage-laden nomenclature of "unlawful enemy combatant" in favor of an
acronym-less, generic reference to those persons subject to detention pursuant to
the September 18, 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force. And it also ex-
pressly embraced the relevance ofLOAC for purposes of defining the particulars of
that authority. Those particulars turned out to be much the same as before, however,
including preservation of the two-track approach encompassing either members or
supporters of al Qaeda, the Taliban or associated groups. The only substantive dif-
ference was the qualification—or clarification—that independent support must be
"substantial" in order to trigger eligibility for detention, thus eliminating any argu-
ment that de minimis support might suffice to support detention.
Before Judge Bates had the chance to address the merits of the revised position
in Hamlily, Judge Walton did so in Gherebi v. Obama.m As an initial matter, Judge
Walton rejected the argument that LOAC provides no detention authority at all
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outside of international armed conflict, and that the AUMF should be construed
accordingly. 188 LOAC, he argued, is best viewed as a restraining body oflaw rather
than an authorizing body of law. 189 Thus, though it is true that Common Article 3
has no express language affirmatively authorizing detention, this merely showed
that LOAC imposes no restraints on who lawfully may be detained in non-
international armed conflict.
Any restraints instead must come from some other body of law, including the
AUMF itself. In Judge Walton's view, however, the AUMF most certainly did con-
fer at least some detention authority. " [W]henever the President can lawfully exer-
cise military force, so, too, can he incapacitate the enemy force through detention
rather than death." 190
That position, of course, was not enough to settle the legal boundaries of
AUMF-based detention authority. Judge Walton next had to confront the question
of who counts as the "enemy force" when you are not contending with another
State's army. Borrowing from the approach of the petitioners in Boumediene, the
detainee in Gherebi urged Judge Walton to adopt DPH as the measure of
detainability. 191 But he did not advocate the same conception of DPH as had the
Boumediene petitioners. Specifically, he rejected the notion that the protections of
civilian status might be waived on a sustained basis through continuous participa-
tion in hostilities, thus eliminating the need to determine whether a person was en-
gaging in DPH at a precise point in time. 192 Furthermore, the petitioner in Gherebi
added that it would not be enough just to show that a person had engaged in DPH;
in addition, he argued, the person must also have been "part ofan organized armed
force" rather than some independent actor. 193
In the end Judge Walton rejected the invitation to adopt one or another ver-
sion of the DPH standard as a necessary condition for detainability—though he
did not refrain from stating in dicta that the continuous-combat-function con-
ception ofDPH "while perhaps not quite broad enough, is a step toward the right
answer," and that if he were to accept the DPH standard he would construe it to
cover "all members of the armed forces of the enemy ... at all times for the dura-
tion of hostilities." 194
He did agree, however, that membership in an organized armed force is a neces-
sary condition for detention authority—indeed, he concluded that it was a suffi-
cient condition as well. 195 His argument in support of this conclusion turned on
the notion that the combatant category did indeed exist in non-international
armed conflict. 196 Again noting his view that LOAC is merely restrictive in nature,
and hence that silence on a point does not deprive a State of the power to act in a
particular way, Judge Walton explained that the silence ofCommon Article 3 with
respect to the existence of a "combatant category" did not mean that no such
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category could be recognized in the non-international armed conflict setting. 197
Explicitly equating targeting and detention authority, he asserted that the mem-
bers of the enemy armed force can be attacked at any time in non-international
armed conflict "and, incident to that attack, detained at any time." 198
In recognizing the existence of a category of detainable combatants in the non-
international conflict setting, Judge Walton's opinion in Gherebi was contrary to
the views expressed by the Second Circuit in Padilla and Judge Motz in Al-Marri.
By accepting that membership alone might establish this ground for detention, his
opinion was contrary to Judge Green's in the In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases
(though, to be fair, Judge Green's position against association status as a permissi-
ble detention predicate rested on the premise that the detainee had a Fifth Amend-
ment Due Process right to invoke). And to the extent his opinion rejected the need
to show a detainee had personally had involvement in hostile conduct, it seemed
contrary as well to the views expressed by Judges Williams and Wilkinson in the
Fourth Circuit's en banc opinion in Al-Marri. It was most akin, if anything, to
Judge Mukasey's original Padilla opinion, and perhaps also to the concurrence of
Judge Traxler in Al-Marri.
In any event, Judge Walton's approach at first blush appeared to be a government-
friendly one, insofar as it demanded only a showing of associational status. But
whether this was in fact a flexible or narrow standard really depends on how one
defines "membership" and "armed force"—concepts with relatively clear meaning
in a conventional armed conflict between the armies of States, perhaps, but most
certainly not in the context of conflict with a clandestine non-State network with
indeterminate organizational conceptions.
As to this question, Judge Walton turned explicitly to LOAC, stating that the
"criteria" set forth in GPW, Article 4 and Additional Protocol I, Article 43 consti-
tute "templates from which the court can glean certain characteristics" of an
"armed force." 199 This was a challenging approach, to say the least, because if there
is anything that Articles 4 and 43 emphasize as criteria for recognition as an armed
force, it is adherence to LOAC—and whatever else one might say about al Qaeda
and the Taliban, they neither comport their conduct with LOAC nor make any
pretense of doing so. Taken literally, then, Judge Walton's reference to the criteria
in these provisions would produce precious little in the way of combatant deten-
tion authority in this particular context. But Judge Walton's opinion did not high-
light the LOAC-adherence language in these articles. Instead, he highlighted their
implicit emphasis on the existence of a hierarchical command structure.200 Treat-
ing formal organizational structure as the hallmark ofan armed force whose mem-
bers might constitute detainable (and targetable) combatants, Judge Walton then
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concluded that the ultimate inquiry is whether the person in question had "some
sort ofstructured' role in the 'hierarchy' of the enemy force."201
Judge Walton did seem sensitive to the difficulties inherent in mapping that
model onto the context of decentralized networks such as al Qaeda, emphasiz-
ing that one must not be too rigid in looking for formal proof that a person oc-
cupied such a position.202 He noted that there usually will not be membership
cards or uniforms. 203 The "structured role" test, he explained, may turn instead
on a particular functional inquiry: did the person "receive [] and execute [] or-
ders" from the "command structure"?204
But there was a further qualification. Judge Walton explained that it is not
enough that a person was part of the chain of command of the organization-as-a-
whole. Rather, the person must be part ofthe specific chain ofcommand associated
with "the enemy force's combat apparatus."205 To be sure, Judge Walton was trying
to make the point that even a logistics officer for al Qaeda could be detained if part
of al Qaeda's military chain of command.206 And he did also explicitly recognize
that a person who at one point in time was performing a non-military function
may well be subject to orders to shift to a military function after all, and hence
should not be treated as a non-combatant. 207 Nonetheless, this approach did nec-
essarily embrace the notion of distinct "military" and "civilian" wings in such
groups, with the personnel ofthe latter at least sometimes lying beyond the reach of
the AUMF for any purpose, including not just detention authority but also the
authority to target with lethal force.
In this way, Judge Walton's opinion in Gherebi at least partially supported the
government's assertion that theAUMF conferred authority to detain the members
ofgroups such as al Qaeda and the Taliban. As for the government's claim that the
AUMF also conferred authority to detain independent supporters of such groups,
however, Judge Walton was less accommodating. He did not directly reject that
claim. But he did insist that any support-based detention must comply with the
"structured role" test described above, which effectively folded the support inquiry
into the membership standard after all.208 Put simply, no purely independent sup-
porter could be detained under that test (or, presumably, targeted with lethal
force). A contrary reading, Judge Walton asserted, would cause the AUMF to con-
flict with LOAC, and he was unwilling to impute such a reading to the statute ab-
sent a clearer showing of legislative intent to accomplish such an end. 209 In this
way, Judge Walton broke with the more accommodating approach ofJudge Leon.
Obviously Judge Walton's approach embraces the relevance of LOAC and the
premise that the United States in at last some current settings is involved in non-
international armed conflict—and he offers a highly specific interpretation ofwhat
LOAC has to say about who may be detained (or targeted) as a result. Indeed,
145
Who May Be Held? Military Detention through the Habeas Lens
driving home the point that his reasoning applied as much to targeting as to deten-
tion, he routinely cross-references targeting authority as turning on the exact same
standards.
Just a few weeks after Judge Walton's opinion in Gherebi, Judge Bates issued his
ruling in Hatnlily. 210 For the most part, his analysis followed Judge Walton's. He
agreed, for example, that LOAC permitted detention based on membership status
even in the non-international conflict setting, notwithstanding the lack of affirma-
tive treaty language to that effect. 211 And he agreed, too, that in this context "mem-
bership" boils down to whether the individual "receives and executes orders or
directions" as part of an AUMF-covered group's command structure. 212 Unlike
Judge Walton, however, he did not distinguish between the military and non-military
wings ofan organization, and thus did not restrict eligibility to persons subject to a
military-specific chain ofcommand. 213 Hamlily, in other words, appears more akin
to the Mukasey opinion in Padilla and, perhaps, the Judge Traxler opinion in Al-
Marri.
Whether Judges Walton and Bates differ with respect to non-members who
provide substantial support to AUMF-covered groups is less clear. On one hand,
Judge Bates concluded that LOAC simply does not permit military detention of
such a person (though like all the other judges to address this question, he did not
address the potential relevance of the security internment option that would be
available in such circumstances in the event ofinternational armed conflict). 214 On
the other hand, he noted that membership in organizations such as al Qaeda may
be more of a functional than a formal concept, and that conduct that one might de-
scribe as independent support could well be conceived instead as evidence of func-
tional membership in some instances. 215 That said, even a functional member must
still be shown to be part of the group's chain ofcommand in order to be detained
under the Hamlily model; truly independent supporters may not be detained no
matter how important their aid might be to the group. 216
Gherebi and Hamlily thus are best as consistent on the point that non-members
may not be detained, and consistent as well on the point that membership ulti-
mately turns on participation in a chain of command. They appear to differ, how-
ever, with respect to whether detention authority is limited to the "military" chain
of command within an organization—though the magnitude of that difference
very much depends on how strictly one defines "military" in this context.
Adding to the confusion, other district judges subsequently disagreed with one
another regarding whether there is a genuine difference between Gherebi and
Hamlily. Judge Hogan, for example, has argued that there is not a substantial dif-
ference. 217 Judge Kessler, on the other hand, states that there is, and that she prefers
the Gherebi approach. 218 Meanwhile, Judge Urbina in Hatim v. Obama articulated
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an understanding of the chain-of-command test that very likely differs from what
either Judge Walton or Judge Bates had in mind. 219
In Hatim, Judge Urbina stated that he adopts the Hamlily standard, including
the notion that detention authority turns on whether the person in question occu-
pied a role within a relevant group's chain of command.220 According to Hatim,
however, merely notional status within a chain ofcommand was not enough; one
must have actually obeyed specific orders in the past in order to be a member in
this sense, and hence to be detainable. 221 Thus, according to Judge Urbina, it was
not enough for the government to prove that a person knowingly attended an al
Qaeda training camp and that the individual believed that in doing so he or she
had effectively joined al Qaeda. 222 It maybe that Judges Bates and Walton, or other
judges following the Gherebi and Hamlily standards, might interpret the chain-of-
command test in the same fashion. It seems equally if not more likely, however,
that they would not.
In any event, the nuanced disagreement among Judges Walton, Bates and Urbina,
ifdisagreement there truly was, became moot once the chain-of-command question
came before the D.C. Circuit Court ofAppeals. In a series of cases in 2010, the Cir-
cuit has expressly rejected the proposition that one must be part of any chain of
command—let alone that of the military wing of an organization—in order to
qualify as a member subject to military detention under the AUMF.
The Circuit first made this point in Al-Bihani v. Obama, 223 in January 2010. In
that case, a divided panel offered a number of important observations regarding
the lawful scope of detention authority. To begin with, the majority opinion by
Judges Kavanaugh and Brown broke sharply with most ofthe prior detention cases
by concluding that LOAC simply has no bearing on the question of who lawfully
may be detained without criminal charge in this setting. 224 That is to say, Al-Bihani
broke new ground in the habeas litigation by holding that only domestic law
sources should be considered in the course of determining the legal bounds of
detention authority.
Absent reference to LOAC, however, how was the broad language of the AUMF
to be construed? As noted, the AUMF itself provides some guidance at the group
level, but almost no guidance at all at the individual level. Other domestic law
sources would be needed, therefore, in order to address what conduct or status suf-
ficed to link a person to an AUMF-covered group for detention purposes. And ac-
cording to the majority in Al-Bihani, the personal jurisdiction provisions found in
the MCA 2006 and MCA 2009 provided the necessary guidance. 225
Those provisions clearly stated that military commissions may entertain pro-
ceedings against non-citizens who are members ofAUMF-covered groups and also
those who are non-members but who nonetheless provide support to such groups.
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Asserting that a person subject to military commission prosecution under the two
MCAs a fortiori would be subject to detention under the AUMF, the panel majority
in Al-Bihani concluded that independent support thus constitutes a sufficient con-
dition for detention separate and apart from proof of membership in an AUMF-
covered group. 226
As for the meaning of membership, the panel majority rejected the view ad-
vanced by Judge Walton in Gherebi, Judge Bates in Hamlily and Judge Urbina in
Hatim to the effect that proof of membership requires some kind of participation
in a group's chain ofcommand. 227 But ifthe chain-of-command test did not define
membership, what criteria would? Here the opinion was less clear, except as to two
remarkable points. First, Al-Bihani asserted that a person should be deemed a
member and hence subject to detention in the event that he attended a training
camp sponsored by an AUMF-covered group. 228 Second, it raised the possibility
that merely having stayed at a guesthouse associated with an AUMF-covered
group's recruitment process might also constitute adequate evidence of member-
ship and detainability. 229 These statements were dicta and hence not binding on
the district court, yet they certainly signaled a broad conception of membership
—
arguably broader than anything previously endorsed in the habeas litigation, either
before Boumediene or since.
Subsequent decisions by the Circuit largely reinforced Al-Bihani. To be sure,
some of Al-Bihani
y
s punch was diluted by the fact that a majority of the active
judges of the Circuit declared the panel's views about the irrelevance of interna-
tional law to be mere dicta, in the course of"denying" en banc review. 230 The dicta-
fication of that aspect of the panel opinion did not necessarily undermine the sup-
port and membership aspects ofthe earlier decision, however, as the panel had also
observed that it found "Al-Bihani's reading of international law to be unpersua-
sive."231 More significantly, subsequent Circuit decisions have reinforced key as-
pects of the Al-Bihani panel opinion.
First, the unanimous opinion in Awad v. Obama232—by Chief Judge Sentelle
and Judges Tatel and Garland—restated the point that one need not be part of a
chain of command in order to be detainable.233 This would be useful evidence of
membership, of course, but membership also could be shown by proof that a per-
son self-identified as part of an AUMF-covered group or was captured in circum-
stances amounting to fighting on behalf of such a group. 234 And in Barhoumi v.
Obama, 235 Judges Tatel, Ginsburg and Kavanaugh joined to state once again that
the chain-of-command test is not a necessary condition for detention, though it
happened to be satisfied in that case and did count as a sufficient condition. 236
Neither Awad nor Barhoumi provided the D.C. Circuit with an opportunity to re-
visit or refine Al-Bihams favorable treatment of independent support as a distinct
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ground for detention. Many thought that the next decision
—
Bensayah v. Obama—
would do so. Bensayah himselfwas the last of the original Boumediene petitioners,
the only one whom Judge Leon found was subject to detention after remand from
the Supreme Court. And as noted above, Judge Leon had expressly approved reli-
ance on independent support as a ground for detention in that case. Indeed, he had
found Bensayah subject to detention not for being an al Qaeda member, but in-
stead for having provided support to al Qaeda (in the form of facilitating the travel
of would-be fighters to Afghanistan). A casual observer might have assumed,
therefore, that the appeal would oblige the D.C. Circuit to give further consider-
ation to the sufficiency of independent support as a detention ground.
A more rigorous observer, on the other hand, would anticipate that the Circuit's
decision would focus on the membership ground instead. Several months earlier,
Charlie Savage of the New York Times had reported the existence of a "pro-
nounced" disagreement among "top lawyers in the State Department and the Pen-
tagon," as well as the Justice Department and other agencies, with respect to "how
broadly to define the types ofterrorism suspects who maybe detained without trial
as wartime prisoners."237 According to Savage's account, the debate arose initially
when the government was obliged to develop its revised detention position in
Hamlily.238 As noted above, the government ultimately chose to make some
changes to its position, but did not abandon the claim that it had authority to de-
tain both members and non-member supporters of AUMF-covered groups. This
did not end the internal debate, however, but instead merely delayed it until such
time that the administration might be faced with the choice ofwhether to defend a
specific case on independent support grounds.239
The need to develop a position on appeal in the Bensayah litigation, Savage
wrote, provided just such an occasion:
The arguments over the case forced onto the table discussion of lingering discontent at
the State Department over one aspect of the Obama position on detention. There was
broad agreement that the law of armed conflict allowed the United States to detain as
wartime prisoners anyone who was actually a part ofAl Qaeda, as well as nonmembers
who took positions alongside the enemy force and helped it. But some criticized the
notion that the United States could also consider mere supporters, arrested far away, to
be just as detainable without trial as enemy fighters.240
Assuming the accuracy of this account, then, the specific dispute involved the con-
junction of the independent support ground with the use of detention authority
for captures away from the conventional battlefield. Savage reported that the State
Department's newly arrived Legal Adviser, Harold Koh, championed the view "that
there was no support in the laws ofwar" for the claim of detention authority in that
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circumstance, while the Defense Department's General Counsel, Jeh Johnson, dis-
agreed. 241 Savage indicates that the question was then put to the Justice Depart-
ment's Office of Legal Counsel, which eventually produced an equivocal
memorandum "stating that while the Office of Legal Counsel had found no prece-
dents justifying the detention ofmere supporters ofAl Qaeda who were picked up far
away from enemy forces, it was not prepared to state any definitive conclusion."242
Nonetheless, a position was needed for the Bensayah appeal. 243 According to
Savage's account, the solution was to "try to avoid that hard question" by
"changing] the subject" in Bensayah. Rather than defend the decision below on
the ground relied upon by Judge Leon—i.e., that Bensayah could be detained be-
cause he provided support to al Qaeda—the government would instead seek
affirmance on the ground that Bensayah was a functional member of al Qaeda. 244
And thus the Justice Department's Civil Division came to make a most unusual fil-
ing on the eve of oral argument in the case, explaining to the court in a brief letter
that the "Government's position is that this case is best analyzed in terms of
whether Bensayah was functionally 'part of al Qaida, and that the district court's
judgment can and should be affirmed solely on that ground."245 In an indication
that the internal debate had not yet been resolved, however, the letter added that
the Government is not foreclosing its right to argue in appropriate cases that the
AUMF, as informed by the laws of war, permits detaining some persons based on the
substantial support they provide to enemy forces, even though such persons are not
themselves "part of those forces. The Government continues to defend the lawfulness
ofdetaining certain individuals who provide substantial support to, but are not part of,
al Qaida or the Taliban.246
At the time he wrote, Savage did not know how this strategy would play out with
the D.C. Circuit. Nonetheless, he concluded his account with a perceptive observa-
tion regarding the larger significance ofthe issue: "The outcome ofthe yearlong de-
bate could reverberate through national security policies, ranging from the
number of people the United States ultimately detains to decisions about who may
be lawfully selected for killing using drones."247
Some nine months later, in late June 2010, the Circuit reversed in Bensayah v.
Obama. 24* But it is far from clear that the government's decision not to advance
the independent support argument caused that outcome, nor that geographic
constraints entered into the analysis. In addition to limiting its legal theory on ap-
peal, the government also had decided not to continue to rely on certain
inculpatory statements that had been made by another detainee. The latter move
appeared to be the decisive one. The panel held that the remaining evidence did
not suffice to prove that Bensayah had engaged in the recruiting and logistical
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support activities that the government had alleged, and hence that the govern-
ment had failed to show that Bensayah was a functional member of al Qaeda. By
the same token, presumably, this same body of evidence would not have sufficed
even if the government had advanced its original independent support theory. In
any event, the litigation continues; the Circuit remanded the case not with orders
to grant Bensayah's petition, but rather for Judge Leon to reconsider the merits,
including any new evidence offunctional membership that the government might
put forward.
Thus we are left with an unusual state of affairs. After the majority of the district
judges to consider the question rejected the proposition that the government law-
fully may assert authority to detain independent supporters of AUMF-covered
groups, the Circuit took the contrary view. In the meantime, however, the execu-
tive branch itself appears to have become internally divided on the question, and
for the moment appears disinclined to take advantage of the Circuit's position on
the matter—at least where the independent support occurs in a place geographi-
cally remote from a conventional battlefield.
The Circuit has not had an opportunity to weigh in on the independent support
question since Al-Bihani and Bensayah. The next two circuit opinions instead
touched lightly on other aspects of the substantive-scope issue. Shortly after
Bensayah, for example, the Circuit in Al Odah v. Obama affirmed the detention of
an individual on membership grounds. 249 The most notable aspect of the case, for
present purposes, was the fact that the opinion by Chief Judge Sentelle and Judges
Rogers and Garland restated Al-Bihani s suggestion that training camp attendance
alone might well be sufficient to make out the case for detention on membership
grounds. Then, two weeks later, Judges Randolph, Henderson and Kavanaugh in
Al Adahi v. Obama found that evidence of a detainee's attendance at a training
camp and guesthouse constituted powerful evidence of functional membership,
and sharply criticized a district judge for suggesting otherwise.250
In contrast, the Circuit has had a chance since Bensayah to comment—albeit
only implicitly—on the question ofgeographic constraints at least in the context of
membership-based detention. In Salahi v. Obama, in November 2010, a circuit
panel dealt with a Mauritanian detainee whom the government alleged to be an al
Qaeda member but who was not captured in Afghanistan nor alleged to have been
involved in combat in or near Afghanistan (at least not after the early 1990s). 251
The appellate panel expressed no concerns about the theoretical assertion of deten-
tion authority in such circumstances, but instead remanded so that the district
court could reweigh the evidence under a different standard. Implicit rejection of
geographic constraints in the membership setting, of course, does not compel the
same with respect to detention based solely on independent support.
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c. That Which Is Now Clear and That Which Remains Contested. As a result of
the foregoing string of D.C. Circuit decisions, an important aspect of the govern-
ment's detention authority appears settled, at least at a high level of generality and at
least for the moment. Specifically, the Circuit has developed a broad consensus to the
effect that membership in an AUMF-covered group is a sufficient condition for de-
tention. But other questions remain. What precisely counts as membership in a clan-
destine, diffused network such as al Qaeda? Does independent support provide an
alternative ground for detention? Does the location of a person's capture or underly-
ing activities matter under either the membership or support criteria?
With respect to the detailed meaning of membership, some things have been
made clear while others remain uncertain—perhaps inevitably so. The cases do es-
tablish that proof of participation in a formal chain of command would be suffi-
cient but is not necessary to demonstrate membership. They are relatively clear,
moreover, that training camp participation is highly significant to prove member-
ship, if not a sufficient condition to do so on its own, and the cases further suggest,
albeit with less force, that the same may be true for guesthouse attendance in at
least some contexts. Absent those elements, however, it remains unclear which
forms of involvement with the affairs of an AUMF-covered group distinguish
those who can be detained from those who cannot. In that circumstance, the ques-
tion would seem to depend upon the gestalt impression conveyed by the totality of
the circumstances, measured against unspecified—and potentially inconsistent
—
metrics of affiliation held by particular judges. Consider, in that regard, the way in
which Judge Bates summarized the task in a recent, post-Al-Bihani opinion:
* [T]here are no settled criteria" for determining who is "part of the Taliban, al-Qaida,
or an associated force. "That determination must be made on a case-by-case basis
by using a functional rather than formal approach and by focusing on the actions of
the individual in relation to the organization." The Court must consider the totality of
the evidence to assess the individual's relationship with the organization. But being
"part of the Taliban, al-Qaida, or an associated force requires "some level of knowl-
edge or intent."252
Even when the training camp or guesthouse elements are present, moreover, it
is not clear that they will always suffice. Indeed, one of the first district court
opinions to emerge against the backdrop of the Circuit's interventions directly
challenged the relevance of guesthouse attendance, arguing that the connotations
of guesthouse attendance vary depending on the house in question and that resi-
dence at the guesthouse in that particular case was not necessarily inculpatory. 253
On the other hand, another recent district court opinion gives substantial weight
to the fact that a detainee attended a Taliban-controlled guesthouse, particularly
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when viewed in combination with evidence that a Taliban recruiter gave the
man money, a passport and a ticket for air travel, and that the man twice went
near to the front lines and received a weapon from a person who likely was a
Taliban member. 254
Note that similar disagreements could yet emerge in connection with the train-
ing camp variable. Like guesthouses, training camps can vary in terms of their
provenance and connotations. Some clearly were or are operated by al Qaeda or
the Taliban, but not all were; fact patterns may arise that raise difficult questions of
attribution and inference.255 Of course, it maybe that no further refinement of the
variables defining membership is possible in this setting, and that the status quo
represents the realistic maximum when it comes to defining this criterion (though
it should at least be possible to clarify the geographic question).
In any event, the status quo certainly has not settled the separate question of
whether detention may be predicated on a showing of independent support to an
AUMF-covered group—nor whether, if such a criterion is legitimate, it must be
limited to persons who were captured or acted in certain geographic locations, or
for that matter whether it must be confined to only certain types of support or to
support rendered with certain specific mental states.
Finally, the question of geography continues to loom large in the substantive-
scope debate. Recent litigation associated with alleged plans to conduct a targeted
killing ofan American citizen in Yemen, on the ground that the individual was an
operational leader of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, has sharpened the debate
as to whether LOAC's field of application is strictly limited to geographically de-
fined battlefields of a conventional nature or if, instead, any LOAC-related au-
thority to use force attaches to at least some enemy-affiliated personnel wherever
they may travel (or, more narrowly, to such persons when they are located in de-
nied or ungoverned areas).256 The question is at least as pertinent in the detention
context. As noted above, at least two of the Guantanamo habeas cases thus far
—
Bensayah and Salahi—involved detainees with remote or no linkages to any tradi-
tional battlefield, and the judges in those instances expressed no particular con-
cerns on that point—though they did not expressly address the issue. The earlier
experience of the Al-Marri litigation, meanwhile, suggests there may yet be judi-
cial disagreement on the point.
Overarching all these questions, finally, is the lingering disagreement regarding
which bodies oflaw actually govern. The Al-Bihani panel opinion sought to resolve
this dispute by forbidding reference to LOAC and other forms of international law.
Though the Circuit majority subsequently neutered that claim by declaring it to be
dicta, it did not go so far as to issue a contrary holding to the effect that any such
body oflaw does actually apply. In any event, as Part I illustrated, determining that
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a particular body of law applies does not ensure agreement as to what that body of
law requires when it comes to selecting and calibrating the variables that combine
to form the individualized detention standard.
HI. The Significance of the Emerging Law Governing Detention Criteria
In the wake of this descriptive account, several questions arise. First, does it actually
matter that the habeas process has not yet resolved the disagreements and unan-
swered questions noted in Part II? Second, if this does matter, is it preferable to
simply be patient, leaving the matter in judicial hands, or instead should Congress
intervene with legislation?
A. Do the Disagreement and Uncertainty Matter?
The persistence of disagreement and unresolved questions regarding the substantive-
scope issue in the habeas litigation is problematic on many levels. First, the
uncertainty and disagreement may prove significant with respect to the many as-
yet-undecided Guantanamo habeas cases. True, the vast majority of the Guan-
tanamo habeas cases to this point have turned on other issues—above all, ques-
tions of evidentiary sufficiency. Only Basardh, in which Judge Huvelle made an
ill-fated attempt to limit detention authority to circumstances in which a person
was likely to cause harm if released, clearly turned on an issue involving the scope
of detention authority that the judge in question was prepared to recognize. But
much more habeas litigation is to come, and hence this question may yet prove
dispositive for some Guantanamo detainees. No one can say for sure precisely
how many cases may yet proceed to the merits, but it seems likely that we are not
yet halfway through. We cannot know at this point whether the substantive-scope
question will remain marginal to the merits. If it does become central in these
future cases, the continuing uncertainty surrounding the question is problematic
from both the detainee and the government perspectives.
Second, the pool of habeas cases eventually may encompass more than the
Guantanamo detainees. Whether this will come to pass most likely depends, how-
ever, on whether the United States resumes the practice of taking long-term cus-
tody of individuals captured outside of States in which conventional armed
conflict is occurring. This issue has been tested to some extent in the context ofAf-
ghanistan. Attorneys representing a group ofUS military detainees in Afghanistan
have been attempting for several years now to establish habeas jurisdiction over
detention operations there. They met with mixed success at the district court level,
with Judge Bates holding that non-Afghans may pursue habeas relief if captured
outside of Afghanistan and brought there for detention by the United States,
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whereas none ofthose actually captured in Afghanistan could do so. 257 A D.C. Cir-
cuit panel subsequently reversed on the first point only, explaining that "all of the
attributes of a facility exposed to the vagaries of war are present in Bagram" and
that the US detention facility in Afghanistan (then at Bagram, today in Parwan) is
in "territory under neither the de facto nor de jure sovereignty ofthe United States
and within the territory of another de jure sovereign."258 The court did not, how-
ever, close the door to habeas jurisdiction entirely. The panel went out of its way to
observe that there was no evidence in this case that the detainees had been brought
into Afghanistan in order to evade judicial review, as their transfer occurred long
before Boumediene rendered Guantanamo subject to judicial review. 259 The panel
warned that if "such manipulation by the Executive" were proven in a future case,
the outcome might be different.260 In the course of remanding that case to Judge
Bates for further proceedings, moreover, the Circuit noted that it might take a dif-
ferent view even in that very case should new evidence emerge regarding the nature
ofUS detention operations in Afghanistan.
Given that the United States is actively engaged in a process meant to culminate
in the transfer of control over its long-term detention operations in Afghanistan to
the Afghan government (just as we already have transferred control of our deten-
tion operations in Iraq to the government there), and absent evidence that the
United States is still in the business of capturing persons elsewhere and bringing
them to Afghanistan for purposes of long-term detention, it must be said that the
prospects for an extension ofhabeas to Afghanistan are increasingly slim notwith-
standing these caveats. The more significant lesson from the Afghan habeas litiga-
tion, therefore, is that courts going forward likely would be receptive to an
extension of habeas to any location should the United States in the future resume
the practice of taking and maintaining military custody of individuals captured
outside of a traditional battlefield context. It may be that the United States will
avoid that practice in the future, substituting some combination of rendition, host-
nation detention,261 targeted killing, surveillance, prosecution or inaction in its
place. But if the practice of long-term detention for non-battlefield capture re-
emerges, so too will the questions surrounding habeas jurisdiction.
Even if habeas jurisdiction remains limited to Guantanamo, however, there are
still other reasons to believe the uncertainty associated with the substantive-scope
jurisprudence to be problematic. Most significantly, the struggle over who may be
held matters not only for those detainees who already have or may one day receive
the right to seek habeas review but also for any detention operations that ultimately
depend upon the same underlying legal authority—i.e., the AUMF. That is to say,
if judges determine in the habeas setting that the AUMF extends only to certain
groups or fact patterns, commanders and policymakers must take that judgment
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into account whenever acting under that same authority—whether subject to ha-
beas review or not. In practical terms, this means that the habeas jurisprudence can
and presumably will impact all AUMF-based detention operations—including
specifically all detention operations in Afghanistan—even though very few
detentions beyond Guantanamo are or likely ever will be subject to direct habeas
review. Civilian government lawyers advising policymakers, and military judge ad-
vocates advising commanders in the field, have an obligation to take account of
this caselaw in the course of devising policy and procedure regarding who may be
detained prospectively and what standard should be employed when carrying out
screening of detainees post-capture. In this way, the detention-scope jurispru-
dence arising out ofGuantanamo could come to impact a far greater number ofde-
tainees. Unfortunately, policymakers and commanders at the moment lack clarity
regarding the boundaries of their authority, yet have little choice but to proceed in
the shadow of this uncertainty.
Making matters worse, spillover effects from the Guantanamo habeas might not
be limited to detention operations. The effects may extend to AUMF-based target-
ing decisions as well. That is to say, the detention-scope debate may overhang the
decision to kill under color of the AUMF as much it overhangs the decision to de-
tain under that authority.
The point is not an immediately obvious one; the power to kill and the power to
detain are by no means coextensive. But they need not be coextensive in order for
the Guantanamo habeas litigation to impact the legal bounds of targeting authority
elsewhere. Again, the AUMF is the transmission mechanism. Say that in the course
of the habeas litigation, courts ultimately determine that the AUMF must be con-
strued to apply only to sworn members of al Qaeda and the Taliban who have re-
ceived military-style training. Assume further that a commander subsequently
desires to launch a missile from a drone into the window of a car being driven in
Yemen by a local man whom he believes to act as a fund-raiser for al Qaeda—but
whom he also knows has not sworn an oath to al Qaeda or attended any training
camps. The strike on its face would not be an exercise of force supported by the
AUMF, whatever its consistency with LOAC or IHRL.
It may be that the strike could yet be justified, but the important point for pres-
ent purposes is that the issue at the very least would be clouded by the narrowing
construction ofthe AUMF produced via the habeas litigation. Thus military opera-
tions not directly subject to judicial review262 nonetheless may be impacted indi-
rectly by the development of detention-scope jurisprudence. And as in the
detention context, the dynamic matters not so much because it exists, but rather
because it is transmitting uncertainty.
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Finally, the habeas litigation may also generate spillover effects by virtue of the
fact that the judges in the course of resolving the detention-scope issue have en-
gaged with concepts that are both contested and likely to arise in future, unrelated
contexts involving military force. This is most obviously the case with respect to the
episodes in which judges have grappled with the meaning of "direct participation
in hostilities" in an effort to clarify the scope of the government's detention
authority. The merits of referencing DPH for this purpose are considered above.
For now, the important point is that when courts do make use ofDPH in this way,
they maybe obliged to define this deeply contested concept. And once they do this,
their opinion will matter at least to an extent in any subsequent context in which
that LOAC concept matters—without regard to whether that subsequent context
has anything to do with the AUMF. Any future armed conflict implicating the
DPH question—which is to say, any future armed conflict—henceforth would
take place in the shadow of that earlier opinion. Much the same might be said for
frequently employed statutory language like "all necessary and appropriate force,"
moreover.
B. Should Congress Intervene?
Assume for the sake of argument that the emerging habeas jurisprudence does in-
deed involve a substantial degree of disagreement and uncertainty with respect to
individualized detention criteria, and that this disagreement and uncertainty are
important in relation to future cases and to other, collateral matters. It does not fol-
low automatically that Congress should step in with legislation designed to address
the situation.
One might oppose legislative intervention on the ground that the process of re-
fining the law in this area should be left in the hands of the judiciary. Judges, after
all, routinely disagree about fine points of law concerning complex subjects, and
the appellate review over time will tend to smooth out such discrepancies in the
traditional common law fashion. This is, in fact, the argument advanced by a pair
ofadvocacy groups—Human Rights First and the Constitution Project—in a doc-
ument titled Habeas Works: Federal Courts' Proven Capacity to Handle Guan-
tanamo Cases: A Reportfrom Retired Federal Judges.263 The report contends that the
"lower courts are steadily progressing toward a workable detention standard,"264
and denies that judges have to "draft" a substantive standard or otherwise are en-
gaged in a "lawmaking" process. What the judges are doing instead, the report ar-
gues, is merely "interpreting and applying" the detention standard established by
Congress and the President in the AUMF as informed by the laws ofwar. 265 To the
extent that the report acknowledges any variation among the judges, it character-
izes that variation benignly as the mere "gradual exploration and shaping of the
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detention standard," in traditional common law-like fashion. 266 Habeas Works
concludes that "there is no reason to doubt the ability of the three-level federal
court system to develop a substantive detention standard." 267
That last claim no doubt is correct. As Judge Wilkinson's opinion in Al-Marri il-
lustrates, judges can undertake to develop detention standards meant to conform
to the peculiarities of the non-State-actor context. And so too no one doubts that
the common law process in theory can smooth out the many disagreements that
actually arise when judges undertake to do this, much as courts in the past used
case-by-case adjudication to develop and amend substantive rules for torts, con-
tracts and the like. But this is a straw man argument. The important question is
whether it would be better for Congress to play the primary role in crafting the
details of the detention standard.
There are several factors to consider in thinking about this question. First, one
could select between these approaches based on the normative desirability of the
substantive standard one believes is most likely to be produced in the end by each.
On close inspection, however, the two options may be close to a wash along this
dimension.
Those who would prefer to see greater restraints on the government's capacity
to detain might at first blush be inclined to disfavor legislation on the theory that
Congress most likely would adopt a broad detention standard and that the judi-
ciary over time will settle upon a more constrained approach. Proponents of a
broad standard, by the same token, might favor legislation for the same reason. The
Democratic-controlled Congress in 2009 and 2010 persistently used the power of
the purse to make it more difficult for the President to close Guantanamo, after all,
and the Republican takeover of the House in 2010 might be expected to tilt Con-
gress still further toward erring on the side of facilitating rather than restraining
military detention. But careful consideration of the trends in the caselaw described
in Part II suggests that it would be unwise to assume that the judiciary in the end
will adopt narrower tests. The sequence of D.C. Circuit opinions in 2010, begin-
ning but by no means ending with Al-Bihani, if anything suggests the contrary.
And though many of the Circuit's decisions are now the subject ofpending certio-
rari petitions, it would be foolish to assume that the Supreme Court will both take
up the substantive-scope question and adopt more constrained positions with re-
spect to it; Justice Kagan is recused from these cases in light ofher recent role as the
Solicitor General, and Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas and Alito
are unlikely to be interested in such a narrowing approach.
Fear of, or desire for, a broad detention standard accordingly does not point
clearly in favor of or against legislative intervention. What other factors, then,
might one bring to bear in developing a well-considered position on the question?
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Second, one could focus on the democratic pedigree of the resulting rule set.
That is, one might favor legislative intervention because the lawmaking process
would do more to contribute to a national debate and public engagement on the
question, and the resulting rules would in any event bear a superior stamp ofdem-
ocratic legitimacy. In response, one might note that we routinely have relied on
common law processes to develop and refine rules in other important settings. But
it is not clear we ever have done so in a context that impacted contemporaneous
military operations to this extent. Here, the question at issue is one that speaks di-
rectly to an issue of pressing national concern: just who is it that the United States
purports to be at war with? A strong argument can be made that the United States
has a moral obligation to engage in a forthright national debate on this subject ifwe
are to have military detention at all; indeed, that argument has been made, and it is
rather convincing.268
Third, one might favor or disfavor legislation on grounds of speed and finality
in light of my argument that lingering uncertainty regarding the precise bound-
aries of detention authority is harmful. For example, one might argue that legisla-
tion will settle the substantive-scope question more quickly than the ongoing
process ofcommon law development. That process, after all, dates back at least to
the initial decision by Judge Mukasey in Padilla in late 2002, and does not seem
likely to end anytime soon. Anticipating this concern, Habeas Works argues that
some amount of residual ambiguity—and thus some need for case-by-case clarifi-
cation—invariably will remain even in the event of a legislative intervention.269
This is true, but the reduction in ambiguity via a statute if carefully designed could
reduce the total amount ofwork left to be accomplished through the habeas lens.
Then again, an inartfully drafted statute could achieve the opposite by introducing
entirely new ambiguities and undoing points of consensus already established
through the existing habeas jurisprudence.
Fourth, one might take account of the fact that legislative rulemaking as a
general proposition is more easily revisited than rules derived through the ha-
beas process. Should experience demonstrate that a statutory definition of the
bounds of detention authority is too broad or too narrow, that definition can be
revised in the ordinary course of further legislation. Inclusion of a sunset provi-
sion in legislation, moreover, could guarantee periodic reassessment. Judicially
crafted rules are not so readily altered, however. The judiciary is reactive rather
than proactive. It must have a case or controversy in order to have the occasion to
take up a question, and hence the opportunity to revise the substantive scope of
detention authority may or may not be there even if the existing standard proves
unwise. Even assuming a proper case arises, moreover, the time lag between the
beginning of a case and final judgment by the last court to consider the matter
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can be substantial—particularly if it is necessary for the Supreme Court to inter-
vene in order to limit or reverse precedent.
These factors, taken together, incline me to think that legislation on the
substantive-scope question would in fact be desirable, at least in the abstract. In
particular, it would be desirable to have express statutory language that
• confirms that membership in an AUMF-covered group is a sufficient condi-
tion for detention;
• provides that participation on such a group's chain of command, knowing
attendance at a military- style training camp operated by such a group and perhaps
other factors constitute substantial but not dispositive evidence of membership;
• articulates a mens rea standard for membership, such as a requirement that
the individual not only knew the identity of the group but intended to become an
active participant in its affairs and thereby to facilitate, directly or indirectly, the
unlawful ends of the group;270
• takes a clear position on whether the provision of support independent of
membership can count as a sufficient condition to justify detention, and articu-
lates a corresponding mens rea element such as intent to facilitate, directly or indi-
rectly, the group's unlawful use of violence; and
• specifies whether there are any geographic limitations as to the availability of
detention (e.g., limiting detention to persons captured outside the United States,
or limiting support-based detention to persons captured in connection with com-
bat operations).
All that said, any serious discussion oflegislative intervention also must account for
the fact that in no plausible scenario would Congress address only the substantive-
scope question. Rather, if it reaches this question at all, Congress almost certainly
would simultaneously address any number of other related matters, including the
procedural and evidentiary rules associated with habeas review. Depending on
what one expects Congress to produce on those issues, then, even someone who
supports the idea of legislation on the substantive-scope question may conclude
that legislation on the whole is undesirable.
* * *
We lack consensus regarding who lawfully may be held in military custody in the
contexts that matter most to US national security today—i.e., counterterrorism
and counterinsurgency. More to the point, federal judges lack consensus on this
question. They have grappled with it periodically since 2002, and for the past three
years have dealt with it continually in connection with the flood of habeas corpus
litigation arising out ofGuantanamo in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's 2008
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decision in Boumediene v. Bush. Unfortunately, the resulting detention jurispru-
dence is shot through with disagreement on points large and small. As a result, the
precise boundaries of the government's detention authority remain unclear de-
spite the passage of more than nine years since the first post-9/11 detainees came
into US custody.
We should not be surprised at this disagreement. The conflicting efforts of the
judges reflect the fact that the very metrics of legality are deeply contested in this
setting. We do not agree which bodies of law should govern in the first instance
and, even ifwe did, we then encounter indeterminacy and plausible disagreement
with respect to what each body of law actually has to say, if anything, about the
detention-scope question. Making matters worse, these difficulties arise in a con-
text in which familiar legal frameworks experience substantial evolutionary pres-
sures, making it difficult to distinguish descriptive and normative arguments
about the legal limits of the government's authority. Against this backdrop it be-
comes easy to see that the judges at times are speaking past one another, much as
occurs in the larger public debate.
Understandable or not, though, this state of affairs is problematic. Most obvi-
ously, it renders the prospects for success in the Guantanamo habeas litigation un-
certain for both the government and the detainees. More significantly, however,
the failure to resolve the detention-scope question casts a shadow across an array of
military activities that are not directly subject to habeas review. The mixed pro-
nouncements overhang detention operations in Afghanistan that are not subject to
habeas review, insofar as those detentions depend on the same underlying claims
of authority that undergird the government's position in the Guantanamo litiga-
tion. And by the same token, the habeas caselaw may have the same spillover effect
on targeting operations—i.e., the use of lethal force—in places as varied as
Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia.
It is important to bring these disagreements, their causes and their conse-
quences to the surface, and to push for their resolution. The Obama administra-
tion, after all, is not going to abandon the use of military detention. The
Guantanamo habeas litigation will not conclude for years to come. The use of de-
tention in Afghanistan will persist for some time. Even in Iraq—even after the sup-
posed end of combat operations—a small population of US-controlled military
detainees continues to exist, and will do so for some time. Uses of lethal force, via
drone strikes and otherwise, will continue with respect to al Qaeda targets in vari-
ous spots around the world for the foreseeable future. Were it all to end tomorrow,
moreover, we could still expect future situations to arise in which another adminis-
tration decides to employ military detention in a setting involving terrorism or in-
surgency, giving rise to the same set of issues.
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Simply put, the problem is embedded in our evolving strategic context—partic-
ularly in the perception that non-State actors have become increasingly empow-
ered, to the point that some can pose a strategically significant threat. Insofar as law
and strategic context exist in dynamic relationship with one another, then, the
question is not whether the law will adapt to these circumstances. It will, sooner or
later, more or less appropriately. The question, instead, concerns which institu-
tions we will rely upon to mediate that process.
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The Changing Character of the Participants
in War: Civilianization of
Warfighting and the Concept of "Direct
Participation in Hostilities"
Charles Garraway*
The fact that the nature of conflict has changed is not in dispute. The question
that is being asked is how this has affected the traditional law of armed con-
flict, particularly as it has developed in the modern era. Modern codification of the
law began almost simultaneously on opposite sides of the Atlantic. In the United
States, during the Civil War, Dr. Lieber drafted the Lieber Code, 1 designed for the
Unionist forces. Meanwhile, in Europe, Henry Dunant, following his experience at
the Battle of Solferino, was working to fulfill his dream of providing succor to the
victims of armed conflict. The first emanation of this was the Geneva Convention
of 1 864. 2
What was of particular interest in both these initiatives is the emphasis on those
who took a direct part in hostilities. In both Europe and the United States, conflict
was restricted to defined geographical areas. The limits on the range of weaponry
meant that this could be so. Thus there was, for the most part, a clear distinction
* Associate Fellow at Chatham House on the International Security Programme and a Fellow of
the Human Rights Centre, University of Essex.
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between the "battlefield" and other areas, and between those who took a direct part
in hostilities and those who did not. Battles were largely set pieces between armed
forces and did not involve the civilian population. At the first battle of Bull Run in
July 1861, civilian sightseers came down from Washington in order to take vantage
points on the surrounding hills. They thought they were entirely safe but even
then, they learned a sharp lesson as, to their total surprise, the Union forces were
routed and the civilians found themselves caught up in the ignominious retreat.
As weaponry increased in power, the battlefield turned into the battlespace. The
growing range of artillery and of airpower meant that no longer could war be lim-
ited to armed forces. Civilians were becoming involved, at first as victims of the
new weaponry as occurred in the area bombings of the Second World War, and
then as participants. As war became all-encompassing and the difference between
front lines and rear areas began to evaporate, total war involved the mobilization of
the whole population. Some were in the armed forces; others went into other occu-
pations supporting the war effort, e.g., working in ammunition factories or trans-
port units.
One of the key principles of the law of armed conflict has always been that of
distinction; a clear separation is to be kept between those who take a direct part in
hostilities and those who don't. Those who don't are protected from direct attack
and those engaging in conflict are required to take all feasible precautions in the
choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event
to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and destruction or
damage to civilian objects. On the other hand, the growing involvement of civil-
ians in activities relating to conflict in itself caused difficulties. Where is the divid-
ing line to be drawn? The dilemma was met in 1977 by a provision that civilians
enjoy protection from attack "unless and for such time as they take a direct part
in hostilities."3
Until comparatively recent times, the distinction between direct and indirect
participation in hostilities was comparatively uncontroversial. It was agreed that
working in industries supporting the war effort, such as ammunition factories, did
not amount to "direct participation," though, as the factory itself would remain a
military objective, this might not be too much of a protection. On the other hand,
those who committed "acts which by their nature and purpose are intended to
cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment ofthe armed forces"4 were seen
as taking a direct part in hostilities and thus losing their protection. However, as
the nature of warfare has changed, so have the participants. Now, in the
battlespace, there are many different actors. The regular armed forces sometimes
seem to be almost in a minority. The complexity ofweaponry has led to a growing
number of civilian contractors hired to maintain, repair and in some cases even
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operate equipment. Unmanned aerial combat vehicles can be operated by
personnel situated thousands of miles away from the conflict area. The cost of
maintaining military personnel has also led to the contracting out ofmany support
functions, particularly logistics. The merging of front lines and rear areas has
meant that rear area security, often in the past carried out by civilian personnel,
has now developed into a major industry so that private military and security
companies bid for contracts all over the world in areas where they will be operat-
ing in areas of conflict.
Even the nature offighting forces has changed. While in international armed con-
flict regular armed forces continue to predominate, there are an increasing number
of armed groups and even individuals who involve themselves in the hostilities. In
non-international armed conflict, one party is by definition "irregular." How does
the principle of distinction apply to all these new actors in the battlespace?
Linked to this is the growing overlap between the law of armed conflict and
human rights law. Some continue to argue that these two separate parts of public
international law are indeed separate and there is no overlap. However, for most,
particularly States that are members of the Council of Europe and thus subject to
the European Convention of Human Rights, 5 that is no longer even an arguable
position. How then do the protective provisions ofhuman rights law, which do not
contain the same distinctions between civilians and direct participation, being
technically applicable to all, apply in situations of armed conflict?
To complicate matters still further, the lines between conflict and law enforce-
ment have themselves become blurred. Terrorism, which in the past was looked
upon as a domestic problem to be dealt with under the law enforcement paradigm,
has become ideological "warfare" extending across international boundaries. Ter-
rorists have acquired weaponry and equipment, the power of which would be the
envy ofmany States.
All these factors have led to increasing strain on the laws of war as we know
them. Are the restraints ofthe Geneva Conventions "quaint" and "obsolete" in this
"new paradigm"?6 Or are we merely seeing a development ofprevious types ofwar-
fare which do not affect the underlying principles?
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) realized at an early stage
after 9/11 that the principle of distinction might be under threat and that it was neces-
sary to seek to establish guidelines to assist governments to differentiate between those
who are protected from direct attack and those who are not. At the center ofthis issue
is the phrase "taking a direct part in hostilities." Who qualifies as a "civilian"? What is
the meaning of "direct part"? What are the consequences of losing protection?
In conjunction with the TMC Asser Institute, the ICRC established an expert
process in 2003 to see if answers could be found to these questions. The experts
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held five meetings between 2003 and 2008 but, although there was much agree-
ment, that agreement did not extend to many of the key issues. As usual, it is the
hard cases where the differences came to the fore. 7
At the end of the process, the ICRC decided to issue its own Interpretive Guid-
ance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International
Humanitarian Law. 8 The ICRC made it plain that the Interpretive Guidance "is
widely informed by the discussions held during these expert meetings but does
not necessarily reflect a unanimous view or majority opinion of the experts."9
Unanimity would have been difficult as, on some of the key issues, the division
was wide and the views strongly held on all sides. Indeed, a number of the experts,
particularly those who held government positions (though all experts took part in
their private capacity), felt it necessary to withdraw from the process as the nature
ofthe Interpretive Guidance became clear. As a result, the Interpretive Guidance has
been highly controversial and subject to strong criticism. 10 At the same time, Dr. Nils
Melzer, the ICRC's author of the Interpretive Guidance, and others have defended
the text. 11
But what is the debate about? The first issue is on the definition of "civilian,"
particularly in non-international armed conflict. The Interpretive Guidance holds
that organized armed groups of a party to the conflict do not qualify as civilians.
However, in non-international armed conflicts, because of the difficulty in defin-
ing members of such groups and the risk that "membership" might then lead to
persons who were members of political or social wings of such groups losing pro-
tection, "members" are limited only to "individuals whose continuous function it
is to take a direct part in hostilities {'continuous combatfunction)." 12 To some, this
was going too far in that it created a new group of individuals who were not "com-
batants," since there is no combatant status in non-international armed conflict,
but who were no longer classed as "civilians." To others, it did not go far enough, in
that "continuous combat function" did not properly equate to the regular armed
forces opposed to the group. Those in support functions such as the logistician,
cook or even lawyer, who might be considered as "combatant" members if in the
regular armed forces, would normally not qualify as legitimate targets under the
"continuous combat function" test.
In relation to the constitutive elements of direct participation in hostilities, the
Interpretive Guidance suggested three cumulative conditions. The relevant section
states: 13






The act must be likely to adversely affect the military operations or military capac-
ity of a party to an armed conflict or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or destruc-
tion on persons or objects protected against direct attack (threshold of harm), and
2. there must be a direct causal link between the act and the harm likely to result
either from that act, or from a coordinated military operation ofwhich that act con-
stitutes an integral part (direct causation), and
3. the act must be specifically designed to directly cause the required threshold of
harm in support ofa party to the conflict and to the detriment ofanother (belligerent
nexus).
These three constituent elements, threshold ofharm, direct causation and belliger-
ent nexus, may be thought to be helpful and seem to have received general ap-
proval. While there may be differences on the edges such as whether voluntary
human shields come within "direct causation," 14 the concepts themselves seem to
be well grounded both in existing law and in practice.
Perhaps the most controversial part of the Interpretive Guidance has proved to
be the third part, namely, the consequences of the loss of protection. It states in
Recommendation IX that
[i]n addition to the restraints imposed by international humanitarian law on specific
means and methods of warfare, and without prejudice to further restrictions that may
arise under other applicable branches ofinternational law, the kind and degree offeree
which is permissible against persons not entitled to protection against direct attack
must not exceed what is actually necessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose
in the prevailing circumstances. 15
This has been interpreted by some as introducing a rule of graduated use of force
whereby lethal force may only be used, even against combatants, only if it is "actu-
ally necessary." The Guidance includes a quote from Jean Pictet that
[i]fwe can put a soldier out of action by capturing him, we should not wound him; if
we can obtain the same result by wounding him, we must not kill him. If there are two
means to achieve the same military advantage, we must choose the one which causes
the lesser evil. 16
A number of experts in the process, mainly from government backgrounds, saw
this as the introduction of a human rights standard into international humanitar-
ian law and vigorously opposed it. They argued that no such rule existed in law in
that the traditional interpretation was that a combatant who had the right to
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conduct hostilities in accordance with the law of armed conflict also could be tar-
geted at any time and in any place. It was accepted that on many occasions, where it
was possible to do so, capture might be a preferable option but it was not a rule of
law. There were also concerns over the use of the word "actually." Did this intro-
duce an expostfacto element into the decision-making process? Ifthe "armed" per-
son facing the soldier turned out to have no bullets in his weapon, was it "actually
necessary" to kill him?
The debate has been bitter and the issues have sometimes become confused. The
New York University Journal of International Law and Politics published a Forum
consisting of four articles by critics from Canada, the United States and the United
Kingdom of the Interpretive Guidance, all ofwhom had been involved in the expert
process. 17 The same volume published a lengthy riposte to the critics by Dr. Melzer. 18
What seems clear is that the Interpretive Guidance has launched an extensive de-
bate, one which will be continued in this volume of the "Blue Book" series.
However, while direct participation may seem to be the key to the "civiliani-
zation" of warfare, there are a number of other issues which should not be forgot-
ten. One is the growing use of private companies to fulfill what were previously
considered to be military tasks. Increasingly, as mentioned earlier, Western forces
are outsourcing specific functions to such companies. Logistics are now heavily re-
liant on civilian contractors, whether it is the cook who provides the food in the
mess tent or the weapons technician who provides an in-theater repair capability
for a complex weapons system. Transportation is now heavily civilianized and this
became a factor in the direct participation debate. However, more problematic is
the growing number of companies providing security in complex emergencies.
These can range from static guards for civilian businesses to bodyguards for senior
government officials.
How far can or should such companies become involved in military activities?
What are the limits on their participation and to what extent does the contextual
situation change the status of the personnel? Is training of military personnel in a
peacetime environment acceptable but not in a country racked by conflict? Where
are the dividing lines?
The regulation of private military and security companies has been a matter of
concern to governments and indeed to responsible companies within the industry.
An initiative by the Swiss government in cooperation with the ICRC led to the
signing on September 17, 2009 of the Montreux Document on Pertinent Interna-
tional Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Pri-
vate Military and Security Companies during Armed Conflict. 19 This document,
initially signed by seventeen States, led to efforts to develop an international code of
conduct that would set forth norms and standards for the provision of private
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security services with some form of accountability mechanism. These efforts, which
included an active collaboration ofmembers ofthe private security industry with the
Swiss Department ofForeign Affairs, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control
ofArmed Forces and the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and
Human Rights, resulted in the International Code of Conduct for Private Security
Service Providers in November 20 1020 signed by fifty-eight companies.
Underlying all ofthese discussions is the even more fundamental issue ofthe re-
lationship between the law ofarmed conflict and human rights law. As the bound-
aries between law enforcement and armed conflict become increasingly blurred, it
becomes harder for the soldier to know which is the predominant paradigm.
Traditionally, the law ofarmed conflict and human rights law have been seen as
separate and distinct. One was the law ofwar and the other the law of peace. Never
the twain should meet. However, that separation no longer can be upheld. Quite
apart from the problems of delineation across the spectrum ofviolence, the two sys-
tems oflaw have also deliberately sought to expand their own spheres of influence.
At the end ofthe Second World War, in keeping with the traditional divide, the
law of armed conflict belonged almost exclusively to international armed con-
flict—war between States. In 1949, the first tentative steps were made to extend
some provisions to non-international armed conflicts through the medium of
Common Article 3.21 At the same time, the United Nations in its attempts "to save
succeeding generations from the scourge ofwar" sought to "reaffirm faith in fun-
damental human rights, in the dignity and worth ofthe human person, in the equal
rights ofmen and women and ofnations large and small."22 In December 1948, the
General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.23 Although "universal," no direct mention is made in the Declara-
tion of time ofwar. It is only in later documents such as the European Convention
for the Protection ofHuman Rights ofNovember 1950 (entering into force in Sep-
tember 1953) 24 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of
196625 that there is reference to wars and states of emergency.
Common Article 3 is important because it extended only small parts of the law
ofarmed conflict into non-international armed conflict. These parts dealt with the
protection of individuals ("Geneva law") and not the conduct of hostilities
("Hague law"). However, that has now changed. In the Diplomatic Conference
that led to the adoption of the two 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, detailed proposals were put forward to extend the "Hague-type" pro-
visions introduced in Additional Protocol I,26 and thus applicable only to interna-
tional armed conflict, into Additional Protocol II,27 dealing with non-international
armed conflict. For the most part, these attempts were unsuccessful and Additional
Protocol II contains primarily "Geneva-type" law. However, the tide was already
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turning and today there is an increasing trend for law of armed conflict treaties to
apply across the board to all types of conflict. The ICRC's study Customary Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law,28 published in 2005, supported this trend, coming to the
conclusion that almost all "Hague-type" law was now applicable to all conflicts,
both international and non-international.
At the same time, the International Court of Justice29 and a number of human
rights bodies,30 in particular the European Court of Human Rights, 31 were con-
firming that human rights law applied at all times, including in times of conflict
and public emergency, subject only to derogation and to the relationship between
human rights law and the law of armed conflict as the lex specialis. Unfortunately,
while the principle seemed to be established, the devil, as always, is in the detail and
the nature of the relationship between human rights law and the law of armed
conflict has not been adequately defined.
The extension of "Hague-type" law into non-international armed conflict itself
causes difficulties. Whereas "Geneva law" is primarily concerned with the interests
ofvictims and thus tends to give primacy to the interests ofhumanity over military
necessity, "Hague law" is more of a balance. It is accepted in the law ofarmed con-
flict that in conflict there will be damage to civilian property and civilian lives will
be lost. However, the principle of proportionality seeks to keep this damage and
loss of life within reasonable bounds, taking into account the nature of conflict.
Human rights law sits reasonably comfortably alongside "Geneva law" but less
comfortably with "Hague law." The concept of balance is more limited in human
rights law, particularly in those areas that are of most importance in conflict. Thus
the rules for the use of force in the law of armed conflict are difficult to reconcile
with the right to life under human rights law.
While conflict was a distinct activity conducted, for the most part, away from
civilian locations, these divergences were reasonably unimportant. However, in
"wars amongst the people," they become critical and need to be resolved. 32 In-
deed, the reconciliation of human rights law and the law of armed conflict in a
manner that provides a comparatively seamless and coherent set of rules across
the spectrum of violence may be the challenge of the next generation of interna-
tional lawyers.
The civilianization of warfighting poses many challenges to the accepted legal
framework. Some of the work being done and the concepts being explored are ex-
amined in these following contributions by the members of the panel I chaired.
Much, however, remains to be done. Unless the problems and challenges are rec-
ognized and faced, they will never be met and resolved. The characteristics of con-
flict may be changing but that does not mean that the need for regulation is
changing too. The laws of war have stood the test of time down the centuries,
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adapting as required to meet new situations. The essential balance between hu-
manity and military necessity has underpinned the regulation of conflict through
those centuries, adjusting to meet each new challenge, each "new paradigm." Our
task is to ensure that that balance is maintained in the world as we face it in the first
quarter of the twenty-first century.
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Direct Participation in Hostilities and the
Interoperability of the Law ofArmed Conflict
and Human Rights Law
Fran^oise J. Hampson*
I. Introduction
There is an ongoing debate as to how to make the law of armed conflict
(LOAC) and human rights law (HRsL) interoperable. The International
Committee of the Red Cross's (ICRC's) Interpretive Guidance on the Notion ofDi-
rect Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law has compli-
cated that process. 1 This article seeks to explain why there is a problem and to
propose possible solutions. It only deals with the specific issues of targeting and
opening fire. It does not address the issue of detention. 2 Before embarking on that
examination, it is first necessary to identify a range of assumptions and assertions
on which the analysis will be based. Certain distinctions within LOAC will then
be explored, because of their impact on the rules on targeting. The article will
then examine how the decision to open fire is analyzed under HRsL. Options
available to make LOAC and HRsL interoperable will be considered before finally
suggesting a solution.
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IT. Assumptions and Assertions
This section identifies certain issues relevant to the discussion that, for reasons of
length, it will not be possible to discuss in any detail.
The Applicability ofLOAC Does Not Have the Effect of Making HRsL
Inapplicable3
There is overwhelming evidence to support this general proposition, including two
advisory opinions and one judgment in a contentious case of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ).4 The ICJ has suggested that, when both bodies of rules are
applicable, LOAC is the lex specialist It is unclear as yet both precisely what this
means and also how it is to be operationalized.6 While the United States and Israel
have argued that the applicability of LOAC displaces that of HRsL, it appears un-
likely that they can claim to be "persistent objectors." 7
One of the most important implications of the co-applicability of LOAC and
HRsL is that bodies charged with monitoring compliance with HRsL would appear
to have the competence to assess whether a killing was a breach of HRsL, even if
they have to interpret HRsL in the light ofLOAC. The bodies in question include
not only monitoring mechanisms that owe their authority ultimately to the United
Nations Charter, such as the UN Special Procedures mechanisms, 8 but also moni-
toring bodies established under treaties. Those likely to have the most impact in
practice are treaty bodies, which can receive individual complaints and deliver
binding legal judgments—in other words, the three regional human rights courts. 9
This does not mean that the opinions of other bodies, notably the Human Rights
Committee under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, are not
important. 10 The jurisdiction of the regional human rights courts may be limited
on other grounds, most notably the uncertain scope of the extraterritorial applica-
bility of HRsL.
The Scope of the Extraterritorial Applicability ofHRsL
Unlike the first issue, this question is far from settled. 11 It appears to be clear that
States have to apply their human rights obligations in territory that they occupy, at
least in the case of stable or settled occupation. 12 It is also well established that
States have to apply their human rights obligations to persons in their physical
control, such as detainees. 13 What is not clear is the extent to which a State's hu-
man rights obligations apply to acts within the control of State agents where the
harm to the victim is foreseeable but the victim is not within their physical control.
Such a situation arises when the armed forces of State A in State B deliberately fire
at X from a distance of eight hundred yards or intentionally strike a building in
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State B, knowing that there are a number of civilians inside, even if they do not
know their names. 14
This issue, unlike the previous question, arises purely as a matter of HRsL; it
has nothing to do with the co-applicability of LOAC. It only arises in the case of
those human rights treaty bodies whose competence is limited to alleged victims
"within the jurisdiction" of the respondent State. 15 The UN Special Procedures
and the Inter-American Commission ofHuman Rights, in exercising its functions
under the Organization ofAmerican States Charter, are not subject to such a limi-
tation. 16 To date, this restriction on the scope ofjurisdiction has been most signifi-
cant in the case ofthe European Court ofHuman Rights (ECtHRs) and, to a lesser
extent, the UN Human Rights Committee. Important cases, arising out of the
conflict in, and occupation of, Iraq in and after 2003 and the conflict between
Georgia and Russia in 2008, are currently pending before the former body. It may
clarify that Court's currently incoherent caselaw. 17 It requires a rational path to be
found between two equally objectionable extremes. It seems self-evident that a
State should not be allowed to do extraterritorially what it is prohibited from do-
ing within its own borders.
It is equally obvious that a State should not be found responsible for acts, omis-
sions and situations over which it exercises no control. An important distinction in
HRsL, that between positive and negative obligations, might be relevant in this
context. By "negative obligations" is meant the obligation to respect a right, usually
by not doing something prohibited. The State also has an obligation to protect in-
dividuals from the risk ofa right being violated. This requires the State to take mea-
sures to protect the individual from potential harm at the hands of State agents or
third parties. It represents a positive obligation to protect. The nature of certain
rights means that the positive obligation can only be fulfilled by the State exercising
the type of control it is expected to have in national territory. The delivery of the
right to education requires machinery for setting up schools, training teachers,
paying teachers and providing various materials. It is self-evident that State A, en-
gaged in a military operation in State B, cannot deliver such a right to the popula-
tion. The situation would be different if the armed forces were in effective control
of part of the State's territory over a significant period of time and failed to address
in anyway the educational needs ofthe population, or if State A's forces, present in
State B with the consent of the State, failed to protect schools from foreseeable at-
tack. This might suggest that the only relevant test is one of situational control.
While that is certainly relevant, it is inadequate to address certain situations when
the State freely chooses to undertake an act that it could not do lawfully in its own
territory. Take the example of State A, which is engaged in a military operation in
State B, but which is not in control of the territory in which it is fighting. Its armed
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forces deliberately fire on X at a distance of eight hundred yards. They are not in
physical control of X. They are, however, in control of the acts of the armed forces
whose behavior is decisive in determining whether or not X is killed. The issue con-
cerns a negative obligation, the obligation not to use potentially lethal force except
in defined circumstances. The State does not require elaborate machinery in order
to deliver the right; its agents simply have to refrain from opening fire.
It should be remembered that, while much of the discussion of the issue con-
cerns the control exercised by the State acting extraterritorially, the treaty language
does not require the alleged perpetrator to be within the control of the State. It re-
quires that the victim should be within the jurisdiction of the respondent State. It
should also be remembered that the question here is not whether the situation
should be analyzed in terms of HRsL or LOAC but whether HRsL is applicable at
all. If it is not, certain human rights bodies do not have jurisdiction. Ifthey do have
jurisdiction, a second and separate question arises. The body then has to determine
whether its analysis ofHRsL has to be undertaken in the light ofLOAC. That might
mean that there was a violation ofHRsL only if there were a violation ofLOAC. In
effect, but not in form, the human rights body would then be enforcing LOAC. It
could only do so, however, if it had jurisdiction.
This article will not discuss the issue further but it must be borne in mind
throughout the subsequent discussion. It has significant implications for the extent
of the problem of co-applicability.
The Geographical Scope of the Applicability ofLOAC
Historically, there seems to have been an assumption that LOAC applied through-
out the territory of the State involved in the conflict or in whose territory the con-
flict was occurring. 18 In the case of international armed conflicts (IACs),
geographical limitations on the scope of applicability ofLOAC may be achieved in
other ways. For example, during the GulfWar 1990-91, the coalition forces appear
not to have targeted roads and bridges in Iraqi Kurdistan. They were not used to
contribute to the Iraqi military effort and their destruction or neutralization would
therefore not have delivered a definite military advantage. 19 In IACs, it may be
preferable to assume that LOAC applies throughout the relevant territories and to
use the definition of a military objective to limit the geographical scope ofthe fight-
ing on a factual basis.
The situation in the case of non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) is signif-
icantly different, whether the State is a party to the conflict or not. 20 Although it is
important that forces needing the protection of LOAC should get it, it is equally
important that a LOAC paradigm should only be used when it is necessary. Emer-
gency measures that are genuinely required are usually accepted, however
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reluctantly, by the majority of the population. That population is, however, likely
to be alienated by reliance on emergency measures not perceived to be necessary.
On that basis, NIAC rules should apply to those parts of the territory in which
righting is occurring and to conflict-related activities in other parts ofthe territory.
Imagine, for example, that there is a conflict in one province of State A. It intro-
duces internment or administrative detention as an emergency measure. That
should not apply to the detention of individuals in other provinces, unless an indi-
vidual is detained there on account of activities in the province where the conflict is
occurring.
The caselaw of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) suggests support for both the general applicability of LOAC throughout
the territory and also a more restricted geographical scope for the applicability of
NIAC rules.21 A study of State practice, at least with regard to NIACs within the ter-
ritory of the State, might suggest a more restrictive approach. As a matter of im-
pression, when a conflict is only occurring in part of its territory, a State often only
declares a state ofemergency in those parts ofnational territory affected by the con-
flict.
22 That may be principally the product of domestic, notably constitutional-
law, concerns or of HRsL, but that would not exclude its possible relevance to the
applicability of LOAC. 23
The process of establishing customary law in NIACs is far more complicated
than in IACs. In IACs, the whole of the relevant discourse is through the vocabu-
lary ofLOAC. That is the principal source of international legal obligations. 24 Do-
mestic law is likely to be of limited relevance, particularly to extraterritorial
conduct.25 In the case of internal NIACs, the constraints on the conduct of the do-
mestic authorities are principally articulated through domestic law and HRsL.
Confining emergency measures to the parts of the territory where the conflict is
occurring and conflict-related activities elsewhere may be the approach currently
favored by human rights bodies dealing with derogation during states of emer-
gency.26 Initially, the ECtHRs emphasized that, in order to justify derogating at all,
the threat had to be to "the life of the nation" as a whole. 27 This might have been
thought to imply that the conflict had to be occurring everywhere, thereby justify-
ing the applicability of LOAC everywhere. More recently, the ECtHRs has ad-
dressed the situations in Northern Ireland and southeast Turkey. 28 At no point was
the argument raised that the two States could not derogate because the conflict was
only occurring in part oftheir territories. At the same time, when dealing with cases
arising in other parts of the respective States, neither the State itself nor the Court
suggested that they should apply the emergency measures in those other areas.
When the applicability ofLOAC depends, among other elements, on the level or
intensity of the violence, as is the case with Common Article 3 to the Geneva
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Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocol II of 1977, it is already the case that
the applicability can vary at different times. That may be relevant when determin-
ing whether a geographical limitation to the applicability ofNIAC rules is, in prin-
ciple, acceptable.
In the rest of the article, it will be assumed that NIAC rules only apply to the ar-
eas of the territory in which the conflict is occurring and to conflict-related issues
elsewhere. In other parts of the territory, domestic law, including relevant human
rights obligations of the State, will be applicable.
The Function of Legal Rules in Situations ofArmed Conflict
The law does not exist to remove the decision-making authority of the military
commander from him. The law determines the bottom line, below which conduct
is unlawful. Just because conduct is not unlawful does not make it wise or apt for
achieving the military purpose. It is possible that a commander could be prose-
cuted on this basis, under national military law, for action that did not constitute
an international crime. 29
The flip side of these propositions is that the law cannot be based on a best-case
scenario. In normal circumstances, a decision on opening fire is based on a law and
order paradigm. 30 That means that it should be taken as a last resort and based on
the behavior of the person targeted. It is dependent on the immediacy and severity
of the threat that person poses at the time. In most situations ofarmed conflict, that
is inappropriate as a bottom line. It may well be that most of the time and in most
of the territory, even during an emergency, a law and order paradigm is appropri-
ate, but in other situations it will not be. Rules are more likely to deliver the desired
result if they are suited to the situation in which they are to be applied and for
which they have been designed. In other words, just as in peacetime it is in every-
one's interest, including that of military forces, to limit decisions on opening fire to
a law and order paradigm, in many situations of armed conflict it is in everyone's
interest, including that of the civilian population, for such decisions to be based on
a LOAC paradigm.
These principles need to inform the operationalization of the relationship be-
tween HRsL and LOAC. To assert an unrealistic protection of civilians in situations
ofarmed conflict based on HRsL is not likely to enhance their protection but rather
to result in unrealizable expectations on the part of civilians and in increased viola-
tion of the rules on the part of the armed forces. If some rules are perceived to be
unrealistic, this is likely to lessen respect for those rules that can be applied in prac-
tice. This is not to argue that at the first sound of gunfire LOAC should displace
HRsL. The circumstances in which an armed conflict paradigm should replace a
law and order paradigm will be considered further below. All that is being asserted
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here is, first, that there are circumstances in NIACs when LOAC is the more appro-
priate paradigm and, second, just because the law allows a soldier to open fire does
not mean that it is necessarily the right thing to do in a particular situation in which
LOAC is applicable.
III. Distinctions within LOAC Relevant to the Rules on Targeting
and Opening Fire
Three distinctions need to be considered here: first, that between Hague law and
Geneva law; second, that between treaty law and custom; and, third, that between
the literal meaning of "direct participation in hostilities" (DPH) and the ICRC's
Interpretive Guidance.
Hague Law and Geneva Law
Before 1977 and the adoption of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conven-
tions of 1949, particularly Protocol I on international armed conflicts, any discus-
sion took the distinction between Hague law and Geneva law for granted. The rules
were usually to be found in different treaties, making the distinction both neces-
sary and relatively straightforward. The usual way of describing the substantive
content of the rules was that Hague law dealt with means and methods of fighting
and Geneva law with the protection ofvictims who were, by definition, in the power
of the other side. In fact, the rules were even more distinct than this might suggest.
Hague law and Geneva law functioned differently as legal subsystems. This was a
product of the issues with which each dealt, but it went much deeper than that.
For reasons of brevity, it will be necessary to discuss the differences by way of
sweeping generalizations. Even if they may be subject to criticism, that does not
mean that there is not an essential truth at their heart. Hague law is directed to the
military operator. It guides his decision making at the time. It deals principally with
the places where, and times when, fighting is occurring. The rules tend to identify
the considerations that must be taken into account and provide guidance as to how
they are to be balanced, rather than simply prohibiting a particular outcome. 31 The
rules are a detailed articulation of general principles, such as the principles of dis-
tinction, proportionality and military necessity.
Geneva law, on the other hand, is focused on the actual or potential victim,
rather than the perpetrator. Many, but by no means all, of the issues that it ad-
dresses arise away from the immediate field of battle. The law tends to prohibit
certain results or outcomes, usually by requiring certain forms of behavior. The
bottom line and the most appropriate behavior in a particular situation are likely
to be much closer in the case of Geneva law than Hague law. If Hague law is
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principally directed at the individual operator, Geneva law appears to focus more
on the obligations of a party to the conflict. Geneva law provides answers or re-
quired outcomes, but Hague law provides tools enabling the operator to arrive at an
answer in a specific situation. To that extent, Geneva law appears to address types
of situations, rather than specific ones. The nature ofGeneva law may make it eas-
ier to mesh with HRsL than is the case with Hague law. If, in the case of Geneva
law, it is a question of finding an accommodation between LOAC and HRsL, in
the case of a significant portion of Hague law it is a matter of making a choice.
That is a product not only of the content of the rules but also of the nature of the
separate legal subsystems.
The internal logic of the two subsystems is therefore significantly different, with
considerable implications for their functioning as systems. This is reflected in pre-
sumptions, qualifications and limitations contained within the rules. If a goal of
the Geneva Conventions is the protection of victims, it may mean that qualifica-
tions to a rule have the nature of exceptions and suggests that they should be inter-
preted restrictively. This would reinforce the parallel with HRsL. Hague law has no
overarching goal. It seeks rather to establish a balance, one between humanitarian
considerations and military necessity. To that end, there can be no default position
or presumption in favor of either side of the equation. The rule itself contains the
balance. There can be no appeal to military necessity outside the formulation ofthe
rule. Equally, as a matter of law, there can be no appeal to humanitarian concerns
outside the rule. There is no need to interpret limitations32 restrictively. They
should be given their natural meaning.
Additional Protocol I appeared to merge Hague law and Geneva law. It is not,
however, possible to "merge" two sets of rules that function in quite different ways.
It might be possible to change each set of rules and to produce an entirely new type
of rule, but that was not done. Rather, Protocol I contained some sections and pro-
visions of a Hague-law type and some of a Geneva-law type. Additional Protocol II,
which is largely a development ofCommon Article 3 ofthe Geneva Conventions of
1949, is principally an example of Geneva law, but it does contain some Hague-
type provisions, unlike Common Article 3.
The specific question being explored in this article is targeting and the decision
to open fire. Is that a matter of Hague law or Geneva law? While it might be
tempting to see civilians at risk from the fighting as an additional class of victim
to be protected under Geneva law, it is submitted that that analysis is flawed. The
categories of victims protected by the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 share two
characteristics. They have been adversely affected by the armed conflict and they
are vulnerable because they are in the power of the other side. 33 Their protection
does not, by and large, affect the conduct of hostilities, although it will be
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necessary to divert resources that could have been used for other purposes to ef-
fect their protection.34 Civilians in need of protection from the fighting do not fit
within this framework. Their vulnerability arises not from the adversary but from
the fact of the fighting. They need protection from their own side as much as
from the enemy. Any measures to improve their protection will have a direct im-
pact on the conduct of hostilities. In other words, rules on targeting and opening
fire form part of Hague law, even if part of their object is the protection of the ci-
vilian population.
The Distinction between Treaty Law and Customary Law in LOAC
Treaty Law
Geneva Law. There is detailed and extensive provision in treaty law for Geneva-
law-type issues in IACs. There is fairly detailed provision for such issues in treaties
applicable in NIACs, with two significant exceptions—grounds for detention and
the status ofmembers ofopposing organized armed groups. This is a logical conse-
quence of the situations in question. Domestic law, possibly emergency law, is
available to deal with the grounds for detention, at least in the case of internal
NIACs. No sovereign State claiming a monopoly on the lawful use of force can
logically admit that organized armed opponents have a special status or are acting
other than unlawfully. To do so would be to recognize the belligerency, thereby
making the conflict effectively subject to the IAC rules. There are some NIAC
Geneva-type rules across the very low threshold of Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949. Those basic rules are further developed in situations
that cross the significantly higher threshold for the applicability of Additional
Protocol II.
Hague Law. The situation is very different in the case ofHague law. Again, there is
detailed regulation of the means and methods of fighting in treaties applicable in
IACs. There are no treaty rules of a Hague-law type in Common Article 3 NIACs,
however, and only very basic provisions in NIACs to which Additional Protocol II
is applicable. The one exception is rules on specific conventional weapons, where
the recent trend in treaty law is to make the same rules applicable in IACs and
NIACs.35 The treaties do not explain whether NIACs refer to all such conflicts or
only those that cross the threshold of Additional Protocol II. 36
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Customary Law
Geneva Law. Assuming that the ICRC's Customary International Humanitarian
Lawi7 study, reinforced by the caselaw ofthe ICTY and International Criminal Tri-
bunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the Statute of the International Criminal Court in
the specific field of criminal rather than civil obligations, offers a fairly accurate
guide to customary law rules of a Geneva-law type, there is a close match between
treaty provisions and customary law in both IACs and NIACs. Again, it is necessary
to exclude rules on grounds for detention and the status of organized armed oppo-
nents in the case of NIACs.
Hague Law. The situation is very different in the case of Hague-law rules. There is
a significant overlap in treaty and customary law rules of a Hague-law type in IACs
but not in NIACs. The caselaw of the ICTY and ICTR and the Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Court, together with the customary law study, suggest that there
are extensive and detailed customary rules of a Hague-law type in NIACs, even
though there are no or only rudimentary treaty provisions. In reaching such con-
clusions, not one ofthose sources distinguishes between Common Article 3 NIACs
and Additional Protocol II NIACs. This is surprising given that there are no
Hague-law-type treaty rules in Common Article 3 NIACs. They only appear in
treaty law when a NIAC crosses the very high threshold for the applicability ofAd-
ditional Protocol II. The most remarkable legal source in this respect is the Statute
of the International Criminal Court, the only source based on inter-State negotia-
tion. The negotiators took as their criterion for inclusion in the list of war crimes
that the act was regarded as a war crime in customary international law. 38 The list in
the Statute of Hague-law war crimes in NIACs is much shorter than that in IACs
and, most notably, does not include launching an indiscriminate or disproportion-
ate attack. The negotiating States are likely to have been influenced by the custom-
ary war crimes in NIACs "discovered" by the ICTY and ICTR. It is nevertheless
surprising that in the definition ofNIACs in the Statute no distinction is drawn be-
tween Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II situations. 39 It would be rash
to assume that the Statute of the International Criminal Court is evidence that the
distinction no longer matters. The last time that States elaborated general rules for
NIACs, they went out of their way to create a threshold of applicability much
higher than Common Article 3. Nor should it be assumed that the ICRC's custom-
ary law study is not controversial. In fact, that is far from being the case, particu-
larly with regard to Hague-law-type issues. 40
It is suggested that alleged customary NIAC rules of a Hague-law type that do
not bear a close relationship to the NIAC treaty rules should be handled with some
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care. The problem is not that such rules risk posing an undue and unwarranted ob-
ligation on States;41 it is rather that the alleged customary rules may imply a shift
from a law and order paradigm to an armed conflict paradigm at an inappropri-
ately low level of disruption. Since Geneva-law rules are focused on the protection
ofvictims and bear a significant similarity to the approach of HRsL, their applica-
bility at the Common Article 3 threshold does not appear to be too problematic. It
is specifically customary rules of Hague law that give rise to this difficulty. More
particularly, it is LOAC rules thatpermit action to be taken, rather than LOAC rules
that prohibit attacks against certain types of targets or the use of certain weapons,
that cause the problem.
When the alleged applicability of customary Hague rules in a NIAC means
that objects indispensable to the civilian population cannot be targeted or that
anti-personnel land mines cannot be used, there is clearly no conflict between
such a rule and HRsL. The situation is very different if the applicability of custom-
ary Hague rules in all NIACs means that an individual can be targeted by virtue of
being a member of an organized armed group exercising a continuous combat
function—in other words, by reference to status—rather than on account of the
threat posed by his behavior.42 In low-intensity armed conflicts, the situation is
likely to be made worse ifarmed forces target by reference to status rather than be-
havior. Mistakes and "collateral casualties" may be even less well tolerated by the
civilian population than in high-intensity NIACs. The issue is not whether armed
forces can be used to deal with organized armed violence during an emergency, but
whether whatever forces are used are applying rules based on a law and order para-
digm or an armed conflict paradigm.
Consider the example of "Bloody Sunday."43 For the sake of argument, let us
assume, first, that the events happened today; second, that the situation in
(London)Derry is to be characterized as coming within Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions;44 and, finally, that it is lawful under LOAC rules to open fire
against an individual because of his membership in an organized armed group ex-
ercising a continuous combat function.45 Since the armed forces are unlikely to
have membership lists of illegal organized armed groups, a membership test has to
be understood as referring to presumed membership. It is not clear how that is to
be determined. Can it seriously be suggested that it would be appropriate if inter-
national law allowed the British armed forces to open fire against any presumed
member ofthe IRA, irrespective ofwhat he was doing at the time? Would it be suf-
ficient if international law gave them that authority but a commander chose to act
within greater restrictions than the law allowed and ordered his forces only to open
fire in self-defense?46 In other words, should such discretion have been allowed to a
military commander or should international law have required him to act within a
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law and order paradigm? That is the kind of problem thrown up by the alleged ap-
plicability of customary Hague rules in all NIACs, rather than in those of sufficient
intensity as to make Additional Protocol II applicable.
The Literal Meaning of "Direct Participation in Hostilities" and the
Interpretive Guidance
According to treaty law, at least in the case of IACs, there exist only two possible
statuses under LOAC in relation to the law on the conduct of hostilities: combatant
and civilian. 47 The term "combatant" does not describe persons who fight, but
persons who are entitled to fight. A combatant has the right to kill and, equally,
can be killed by opposing combatants by virtue of having that status.48 It does not
matter what he is doing at the time he is killed. Only combatants can be targeted
by virtue of status alone. The only other people who can be the target of attack are
persons who are taking a direct part in hostilities. The status of combatant exists
only in IACs. While it is readily understandable that members of an organized
armed group are not regarded as combatants, implying as it does an entitlement to
fight, this does raise an interesting question about the status of members of the
State's armed forces.49 If there is no combatant status in NIACs, are they civilians?
Although an individual has no right in international law to participate in a NIAC,
he is not committing an international crime by doing so, but obviously he is very
likely to be committing a crime under domestic law. Similarly, he will not commit
an international crime ifhe kills a member ofthe State's armed forces or a member
of another organized group, but he will commit an international crime if he
breaches the rules on the conduct of hostilities by intentionally killing a civilian,
for example.
The treaty rule that addresses DPH is the same in IACs and NIACs. Civilians en-
joy the protection afforded against the effects of hostilities "unless and for such
time as they take a direct part in hostilities." 50 Whatever the difficulties regarding
the time during which a person can be attacked or the conduct that constitutes
"taking a direct part," it is clear that the person has to be doing something that
makes him a target of attack. In other words, that depends on behavior and not sta-
tus. Two different types of problems confront armed forces trying to determine
who can be targeted. First, the situations in which armed forces find themselves
have evolved significantly since 1977. "A continuous shift ofthe conduct of hostili-
ties into civilian population centres has led to an increasing intermingling of civil-
ians with armed actors and has facilitated their involvement in activities more
closely related to military operations." 51 A more recent phenomenon is the
outsourcing of traditionally military functions. This could result in people appear-
ing to be members of the military and to be engaged in hostilities when that is not,
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in fact, the case. Alternatively, people could appear to be civilians but also appear to
be involved in military activities. In other words, the factual situations in which
members ofthe armed forces find themselves are increasingly confused. This must
make it difficult to apply any rule, even if they knew what the rule meant.
The second difficulty concerns the formulation of the rule itself. What is the
period of time covered by "unless and for such time as"? When does it start and
when does it end? Which activities constitute "participation" and what is the dis-
tinction between direct and indirect participation?
It is likely that there is an additional element of frustration and that is with the
content ofthe rule. Imagine that there is significant evidence thatX has been and is
actively participating in hostilities, but the evidence is not of a quantity, type or
character as to enable detention on a criminal charge. The armed forces cannot tar-
get X unless they catch him in the act of participating, even though he may be re-
sponsible for many deaths.
In these circumstances, it is not surprising that the ICRC sought to clarify the
meaning of the rule.52 The Interpretive Guidance was the product of extensive con-
sultation with experts who were consulted in their personal capacity, but is exclu-
sively the responsibility of the ICRC. Much of the content, particularly in relation
to IACs, is relatively uncontroversial. In non-IAC situations, however, that is not
the case. In those instances, the Guidance is very controversial from various and
sometimes conflicting standpoints. 53 The clarification ofthe constitutive elements
of direct participation and ofthe beginning and end of direct participation will not
be considered further here. What will be examined is the withdrawal of civilian sta-
tus from members of organized armed groups in NIACs and its implications for
the interoperability ofLOAC and HRsL.
The Interpretive Guidance treats civilians differently in IACs and NIACs. Since
an IAC by definition involves at least two States on opposing sides, there is no
shortage of "parties" to such a conflict. The Interpretive Guidance restates the usual
test for combatant status. 54 All other persons are civilians but they may forfeit pro-
tection from attack if they take a direct part in hostilities. In other words, loss of
protection depends on the behavior of the individual. The Interpretive Guidance
clarifies both the meaning of direct participation and also the time during which
protection is lost. These clarifications have implications for loss of protection by
civilians in IACs, but loss of protection is still dependent on behavior.
The situation with regard to NIACs is very different. A person is no longer to be
regarded as a civilian if he is a member of an organized armed group of a party to
the conflict. Members of an organized armed group constitute the armed forces of
a non-State party to the conflict and consist only of individuals who exercise con-
tinuous combat functions. 55 This clearly means that an individual can be targeted
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on account of his status as a presumed member ofsuch a group and not on account
of his behavior at the time he is targeted. Given the greater flexibility introduced as
a result of the clarification of "unless and for such time as" and "direct participa-
tion," it is not clear why it was thought necessary to address the status of a fighter in
a NIAC at all. After all, no change appears to have been introduced to the status of a
civilian who takes a direct part in hostilities in an IAC. That possibly represents an
oversimplification. In an IAC, civilians who belong to an armed group that does
not belong to a party to a conflict can indeed only be targeted if they take a direct
part in hostilities. Many such groups will, however, belong to a party to the conflict,
even if they do not form part of its regular armed forces. That party, which is by
definition a State, will have responsibility in international law for the conduct of
those armed forces. 56 In other cases, the armed group may belong to a party that is
not a State but which is involved in an armed conflict against a party to the IAC.
The Interpretive Guidance suggests that in such a case two armed conflicts will be
occurring in parallel; an IAC between two States and a NIAC between the non-
State party and one ofthe States parties. In that case, who can be targeted will be de-
termined by the Interpretive Guidance principles applicable in NIACs. 57 If any-
thing, that reinforces the point that the impact ofthe Guidance proposal only arises
in NIACs.
The principal justification suggested for denying civilian status to members of
organized armed groups exercising continuous combat functions, while not also
granting them combatant status, is the principle of distinction. 58 There is a need to
distinguish between civilians and those who act like the armed forces of a party to
the conflict. It is said that Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949
implies that both the State and non-State groups have armed forces. 59 Less con-
vincingly, it is argued that Additional Protocol II makes a distinction between
those who take a direct part in hostilities and the forces that are capable ofconduct-
ing sustained and concerted military operations.60 The Interpretive Guidance ac-
knowledges that it is difficult to establish the membership of an organized armed
group, in contrast to membership of the armed forces or other official armed
group.61 It is difficult to see how "continuous combat function" can be established
other than by conduct, in which case we are driven back to a behavior test. It should
be emphasized that loss of status does not depend on membership of a party to the
conflict, or even of membership of an armed group belonging to such a party. It is
also necessary to establish that the individual exercises a continuous combat
function.
Superficially, it might appear that the proposal supports the principle of the
equality of belligerents, in that both parties are recognized as having armed forces.
In fact, however, the members ofan organized armed group exercising continuous
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combat functions lose civilian immunity from attack but do not gain the privileges
of a combatant.
It could, perhaps with equal plausibility, be argued that the principle of distinc-
tion is based on the idea that there are only two statuses in LOAC: that of combat-
ant and that of civilian.62 A combatant is someone who has the right to take part in
the hostilities and who therefore has the right to kill opposing combatants. Anyone
who is not a combatant, therefore anyone who does not have those rights, is a civil-
ian. In that case, members of organized armed groups must be civilians unless the
opposing party recognizes their combatant status. Immunity from attack could be
lost but only on the basis of the individual's behavior.
The Interpretive Guidance just refers to NIACs and does not distinguish between
Common Article 3 NIACs and Additional Protocol II NIACs. That is why the
"Bloody Sunday" example discussed earlier represents a problem. The Interpretive
Guidance approach would be easier to defend if it were restricted to situations
above the threshold ofapplicability ofAdditional Protocol II, at least with regard to
the level and nature of the violence.63
At present, there are two principal difficulties for armed forces: the scope of the
rule and uncertain facts. Other aspects of the Interpretive Guidance address the
temporal and functional issues. It is not clear why it was thought necessary to ad-
dress the question of status before determining the impact of those clarifications.
The bigger difficulty is uncertainty about the facts. It is hard to see how the Guid-
ance helps there. The ability to target by reference to status depends on the ability to
establish that the person targeted was a member of an organized armed group that
belonged to a party to the conflict and the person fulfilled a continuous combat
function within the group. This is likely to pose a real challenge to armed forces if
such a determination is to be based on fact rather than a vague hunch.
Perhaps as a counterweight to the withdrawal of civilian status from certain
fighters, the Interpretive Guidance emphasizes that, when an individual can be the
target ofan attack, the kind and degree of force used must "not exceed what is actu-
ally necessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose in the prevailing circum-
stances."64 The Interpretive Guidance suggests that, in circumstances when it would
not increase the risk to the opposing armed forces or to other civilians, the threat
posed by the individual might be neutralized by measures short of the use of lethal
force, notably detention.65 It is submitted that this represents dangerous category
confusion.66 Key features of a law and order paradigm are, first, that force is used as
a last resort and, second, that priority should be given to an attempt to detain. The
essential feature ofan armed conflict paradigm, as far as Hague-type rules are con-
cerned, is that there is no obligation to detain. An individual can be targeted by vir-
tue of his status, irrespective ofwhat he is actually doing at the time, or on the basis
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of his behavior at the time. As a matter of law, the combination of a right to use
deadly force and a requirement to use the minimum force necessary would appear
to be incoherent.67
It is submitted that there is a better solution, even in purely LOAC terms. It
would also have the additional benefit of making easier the operationalization of
the relationship between LOAC and HRsL.
IV. A Comparison ofthe Basis for Opening Fire under HRsL and LOAC
As indicated above, the majority of human rights treaties prohibit arbitrary kill-
ings without defining the term. The meaning to be given to "arbitrary" becomes
apparent through an examination of the practice of treaty bodies in exercising
their monitoring functions and particularly through the caselaw arising out of
individual complaints. In this context, it is also relevant to consider the analysis in
the report to the UN Human Rights Council of the Special Rapporteur on Extraju-
dicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions.68
It is clear from the caselaw that the prohibition on arbitrary killings is applied
strictly in the case of deaths resulting from the acts of State agents.69 The only basis
for opening fire is the behavior of the individual at the time, including the risk
posed by the individual to himself or others. It is conceivable that it might, in lim-
ited circumstances, be interpreted more broadly. It might be possible to argue that
the agent could justify opening fire against an individual on account of the general
risk he poses, rather than the risk posed by his behavior at the time. 70 It would,
however, be necessary to establish why, if his behavior is not dangerous at the time,
he cannot be detained. The use of potentially lethal force has to be a last resort.
The European Convention for the Protection ofHuman Rights (ECHR) is un-
usual in that it defines exhaustively the only circumstances in which resort may be
had to potentially lethal force. 71 All those circumstances are based on a law and or-
der paradigm, and are based on the behavior ofthe individual at the time. Further-
more, the test is not that the use of potentially lethal force is reasonably necessary
but that it is absolutely necessary. 72 In addition, the Convention requires that the
State take measures to protect the right to life. This has been interpreted, in the case
of planned operations, as requiring security forces to take measures to try to pre-
vent the need to resort to potentially lethal force73 and to protect other civilians in
the vicinity from the risk ofbeing injured or killed. 74 This can result in the State being
held responsible for a death that resulted from the use of inappropriate weapons.75
All the treaty bodies require both lawful grounds for resorting to potentially
lethal force and also that the force used be proportionate. This does not mean
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proportionality as it is understood in LOAC but that the force used is proportion-
ate to the risk posed by the individual at the time.76
The analysis has so far considered the requirements ofHRsL in a "normal" con-
text. The question arises ofhow the rules are modified, if at all, by the existence of a
situation of emergency or armed conflict. All the treaty bodies, other than the
ECHR, provide that the prohibition ofarbitrary killing is non-derogable. Primafacie,
this means that it applies also in such situations. It is, however, possible that the
meaning of "arbitrary" has sufficient flexibility to apply in a different way in such
situations. There appears as yet to be no human rights caselaw involving killings
arising out of circumstances in which LOAC indisputably applies a status test—in
other words, in IACs. There are relevant cases currently pending before the
ECtHRs. There is, however, caselaw arising out of situations in which the Interpre-
tive Guidance would suggest that targeting by reference to status is legitimate—in
other words, the targeting, in every type of NIAC, of a member of an organized
armed group exercising a continuous combat function. The author is not aware of
any such situation where the State invoked LOAC or the State claimed such a basis
for opening fire. On the contrary, States have argued, successfully or otherwise,
that the behavior of those targeted justified the resort to potentially lethal force
and/or that the force used was proportionate.
The ECHR is again different in that it provides, "No derogation from Article 2,
except in respect ofdeaths resulting from lawful acts ofwar . . . shall be made under
this provision."77 This either represents a possible derogation or a defense. No State
has ever invoked the article, even where the alleged violation of Article 2 occurred
during the course of an armed conflict to which Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions was arguably applicable.
It is submitted that human rights bodies appear to be wedded to a behavior test.
Even assuming that they wish to give effect to the directions of the ICJ that, when
both LOAC and HRsL are applicable, they should apply LOAC as the lex specialis,
they are likely to be reluctant to go back on existing caselaw, either in NIACs gener-
ally or specifically in the case ofNIACs between the threshold ofCommon Article 3
and that of Additional Protocol II.
The basis of targeting in LOAC will be set out baldly here, since it has already
been the subject of discussion. In IACs, there appears to be a close relationship be-
tween the rules of treaty law and customary law. Under both, the following may be
targeted by virtue of their status as combatants: members of the armed forces of a
party to the IAC, members of a militia belonging to that party and members of a
levee en masse. Others may only be targeted ifthey take a direct part in hostilities, ei-
ther as interpreted on the basis of treaty law or as interpreted in the light of the In-
terpretive Guidance.
203
DPH and the Interoperability ofLOAC and Human Rights Law
In the case of NIACs, there is a marked difference between treaty law and what
some allege to be customary law. Under treaty law, there is no guidance as to who
may be targeted and on what basis under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Con-
ventions. That presumably falls to be regulated by domestic law and HRsL. Where
a NIAC crosses the much higher threshold necessary to make Additional Protocol
II applicable, a person may only be targeted for taking a DPH. A person cannot be
targeted by virtue of his status.
An analysis of the position under customary law requires a distinction to be
drawn between customary law without the Interpretive Guidance and customary
law taking it into account. The expansive view, based on the Customary Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law study, the caselaw of the ICTY and ICTR, and the provi-
sions of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, suggests that in all NIACs
a person can be targeted only if he takes a direct part in hostilities. This is not the
same as the human rights test based on the threat posed by the behavior of the in-
dividual at the time, but it is at least based on behavior. It might be possible for
human rights bodies to accommodate themselves to that slight widening of the
concept of threat, particularly those bodies applying a prohibition of "arbitrary
killings." The picture changes if we take account of the Interpretive Guidance. On
that basis, a person may be targeted in all NIACs either on account of his taking a
direct part in hostilities or because he is a member of an organized armed group
belonging to a party to the conflict and exercising a continuous combat function.
That last element involves targeting on the basis of status and doing so in a situa-
tion in which human rights bodies have hitherto applied, without apparent con-
troversy, a behavior test. That is likely to complicate rather than to facilitate the
operationalization of the relationship between LOAC and HRsL.
V. Conclusion
A human rights body, trying to give effect to the principle articulated by the ICJ,
has to decide first whether LOAC is applicable. 78 It then has to decide what LOAC
says. In order to identify the relevant LOAC rule, it has to characterize the armed
conflict as an IAC or a NIAC. If it is an IAC, the possible distinction between treaty
LOAC and customary LOAC is unlikely to be of major importance. That is not the
case in relation to NIACs. The human rights body needs to know whether it should
only apply treaty law, in which case there is a significant difference between situa-
tions within Common Article 3 ofthe Geneva Conventions and those in which Ad-
ditional Protocol II is applicable. On the other hand, if they are to apply both treaty
and customary law, they have the unenviable task of determining the content of
customary NIAC rules. The arguments as to the content of customary NIAC rules
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are not for academics in ivory towers, dancing on the head of a pin; they have con-
siderable practical importance.




They could regard LOAC as silent with regard to the basis for targeting in
low-intensity armed conflicts, therefore applying their usual test under
human rights law and limiting the application of DPH to conflicts in
which Additional Protocol II was applicable. 79 This would still involve
the application of a behavior test, but a slightly different one from the
peacetime test.
(2) They could applyDPH as the basis for targeting in all NIACs. This would
still involve the application of a behavior test, but again a slightly differ-
ent one from the peacetime test.
(3) They could regard LOAC as silent with regard to the basis for targeting in
low-intensity armed conflicts, therefore applying their usual test, but in
this instance applying both DPH and a status test (member of an orga-
nized armed group exercising a continuous combat function) in situa-
tions in which Additional Protocol II was applicable.
(4) They could use DPH as the basis for targeting in low-intensity armed
conflicts and apply both DPH and a status test in situations in which Ad-
ditional Protocol II was applicable.
The one thing that human rights bodies are unlikely to accept is the application
of a status test in low-intensity armed conflicts.80 That is, however, precisely what
the Interpretive Guidance proposes with regard to members of organized armed
groups exercising continuous combat functions. The Interpretive Guidance has
therefore complicated, rather than made easier, the relationship between LOAC and
HRsL. The Interpretive Guidance makes it clear that it is only addressing LOAC and
not other bodies of rules. 81 That is unhelpful since the majority of States have obli-
gations under both LOAC and HRsL. There would appear to be little point in sug-
gesting that States can target by reference to status in all NIACs if HRsL precludes
that possibility, at least in the case oflow-intensity armed conflicts. 82 The only situ-
ation in which such a LOAC rule would conceivably be relevant would be a trans-
national NIAC, if and only if HRsL was not applicable extraterritorially in the
particular circumstances. 83 The Interpretive Guidance should either have confined
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targeting by status to situations in which Additional Protocol II was applicable or
not used targeting by status at all.
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/. Introduction
As the number ofunmanned systems to support military operations has pro-
liferated over the past decade, so too have the legal issues associated with
their use in conventional warfare and the "war on terrorism." Between 2000 and
2008, the number ofunmanned aerial systems (UAS) in the US Department ofDe-
fense (DoD) inventory jumped from under fifty to over six thousand. 1 By March
2010, the number had increased to over seven thousand. 2 In fiscal year 2009, UAS
conducted over 450,000 flight hours; the number ofhours in 2010 was expected to
exceed 550,000. 3 To support this increasing reliance on unmanned systems, the Air
Force is expanding the number ofUAS pilots and air operations staffers from 450 to
1,100 by 20 12.4 In 2009, the Air Force trained more UAS pilots than fighter pilots.5
Today, unmanned systems are being used across the entire spectrum of opera-
tions, from their traditional role of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
(ISR) to an emerging role of offensive strike operations. UAS have clearly become
the weapon of choice to target terrorists and other militants in isolated locations
within Pakistan and Yemen. In 2007, for example, there were only 5 UAS attacks in
Pakistan.6 The number of aerial attacks increased to 36 in 2008, and during the
first year ofthe Obama administration the number jumped to 53. 7 During the first
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four months of 2010, UAS have conducted 60 attacks in Pakistan. 8 If the current
pace continues, the number of UAS attacks could well exceed 150 in 2010.
The importance of the relationship between the use of unmanned systems and
the law is not lost on our military and civilian leaders. At a session on unmanned
naval technologies at the Brookings Institution in November 2009, the Chief of
Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead, acknowledged that "as unmanned
systems become ubiquitous on the modern battlefield in everything from targeting
to disrupting the flow ofenemy information . . . , there are going to be legal issues
that come up and issues related to the law ofwar."9 Four months later, the State De-
partment Legal Adviser, Harold Koh, defended the Obama administration's use of
UAS to engage terrorist targets in Pakistan and elsewhere, indicating that "U.S. tar-
geting practices, including lethal operations conducted with the use ofunmanned
aerial vehicles, comply with all applicable law, including the laws of war." 10
Not everyone agrees, however, that the use of unmanned systems to attack ter-
rorist targets outside traditional "combat zones," like Afghanistan and Iraq, is con-
sistent with international and domestic law. Some of the criticisms that will be
examined in this paper include:
• The United States is not engaged in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda or any
other militant group. Terrorist attacks are criminal acts that must be addressed
with law enforcement measures, not armed attacks that give rise to the use of mili-
tary force in self-defense. The use of force in this context is governed by interna-
tional human rights law (IHRL), not international humanitarian law (IHL).
Because armed drones are warfighting, not law enforcement, tools, they may not
be used to strike terrorist targets outside the combat zone.
• Targeting individual terrorist leaders constitutes an unlawful extrajudicial
killing in violation of IHRL, as well as the ban on assassination under Executive
Order (E.O.) 12333.
• Conducting UAS strikes against terrorist targets within the territory of an-
other nation without the consent of that nation violates Article 2(4) of the UN
Charter, which restricts nations from using force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any State.
• Even if the right of self-defense applies, the use ofUAS to attack terrorist tar-
gets outside Afghanistan and Iraq violates the IHL principles of military necessity,
proportionality and distinction.
• If the United States is engaged in an armed conflict, civilian UAS operators
(e.g., Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operatives) are unlawful combatants and
may not participate in hostilities. Only lawful combatants have a right to use force
during an armed conflict.
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• UAS strikes may only be conducted against civilians who have taken a direct
part in hostilities. Although acts of terrorism may cause harm, most do not meet
the criteria for direct participation in hostilities (DPH). State responses to these
acts must conform to the lethal force standards applicable to self-defense and law
enforcement.
• The use of advanced weapons systems in lethal operations against terrorists
is illegal under international law.
II. Armed Attack or Threat ofAttack by Non-State Actors and the
Right ofSelf-Defense
Opponents to the use ofdrones outside ofAfghanistan and Iraq argue that the "war
on terrorism" is a myth because al-Qaeda's actions and US responses thereto "have
been too sporadic and low-intensity to qualify as armed conflict." 11 They cite Pros-
ecutor v. Tadic and Additional Protocol II (AP II) to support their position. In
Tadic, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia determined
that an "armed conflict exists wherever there is a resort to armed force between
States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and orga-
nized armed groups or between such groups within a state." 12 AP II similarly pro-
vides that armed conflicts do not include "situations of internal disturbances and
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a
similar nature." 13 These opponents further argue that an armed military response
to a terrorist attack will almost never meet the requirements for the lawful exercise
of self-defense, because "terrorist attacks are generally treated as criminal acts . . .
,
not armed attacks that can give rise to the right ofself-defense." 14 They additionally
argue that the use of military force "long after the terror act . . . loses its defensive
character and becomes unlawful reprisal." 15
These arguments are incorrect as a matter of law and are clearly not supported
by State practice. Foremost, they ignore the fact that more innocent victims have
died at the hands of terrorists since 9/11 than on the battlefields of Afghanistan
and Iraq combined. These numbers do not include the thousands of innocent civil-
ians killed by al-Qaeda, the Taliban and other militant groups in Afghanistan and
Iraq since 2002. These figures also do not take into account the fact that the num-
ber of deaths and injuries would have been much higher had several planned ter-
rorist attacks been successful. To argue that al-Qaeda's actions have been too
sporadic and low-intensity to qualify as an armed conflict is disingenuous, at best.
Al-Qaeda operatives have attacked US embassies and consulates, US naval vessels,
US military bases, the Pentagon and the US financial center in New York. With
operations in over sixty countries, al-Qaeda has trained, equipped and supported
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a potent armed force that continues to plan and execute attacks against the United
States and its interests worldwide on a scale that requires a proportionate military
response. Despite coalition successes in Iraq, Afghanistan and around the world,
al-Qaeda continues to pose a significant and imminent threat to the United States
and its allies. In short, the armed conflict against the organization and its affiliates
is far from over.
The opponents' arguments likewise disregard the fact that the law regarding
armed attacks by non-State actors and the application ofIHL (i.e., the law ofarmed
conflict (LOAC)) to these armed groups have evolved dramatically since the mid-
1990s, particularly after 9/11. Based on actions taken by the UN Security Council,
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Organization ofAmerican
States (OAS) after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, it is now well recognized that non-
State actors can engage in an armed attack that gives rise to the right ofnational and
collective self-defense.
A. Armed Attacks by Non-State Actors
On September 11, 2001, terrorists associated with al-Qaeda crashed two commer-
cial jets into the twin towers ofthe World Trade Center (WTC), another jet into the
Pentagon and a fourth in a field in rural Pennsylvania. Nearly three thousand peo-
ple, mostly civilians, were killed and thousands of others were injured.
Immediately following these brutal and unprovoked attacks, the Security Coun-
cil determined that al-Qaeda, a non-State actor, had conducted an armed attack
against the United States, giving rise to the right of individual and collective self-
defense under Article 51 ofthe Charter. 16 Security Council Resolution 1368 (2001)
further determined that the 9/11 attack, "like any act of international terrorism,"
was a "threat to international peace and security" and expressed a readiness "to
take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of . . . [9/11], and to com-
bat all forms of terrorism." 17
NATO soon followed suit, invoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty for the
first time in its history. Article 5 provides that if a NATO ally is the victim of "an
armed attack" each and every member of the alliance will consider that act as an
armed attack against all members and will take actions they deem necessary in
collective self-defense to assist the ally that has been attacked (emphasis
added). 18 A few weeks later, recalling the inherent right of individual and collec-
tive self-defense, the OAS adopted a resolution on September 21 acknowledging
that the 9/11 attack against the United States was an attack "against all American
states and that in accordance with [Article 3 of] . . . the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) . .
.
, all States Parties . . . shall provide effective
reciprocal assistance to address such attacks and the threat of any similar attacks
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against any American state . . . ." 19 The resolution further decided that "the States
Parties shall render additional assistance and support to the United States and to
each other ... to address the September 1 1 attacks, and also to preventfuture ter-
rorist acts"20 (emphasis added).
Domestically, the US Congress responded by adopting a joint resolution—Au-
thorization to Use Military Force (AUMF)—that authorized the President "to use
all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons
he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order
to prevent anyfuture acts ofinternational terrorism against the United States by such
nations, organizations or persons"21 (emphases added). The US Supreme Court
subsequently "recognized the AUMF as the functional equivalent of a declaration
ofwar" in the Hamdi and Hamdan decisions and the 2010 National Security Strat-
egy continues to reflect the view that the United States is "at war with . . . al-Qa'ida,
and its terrorist affiliates who support efforts to attack the United States, our allies,
and partners."22
Based on these international and domestic authorities, the United States com-
menced military operations in self-defense against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Af-
ghanistan on October 7, 2001. Of note, military operations against non-State
actors are consistent with prior US practice. Throughout its history, the United
States has engaged in a number of armed conflicts with groups that it has not rec-
ognized as sovereign nations in such conflicts as the US Civil War, Indian wars,
Philippine Insurrection and Vietnam War (Viet Cong).23 The question today is
whether these historical precedents and the 2001 authorities remain viable in 2010,
and whether they (along with the inherent right of self-defense) can be extended to
apply to terrorist forces that continue to plan and conduct acts of aggression
against the United States and its allies outside the borders ofAfghanistan and Iraq.
Clearly, the answer to both of these questions is yes. Following 9/11, the Secu-
rity Council, NATO and OAS all determined that the United States had been "at-
tacked" by al-Qaeda, giving rise to the right of national and collective self-defense.
These determinations are consistent with the plain language of Article 5 1 of the
UN Charter, which simply refers to armed attacks against a member State (i.e.,
"nothing . . . shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense
if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations" (emphasis
added)). The Charter does not require that the attack be conducted by a nation-
State. Moreover, none of these organizations placed temporal or geographic re-
strictions on the use of force in self-defense. On the contrary, the opposite is true.
Resolution 1368 specifically decided that
"
any act of international terrorism [is] . .
.
a threat to international peace and security" (emphasis added). Moreover, the
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resolution expressed a readiness "to take all necessary steps ... to combat allforms
ofterrorism" not just the 9/11 attack (emphasis added). The OAS resolution simi-
larly provided that the States parties would provide assistance and support to the
United States to address the 9/ 1 1 attacks, as well as "the threat ofany similar attacks
against any American state ... to prevent future terrorist acts" (emphases added).
And while NATO simply decided that all member States should take the actions
they deemed necessary to assist the United States following the 9/11 attacks, it did
not limit that assistance to a particular country or military operation. Likewise, al-
though the AUMF adopted by Congress focuses on the nations, organizations or
persons that planned, authorized, committed or aided the 9/11 attacks (or har-
bored such organizations or persons), the law does not place any temporal or geo-
graphic restrictions on the use of force. It simply provides that the President can
use all necessary and appropriate force against those responsible for the 9/11 at-
tacks "in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the
United States by such nations, organizations or persons" (emphasis added).
Despite the use-of-force measures authorized by these international and re-
gional organizations, as well as the US Congress, opponents to the use of drones to
attack terrorists outside of Afghanistan and Iraq nevertheless argue that these
authorities are dated and that use of force based on continued reliance on these
authorities has lost its defensive character and amounts to unlawful reprisals. As-
suming for the sake of argument that the opponents are correct in saying that the
United States is not at war with al-Qaeda and that the 2001 authorities have some-
how lapsed, that does not end the debate. The inherent right of self-defense still
provides an adequate legal basis to use lethal force against terrorist targets in Paki-
stan and elsewhere that demonstrate a continuing and imminent threat of armed
attack against the United States and its interests.
B. The Inherent Right of Self-Defense
Customary international law, as reflected in Article 5 1 ofthe UN Charter, recognizes
that all nations enjoy an inherent right of individual and collective self-defense.
Included within this right is the right of anticipatory self-defense—the right of a
nation to protect itselffrom an imminent attack where peaceful means are not rea-
sonably available to prevent the attack. 24 Clearly, it would be inconsistent with the
purposes ofthe Charter ifa nation was required to absorb a first strike, e.g., another
9/11 or a weapon of mass destruction attack, before taking necessary and propor-
tionate military measures to prevent an imminent attack by an armed aggressor. In
this context, "imminent" does not necessarily mean immediate or instantaneous.
As indicated in the 2006 US National Security Strategy:
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[T]he first duty of the United States Government remains what it always has been: to
protect the American people and American interests. It is an enduring American prin-
ciple that this duty obligates the government to anticipate and counter threats, using all
elements of national power, before the threats can do grave damage. The greater the
threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking
anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainly remains as to the time and
place of the enemy's attack
To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if
necessary, act preemptively in exercising our inherent right ofself-defense. The United
States will not resort to force in all cases to preempt emerging threats. Our preference is
that nonmilitary actions succeed. And no country should ever use preemption as a pre-
text for aggression.25
The determination of whether an attack is imminent is therefore based on an as-
sessment of all facts and circumstances known at the time—real-time intelligence,
heightened political tensions, previous and current threats by the aggressor, pat-
tern of aggression/attacks, stated intentions of the aggressor, etc.
The pivotal question today is whether the ongoing activities ofal-Qaeda and its
supporters continue to pose an imminent threat to the United States and its allies
that would justify the use of armed force in self-defense to preempt future attacks
against US interests at home and abroad. If one examines past and current acts of
aggression committed by al-Qaeda and its affiliates against the United States and
its allies, the answer to that question is clearly yes.
Since the first attack on the WTC in 1993, there have been over seventy major
terrorist attacks against the United States and its allies that have resulted in the
deaths of over five thousand people, most of whom were innocent civilians. 26
These deaths exceed the total number ofUS soldiers killed in action in Afghanistan
and Iraq since the beginnings of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation
Iraqi Freedom.27 Over sixty ofthese incidents have occurred since 9/11, resulting in
over sixteen hundred deaths and thousands of others injured. These numbers
would be much higher ifyou count the thousands of innocent civilians that have
been killed by al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Iraq and Afghanistan or had several
planned attacks—such as the December 1999 plot to bomb the Los Angeles airport,
the December 2001 failed "shoe bomber" attack, the foiled attack on a British air-
liner in Saudi Arabia in August 2003, the August 2006 plot to blow up ten planes
bound for the United States, the June 2007 failed car bombings in London, the De-
cember 2009 failed "underwear bomber" attack and the May 2010 failed bombing
in Times Square—been successful.
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It is clear from these incidents that al-Qaeda continues to pose an imminent
threat to the United States and its allies and continues to threaten large-scale at-
tacks against the United States and US interests. For instance, in November 2008,
a former senior Yemeni al-Qaeda operative told the London-based Al-Quds Al-
Arabi newspaper that Osama bin Laden was planning an attack against the United
States that would outdo 9/11 and that al-Qaeda was reinforcing "training camps
around the world that will lead the next wave of action against the West." 28 In June
2009, Al-Jazeera television broadcast a message from bin Laden that threatened
Americans with revenge for supporting Pakistan's military offensive to expel the
Taliban from Swat Valley.29 Six months later, a Nigerian man (Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab, the "underwear bomber") with links to al-Qaeda attempted to
ignite an explosive device on board a Northwest Airlines flight with 278 passengers
on board as the plane prepared to land in Detroit on Christmas day.30 Fortunately,
the device failed to ignite, but bin Laden nevertheless claimed responsibility for
the attempted bombing. 31 In January 2010, the US embassy in Yemen was closed
in response to ongoing threats by al-Qaeda. 32 An attack on the embassy in 2008
had killed nineteen, including an eighteen-year-old American woman. 33 In March
2010, Al-Jazeera aired a tape in which bin Laden threatened to kill any American
captured by al-Qaeda if the United States executed Khalid Sheikh Mohammed,
the alleged mastermind of the 9/11 attack.34
In early May 2010, a naturalized US citizen from Pakistan, Faisal Shahzad,
unsuccessfully attempted to ignite a car bomb that contained gasoline, propane,
fertilizer and fireworks in Times Square. 35 According to Attorney General Holder,
it was "clear that this was a terrorist plot aimed at murdering Americans in one of
the busiest places in the country."36 Shahzad was arrested by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation on May 4. During his interrogation, he admitted his role in the at-
tempted attack and that he had received explosives training in Pakistan during a
then-recent visit. 37 On June 21, Shahzad pled guilty to ten criminal counts, includ-
ing the attempted use of a weapon ofmass destruction, and indicated that until the
United States "stops the occupation of Muslim lands and stops killing the Mus-
lims ... we will be attacking [the] U.S." 38 The Pakistani Taliban immediately took
credit for the attack and there is now evidence that the group was intimately in-
volved in the failed attack. 39 Several additional suspects have been arrested in Paki-
stan, including an executive (Salman Ashraf Khan) of a catering company that
routinely organizes events for the US embassy, and three Pakistanis were taken into
custody in the United States for their suspected roles in the attack.40
In mid-May, Indonesian police foiled an al-Qaeda plot to assassinate President
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and other senior government officials at the upcom-
ing Independence Day (August 17) celebrations in Jakarta. The plan also included
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attacking hotels and killing foreigners—in particular, Americans. In addition to
arresting a large number of suspected militants at an al-Qaeda training camp in
Aceh, the Indonesian police also seized a large number of assault rifles, thousands
of rounds of ammunition and jihadist literature.41
And on May 17, 2010, Iraqi security forces announced they had arrested a
known al-Qaeda militant, Abdullah Azam Saleh al-Qahtani, who was planning an
attack at the World Cup in South Africa and on June 26, 2010, a Pakistani suspect
in the 2008 Mumbai attacks was arrested in Zimbabwe when he tried to cross into
South Africa with a false Kenyan passport.42 Finally, on July 11, 2010, the Somali
insurgent group al-Shabab, which has ties to al-Qaeda, claimed responsibility for a
coordinated attack that killed more than seventy people, including a number of
foreigners (one was an American), that were watching the final match ofthe World
Cup on outdoor screens in Kampala, Uganda.43
In discussing the ongoing terrorist threat against the United States and its allies,
Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell told Congress in November
2008 that al-Qaeda was "improving the last key aspect of its ability to attack the US:
the identification, training and positioning ofoperatives [i.e., Western recruits, in-
cluding American citizens] for an attack on the homeland."44 According to a study
by the New America Foundation, "between 100 and 150 Westerners are believed to
have traveled to the [Federally Administered Tribal Areas] FATA in 2009" to train
with Taliban militants.45 Arguably, these new recruits will be able to move around
the United States and Europe more easily and be more difficult to detect than tradi-
tional foreign operatives.
There is also growing evidence that al-Qaeda's anti-American/anti-Western
ideology has been adopted by a number of Islamist extremist groups in Europe and
North America.46 A Pennsylvania woman (Colleen LaRose, a.k.a. Jihad Jane), for
example, was indicted in March 2010 for "conspiracy to provide material support
to terrorists and kill a person in a foreign country."47 LaRose conspired with five
unnamed coconspirators to, inter alia, recruit "men online to wage violent jihad in
South Asia and Europe . . . [and] women online who had passports and the ability to
travel to and around Europe in support ofviolent jihad."48 According to the indict-
ment, LaRose believed that "her physical appearance would allow her to blend in
with many people."49 A second US citizen, Jamie Paulin Ramirez, was indicted in
April 2010 for her involvement in the conspiracy with Jihad Jane. 50 Irish police
have since arrested seven additional individuals involved in the conspiracy. 51
In June 2010, a federal grand jury in Houston indicted Barry Walter Bujol, a US
citizen from Hempstead, Texas, for attempting to provide material support to al-
Qaeda, including personnel, money, prepaid phone cards, SIM cards, global posi-
tioning systems, cell phones and restricted publications on the effects of US
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military weapons (e.g., UAS) in Afghanistan. 52 On the same day, an Ohio couple
from Toledo, Hor I. and Amera A. Aki, dual US-Lebanese citizens, were arrested
for conspiring to provide material support to Hezbollah. 53 And on June 5, 2010,
two New Jersey men (Mohamed Mahmood Alessa and Carlos Eduardo Almonte)
were arrested at Kennedy International Airport as they attempted to board sepa-
rate planes for Somalia. The two men intended to join al-Shabab and receive train-
ing in Somalia in order to kill American troops. 54 Finally, to further illustrate the
ability of al-Qaeda to recruit and direct terrorist operations in the West, on July 8,
2010, Norwegian officials announced the arrest of three al-Qaeda operatives for
their roles in plotting a foiled 2009 New York subway attack and planning to blow
up a shopping center in Manchester, England. 55
In response to continuing al-Qaeda activities and threats aimed at US interests
at home and abroad, President Obama indicated in November 2009 that terrorist
networks like al-Qaeda remained the greatest threat to US security. 56 Similarly,
Secretary of State Clinton stated in February 2010 that the greatest threat to the
United States was transnational non-State terrorist networks like al-Qaeda, com-
menting that al-Qaeda was a "very committed, clever, diabolical group ofterrorists
who are always looking for weaknesses and openings." 57 On March 9, 2010, the
US Maritime Administration issued an advisory that warned ships transiting the
Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, Red Sea and the Gulf ofAden along the coast ofYemen that
al-Qaeda remains interested in maritime attacks in these waters and that the
attacks could be similar in nature to the attack against the USS Cole (2000) or the
M/V Limberg (2002), "where a small to mid-size boat laden with explosives was
detonated in the vicinity of the targeted ships." 58 The advisory further indicated,
however, that "it cannot be ruled out that the extremists may be capable ofother [,]
more sophisticated methods of targeting, such as the use of missile[s] or projectiles
to target ship[s] such as the mortars used to target a Navy ship in Jordan in
2005." Finally, a May 2010 Department of Homeland Security memo indicates
that "the number and pace of attempted [terrorist] attacks against the United
States over the past nine months have surpassed the number of attempts during
any other previous one-year period" and that terrorists will attempt to conduct
strikes within the United States with "increased frequency" and with "little or no
warning. ^
In short, despite the substantial progress that has been made toward eliminating
the threat posed by terrorists, al-Qaeda and its affiliates remain a potent and deter-
mined force with the capability and intent to strike the US mainland, its allies and
US interests abroad at every opportunity with the most destructive means at their
disposal. The militant groups continue to train and equip their fighting forces in
order to plan and execute devastating attacks against the United States and its allies
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around the world. Under these circumstances, international law allows the United
States to preemptively use proportionate force in self-defense to eliminate the con-
tinuing and imminent threat posed by al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups.
Whether one agreed or disagreed with the former Bush administration's initiatives
following 9/11, the President's statement in 2004 regarding the war on terror can-
not be ignored:
The war on terror is not a figure ofspeech. It is an inescapable calling ofour generation.
. . . There can be no separate peace with the terrorist enemy. Any sign ofweakness or re-
treat simply validates terrorist violence and invites more violence for all nations. The
only certain way to protect our people is by early, united, and decisive action.60
Until the threat is effectively eliminated, the United States can continue to use
force in self-defense against al-Qaeda and its supporters, to include the use of un-
manned systems.
Despite disagreements with some of the Bush administration's policies with re-
gard to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Obama administration appears to
have adopted the Bush approach to the use of drones in Pakistan and elsewhere.
On March 24, 2010, Department of State Legal Adviser Harold Koh delivered the
keynote speech at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International
Law (ASIL). In part, Mr. Koh discussed the strategic vision ofinternational law that
the Obama administration was attempting to implement, what he called "The Law
of 9/1 1: detentions, use of force, and prosecution."61 In defending US targeting of
terrorists in Pakistan and elsewhere, Mr. Koh indicated that, as a matter of interna-
tional law, the United States is engaged in an "armed conflict with al-Qaeda, as well
as the Taliban and associated forces, in response to the horrific 9/11 attacks, and
may use force consistent with its inherent right to self-defense under international
law."62 Mr. Koh further emphasized that al-Qaeda continues to pose an imminent
threat to the United States: "[A]l-Qaeda has not abandoned its intent to attack the
United States, and indeed continues to attack us."63 Accordingly, he continued,
"the United States has the authority under international law, and the responsibility
to its citizens, to use force, including lethal force, to defend itself, including by tar-
geting persons such as high-level al-Qaeda leaders who are planning attacks."64
III. Lawful Targeting ofBelligerents v. Extrajudicial Killings/Assassination
Opponents to the use of drones argue that IHRL is the governing body of law that
must be applied when using deadly force against terrorists outside the traditional
combat zone. They further argue that IHRL prohibits extrajudicial killing. Under
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an IHRL/law enforcement construct, deadly force should only be used as a last re-
sort to save lives and only after lesser means have failed. Accordingly, before using
deadly force, an attempt should be made to capture the terrorist or allow him/her
an opportunity to surrender. They argue that the use ofUAS to target terrorists in
Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and elsewhere violates the IHRL prohibition on extraju-
dicial killing, as well as the US ban on assassination in E.O. 12333.
These arguments incorrectly assume that the United States is not engaged in an
armed conflict with al-Qaeda and that the targeted terrorist groups do not pose an
imminent and continuing threat to the United States, either of which gives rise to
the inherent right of self-defense. In short, nothing in E.O. 12333 or IHL/LOAC
restricts the lawful use of force in self-defense against an enemy belligerent (privi-
leged or unprivileged) or against a group that poses an imminent or continuing
threat to the United States and its interests.
A. The Assassination Ban under E.O. 12333
Assassination of foreign nationals has been prohibited as a matter ofUS domestic
policy since 1976 when President Ford signed E.O. 11905. Section 5(g) provides
that "no employee of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire
to engage in, political assassination."65 The reference to "political" assassination
was dropped by the Carter administration in E.O. 12036, opting instead to generi-
cally prohibit "assassination."66 An identical prohibition is found in section 2. 1 1 of
E.O. 12333.67 Although "assassination" is not defined in the executive orders, the
term involves the intentional killing (or murder) of a targeted individual commit-
ted for political purposes. 68 The purpose of E.O. 12333 is, therefore, to prevent the
killing of foreign public officials for political purposes. It does not, however, limit
the lawful use of force in self-defense against terrorists or other groups that pose
an imminent or continuing threat to the security of the United States and its citi-
zens. 69
It is widely recognized that enemy belligerents—whether members ofthe armed
forces of a State or civilians and non-State actors directly participating in hostili-
ties—may be lawfully targeted and killed at all times, subject to the IHL principles
of military necessity and proportionality. 70 Therefore, the ambush by US aircraft
and downing ofthe Japanese aircraft, over Bougainville, on April 1 8, 1943, carrying
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the Japanese commander of the Pearl Harbor attack,
was not considered an assassination, but rather a lawful attack on an individual
combatant—a legitimate military target. 71 Likewise, President Reagan's authoriza-
tion to attack Moammar Gadhafi's home in Libya following the 1986 Berlin disco-
theque bombing that killed an American service member and injured 230 others
was not considered a violation of the executive order's ban on assassination,
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because Gadhafi was a legitimate military target. 72 During the first Gulf War
(1991), coalition aircraft targeted 580 command and control targets, including 260
leadership targets (e.g., Saddam Hussein's palaces and places that he frequented).73
These attacks were not considered as violations of the assassination ban. Similarly,
President Clinton authorized missile attacks against the Iraqi Intelligence Service
(the Mukhabarat) headquarters on June 26, 1993 after he was informed that
Kuwaiti forces had foiled an Iraqi-sponsored assassination attempt against former
President George H.W. Bush.74
Five years later, President Clinton again authorized cruise missile strikes, on this
occasion against a chemical plant in Sudan and al-Qaeda training camps in Af-
ghanistan after terrorists bombed the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing
224 people and injuring over 4,500 others. 75 None of the strikes authorized by
President Clinton were considered violations of E.O. 12333. Finally, following
9/11, the Bush administration concluded that the assassination ban did not prevent
the United States from targeting terrorist leadership and command and control
capabilities in self-defense.76 This determination was later used to justify the 2002
targeted killing ofQaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, a senior al-Qaeda leader, in Yemen
by a CIA drone.77
Similarly, since 9/1 1, it is equally clear that under UN Security Council Resolu-
tion 1368 (2001) a State may use force in self-defense against acts of aggression by
terrorist groups. It is also clear under customary international law and Article 5 1 of
the Charter that a nation may use force in self-defense against the imminent or
continuing threat of attack by these groups. Therefore, killing al-Qaeda members
and other militants who are engaged in ongoing acts ofviolence against the United
States and its allies, and who have the capabilities and stated intentions to continue
to conduct such attacks in the future, is an act of self-defense, not murder, hence
not assassination.
Based on the increased number of drone attacks authorized by President
Obama against suspected terrorist targets in Pakistan's FATA, it appears that the
Obama administration has taken a similar approach to that of its predecessor.78
The administration's position on the issue of assassination was clearly articulated
by the State Department Legal Adviser at the ASIL meeting. During his keynote ad-
dress, Mr. Koh stated that
individuals who are part of . . . an [enemy] armed group are belligerents and, therefore,
lawful targets under international law. . .
.
[A] state that is engaged in an armed conflict or in legitimate self-defense is not re-
quired to provide targets with legal process before the state may use lethal force
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[Ujnder domestic law, the use of lawful weapons systems—consistent with the appli-
cable laws of war—for precision targeting of specific high-level belligerent leaders
when acting in self-defense or during an armed conflict is not unlawful, and hence does
not constitute "assassination."79
B. Extrajudicial Killing under International Law
1. Reports and Correspondence of the Special Rapporteur to the UN Human
Rights Council
In January 2003, the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions (hereinafter Special Rapporteur) submitted a report to the UN Human
Rights Council indicating that a November 2002 UAS strike that killed six al-
Qaeda militants in Yemen was a "clear case of extrajudicial killing."80 Despite find-
ing that (1) the government of Yemen had approved the attack; (2) the militants
(including a senior al-Qaeda official, Abu Ali al-Harithi) had been involved in the
attacks on the Cole and the French oil tanker Limburg; (3) prior attempts to appre-
hend the suspects had been unsuccessful; and (4) "governments have a responsibil-
ity to protect their citizens against the excesses of non-State actors or other
authorities" the Special Rapporteur determined that the actions by the United
States and Yemen violated IHRL and IHL.81
In August 2005, a new Special Rapporteur (Philip Alston) sent a letter to the US
government requesting information on the use ofUAS to target and kill Haitham
al-Yemeni, a senior al-Qaeda figure, on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border on May
10, 2005. The Special Rapporteur reiterated the view that questions of IHL fall
squarely within his mandate and that "efforts to eradicate terrorism must be un-
dertaken within a framework" governed by IHRL, as well as IHL. 82 Dissatisfied
with the US response to the August letter, the Special Rapporteur submitted a re-
port to the Human Rights Council in May 2009 alleging that the United States is
using drones to engage in targeted killings on the territory of other States and that
these attacks have caused a number of civilian casualties. Mr. Alston additionally
alleged that the United States had been evasive in responding to his questions re-
garding the legal basis for its targeting decisions and urged the Obama administra-
tion to reconsider the previous administration's "positions and move to ensure the
necessary transparency and accountability" for its drone program. 83 Having failed
to receive a response from the new administration, Mr. Alston took his case to the
"court of public opinion." In October 2009, he reiterated his position in a New
York Times article stating that "the United States must demonstrate that it is not
randomly killing people in violation of international law through its use of drones
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on the Afghan border" and that the US refusal to respond to UN "concerns that the
use of drones might result in illegal executions was an 'untenable' position."84
2. US Responses to the Special Rapporteur
The United States responded to the January 2003 al-Harithi report on April 14 of
that year, indicating that "inquiries related to allegations stemming from any mili-
tary operation conducted during the course of an armed conflict . . . [did] not fall
within the mandate of the Special Rapporteur" and that the United States dis-
agreed with his conclusion that "military operations against enemy combatants
could be regarded as extrajudicial executions by consent of Governments."85 In
support of its position, the United States pointed out that military operations con-
ducted by a government against legitimate military targets like al-Qaeda were gov-
erned by IHL/LOAC, which allows enemy combatants to be attacked unless they
have surrendered or are otherwise rendered hors de combat. The US response fur-
ther emphasized that the United States was at war with al-Qaeda and related ter-
rorist networks and that, despite coalition successes around the world, the war was
far from over. With operations in more than sixty countries, al-Qaeda had effec-
tively trained, equipped and supported armed forces that have planned and exe-
cuted attacks worldwide against the United States "on a scale that far exceeds
criminal activity."86 More important, al-Qaeda terrorists continued to plan addi-
tional attacks against the United States and its allies and were, therefore, subject to
armed attack by US forces. In conclusion, the United States stressed that the mili-
tary operations conducted against the United States and its nationals by al-Qaeda
both before and after 9/11 "necessitate a military response by the armed forces of
the United States"; to conclude otherwise would "permit an armed group to wage
war unlawfully against a sovereign state while precluding that state from defend-
ing itself."87
The United States submitted a similar response to the Special Rapporteur's letter
requesting information regarding the killing ofHaitham al-Yemeni on the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border in May 2005. Recalling its April 2003 letter, the United States
reemphasized that legitimate military operations conducted by a government dur-
ing an armed conflict do not fall within the mandate ofthe Special Rapporteur and
that the conduct of such operations is governed by IHL/LOAC. For the reasons
previously stated in 2003, the United States reiterated that it was engaged in a con-
tinuing armed conflict with al-Qaeda and that the military operations conducted
and planned against the United States and its nationals by the terrorist organiza-
tion both before and after 9/11 necessitated a military response. The US response
then went on to rebut the Special Rapporteur's position that his mandate included
issues arising under IHL/LOAC. In response to the Special Rapporteur's assertion
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that all major Human Rights Council and UN General Assembly resolutions in re-
cent years referred explicitly to IHL, the United States pointed out that the mention
of IHL in these resolutions is in the context of suggestions or admonitions to gov-
ernments and "does not . . . impart upon the Special Rapporteur a mandate to con-
sider issues arising under" IHL/LOAC. 88 The US response similarly rejected the
Special Rapporteur's argument that General Assembly Resolution 59/197 (2004)
urged governments to take all necessary and possible measures, in conformity with
IHRL and IHL, to prevent loss of life during armed conflicts. The United States
pointed out that the Resolution did not expand or modify the mandate of the Spe-
cial Rapporteur, but rather urged governments to take action, while directing the
Special Rapporteur to continue to operate within his mandate. Finally, in response
to the Special Rapporteur's assertion that "every single annual report of the Special
Rapporteur since at least 1992 has dealt with violations of the right to life in the
context of international and non-international armed conflicts," the United States
noted that "while the Special Rapporteur may have reported on cases outside of his
mandate, this does not give" him the competence to address such issues. 89
Regarding the scope of the Special Rapporteur's mandate, it is also important
to note that nothing in Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1982/29, which
appointed the first Special Rapporteur to examine the questions related to sum-
mary or arbitrary executions, empowers the Special Rapporteur to consider mat-
ters involving armed conflict or IHL.90 Similarly, nothing in General Assembly
Resolution 60/251, which created the Human Rights Council as the replacement
for the Commission on Human Rights, grants the Council competence over mat-
ters regarding IHL in general, or armed conflict in particular.91 Moreover, the
Council is established as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly; matters af-
fecting international peace and security, aggression and the use of force in self-
defense are under the cognizance of the Security Council, not the General
Assembly.
3. Obama Administration's Position
As evidenced by the Koh speech, the current administration's position on the legal-
ity of using UAS to target al-Qaeda operatives in areas like the FATA parallels that
of the previous administration:
[I]n all of our operations involving the use offorce, including those in the armed con-
flict with al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated forces, the Obama Administration is
committed ... to conducting ourselves in accordance with all applicable law. With re-
spect to the subject of targeting, . . . it is the considered view ofthis Administration—and
it has certainly been my experience during my time as Legal Adviser—that US targeting
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practices, including lethal operations conducted with the use ofunmanned aerial vehicles,
comply with all applicable law, including the laws ofwar. .
.
.
[A]s a matter of international law, the United States is in an armed conflict with al-
Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and associated forces, in response to the horrific 9/11 at-
tacks, and may use force consistent with its inherent right to self-defense under inter-
national law. As a matter of domestic law, Congress authorized the use of all necessary
and appropriate force through the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force
(AUMF). These domestic and international legal authorities continue to this day
[A]l-Qaeda has not abandoned its intent to attack the United States, and indeed
continues to attack us. Thus, in this ongoing armed conflict, the United States has the
authority under international law, and the responsibility to its citizens, to use force,
including lethal force, to defend itself, including by targeting persons such as high-level
al-Qaeda leaders who are planning attacks [T]his is a conflict with an organized ter-
rorist enemy that . . . plans and executes its attacks against us and our allies while hiding
among civilian populations. That behavior . . . makes the application of international
law more difficult and more critical for the protection of innocent civilians [T]his
Administration has carefully reviewed the rules governing targeting operations to ensure
that these operations are conducted consistently with law of war principles, includ-
ing . . . the principle of distinction . . . and . . . the principle ofproportionality In U.S.
operations against al-Qaeda and its associated forces—including lethal operations
conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles—great care is taken to adhere to
these principles in both planning and execution, to ensure that only legitimate objec-
tives are targeted and that collateral damage is kept to a minimum. . .
.
[individuals who are part ofsuch an armed group are belligerents and, therefore, law-
ful targets under international law [S]ome have argued that the use of lethal force
against specific individuals fails to provide adequate process and thus constitutes un-
lawful extrajudicial killing. But a state that is engaged in an armed conflict or in legiti-
mate self-defense is not required to provide targets with legal process before the state
may use lethal force [S]ome have [also] argued that our targeting practices violate
domestic law, in particular, the long-standing domestic ban on assassinations. But under
domestic law, the use of lawful weapons systems—consistent with the applicable laws
ofwar—for precision targeting of specific high-level belligerent leaders when acting in
self-defense or during an armed conflict is not unlawful, and hence does not constitute
"assassination."92
C. Application ofIHL v. IHRL in the War on Terrorism
As discussed above, human rights advocates argue that targeting decisions in the
war on terrorism are governed by both IHL and IHRL. The US government, on the
other hand, has correctly taken the position that the targeting of enemy
belligerents, including al-Qaeda terrorists outside the traditional combat zone,
is governed solely by IHL. In short, enemy belligerents, whether members of the
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armed forces of a nation, terrorists or other civilians directly participating in
hostilities, do not enjoy a "right to life" during an armed conflict, irrespective of
their location.
1. Are IHL and IHRL Complementary Regimes?
Proponents of the assassination/extrajudicial killing argument take the position
that al-Qaeda terrorists are criminals to whom law enforcement rules and IHRL,
not major military force and IHL, apply. Military force, they argue, may only be
used in self-defense or as authorized by the UN Security Council. They argue that
outside of these situations, States may only use law enforcement measures to com-
bat terrorists,93 and that drones are warflghting weapons, not law enforcement
tools, and may, therefore, not be used to target terrorists outside the traditional
combat zone. 94 Rather, law enforcement rules, such as the UN Basic Principles on
the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (UN Basic Princi-
ples), govern when police can use force against civilians, including terrorists. They
include such provisions as:
4. Law enforcement officials, in carrying out their duty, shall, as far as possible, apply
non-violent means before resorting to the use of force and firearms. They may use
force and firearms only if other means remain ineffective or without any promise of
achieving the intended result.
9. Law enforcement officials shall not use firearms against persons except in self-
defence or defence of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury, to
prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life, to
arrest a person presenting such a danger and resisting their authority, or to prevent his
or her escape, and only when less extreme means are insufficient to achieve these ob-
jectives. In any event, intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly
unavoidable in order to protect life.95
The proponents of IHRL applicability to the targeting of terrorists also cite the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) Nuclear Weapons and Wall advisory opinions
to support their position. In discussing the right to life in paragraph 25 of the
Nuclear Weapons opinion, the ICJ stated that
[t]he protection of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not
cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain
provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency. Respect for the
right to life is not, however, such a provision. In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be
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deprived of [one's] life applies also in hostilities. The test ofwhat is an arbitrary depri-
vation of life, however, then falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialise
namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct
of hostilities. Thus whether a particular loss of life, through the use ofa certain weapon
in warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 ofthe
Covenant can only be decided by reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and
not deduced from the terms of the Covenant itself.96
Similarly, in the Wall opinion, the Court indicated in paragraph 106 that
the protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed
conflict, save through the effect ofprovisions for derogation of the kind to be found in
Article 4 ofthe International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As regards the re-
lationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law, there are
thus three possible situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of international
humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of human rights law, yet others
may be matters of both these branches of international law. In order to answer the
question put to it, the Court will have to take into consideration both these branches of
international law, namely human rights law and, as lex specialis, international humani-
tarian law. 9 '
2. Targeting ofEnemy Belligerents Is Governed by IHL
Arguments advanced by proponents of the complementary IHL/IHRL model are
misplaced from both a practical and a legal point ofview. Human rights advocates
would argue that US forces must first attempt to capture a suspected terrorist or
provide him/her an opportunity to surrender before using lethal force. 95 From a
practical perspective, such a suggestion borders on the ridiculous. These terrorists
are hiding and operating in camps and strongholds located in some of the most
remote and inaccessible areas in the world—in the FATA, Yemen, Somalia and else-
where. Any attempt by US Special Forces to capture these terrorists would be virtu-
ally impossible to undertake—and likely suicidal. Moreover, what human rights
advocates are suggesting is a retrospective approach to combating terrorism
—
capture and prosecute the terrorists, hopefully before and not after another 9/11
attack occurs. Such an approach is wishful iiiinking, at best.
A prospective approach—preventing attacks before thev are planned and suc-
cessfully executed—is necessary to protect the United States and its citizens against
the real and continuing threat from al-Qaeda and its supporters. " There is simply
no obligation in domestic or international law to provide due process (e.g., judicial
review, offer to surrender, attempted capture, etc.) before using lethal force against
known enemy belligerents, including terrorists, who present an imminent and
continuing threat to the United States and its citizens. The Convention for the
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Protection ofHuman Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention)
recognizes that there is no "right to life" during armed conflict, by providing in
Article 15.2 that "deaths resulting from lawful acts ofwar" are outside the scope of
the Convention. 100
Reliance on the ICJ advisory opinions to support the position that IHRL applies
to the targeting of al-Qaeda and other terrorists is also misplaced. The focus of the
Nuclear Weapons opinion was not on the targeting ofcombatants, but rather on the
catastrophic effects a nuclear weapon detonation would have on the civilian popu-
lation. The Court questioned whether the use of nuclear weapons could discrimi-
nate between the civilian population and combatants and civilian objects and
military objectives, indicating that the number of casualties that would ensue fol-
lowing the use of such a weapon would be enormous. 101 UAS, with their enhanced
ISR and precision targeting capabilities, can easily distinguish between military
targets and protected people and places. Moreover, although there have been inci-
dental civilian deaths associated with the use of drones, the numbers (as discussed
below in the sections on proportionality and military necessity) are not excessive in
terms of the military advantage that has been achieved, and would certainly not fall
within the scope of casualties envisioned by the use of a nuclear weapon. Had the
Court been asked, "Does an enemy combatant or civilian directly participating in
hostilities have a 'right to life' during an armed conflict?" the Court would have
said no. It is also important to note that, other than the reference to human rights
in dicta in paragraphs 24 and 25, the Court applies IHL, not IHRL, in its analysis of
the issues (paragraphs 74-96). Nor does the Court cite any authority for its novel
declaration that IHRL applies during an armed conflict. Finally, in issuing its deci-
sions, the Court relies on IHL, not IHRL, stating:
D. Unanimously,
A threat or use of nuclear weapons should also be compatible with the requirements of
the international law applicable in armed conflict, particularly those of the principles
and rules of international humanitarian law, as well as with specific obligations under
treaties and other undertakings which expressly deal with nuclear weapons;
E. By seven votes to seven, by the President's casting vote,
It follows from the above-mentioned requirements that the threat or use of nuclear
weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in
armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules ofhumanitarian law;
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However, in view ofthe current state of international law, and ofthe elements of fact at
its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitivelywhether the threat or use ofnuclear
weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in
which the very survival of a State would be at stake. 102
Similarly, the Wall advisory opinion focused on an occupation setting. It did not
address the issue of targeting enemy combatants or civilians directly participating
in hostilities. In fact, the Court recognizes in paragraph 106 that there are situa-
tions in which only IHL applies:
As regards the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights
law, there are thus three possible situations: some rights may he exclusively matters ofin-
ternational humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters ofhuman rights law;
yet others may be matters of both these branches of international law (emphasis
added).
Clearly, targeting of enemy combatants and civilians directly participating in hos-
tilities falls into the first category—exclusively matters of IHL. Additionally, as was
the case in the Nuclear Weapons opinion, the Court relies on IHL, not IHRL, in de-
ciding the case:
For these reasons,
The Court . . . [decided]
D. By [a vote of] thirteen votes to two, [that]
[a] 11 States are under an obligation not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from
the construction ofthe wall and not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situ-
ation created by such construction; all States parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time ofWar of 12 August 1949 have in
addition the obligation, while respecting the United Nations Charter and international
law, to ensure compliance by Israel with international humanitarian law as embodied
in that Convention. 103
Finally, some opponents to the use of drones have suggested that the rules
should be different if the suspected terrorist is a US citizen. The fact that the in-
tended target of a drone strike is an American citizen, such as radical cleric Anwar
al-Awlaki who is hiding in Yemen, does not change the analysis. The citizenship of
the belligerent is irrelevant in the targeting decision. In an al-Qaeda video posted
on the Internet on May 23, 2010, al-Awlaki advocates the killing of American
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civilians in retaliation for the death of Iraqi and Afghan civilians killed by US
forces. 104 Americans do not have a right to wage war against the United States. If
they do, they become lawful targets and may be engaged without "due process."
The Supreme Court held in Ex parte Quirin that US citizenship did not bar the
prosecution of individuals as "enemies who have violated the law of war." 105 The
same logic would allow the direct engagement of a US citizen who has actively
sided with al-Qaeda. 106
3. Does It Really Matter IflHRL Applies in an Armed Conflict?
Even if IHRL complemented IHL during periods of armed conflict, use of drones
to conduct strikes against terrorists outside the combat zone in self-defense would
not constitute a violation of IHRL. Although the ICJ indicated in the Nuclear
Weapons advisory opinion that the right to life found in Article 6.1 of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) applies in times of war, the
Court went on to explain that
[t]he test ofwhat is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be determined
by the applicable lex specialise namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is
designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. Thus whether a particular loss of life,
through the use of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary depriva-
tion of life contrary to Article 6 ofthe Covenant can only be decided by reference to the
law applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from the terms of the Covenant
itself.
107
Under IHL, enemy belligerents, like the al-Qaeda terrorists, who have not surren-
dered and are not hors de combat may be lawfully engaged at all times, subject only
to the principles of military necessity and proportionality. Such attacks would not
constitute an arbitrary deprivation of life under the ICCPR. 108
It is also questionable whether the ICCPR would even apply to targeted killings
in Pakistan and other places outside the traditional combat zone. Article 2.1 pro-
vides that "[e]ach State Party . . . undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individ-
uals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the
present Covenant" (emphasis added). The ICJ similarly held in paragraph 1 1 1 of
the Wall advisory opinion that the ICCPR is only "applicable in respect ofacts done
by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory" (e.g., in an oc-
cupation situation). The question of applicability of the Covenant therefore turns
on whether the terrorist being targeted "is within the jurisdiction, actual power, or
effective control of the state using the drone." 109 Al-Qaeda terrorists and their sup-
porters operating out of the FATA, Yemen or Somalia are not within the territorial
238
Raul A. "Pete" Pedrozo
jurisdiction of the United States nor are these individuals within the actual power
or control ofthe United States. In these circumstances, the ICCPR does not apply.
4. So What Are Human Rights Advocates Really After?
From the foregoing, it appears that there is nothing to gain by applying IHRL in an
armed conflict scenario. In fact, application of the IHRL "arbitrary deprivation of
life" standard would arguably provide far less protection than the IHL principles of
military necessity and proportionality. So what are human rights advocates really
trying to accomplish by arguing that IHRL applies in armed conflicts? The answer
is simple: change the outcomes governed by IHL by adding IHRL into the equa-
tion, thereby making IHL more restrictive and channeling the enforcement ofIHL
through human rights mechanisms such as the Human Rights Council and re-
gional human rights courts. To quote a human rights advocate:
We wish to (boldly) take human rights to places, be they extraterritorial situations, or
those of armed conflict, where, as a matter of practical reality, no human rights have
gone before. ... [A] purpose of the IHL/IHRL project is the enforcement of IHL
through human rights mechanisms. Thus, even if human rights substantively added
nothing to IHL, there would still be a point in regarding IHL and IHRL as two comple-
mentary bodies of law. IHL, now (jurisdictionally) framed in human rights terms,
could be enforced before political bodies, such as the Human Rights Council or UN
political organs more generally, or through judicial and quasi-judicial mechanisms,
such as the International Court of Justice, the European Court ofHuman Rights, the
UN treaty bodies or domestic courts. 110
The danger of allowing human rights mechanisms to review lawful military op-
erations, whether in a traditional armed conflict or in the war on terrorism, is illus-
trated by the absurd decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the
McCann case. 111 The British government had information that three known IRA
terrorists were going to conduct a terrorist attack in Gibraltar by detonating a car
bomb by remote control. While several UK soldiers were following them, it ap-
peared that the terrorists were preparing for an attack. As one ofthe soldiers moved
forward to arrest the suspects, he observed one of the terrorists move his hand as if
he was about to press a button to detonate the bomb, and shot the suspect. A sec-
ond terrorist then appeared as if she was going to donate the bomb and was shot.
The third terrorist was also shot. A bomb was subsequently discovered in the car.
After hearing seventy-nine witnesses, a jury in the United Kingdom brought back a
verdict of lawful killing. Dissatisfied by that result, the decedents' estates brought
the case to the European Court ofHuman Rights. Despite finding that "the soldiers
honestly believed . . . that it was necessary to shoot the suspects in order to prevent
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them from detonating a bomb and causing serious loss of life," the Court neverthe-
less found by a vote often to nine that there had been a violation ofArticle 2 of the
European Convention because the UK authorities had not taken "appropriate care
in the control and organisation of the arrest operation." Article 2.2 of the Conven-
tion provides that "deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contra-
vention of this article when it results from the use of force which is no more than
absolutely necessary: (a) in defence ofany person from unlawful violence
" 112
A second example of this dangerous approach is the continuing efforts by Philip
Alston, the current Special Rapporteur, to obtain information (much of which is
classified) on the use of UAS to target terrorists in the FATA and other areas out-
side Afghanistan and Iraq. In May 2010, Mr. Alston called on the United States to
stop using CIA operatives to conduct drone strikes against al-Qaeda terrorists. 113
In a report delivered to the Human Right Council on May 28, Alston argues that
"intelligence agents do not generally operate within a framework which places ap-
propriate emphasis upon ensuring compliance with IHL, rendering violations
more likely." 114 Alston's report also questions the validity of a portion of the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross's (ICRC's) Interpretive Guidance on the No-
tion ofDirect Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law that
allows for the targeting ofcivilians who are members ofan armed group who have a
continuous combat function (CCF). According to the report, the "ICRC's Guid-
ance raises concern from a human rights perspective" because the CCF category of
armed group members may be targeted anywhere, any time. The report concludes
that "the creation ofCCF category is, de facto, a status determination that is ques-
tionable given the specific treaty language that limits direct participation to 'for
such time' as opposed to 'all the time.'" 115 The report therefore recommends, inter
alia, that "[t]he High Commissioner for Human Rights should convene a meeting
of States, including representatives of key military powers, the ICRC and human
rights and IHL experts to arrive at a broadly accepted definition of 'direct partici-
pation in hostilities.'" 116 It would appear from this report that Mr. Alston believes
that the Special Rapporteur and human rights organizations like the Human
Rights Council are more qualified than the ICRC and States parties to the Geneva
Conventions to decide IHL issues of this nature. I would suggest that determining
whether a civilian has directly participated in hostilities under the Geneva Conven-
tions and may therefore be targeted by belligerent forces is clearly outside the man-
date of the Special Rapporteur contained in Resolution 8/3 of the Human Rights
Council and further demonstrates the overreaching by human rights advocates
and organizations. 117
In short, the United States has nothing to gain by acknowledging that IHRL ap-
plies alongside IHL in armed conflict situations, particularly in the targeting
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process. Human rights groups, whether non-governmental or governmental, are
generally biased against military operations conducted by any state and military
operations conducted by the United States, in particular. They (and their financial
supporters) generally oppose a strong military establishment, seek to level the play-
ing field between modern armed forces and insurgent groups/terrorists and en-
deavor to create a standard of zero collateral damage and incidental injury in war.
Any report or decision issued by these organizations would inevitably be critical of
US operations and would provide yet another source ofinformation that can be ex-
ploited by our enemies.
IV. Host Nation Consent v. Self-Help in Self-Defense
Following setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, al-Qaeda has been able to reconstitute
and establish bases ofoperation in the FATA, which have served as a "staging area for
al-Qaeda attacks in Afghanistan," as well as a base for its worldwide training opera-
tions. 118 In fact, most of the high-priority terrorists, who continue to actively plot
against the United States, remain in hiding in some of the most remote, inaccessi-
ble parts ofthe world, including the FATA. 119 To date, Pakistan has been unable or
unwilling to prevent cross-border attacks against coalition forces in Afghanistan or
to disrupt terrorist planning and training efforts to conduct attacks against the
United States and its allies worldwide. That leaves the United States with two
options—wait for another terrorist attack or use UAS to conduct strikes against
these inaccessible targets.
A. Host Nation Consent
Opponents to the use ofUAS to strike targets in nations outside the combat zone
argue that host nation consent is required for such attacks, "unless the state where
the group is present is responsible for their actions." 120 Although there is some evi-
dence that senior leadership within Pakistan tacitly consented to the drone strikes
by providing bases for UAS operations and targeting information to US forces and
the CIA, Pakistan has not officially consented to the attacks and has often publicly
protested the strikes as a violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. 121
Accordingly, the opponents to the use ofUAS argue that there is no legal basis for
the United States to attack terrorist targets in Pakistan or in any other nation out-
side of the combat zone.
B. Sovereignty v. Inherent Right of Self-Defense
The opponents' position appears to be premised on the flawed assumption that
territorial integrity and State sovereignty are paramount in international law. The
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long-standing view of the United States on the issue of sovereignty, as articulated
by a former legal adviser to the US Department of State and a leading international
law scholar, is that "[territorial integrity is not entitled to absolute deference in in-
ternational law, and our national defense requires that we claim the right to act
within the territory of other States in appropriate circumstances." 122 President
Obama reaffirmed this long-standing position in an address at West Point in 2009,
indicating that the United States "cannot tolerate a safe-haven for terrorists whose
location is known, and whose intentions are clear." 123 The US position is supported
by Articles 2(4) and 51 of the Charter, which make clear that territorial integrity
and sovereignty give way to the right of self-defense.
C. Self-Help
It is equally well settled that States have an obligation under international law "to
control persons within their borders to ensure that they do not utilize their terri-
tory as a base for criminal activity." 124 Both domestic courts and international tri-
bunals have acknowledged this obligation. For instance, the US Supreme Court
held in 1887 that "[t]he law of nations requires every national government to use
'due diligence' to prevent a wrong being done within its own dominion to another
nation with which it is at peace, or to the people thereof." 125 The ICJ has similarly
held that every State has an "obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be
used for acts contrary to the rights of other States." 126
It is equally well settled that, if a nation is unwilling or unable to stop terrorists
or other armed groups from using its territory as a location from which to launch
attacks against another nation or its citizens, the aggrieved State has the right to
strike the terrorists or other armed groups within the territory ofthe host nation. 127
The State Department Legal Adviser reiterated this right in his remarks at the ASIL
meeting:
[Wjhether a particular individual will be targeted in a particular location will depend
upon considerations specific to each case, including those related to the imminence of
the threat, the sovereignty of the other states involved, and the willingness and ability of
those states to suppress the threat the target poses. 128
Much of the FATA is inaccessible to Pakistani security forces. Additionally, the
Pakistani army has been reluctant to conduct offensive military operations against
militant groups in North Waziristan "because it does not want to antagonize
powerful insurgent groups there that have so far attacked only targets in
Afghanistan." 129 In short, Pakistan has been unable and unwilling to prevent use of
its territory by al-Qaeda and other militant groups that continue to plan and
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conduct terrorist attacks against the United States and its allies. Under these
circumstances, the United States has the inherent right under international law to
use force in self-defense against terrorist targets in Pakistan.
D. A History of Self-Help
Self-help is nothing new to the United States—our history is replete with examples
of the use of necessary and proportionate force in self-defense where a "neutral"
nation has been unable or unwilling to prevent the use of its territory as a staging
base for attacks. Some examples include: 130
• 1814, 1816 and 1818 Seminole Indian attacks. The United States used force
in self-defense against attacks by Indians and former slaves emanating from Span-
ish Florida without the consent of Spain. The attacks were not directed at Spain
nor was the United States at war with Spain at the time.
• 1817 Amelia Island occupation. The United States used force in self-defense
to attack non-State actors (pirates, smugglers and privateers) on Amelia Island,
relying, in part, on "Spain's inability to control misuse of its islands to prevent
armed attacks on U.S. territory and shipping . . . emanating from the islands." At
the time, the United States was not at war with Spain and assured Spain that the
temporary occupation ofAmelia Island was not a threat to its sovereignty. The US
military actions were taken without Spanish consent.
• 1837 Caroline incident. The Caroline case also provides an example of the
use of force in self-defense against non-State actors without the consent of the
host nation. The United Kingdom was not at war with the United States when it
attacked the Caroline in US waters to prevent future insurgent attacks emanating
from the United States into Canada. The attack was directed at the insurgents, not
the United States, and was not viewed as an act ofwar by the US government.
• 1854 Greytown bombardment. The US Navy bombarded the town of
Greytown, Nicaragua after the citizens of the town forcibly took possession of the
town, established their own government (not recognized by the United States),
and attacked a US diplomat and engaged in other acts of violence against US na-
tionals. In deciding whether the President had the power to order such an attack,
Justice Nelson of the US Supreme Court held that the President had the authority
to use force "as part of a power ofprotection ofUS nationals abroad against acts of
lawless violence and an irresponsible and marauding community." The bombard-
ment was conducted without the consent of Nicaragua.
• 1916 Pancho Villa raids. In 1916, President Wilson authorized US forces to
attack Pancho Villa's forces in Mexico after they had crossed into the United
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States and attacked towns in Texas and New Mexico. A second incursion was au-
thorized later that year when Mexican bandits attacked Glen Springs, Texas.
• 1998 cruise-missile strikes. President Clinton authorized cruise-missile
strikes against al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan without the consent of the
Taliban government after al-Qaeda bombed the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya
and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The terrorist attacks killed more than 250 persons and
injured over 5,500. The strikes were justified as self-defense in response to prior
armed attacks and to prevent future attacks against the United States by al-Qaeda.
As these examples illustrate, while a nation's sovereignty is an important factor
that must be taken into consideration before conducting a cross-border strike, it
does not take precedence over a right of self-defense where that nation has been
unable or unwilling to prevent the use of its territory as a base of operations for
attacks. Article 51 of the Charter also makes clear that sovereignty and territorial
integrity give way to this inherent right of self-defense against an armed attack or
imminent threat of armed attack. Pakistan has been unable (due to inaccessible
terrain) or unwilling (due to political considerations) to prevent militant groups
from using the FATA to plan and attack the United States and its allies. Under these
circumstances, the United States is legally justified in using force in self-defense,
including UAS strikes, to prevent future attacks from Pakistani territory.
V. Do Drone Strikes Violate Traditional Principles oflHL/LOAC?
Basic principles of IHL affect all phases of the targeting cycle. This is particularly
true during the target development, validation, nomination and prioritization
phase, as well as the mission planning and force execution phases. However, IHL
recognizes that military forces cannot engage in hostilities without some degree of
incidental injury to protected persons and collateral damage to protected objects.
The key is the determination ofhow to minimize incidental injury to civilians and
collateral damage to civilian objects consistent with mission accomplishment and
the law.
As a general rule, "the right ofbelligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy
is not unlimited." 131 Additionally, "[t]he civilian population as such, as well as indi-
vidual civilians, shall not be the object of attack." 132 In this regard, when conduct-
ing military operations, commanders must
• do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians
nor civilian objects . . . but are military objectives . . .
;
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• take all feasible precautions in the choice ofmeans and methods ofattack with a view
to avoiding, and in any event minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civil-
ians and damage to civilian objects; [and]
• refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause inciden-
tal loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects . . . which would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. 133
Commanders must also be prepared to cancel or suspend an attack
if it becomes apparent that the objective is not a military one or is subject to special pro-
tection or that the attack may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury
to civilians, or damage to civilian objects . . . which would be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. 134
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that incidental injury of civilians and collateral
damage to civilian objects is not prohibited by IHL; what is prohibited is excessive
injury or damage in relation to the military advantage expected to be gained by the
use of force. In other words, the wanton destruction of life and property as an end
in itself violates IHL, but the law does not prohibit the use of force, even over-
whelming force, by a military commander to compel the complete submission of
the enemy in order to protect the safety ofhis force and facilitate the success ofhis
mission. 135 Therefore, attacks by UAS that unintentionally cause incidental
injury to civilians or damage to civilian property, in addition to killing the intended
targets, e.g., an insurgent leader, are fully consistent with IHL to the extent the in-
jury or damage is not excessive when compared to the military advantage gained by
the attacks.
Compliance with IHL is much more complex in the current conflict with al-
Qaeda because insurgent forces routinely commingle with the civilian population
and operate from protected places. It becomes exceedingly more difficult to mini-
mize incidental injury and collateral damage in such situations because ofthe diffi-
culties encountered in distinguishing combatants from civilians and military
objects from civilian objects. Under these circumstances, al-Qaeda and its support-
ers must be held primarily responsible for any collateral damage and incidental in-
jury in such cases because they have failed to comply with their obligation to "avoid
locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas." 136 Addition-
ally, one must consider whether the civilians are deliberately acting as voluntary
human shields for the insurgent forces, in which case, they may be considered to be
directly participating in hostilities and therefore subject to attack. 137
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A. Military Necessity
The purpose of IHL is to ensure that hostilities are directed toward the enemy and
not used to cause unnecessary human suffering and physical destruction. The
principle of military necessity limits suffering and destruction to that which is nec-
essary to achieve a valid military objective. When applying this principle, the com-
mander should ask whether the object of attack is a valid military objective and, if
so, whether the total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization of the object
will constitute a definite military advantage under the circumstances existing at the
time of the attack. This does not mean, however, that overwhelming force cannot
be used to destroy a valid military objective if consistent with the principles of dis-
tinction and proportionality discussed below. 138
Opponents to the use ofUAS to conduct strikes outside the traditional combat
zone argue that drone attacks violate the principle of military necessity because
they fuel anti-Americanism in the FATA and do little to weaken the al-Qaeda orga-
nization. 139 Opponents argue that killing innocent civilians invites retaliation and
aids al-Qaeda recruitment efforts in the FATA and elsewhere by antagonizing the
local population, alienating surviving family members and creating martyrs. 140
The opponents point to statements by some Pakistani military officers who have
confirmed that drone strikes motivate local tribesmen in the FATA to fight against
the Pakistani government because the attacks are viewed as a breach of Pakistan's
sovereignty. 141 It is therefore argued that, if the military objective of defeating al-
Qaeda cannot be achieved because drone strikes do not weaken the terrorist orga-
nization as intended, but rather have had unforeseen consequences of fueling anti-
American sentiments and assisting al-Qaeda's recruitment efforts, the attacks vio-
late the principle of military necessity. 142
These arguments, which are not supported by independent studies, are based on
exaggerated civilian casualty figures. They also fail to acknowledge that, in the past
two years alone, UAS strikes have killed over 500 militants, including 39 top-tier
and mid-to-high-level leaders, thereby disrupting al-Qaeda's ability to operate
with impunity from the FATA. 143 An independent study by the New America
Foundation puts the number of militants killed at between 618 and 966. 144 More
important, since December 2009, the terrorist organization has been dealt a num-
ber of serious blows by successful drone attacks against several high-ranking al-
Qaeda officials. In December, Saleh al-Somali, a senior planner responsible for al-
Qaeda operations outside Afghanistan and Pakistan, was killed by a drone strike in
northern Waziristan. 145 Al-Qaeda operations were dealt further crippling blows in
April 2010 and May 2010 with the deaths of the two top al-Qaeda leaders in Iraq,
Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, and the death ofthe number-three
official in the organization and overall commander for al-Qaeda in Afghanistan,
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Mustafa Abu al-Yazid. 146 Equally important, drone strikes have effectively im-
paired al-Qaeda operations by creating an "atmosphere of fear and distrust among
members" of the organization, with reports indicating that militant leaders sleep
outside of their homes for fear ofbeing targeted by a drone and suspected spies are
routinely executed for providing information to the United States. 147
Independent studies by the New America Foundation and the Aryana Institute
for Regional Research and Advocacy (AIRRA), as well as Reuters reporting, also
do not support the allegations that civilian casualties in the FATA are fueling
anti-American sentiments and assisting al-Qaeda recruiting efforts. First, despite
claims to the contrary, there have been no major public protests in the FATA
against the use of drones. Moreover, the number of civilian casualties in the
FATA is much lower than the numbers claimed by militant groups and opponents
to the use of drones in Pakistan. The New America Foundation study shows that
the 131 reported drone strikes in the FATA since 2004 "have killed approximately
between 908 to 1,347 individuals, ofwhom around 618 to 966 were described as
militants in reliable press accounts"; thus less than 30 percent of the total casual-
ties were civilians. 148
The AIRRA study also concluded that anti-Americanism in the FATA has not
increased significantly due to US drone attacks. 149 Between November 2009 and
January 2010, AIRRA sent five teams of five researchers each to conduct a public
opinion survey about UAS attacks in areas of the FATA most often targeted by US
drones. The following are the questions posed by the survey teams and the re-
sponses of the people of the FATA:
• Do you see drone attacks bringing about fear and terror in the common people? (Yes
45%, No 55%)
• Do you think the drones are accurate in their strikes? (Yes 52%, No 48%)
• Do you think anti-American feelings in the area increased due to drone attacks re-
cently? (Yes 42%, No 58%)
• Should Pakistan military carry out targeted strikes at the militant organisations?
(Yes 70%, No 30%)
• Do the militant organisations get damaged due to drone attacks? (Yes 60%, No
40%)
Local residents were also asked questions concerning sovereignty and civilian
casualties. Regarding territorial integrity, people were asked ifUS drone attacks on
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the FATA were viewed by the local population as a violation of Pakistani sovereignty.
More than two-thirds said they were not. "Pakistan's sovereignty, they argued, was
insulted and annihilated by Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, whose territory FATA is af-
ter Pakistan lost it to them. The US is violating the sovereignty of the Taliban and
Al-Qaeda, not of Pakistan." 150 Moreover, more than two-thirds ofthe people inter-
viewed consider "Al-Qaeda and the Taliban as enemy number one" and a large
majority (nearly two-thirds) want the United States "to continue the drone attacks
because the Pakistani army is unable or unwilling to retake the territory from the
Taliban." 151 Although there was some concern over civilian casualties and collateral
damage, most of the people interviewed indicated that most of the drone attacks
hit their intended targets. In fact, they indicated that most of the collateral damage
is to houses rented to the militants. Additionally, local residents indicated that the
Taliban and al-Qaeda terrorists normally seal off the area after a drone attack in
order to remove everything, including militant casualties, from the site before al-
lowing locals to return to their homes. As a result, an accurate battle damage assess-
ment is not possible. In short, the AIRRA study contradicts the assertion of the
impact of civilian casualties on anti-Americanism and "the mantra of violation of
the sovereignty of Pakistan perpetuated by the armchair analysts in the media." 152
The results of the AIRRA study were subsequently confirmed by a Reuters spe-
cial report. In a May 2010 interview, a tribal elder from the FATA told a Reuters re-
porter that the residents ofnorthern Waziristan "want to get rid of the Taliban and
if the Pakistani army cannot do it now, then . . . drone attacks . . . [are] fine with
them." 153 He further indicated that " [t]here is no anger against the strikes as long as
civilians are safe" and that "[t]here have been civilian deaths but not in big num-
bers." 154 A second tribal leader indicated: "We prefer drone strikes than army oper-
ations because in such operations, we also suffer. But drones hit militants and it is
good for us." 155 Based on these independent reports and surveys, allegations that
drone strikes violate the principle of military necessity are clearly misplaced.
B. Proportionality
The principle ofproportionality is concerned with weighing the military advantage
one expects to gain by an attack against the unavoidable and incidental harm to civil-
ians and damage to civilian property that will result from the attack. This principle
requires the commander to determine whether incidental injury to civilians and
damage to civilian objects that may result from the attack will be excessive in rela-
tion to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained. 156
Opponents to the use of drones outside the traditional combat zone also argue
that killing a large number of civilians in an attempt to kill one terrorist leader vio-
lates the principle of proportionality. 157 This argument is based on alleged civilian
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casualty rates of fifty innocent civilians killed to each militant targeted
—
" [a] t a ra-
tio of50 to 1, the disproportionate impact ofdrone attacks in Pakistan represents a
serious violation of the traditional rules of war." 158
The opponents' position that UAS cause unnecessary and disproportionate
harm to the civilian population is flawed for a number of reasons. First, as indi-
cated above, the number of actual civilians killed by UAS strikes in Pakistan is sig-
nificantly lower than the numbers reported by the opponents to the use of drones.
The New America Foundation study shows innocent civilian casualties caused by
drone strikes at around 30 percent. 159 These figures have been confirmed by a se-
nior Pakistani military officer who indicated that "he believed that a third of the
dead were militants, a third sympathizers and a third innocent civilians/' 160 And
some US and Pakistani intelligence estimates put the number of non-combatant
civilian casualties—primarily family members who live and travel with targeted
militants—as low as 5 and 20 percent, respectively. 161 Second, the opponents' ar-
gument incorrectly assumes that the principle of proportionality requires a com-
parison between the number of innocent civilians killed or wounded and the
number ofterrorists killed or wounded. Rather, what the proportionality principle
actually requires is a balancing of incidental injury to civilians and collateral dam-
age to civilian property against the military advantage expected to be gained by the
attack, as determined by the military commander—notby the ICRC, Human Right
Council, Human Rights Watch or the Special Rapporteur. The commander's deci-
sion is based on validated, real-time, reliable intelligence; target evaluation in light
ofthe campaign plan (e.g., top-tier, high-level, mid-level leader or low-level opera-
tive); presence of civilians at the target and their statuses (e.g., voluntary or invol-
untary human shields, women and children); location of the target (e.g., protected
place, civilian object, safe house, terrorist training camp); and his or her experience
as a commander. Each target is carefully scrutinized and analyzed through a com-
plex targeting approval process which considers all of these factors in light of the
most recent real-time intelligence.
C. Distinction
The principle of distinction is concerned with distinguishing combatants from
civilians and military objects from civilian objects so as to minimize harm to civil-
ians and damage to civilian property. 162 To achieve this result, military command-
ers have a duty to distinguish their forces from the civilian population (e.g.,
through the wearing of uniforms or other distinctive signs) and distinguish valid
military objectives from civilians or civilian objects before attacking. 163
Opponents of the use of drones argue that, even if a US drone operator is
reasonably certain that the intended target is a valid military objective (e.g., an
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al-Qaeda terrorist), he or she is still obligated to minimize civilian injuries.
Because suspected terrorists wear civilian clothes and commingle with the local
population, they cannot be clearly distinguished from the innocent civilians, even
by high-tech drones. Citing Article 50(1) of Additional Protocol I (AP I), which
provides that "in case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be
considered to be a civilian," opponents to the use of drones argue that if there is
any uncertainty as to whether or not a person is a suspected militant (because he
is wearing civilian clothes or has commingled with the civilian population, etc.),
IHL presumes that the person is a protected civilian. 164
Such a position rewards terrorists for violating the very laws that opponents to
the use of drones seek to use to protect them from attack. Moreover, it encourages
further violations by the militants, thereby increasing the danger to the civilian
population. It also ignores the enhanced precision and restraint drones bring to the
targeting process as compared to a pilot with limited information in the cockpit or
the commander of a long-range artillery battery. 165 Improved ISR capabilities,
"lack of fear-induced haste, reduced anger levels" and clearer battle damage assess-
ments all combine to enhance awareness of protected persons and objects in the
target area and restraint on the part of drone operators to engage such persons or
objects. 166 More important, the opponents' position ignores basic rules ofIHL that
prohibit belligerents from using protected persons and protected objects to render
certain areas, objects or belligerent forces immune from attack. 167 In this regard,
Article 51(7) ofAP I provides that "[t]he Parties to the conflict shall not direct the
movement of the civilian population or individual civilians in order to attempt to
shield military objectives from attacks or to shield military operations." Article
58(b) additionally provides that "[t]he Parties to the conflict shall, to the maxi-
mum extent feasible!,] . . . avoid locating military objectives within or near densely
populated areas." Militants violate these principles on a daily basis by commin-
gling with the civilian population and enlisting the voluntary and involuntary aid
ofhuman shields to enhance their operations and mobilize public opinion against
the United States when UAS strikes cause incidental injury or collateral damage.
They store their ammunition in mosques, place weapons on top of schools and
hospitals, use ambulances to deliver suicide bombs and set up command and con-
trol centers in private homes, and then exploit the resulting injury or damage when
these protected places or objects are attacked. 168
Even though UAS are among the most precise weapons in the US inventory to-
day, incidental injury to innocent civilians and collateral damage to civilian prop-
erty is inevitable, particularly in light of the manner in which terrorists fight and
operate. The State Department Legal Adviser highlighted this fact in his remarks:
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[T] his is a conflict with an organized terrorist enemy that does not have conventional
forces, but that plans and executes its attacks against us and our allies while hiding
among civilian populations. That behavior . . . makes the application of international
law more difficult and more critical for the protection of innocent civilians. 169
Although these repeated IHL violations do not relieve the United States of its obli-
gation under the law to take all feasible precautions to minimize incidental loss of
civilian life and damage to civilian objects, the terrorists' actions must be taken into
consideration when determining the legality and proportionality of an attack
against militants who have taken refuge in the civilian population and engaged in
hostilities from protected places. 170
D. US Adherence to IHL in the Targeting Process
The Obama administration (as well as the previous administration) has continued
to adhere to basic principles ofIHL when targeting al-Qaeda terrorists outside the
traditional combat zone. Koh emphasized that administration officials have
carefully reviewed the rules governing targeting operations to ensure that these opera-
tions are conducted consistently with law ofwar principles, including: . . . the principle
ofdistinction, which requires that attacks be limited to military objectives and that civil-
ians and civilian objects shall not be the object ofthe attack; and . . . the principle ofpro-
portionality, which prohibits attacks that may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,
that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage antici-
pated. In U.S. operations against al-Qaeda and its associated forces—including lethal
operations conducted with the use ofunmanned aerial vehicles—great care is taken to
adhere to these principles in both planning and execution, to ensure that only legiti-
mate objectives are targeted and that collateral damage is kept to a minimum. 171
In short, drone attacks are being conducted in accordance with US obligations un-
der IHL.
VI. Use of Civilian UAS Operators to Target Terrorists
Today, more than ever, civilian contractors are increasingly being utilized to sup-
port combat forces across the entire spectrum of military operations, to include in-
telligence, planning, technical support, logistics and communications support
functions. Civilian contractors play critical roles as analysts, trainers, computer
programmers and maintenance technicians for high-tech unmanned systems. The
1907 Hague Regulations and the 1949 Third Geneva Convention both recognize
that civilians will support and accompany the armed forces in times of armed
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conflict. 172 AP I, Article 50 further recognizes that these individuals, notwithstand-
ing their affiliation with the armed forces, are still considered to be "civilians" for
purposes of targeting and Article 51 specifies that civilians "shall not be the object
of attack." 173 Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention similarly provides that
"protected persons . . . shall at all times be . . . protected . . . against all acts of vio-
lence." 174 Therefore, although the nature of their duties, and/or proximity to or
presence in the combat zone, may increase the risk that these civilian contractors
may be incidentally injured or killed, as long as they do not directly participate in
hostilities, they are not subject to direct attack.
Civilians lose their protected status if they directly participate in the hostilities.
AP I, Article 51 provides that "[civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by
this section, unless andfor such time as they take a directpart in hostilities'' (emphasis
added). Similarly, Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions provides
that "persons taking no active part in the hostilities . . . shall in all circumstances
be treated humanely" (emphasis added). Consequently, civilian contractors or
CIA operatives who conduct drone strikes against military objectives would be
considered to be directly participating in hostilities and could be lawfully targeted
by the enemy.
A. Inherently Governmental Functions
DoD avoids this issue by prohibiting its civilian personnel and contractors from
engaging in functions that are inherently governmental, including combat opera-
tions. 175 Pursuant to DoD guidelines, civilians are prohibited from participating in
combat operations if the planned use of disruptive and/or destructive combat ca-
pabilities is an inherent part of the mission. 176 Combat operations include actively
seeking out, closing with and destroying enemy forces, including employment of
firepower and other destructive and disruptive capabilities on the battlefield. 177
Consistent with this guidance, only US military personnel may operate US weap-
ons systems against the enemy.
B. Direct Participation in Hostilities
Opponents to the use of UAS to conduct strikes outside the traditional combat
zone argue that CIA operatives and civilian contractors conducting such strikes are
unlawful combatants and may not participate in hostilities. 178 This position is con-
trary to the majority view expressed by most law ofwar scholars, who hold that it is
not a war crime for civilians to participate in hostilities, but if they do, they are not
entitled to combatant immunity under domestic law for their belligerent acts. 179
Even the Special Rapporteur (Philip Alston) would agree that under IHL "civilians
. . . are not prohibited from participating in hostilities." 180 In his report filed with
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the Human Rights Council in late May, Alston indicates that direct participation in
hostilities is not a war crime, but that there are consequences that flow from such
participation.
First, because they are directly participating in hostilities by conducting targeted
killings, intelligence personnel may themselves be targeted and killed. Second, in-
telligence personnel do not have immunity from prosecution under domestic law
for their conduct. Thus CIA personnel could be prosecuted for murder under the
domestic law of any country in which they conduct targeted drone killings, and
could also be prosecuted for violations of applicable US law. 181
The aforementioned discussion assumes, of course, that the United States is en-
gaged in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda and its affiliates. If the opponents to the
use of drones are correct in arguing that the United States is not at war with al-
Qaeda, then civilian operators would not be considered "unlawful combatants"
and their actions could be legally justified as a "lawful exercise of the customary
sovereign right of self-defense against a non-state actor." 182
VII. Targeting Terrorists Who Directly Participate in Hostilities
Questions concerning who may be targeted by a UAS strike have also been raised
by opponents to the use of drones. These questions center on what activity consti-
tutes direct participation in hostilities (DPH) and how long individuals who have
directly participated in hostilities maybe targeted. In his May 2010 report, Philip
Alston indicates that
regardless ofthe enemy's tactics, in order to protect the vast majority of civilians, direct
participation may only include conduct close to that of a fighter, or conduct that
directly supports combat. More attenuated acts, such as providing financial support,
advocacy, or other non-combat aid, does [sic] not constitute direct participation. . .
.
Thus, although illegal activities, e.g., terrorism, may cause harm, ifthey do not meet the
criteria for direct participation in hostilities, then States' response must conform to
the lethal force standards applicable to self-defence and law enforcement. 183
Other critics have similarly argued that IHL "supports decisions in favor ofsparing
life and avoiding destruction in close cases." 184
Neither the Geneva Conventions nor the Additional Protocols define DPH. In
an effort to fill this gap, the ICRC issued the non-binding Interpretive Guidance on
the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian
Law. 185 In essence, the ICRC guidelines address three questions:
• Who is considered a civilian for the purposes ofthe principle ofdistinction?
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• What conduct amounts to direct participation in hostilities?
• What modalities govern the loss of protection against direct attack?
A. Who Is a Civilian?
The ICRC takes the position that, in an international armed conflict, "all persons
who are neither members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict nor
participants in a levee en masse are civilians and . . . entitled to protection against
direct attack unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities." 186 For
a non-international armed conflict, the ICRC maintains that
all persons who are not members of State armed forces or organized armed groups of a
party to the conflict [i.e., armed forces ofa non-State party to the conflict who continu-
ously take a direct part in hostilities (continuous combat function) ] are civilians and . .
.
entitled to protection against direct attack unless and for such time as they take a direct
part in hostilities. 187
B. What Constitutes DPH?
An act must meet the following criteria in order to constitute DPH under the Inter-
pretive Guidance: 188
• Threshold of Harm. An act likely to adversely affect the military operations
or military capacity of a party to an armed conflict or to inflict death, injury or de-
struction on protected persons or objects.
• Direct Causation. There must be a direct causal link between the act and the
harm likely to result from that act or from a coordinated military operation of
which that act constitutes an integral part.
• Belligerent Nexus. The act must be specifically designed to directly cause the
required threshold of harm in support of a party to the conflict and to the detri-
ment of another.
C. Loss of Protected Status
The third question, concerning belligerent nexus, addresses a number of issues, in-
cluding the length of the period during which civilians lose their protected status if
they directly participate in hostilities. According to the Interpretive Guidance, civil-
ians lose their protection against direct attack only for the "duration of each spe-
cific act amounting to [DPH]," which includes measures preparatory to the
execution of the act, "as well as the deployment to and the return from the location
of its execution." 189 When civilians cease to directly participate in hostilities, they
regain their status as civilians and are protected against direct attack (the so-called
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"revolving door" of civilian protection). The only exception to this rule is that
civilians who assume a CCF as members ofan organized armed group belonging to
a non-State party to the conflict lose their protected status for as long as they re-
main members of the group.
D. Problems with the ICRC Approach
The ICRC guidelines concerning the "revolving door" of civilian protection and
the application ofthe CCF are problematic, at best, and appear to be biased against
modern military forces, particularly when applied in the UAS context. To illus-
trate: under the "revolving door" of civilian protection, if an Afghan baker leaves
his shop with an improvised explosive device (IED), places it on the side of the
road, detonates it when a convoy drives by, killing five coalition soldiers, then
safely returns to his home without being detected, the baker can no longer be di-
rectly targeted, because he has regained his protected status as a civilian (assuming
of course that he has not assumed a CCF). This "baker by day, terrorist by night"
can be apprehended and prosecuted for his criminal acts, but he is no longer con-
sidered to be directly participating in hostilities and is not subject to direct attack.
Application of the ICRC guidelines to individuals involved in the use of IEDs
against coalition forces also produces anomalous results. The ICRC maintains that
a person who purchases and smuggles components for an IED and the person who
assembles and stores the IED in a workshop do not cause direct harm and are,
therefore, not directly participating in hostilities and may not be directly targeted.
According to the ICRC, only the person planting or detonating the IED meets the
requirement of direct causation for the purposes of direct participation in hostili-
ties. Purchasing, smuggling, assembling and storing an IED that is later used in an
attack against coalition forces are not considered by the ICRC to be "integral parts
of a concrete and coordinated tactical operation."
Compare the ICRC's "integral part" analysis to the use of drones. The ICRC
considers all the following individuals to be directly participating in hostilities and
therefore subject to direct attack:
• the individual who loads the missile on a drone that is used to conduct a
strike against terrorist targets;
• the individual who launches (or recovers) the UAS, even though control of
the drone is transferred to uniformed combat forces when it arrives on station;
• the computer specialist who operates the UAS through remote control;
• the operator collecting intelligence data;
• the individual illuminating the target;
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• the specialist controlling the firing of the missile;
• the radio operator transmitting orders to fire the missile; and
• the overall mission commander.
While acknowledging that only a few of these individuals carry out activities that,
in isolation, could be said to directly cause the required threshold of harm, the
ICRC interprets the standard of direct causation more broadly in the UAS context
to include conduct that causes harm in conjunction with other acts. In other
words, even if a specific act does not on its own directly cause the required thresh-
old of harm, "the requirement of direct causation would still be fulfilled where the
act constitutes an integral part of a concrete and coordinated tactical operation that
directly causes such harm." 190
It is clear from these examples that the Interpretive Guidance guidelines are in-
ternally inconsistent and provide greater protection for terrorists and insurgents
than they do for civilians and civilian contractors accompanying the force. It is in-
conceivable that the ICRC does not consider the purchasing, smuggling of com-
ponents, assembling or storing ofan IED that is later used in an attack on coalition
forces to be an "integral part of a concrete and coordinated tactical operation,"
thereby fulfilling the requirement of direct causation/harm. Yet, the ICRC would
say that a contractor loading a missile on a UAS that is later dropped on a terrorist
target is directly participating in hostilities because the act of loading the missile is
an integral part of a concrete and coordinated tactical operation that directly
causes harm to the enemy. Such a conclusion is absurd and completely ignores the
fact that IED attacks "are the No. 1 killer of US troops in Afghanistan" and "more
than half of American combat deaths [in 2008] were the result of IED" attacks. 191
The ICRC is supposed to act as a neutral and independent humanitarian organi-
zation to protect innocent civilians and promote and work for a better understand-
ing of IHL; its job is not to level the playing field between opposing belligerents.
Unfortunately, in the case ofDPH the ICRC has lost its impartiality by attempting
to penalize the use of civilian contractors and high-tech unmanned systems, while
at the same time providing additional protection to supporters of terrorist groups
like al-Qaeda.
E. The Israeli Approach
The Israeli Supreme Court has taken a different, yet similar, approach to DPH. In
the Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government ofIsrael decision, the
Court determined that a civilian is considered to have taken part in hostilities when
• using weapons in an armed conflict, while gathering intelligence or while
preparing himself/herself for the hostilities;
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• acting as a voluntary human shield;
• sending a person to commit a hostile act, directing the hostile act and plan-
ning a hostile act; or
• joining a terrorist organization and committing a chain of hostilities, with
short periods of rest between them. 192
The Court additionally determined that lethal force could only be used against a
civilian that is considered to have taken a direct part in hostilities if the following
criteria were satisfied: 193
• well-based information is needed before categorizing a civilian as directly
participating in hostilities;
• a civilian taking a direct part in hostilities cannot be attacked ifa less harmful
means can be employed (e.g., arrest) unless such means involve a risk so great to
the lives ofthe soldiers that they are not required or harm to nearby innocent civil-
ians might be greater than that caused by refraining from using lesser means; and
• after an attack on a civilian suspected of taking an active part in hostilities, a
thorough, independent investigation regarding the precision of the identification
of the target and the circumstances of the attack upon him is to be performed.
Although not a perfect solution, the Israeli approach is more realistic and offers
sufficient safeguards to ensure protection of innocent civilians in the targeting
decision.
VIII. Use ofAdvanced Weapons Systems
A final argument, which merits little attention, has been advanced by some oppo-
nents to the use of drones. In general, they argue that the use ofadvanced weapons
systems in lethal operations against terrorists is illegal under international law. In
response to this argument the State Department Legal Adviser correctly noted that
"the rules that govern targeting do not turn on the type ofweapon system used, and
there is no prohibition under the laws of war on the use of technologically ad-
vanced weapons systems in armed conflict ... so long as they are employed in con-
formity with applicable laws of war." 194 In this regard, DoD regulations require
that all acquisition and procurement ofDoD weapons and weapon systems be con-
sistent with all applicable domestic law, treaties and international agreements, cus-
tomary international law and the law ofarmed conflict. To ensure compliance with
international law and US treaty obligations, all intended acquisitions of weapons
and weapons systems are subject to a legal review by a DoD attorney authorized to
conduct such reviews. 195 Drones have been determined to be consistent with all US
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treaty obligations and international law. A similar requirement applies to non-lethal
weapons. Each military service is required to conduct a legal review of the acquisi-
tion of all non-lethal weapons to ensure consistency with US treaty obligations,
customary international law and, in particular, the laws of war. 196
IX. Conclusion
The position being advocated by human rights advocates and the opponents to the
use of drones is a position of weakness that, if adopted by the Obama administra-
tion, will provide al-Qaeda and its affiliates with a substantial advantage in their
war of aggression against the United States and its allies. J. Cofer Black, the State
Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism, got it right when he testified be-
fore the House Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and
Human Rights in 2004:
No country is safe from the scourge of terrorism. No country is immune from attack,
and neither policies of deterrence nor accommodation will ward off attack. Al-Qaeda
seeks only death and chaos, which is why we will continue to pursue the only viable
course ofaction before us, which is to destroy this enemy utterly, both with the cooper-
ation ofour allies and by unilateral action when necessary This is definitely a long-
term fight. This is a war [W]hile we have made substantial progress toward eradi-
cating the threat posed by al-Qaeda, we are on a long, tough road. We cannot afford to
falter [I] n counterterrorism . . . weakness is exploited, and it must not be shown. 197
Mr. Black's testimony is equally applicable today. The United States must continue
to attack al-Qaeda and its affiliates wherever they maybe found in order to achieve
victory in this protracted war. In the short term, the use of UAS appears to be the
best (if not the only) viable option to target terrorists operating from the remote
areas ofthe FATA, Yemen, Somalia and other places. As Harold Koh emphasized,
al-Qaeda continues to pose an imminent threat to the United States and the terror-
ist organization
has not abandoned its intent to attack the United States, and indeed continues to attack
us [Accordingly,] the United States has the authority under international law, and
the responsibility to its citizens, to use force, including lethal force, to defend itself,
including by targeting persons such as high-level al-Qaeda leaders who are planning
attacks. 198
If you've seen the movie Patton you will recall General Patton's address to the
Third Army on the eve of the D-Day invasion in 1944, which begins with his
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famous quip: "I want you to remember that no bastard ever won a war by dying for
his country. He won it by making the other poor dumb bastard die for his coun-
try."
199 Opponents to the use of drones argue that US forces must first warn or at-
tempt to capture suspected terrorists before they are engaged with lethal force,
even if the terrorists are operating out of remote and inaccessible areas like the
FATA. This "capture first" mentality violates the first tenet of Patton's clever re-
mark by turning a blind eye to reality—such a limitation on the use of force in an
armed conflict will provide greater protection for suspected terrorists and will in-
evitably result in large numbers ofUS casualties. Fortunately, Presidents Bush and
Obama chose the Patton alternative—providing al-Qaeda terrorists the opportu-
nity to die for their cause. Accordingly the United States will continue to use UAS
to attack enemy belligerents, including al-Qaeda operatives, consistent with the in-
herent right of self-defense and the laws of war.
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Technological Meteorites and Legal Dinosaurs?
The tacit contract ofcombat throughout the ages has always assumed a basic
equality ofmoral risk: kill or be killed. Accordingly violence in war avails itselfof




The issue ofnew technology and its implications for the law ofarmed conflict
(LOAC) is not a new question. For centuries nations and their militaries
have had to respond to developments in the means and methods ofwarfare. These
have ranged from hardware developments, such as the crossbow and gunpowder,
to the development of tactics, such as asymmetric warfare or doctrines like the
effects-based approach to operations (EBAO). In response to each of these chal-
lenges, belligerents have either developed enhanced weapons or tactics, or suffered
defeat. Usually technological change has been of a relatively minor, evolutionary
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nature, affording localized tactical or operational advantage. Occasionally devel-
opments have been profound, changing the strategic balance in the favor of one
side over the other. History provides examples ofthese in the form ofthe crossbow,
gunpowder and nuclear weapons in the case of hardware. Similarly the Greek
hoplite phalanx, the Roman legion and the development ofthe corps structure by
Napoleon are all examples of innovations which have shaped tactics.
The question frequently posed today is whether the current nature of develop-
ments in military technology constitutes a similarly seismic shift in the military
paradigm. Will the development of unmanned systems in the land, air and mari-
time environments be recorded in history in the same revolutionary terms as those
previously mentioned? This article will consider this question in the context of the
implications that flow from these developments for LOAC.
Over the centuries LOAC, in its various guises, has always had as its focus the
regulation of armed conflict so as to protect the victims of war. 2 During the nine-
teenth century, in response to both the development of military technology and the
prevailing social mores of the time, LOAC rules started to become formalized and
began to reflect the format that we are familiar with today.
One of the notable features of LOAC has been its evolutionary flexibility. This
flexibility has allowed LOAC to evolve in a manner that adapts to the developments
in both technological capabilities (means) and tactics (methods) employed in
armed conflict. This has included specific measures to ban weapons3 and tactics4
when seen as appropriate. More important, LOAC has demonstrated its flexibility
through the defining principles underpinning its operation. These principles
—
military necessity, humanity, distinction and proportionality—are of an enduring
quality and provide a benchmark against which developments in technology and
tactics can be assessed as to their lawfulness. When applied in the context of pre-
vailing international mores, LOAC proves itself both flexible and responsive to
changes in the armed conflict paradigm.
The changing character of weapons systems and their impact on the law is nei-
ther one-dimensional nor negative. In fact, technological advances in weaponry
frequently work to enhance application of LOAC, particularly in the areas of dis-
tinction and proportionality. Challenges usually arise when such developments
raise wider questions as to what are the acceptable ethical limits in the application
of technology to military purposes. In this context LOAC, operating as a system
regulating what is inherently a human activity within a prevailing set of interna-
tional mores, becomes an important consideration.
This article will consider whether the changing character of weapons systems,
particularly unmanned systems and vehicles, is such as to call into question
LOAC's ability to respond to the introduction of new technology onto the
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battlefield. In considering this question, the paper addresses three aspects: current
developments in technology, the impacts on LOAC standards arising from new
technology and the implications for accountability.
Part I will consider current developments in military technology, including un-
manned systems that are either remotely controlled, have automated elements to
their operation or can act in an autonomous manner. What are the military drivers
in the development of such technology? Do developments in artificial intelligence
constitute a turning point in technology such as to warrant a bespoke response
from the law? What then ofthe existing legal framework for the assessment ofnew
weapons for their lawfulness as articulated by Article 36 of Additional Protocol I
(AP I)? 5 These questions will all be addressed in Part I.
The impact ofnew technology in armed conflict brings with it, even under the
extant legal paradigm, an obligation on belligerents to apply the rules such that
applicable standards of behavior may be at variance between those who possess
new technology and those that don't. Whether this calls for a change in the law to
acknowledge common but differentiated responsibilities6 or simply a renewed inter-
pretation ofwhat the applicable LOAC standards are will be considered in Part II.
Of course the question of standards in turn raises the issues of accountability
and the means by which set standards are to be measured. Does the law of unin-
tended consequences mean that the changing nature ofweapons systems will result
in an increased level of attention and scrutiny applied to senior levels of the chain
ofcommand as the only "humans in the loop"? Have States, by removing humans
from the operation ofweapons systems, created a whole new set ofimplications for
accountability? Part III looks at whether civilian leaders and military commanders,
in their quest to employ newer and better technology, have considered the conse-
quences of placing themselves more squarely in the focus for breaches of LOAC
when these (as they invariably will) occur.
Finally, the article will conclude by addressing whether LOAC has been able to
adequately respond to the challenge of the changing character of weapons or if a
fundamental root-and-branch reassessment is required.
Part I. Current Developments in Technology: Unmanned Systems and
Unmanned Vehicles
Definitions
The combination of technology and military jargon can be a dangerous distrac-
tion in the context of terminology and precision in its use. This article will there-
fore use terminology in line with that the United States has developed in its
FY2009-2034 Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap (hereinafter referred to as
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the Roadmap). 7 The Roadmap contains a multitude of acronyms used in this
area, which are usefully consolidated at Annex H to the document.
It should come as no surprise that the accepted term that applies generically to
all vehicles and systems that are either remotely controlled, automated or exhibit a
degree ofautonomy is "unmanned vehicle systems" (UVS). 8 UVS are broken down
by environment: land (unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs)), maritime (unmanned
maritime systems (UMS)) and air (unmanned air systems (UASs)).
UGVs are those that are either armed (ground combat vehicles (GCVs)) or un-
armed. UMS include unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) and unmanned surface
vehicles (USVs). UASs include unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), tactical unmanned
air vehicles (TUAVs) and unmanned combat air vehicles. Some commentators
break UASs into three broad categories: TUAVs, stealth UAVs and agile or expend-
able UAVs,9 however, this structure has not received widespread endorsement.
There have been some attempts byNATO Systems Concepts and Integrations pan-
els to seek standardization in this area, including terminology; however, this is yet
to produce a definitive guide. 10
Equal in importance to the requirement that terminology used with respect to
new technology is of a uniform nature is the requirement to understand the wider
military context in which new technology is employed.
Military Doctrine as a Driver for the Development ofNew Technology
While the development of terminology in relation to new military technology is
relatively straightforward, what is less so is the drivers for its development and use.
The desire to develop a decisive hardware advantage over an opponent is but one of
these. As military doctrine evolves in relation to the employment ofunmanned sys-
tems, technology is seen as a key enabler rather than a panacea to the challenges
posed by the paradigm of the contemporary operating environment. The manner
in which technology is used by the military is therefore critical. As Air Commodore
Julian Stinton puts it:
[L]etting the thinking drive the technology could lead to more coherence in approach
and more commonality in capabilities under an overall concept, but less potential for
exploitation of novel game-changing technologies. This is the steady, analytical, non-
ephemeral approach, requiring just as much technological capability in information
management, prioritisation, automation, pattern seeking, relational activity using star-
ing arrays, change detection, wide-area scanning and cueing, as the adrenalin [e] -laden,
higher-buzz technological demands of real-time ISR. 11
For those in the military, this will, of course, be an obvious statement; however,
the benefits derived from recent developments in new military technology have
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been distorted by a perception that the quest for newer and better technology is vir-
tually an "end in itself," rather than being one of a number of"means to an end." Air
ChiefMarshal Sir Brian Burridge describes the challenge in somewhat blunter terms:
Those who are lured by expensive technologies without a deeper understanding ofhow
to use them, task them and integrate them will be left with empty pockets and shiny
toys—the "esoteric chimera" I referred to earlier. Those that understand their
limitations, benefits and the most important of all, the human dimension, will be left
with a little more money to spend elsewhere and an essential capability that they can
use effectively. 12
With the widespread introduction ofEBAO byWestern militaries into their opera-
tional doctrine, the use of new technology has become but one (albeit sophisti-
cated) component of an increasingly integrated, multifaceted campaign plan. As
such, new military technology cannot be simply viewed as an upward trending
graph ofenhancement in capabilities. It is the manner in which the myriad capabil-
ities afforded by new technology are employed by commanders and their staffs that
is becoming the decisive factor in differentiating opponents and, as a consequence,
their ability to prevail in armed conflict.
Advocates for the employment of automated or even autonomous systems ar-
gue that the phenomenon ofinformation overload, which is prevalent on the mod-
ern battlefield, underscores the requirement for systems that can process
information and make decisions far more efficiently than humans. Such an ap-
proach fails to consider two important elements. First, the processing of informa-
tion into intelligence requires a broad array of skills, including intuitive,
experience-based analysis and cognitive functions ofwhich automated or autono-
mous systems are incapable. Second, and perhaps most important, is the fact that
the battlefield is a complex system ofinterlinked actions, each ofwhich may impact
differently on an opponent depending on the context in which it occurs, and which
will not have the same effect each time. It is the management of this complex net-
work, seeking to influence the effect actions have in a coordinated manner toward
a certain set of campaign objectives, that is at the heart of effects-based operations.
As such:
To the extent that it works, the place ofthe human in the system seems to have changed
dramatically. The important judgement is now made at a data fusion or intelligence
centre—or, alternatively, by a forward observer aware ofhow dynamics of a battle have
made a particular target temporarily important. 13
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Thus, the use ofnew technology in this context, while enabling greater efficien-
cies and providing potentially decisive effect, does so within a wider campaign con-
struct that requires the exercise of clear human direction and control.
Types ofNew and Evolving Technology
Broadly speaking, UVS operating types fit into three categories. First are those that
are remotely controlled, also known as tele-operated, where an operator will con-
trol the UVS by some form of direct radio signal (line of sight or satellite). The
operator can be either relatively close, such as in the same operational theater, or
many thousands of miles away as in the case of Predator/Reaper operations in
Afghanistan. 14
The second category is automated UVS, meaning that functions are carried out
within preprogrammed parameters without the requirement for a command from
a human. There are many examples of this type of UVS currently employed by
militaries around the world. For example, Global Hawk is a UAS, most of whose
flight commands are controlled by onboard systems without recourse to a human
operator. Similarly in the land environment, automated sentry systems that re-
spond to movement in, or breaches of, security perimeters are often used in rela-
tion to minefields or other installations, and provide an automated response
without human intervention. In the maritime context, the close-in weapons sys-
tems used to defend surface warships from anti-ship missile attack are, due to the
speed of response required to defeat the threat, largely automated.
Finally, work is being carried out to develop autonomous systems for military
application that incorporate forms of artificial intelligence, allowing the UVS to
operate independently ofhumans and carry out all of the functions that otherwise
would have involved human action.
Perhaps the best single official source of data on the types and employment of
UVS is the US Roadmap. 15 Not only does it contain an analysis of future require-
ments (including detailed descriptions of individual system characteristics) for the
US military (the largest single user and developer of UVS), but it places these re-
quirements within an operational context focusing on the how and why of UVS
employment. The investment in terms of resources and effort by the United States
in developing new UVS technology is impressive; the funding for this project alone
over a five-year period (2009-13) is projected to be a staggering $18.9 billion. 16
This commitment to the development and use ofUVS is underscored by the 2001
US congressional mandate that one-third of military aircraft and ground combat
vehicles be unmanned by 2015. 17 The size and scope of the US unmanned systems
program bring into sharp focus the impact such new technology has, and will con-
tinue to have, on US military capability. Other nations can ill afford to ignore such
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a development. Professor Jack Beard paints the US fascination with technology in a
rather more somber light:
The U.S. military-technological experience represents a consistent, but exaggerated, vari-
ation ofthe historical trends in this area, as Americans have displayed an almost bound-
less confidence in the power of science and technology to promote "progress" and have
tended to trust in the power of military technology to translate into success in war. 18
It is not possible to list the myriad of types and names of systems that are being
developed or will become spin-offs of the programs covered by the US unmanned
systems program. The table below illustrates the number and types ofUVS that the
United States assesses as having a force application capability (i.e., capable of offen-
sive action). These systems span the ubiquitous Predator and Reaper UAVs to
GCVs and the newly developed littoral combat ship (LCS). The LCS is the latest ad-
dition to the US Navy and is designed to operate on a modular basis with several
unmanned systems loaded on board, including the Remote Mine Hunting System
and MQ-8B Fire Scout Vertical Takeoff Unmanned Air Vehicle.
Table 1
Named Unmanned Systems Associated with Force Application 19
Air-to-Air UAS WMD Aerial Collection System (WACS)
Automated Combat SAR Decoys Autonomous Expeditionary Support Plat-
form (AESP)
Automated Combat SAR Recovery Contaminated Remains/Casualty Evacua-
tion & Recovery
Combat Medic UAS for Resupply &
Evacuation
Crowd Control System (Non-lethal Gladia-
tor Follow-on)
EOD UAS Defender
Floating Mine Neutralization UAS Intelligent Mobile Mine System
High Altitude Persistent/Endurance UAS Next Generation Small Armed UGV
High Speed UAS Nuclear Forensics Next Generation UGV
Micro Air Vehicle (MAV) Small Armed UGV Advanced
MQ-1 Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle (SUGV)
MQ-9 Reaper UAS-UGV Teaming
Next Generation Bomber UAS Amphibious UGV/USV
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Table 1
Named Unmanned Systems Associated with Force Application (continued)
Off Board Sensing UAS Autonomous Undersea Mine Layer
Precision Acquisition and Weaponized
System (PAWS)
Bottom UUV Localization System (BULS)
SEAD/DEAD UAS Harbor Security USV
Small Armed UAS Hull UUV Localization System (HULS)
STUAS/Tier II Mine Neutralization System
Unmanned Combat Aircraft System-
Demonstration (UCAS-D)
Next Generation USV with Unmanned Sur-
face Influence Sweep System (USV w/US3)
Vertical Take-off and Landing Tactical Un-
manned Air Vehicle (VTUAV Firescout)
Remote Minehunting System (RMS)
WARRIOR A/I-GNAT SUSV with Unmanned Surface Influence
Sweep System (USV w/US3)
Weapon borne Bomb Damage Information
UAS
VSW UUV Search, Classify, Map, Identify,
Neutralize (SCMI-N)
To illustrate that not all developments have focused on offensive capability, the
table below illustrates that an even greater number ofUVS are being developed that
are associated with protection capabilities. These systems include harbor security
UASs, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) UASs and battlefield casualty extraction
robots designed to reduce risk to military medics by carrying out the traditional
stretcher-bearer function.
Table 2
Named Unmanned Systems Associated with Protection
20
Automated Combat SAR Decoys MK 3 MOD RONS
Automated Combat SAR Recovery MK 4 MOD Robot, EOD
Combat Medic UAS for Resupply &
Evacuation
Mobile Detection Assessment Response
System (MDARS)
EOD UAS Multi-function Utility/Logistics and
Equipment (MULE) ARV Assault Light
(ARV-A(L))
MQ-1 Multi-function Utility/Logistics and Equip-




Named Unmanned Systems Associated with Protection (continued)
MQ-5B Hunter Multi-function Utility/Logistics and Equip-
ment (MULE) Transport (MULE-T)
RQ-7 Shadow Next Advanced EOD Robot
STUAS/Tier II Next Generation Maritime Interdiction
Operations UGV
Unmanned Combat Aircraft System-
Demonstration (UCAS-D)
Next Generation Small Armed UGV
Vertical Take-off and Landing Tactical
Unmanned Air Vehicle (VTUAV Firescout)
Nuclear Forensics Next Generation UGV
WARRIOR A/I-GNAT PackBot Explorer
Advanced EOD Robot System (AEODRS) PackBot FIDO
All Purpose Remote Transport System
(ARTS)
PackBot Scout
Anti-Personnel Mine Clearing System, Re-
mote Control (MV-4B)
Route Runner
Automated Aircraft Decontamination Small Armed UGV Advanced
Automated Bare Base/Shelter Construction
UGV
Talon Eng/3B
Automated Facilities Services Talon EOD
Autonomous CASEVAC & Enroute Care
System (ACES)
Talon IV
Autonomous Expeditionary Support Plat-
form (AESP)
UAS-UGV Teaming
Battlefield Casualty Extraction Robot
(BCER)
xBot (PackBot Fastac)




CBRN Unmanned Ground Vehicle
Advanced Concept Technology
Demonstration
Bottom UUV Localization System (BULS)
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Table 2
Named Unmanned Systems Associated with Protection (continued)
Contaminated Remains/Casualty Evacua-
tion & Recovery
Hull UUV Localization System (HULS)
Crowd Control System (Non-lethal Gladia-
tor Follow-on)
Mine Neutralization System
Defender Next Generation Surface-launched Mine
Counter-Measures Unmanned Undersea
Vehicle (SMCM UUV)
F6A-ANDROS Next Generation USV with Unmanned Sur-
face Influence Sweep System (USV w/US3)
HD-1 Remote Minehunting System (RMS)
MARCbot SEAFOX USV
Maritime Interdiction Operations UGV Surface-launched Mine Counter-Measures
Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (SMCM
UUV)
Mine Area Clearance Equipment (MACE) USV with Unmanned Surface Influence
Sweep System (USV w/US3)
MK 1 MOD Robot, EOD VSW UUV Search, Classify, Map, Identify,
Neutralize (SCMI-N)
MK 2 MOD Robot, EOD
Other nations have not been idle in the face ofthe incredible pace ofUVS devel-
opment and the unprecedented resource allocation that the United States has com-
mitted to the task. Both the United Kingdom and Israel have long been pioneers in
UVS development, albeit in slightly different areas. In response to the Irish Repub-
lican Army terrorist threat in the second half ofthe twentieth century, which regu-
larly manifested itself through either remotely detonated or time-delayed
improvised explosive devices, the United Kingdom pioneered the development of
a remotely operated EOD capability. Similarly, it was Israeli application of UAS
capability in the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon in the 1970s that showed the potential for
the future development of such systems. 21
However, development in these countries has not been restricted solely to these
types of systems. The United Kingdom is actively developing its capability in
TUAVs, with the early prototype Phoenix TUAV having been replaced by both the
Hermes 450 TUAV and Desert Hawk (a handheld TUAV). 22 Further development
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of the Watchkeeper TUAV will see the capability for automated takeoff and land-
ing being deployed.23 In addition, the United Kingdom has invested in developing
longer-range stealth UAS with offensive strike capability as part of the Taranis proj-
ect, as well as in developing other offensive strike capability in the form ofloitering
munitions24 and cruise missiles such as Brimstone.25
In addition to its vibrant UAS industry, Israel has also developed capabilities in
the land environment with point-defense systems, such as the Guardium System,
which illustrates increasingly enhanced and sophisticated levels of automation.26
South Korea has developed a similar concept with its Samsung Techwin SGR-A1
Sentry Guard Robot27 designed to perform surveillance and sentry duties of
minefields along the Korean Demilitarized Zone. China is also widely assumed to
be developing UVS technology following the unveiling of the Anjian (Invisible
Sword) prototype pilotless combat aircraft by the China Aviation Industry Corpo-
ration I at the sixth International Aviation and Aerospace Exhibition held in
Zhuhai, in October 2006.28
As one would expect when technology develops at such a rate, there are also
prototypes that suggest either bizarre or incredible future developments. These
include the suggestion of using implants in crickets to aid in the detection of the
presence of either explosive chemicals or carbon dioxide emissions in order to
detect explosives and humans, respectively. 29 Other prototypes include LAPCAD
Engineering's FOOT vehicle, the Fly Out ofTrouble jet-engine-powered supercar,
and the aquatic robot named Ghost Swimmer that mimics the propulsion drive of
a bluefin tuna.30 While these developments may seem incredible to many, other
previously dismissed systems such as FIST (Fully Integrated Soldier Technology),
which consists of a combination of special e-textiles, exoskeletons and nanotech ar-
mor, are being developed beyond mere prototype sketches into credible programs by
defense research agencies such as the US Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA). Indeed, such are the advances in nanotechnology that a proto-
type ultramicro UAV called the Maple Seed Flyer is being developed by Lockheed
Martin as a means of providing persistent ISR stealth capability. 31
Legal Consequences ofNew Technology
While much ofthe new technology discussed in the preceding section is ofan auto-
mated or semiautonomous nature, the area giving rise to the greatest controversy,
including legal consequences, is that of autonomous systems. These are UVS pro-
grammed to act independently of human control. A leading proponent of this
technology is Professor Ron Arkin of the Georgia Institute of Technology. 32
Arkin's hypothesis is that not only can robots that are programmed with an ethical
code outperform humans in terms of their ability to process complex, fast-moving
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scenarios, but they will consistently behave in a manner that is more humane. This
is not merely the zealous utterance of an extreme fringe of the unmanned system
development community. Arkin has been commissioned by DARPA to conduct a
study on the feasibility of his hypothesis and whether it, in fact, has any military ap-
plication. In relation to his research for DARPA Arkin states: "This effort has an
over-arching goal of producing an 'artificial conscience,' to yield a new class of ro-
bots termed humane-oids—robots that can perform more ethically in the battle-
field than humans are capable of doing." 33
Clearly the suggestion of robots performing tasks, including offensive operations,
without recourse to human controllers raises not only legal, but considerable ethical
questions. Support for these systems, of course, presumes that programming code
can be produced that will allow robots to act in accordance with LOAC—a matter
that is yet to be determined. However, the mere claim that robots can act in accor-
dance with LOAC does not test the difficult, ifnot problematic, question ofoperat-
ing UVS in armed conflict, where the fog of war creates ambiguity and
unpredictability beyond the imagination of even the most gifted programmer.
These concerns have not gone unnoticed by States in their analyses of the devel-
opment and employment of this type of technology. The US Roadmap states:
Because the DoD complies with the Law ofArmed Conflict, there are many issues re-
quiring resolution associated with employment of weapons by an unmanned system.
For a significant period into the future, the decision to pull the trigger or launch a mis-
sile from an unmanned system will not be fully automated, but it will remain under the
full control of a human operator. Many aspects ofthe firing sequence will be fully auto-
mated but the decision to fire will not likely be fully automated until legal, rules of en-
gagement, and safety concerns have all been thoroughly examined and resolved.34
One could add that the "significant period into the future" referred to will also
include an element of the international community becoming familiar with, and
unconcerned about, the operation of such UVS, assuming, of course, that the
technology will develop in such a way as to satisfy all the operating criteria of the
military. This may well mean that for the foreseeable future we will continue to see
human control being exercised over UVS, even where these systems may have the
capability of operating independently of human control. The United States Air
Force Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan 2009-2047,35 essentially a single-
service plan to implement the strategic guidance provided in the Roadmap, clearly
anticipates the existence of this continued human control when it makes the follow-
ing assumption: "Agile, redundant, interoperable and robust command and control
(C2) creates the capability of supervisory control ('man on the loop') of UAS."36
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The questions to be resolved by policymakers in the military application ofUVS
are set out in the Air Force's UAS Flight Plan as follows:
Authorizing a machine to make lethal combat decisions is contingent upon political
and military leaders resolving legal and ethical questions. These include the appropri-
ateness of machines having this ability, under what circumstances it should be em-
ployed, where responsibility for mistakes lies and what limitations should be placed
upon the autonomy of such systems Ethical discussions and policy decisions must
take place in the near term in order to guide the development of future UAS capabili-
ties, rather than allowing the development to take its own path apart from this critical
guidance.37
Quite apart from the ethical questions posed by the employment of autono-
mous systems, perhaps the most overt extension ofthe application ofUVS technol-
ogy, there remain real concerns as to the ability of such weapons to comply with
LOAC. The autonomous system's ability to distinguish a military objective from a
protected person or object, and its ability to weigh the proportionality test in a
holistic manner,38 is yet to be adequately addressed. The question ofaccountability
for the actions ofautonomous systems also cries out for an answer and will be ad-
dressed in Part III.
The quest to develop the newest, best and most capable military technology (the
Holy Grail of decisive effect) can often result in the relegation to the backseat of
considerations as to whether such technology is not only needed but, indeed in a
broader perspective, even desirable.
Existing Legal Control Mechanisms
As military technology development continues to progress at an unrelenting pace
as States strive to achieve the next level of technological advantage over one an-
other, how does the law cope with these new developments and seek to regulate
them? AP I is clear in articulating those types ofmethods (including weapons) that
are prohibited in armed conflict. 39 Indeed, the prohibitions contained in Article
35(2) are relatively non-contentious, representing as they do the customary law on
the subject.40 Similarly, the provisions of Article 3641 have been accepted, even by
States who are not parties to AP I, as either reflective ofbest practice or as an obliga-
tion flowing from the customary law norm articulated by Article 35(2)—although
it is by no means as clear that Article 36 has the status of customary law. Not that
Article 36 is particularly controversial in its terms, which require States to deter-
mine the lawfulness ofnew weapons and means and methods ofwarfare. Rather, it
is in the obligation to comply with its operation that disparate State practice seems
to have developed. As Professor Jacobsson observes, "Unfortunately, very few
283
New Technology and the Law ofArmed Conflict
States undertake such an examination before employing new means and methods
of warfare, despite the fact that the obligation relates to the initial stages, i.e., the
'study' and 'development' of a new weapon."42
Proving Professor Jacobsson's assertion empirically is problematic, given that
even those States, such as the United States, that have sophisticated weapons test-
ing programs do not publish the results of their analyses. The very nature of certain
new UVS technology will mean that not all States will even have the capacity to con-
duct adequate testing were they to acquire the technology. Notwithstanding this, it
can be assumed that those States that do possess the wherewithal to develop new
technology should also have the concomitant ability to carry out the necessary
analysis required by Article 36. Of course, given that it is arguable whether Article
36 is declaratory of customary law, those States not party to AP I are under no
specific obligation to comply with its provisions. However, as the sole purpose of
the Article 36 requirement to assess LOAC compliance of new weapon systems
prior to introduction relates to customary law obligations as codified in Article 35,
it would appear a fortiori that best practice suggests a State would be prudent to en-
sure that it is not in breach of its LOAC obligations by assessing the introduction of
new weapons systems. Evidence of this approach can be seen in the existence of
what is probably the most sophisticated assessment process for the introduction of
new weapons carried out by a State—and this by a country that is not a State party
to AP I, namely, the United States.
It is another matter, however, whether the output from these reviews should be
published. This is certainly not current State practice, notwithstanding the fact that
there have been calls from a number ofdiffering organizations for greater transpar-
ency in the review ofnew weapon systems. These have ranged from representatives
of States43 to human rights institutions.44 These arguments include questions of
confidence measures in relation to international arms sales and exports in the case
of States, or the characteristics ofweapons systems and their effect on civilian pop-
ulations in the case of human rights activists. What is consistent is the argument
that there is a public right to know that the State that oversaw the development of
the new technology giving rise to the production of a new weapon system correctly
assessed its impact for LOAC compliance.
This debate aside, it is clear that if the law is to keep pace with technological de-
velopments, then it is through the weapons review process that the initial fitness-
for-use test in LOAC terms can be established. While the requirement to carry out
the test, whether as a binding legal obligation or as an exemplar of best practice,
would appear to be entirely consistent with an approach illustrating the law's ability
to keep pace with new technology, the concerns raised by an increasing number of
interested parties within the international community over whether such reviews are
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actually conducted would seem to give rise to justifiable concerns that this important
component ofLOAC application is not being given the effect it should have.
The existence of new military technology, possessing capabilities far beyond
those anticipated when the LOAC paradigm was first formally constructed in the
nineteenth century, has resulted in calls that LOAC is no longer "fit for purpose" in
fulfilling the role of regulating armed conflict and, in particular, providing protec-
tion to those it is designed to protect. Increasing levels ofweapon system automa-
tion, coupled with claims that robots can behave "more humanely" than humans,
create an uncomfortable juxtaposition of concepts leading to further reflection as
to LOAC's suitability in its current guise. These calls fail to address the fact that, in
part, LOAC does provide a framework to address these issues. In many senses it is
the failure of States to apply the principles ofAP I's Articles 35 and 36 in a consis-
tent manner that results in a perception of new technology being allowed to
proceed without any form of checks and balances.
It is clear that in theory, ifnot in practice, adequate control mechanisms do exist
to ensure LOAC compliance during the development and procurement phases. It
is, however, appropriate to consider whether the changing character of weapons
systems has had the effect of altering the applicable LOAC standards in terms of
their employment. Part II will consider this question and whether calls for the de-
velopment ofLOAC to respond are warranted.
Part II. Impacts on LOAC Standards Arisingfrom New Technology
The enhanced capabilities brought about through the development and employ-
ment ofthe new technologies referred to in the preceding part bring with them not
only the ability to achieve decisive effect on the battlefield but an unprecedented
ability to give effect to the application of LOAC. The changing character of weap-
ons means that militaries possessing the relevant capability can not only target with
unprecedented precision but, in addition, through the use of sophisticated persis-
tent surveillance, assess with much greater accuracy the anticipated effects of inci-
dental loss or damage to civilian persons or property and take appropriate remedial
measures. The cumulative effect of this has been to enable, in certain circum-
stances, the achievement of much enhanced levels of protection for civilians by
those nations employing such technology.
It is important to note the qualification "certain circumstances" in the preced-
ing paragraph. Notwithstanding the aspiration to be able to conduct targeting in an
environment that is as controlled as possible, both the nature ofarmed conflict and
in particular the confused and often ambiguous environment of land operations
mean that the conditions necessary to fully exploit the capabilities that new
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technology offers commanders and their staffare frequently not met. This is a partic-
ularly challenging scenario in conflicts of a non-international character, where the
blurring of the lines between civilian and military is a commonplace occurrence.
What effect, then, has the changing character of weapons had on the standards
to be applied by States who possess the types ofadvanced technology ofwhich UVS
are an example? Have technological advances resulted in the effect of Article 57 of
AP I changing?45
Some academics,46 and indeed State practice,47 suggest that the requirement to
take all feasible precautions in attack to minimize incidental loss of life to civilians
and damage to civilian objects should be seen in the context of a subjective analysis
based on capabilities available to the relevant commander. This will mean that
where a commander's technological capabilities exceed those of his opponent, a
higher standard in relation to precautions in attack will apply. There are, however,
those who would argue that an entirely new legal standard is now possible and that
LOAC should be amended so as to speak to the question ofcommon but differenti-
ated responsibilities.48
Common but Differentiated Responsibilities
Professor Gabriella Blum argues that by comparing LOAC to international trade
law or environmental law, parallels can be drawn between those regimes where dif-
fering standards are applied to countries that have greater means than to those who
do not. Or otherwise put:
While the equal application of the law has formally endured in [international humani-
tarian law], as in most spheres of international law, regulation has taken a different
path in some areas of international law—most notably, international environment law
("IEL") and international trade law ("ITL")—by linking obligations with capabilities.
This linkage has been accomplished in several ways: by defining obligations with refer-
ence to resources (such as ordering compliance by developed parties "to the fullest ex-
tent possible"), exempting weaker parties from compliance with certain obligations
altogether, and even ordering more powerful parties to extend material assistance to
weaker ones. Taken together, these provisions have been termed Common but Differ-
entiated Responsibilities ("CDRs") . . . ,49
Taken in the context ofnew technology, the concept ofCDRs, applied in a mini-
malist sense, would support the extant requirement under LOAC for a State who
possesses the technical capability to be obliged to consider its use as part of taking
all feasible precautions in attack. In extremis, the CDR approach might well obli-
gate States to share technology, where to do so would improve the overall level of
protection afforded to the civilian population. Of course, the phenomena, often
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characterized by new technology, of enhanced precision and distinction are moti-
vated more by military considerations than necessarily the ability to minimize inci-
dental loss, which is a welcomed spin-off. In such circumstances the obligation to
share technology as part of some form ofCDR may well prove problematic, even
counterproductive to the development of the types ofnew technology that enable
greater LOAC compliance. Nor is there a positive obligation under LOAC for
States to develop and employ new technology possessing such characteristics. 50
Therefore, CDRs that go beyond the current LOAC construct would require
either a basis in treaty or some form ofdevelopment in the customary law. Neither
would seem to be likely in the short to medium term, nor does there appear to be
any need for this. The current LOAC principle ofproportionality coupled with the
requirement to take all feasible precautions in attack would appear to be perfectly
adequate not only in recognizing the differing means available to parties to a con-
flict, but in also requiring that higher standards be observed by those parties who
can. The term "all feasible precautions" provides sufficient flexibility to address the
relative disparities in capabilities between belligerents. As such, it can adequately
accommodate the application of both extant and new technology.
To create a structure that seeks to codify a set ofCDRs in LOAC not only is un-
necessary, but would be quite impossible to achieve—impossible in the context of
being able to adequately define such CDRs under treaty law (to an extent that pro-
vides any form ofmeaningful advance on the extant LOAC) and impossible in that
State practice sufficient to point to such a development in customary law would be as
elusive as the proverbial pot ofgold at the end ofa rainbow. Which State with the rel-
evant capability is likely to conduct itself in a manner so as to create such practice?
Professor Mike Schmitt underscores this fact in his reference to the existence of
a state of normative relativism:
[A]s the technological gap widens, the precautions in attack requirements operate on
the belligerents in an increasingly disparate manner. After all, the standards are subjec-
tive, not objective; a belligerent is only required to do what is feasible, and feasibility de-
pends on the available technology. The result is normative relativism—the high tech
belligerent is held to higher standards vis-a-vis precautions in attack than its opponent.
It is, ofcourse, normative relativism by choice because States are under no legal obliga-
tion to acquire assets that will permit them to better distinguish between military ob-
jectives and the civilian population.51
Evolution of Customary Law?
Notwithstanding Schmitt's clear statement of where the current law places differ-
ing obligations on belligerents (making the CDR approach somewhat moot), the
recent International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Interpretive Guidance on
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the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian
Law (DPH Study) 52 suggests that the ICRC view of the customary law position in
relation to the use of force might in some limited manner support the premise be-
hind CDRs. At chapter IX of the DPH Study the ICRC sets out its position on the
permissible levels of force that may be used by parties to a conflict to achieve a military
objective. It argues that technology can be determinative in defining the military
necessity context within which particular levels of force are used. Indeed the DPH
Study anticipates technology playing a limiting role where it provides the capability
to achieve effect with the use of lower levels of violence.
The DPH Study is not without its critics, particularly with respect to the posi-
tion it takes in articulating the existing law in chapter IX. Much of the criticism fo-
cuses on what is perceived as a conflation of a law enforcement paradigm
governing the use of force under human rights law with the approach under
LOAC, ignoring the accepted principle of lex specialist While it is not the place of
this article to engage in a detailed debate of the DPH Study (the author would not
be as critical as some commentators of the position articulated by the ICRC in
chapter IX and finds much in the remainder ofthe study to commend it), it is con-
ceivable that the DPH Study might be used to develop arguments in support of a
CDR approach. Whether this is the intent of the DPH Study or not, there is a need
to consider the consequences ofsuch arguments on LOAC, particularly with refer-
ence to proportionality and precautions in attack. This is not a debate that impacts
purely on questions ofdistinction and therefore is ofquestionable value in forming
part of a discrete study on direct participation in hostilities.
Any consideration of the impact of new technology on LOAC standards runs
the risk ofbeing seduced by the same scenario that creates exaggerated perceptions
ofwhat new technology can deliver in terms of effect on the battlefield. Such a per-
ception drives the argument that the law has failed to keep pace with change, is
therefore redundant and requires change. However, such an approach fails to ac-
knowledge the operation ofLOAC as a flexible system in which the latest techno-
logical advances can be adequately accommodated without the need for root-and-
branch change to the law. Professor Christopher Greenwood, writing in 1998,
identified this quality as the key strength of LOAC:
The flexibility of the general principles thus makes them of broader application than
the specific provisions which are all too easily overtaken by new technology. If the
speed of change in military technology continues into the next century (as seems al-
most inevitable), that capacity to adapt is going to be ever more important. 54
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Greenwood's assertion is, of course, predicated upon the assumption that the
pace oftechnological development will make specific attempts to regulate particu-
lar developments either susceptible to redundancy, or reflective of a piecemeal at-
tempt to ban individual weapons. 55 When one couples the AP I requirement to
assess the implementation of new technology for the purposes of LOAC compli-
ance in conjunction with the extant customary law obligations to assess propor-
tionality and take all feasible precautions in attack, it is hard not to agree with
Greenwood when he states:
In this writer's opinion, it is both more probable and more desirable that the law will
develop in this evolutionaryway than by any radical change. With the law ofweaponry,
as with most of the law of armed conflict, the most important humanitarian gain
would come not from the adoption ofnew law but the effective implementation ofthe
law that we have. That should be the priority for the next century.56
If one accepts that the extant LOAC paradigm is adequate in addressing issues
arising from both the development and employment ofnew technology, then it is
right to consider whether the final part of the LOAC system—accountability—is
similarly well placed to cope. Part III will consider the changing character ofweap-
ons and whether the LOAC accountability paradigm can adequately address the is-
sues that arise from new technology.
Part III. Implicationsfor Accountability
When considering new technology and its military application, any analysis will
invariably turn to the question of accountability. While mechanization of the bat-
tlefield is neither new, nor something the international law dealing with criminal
responsibility is unaccustomed to addressing, the potential for autonomous
weapon systems to effectively remove the human, either from the loop or even on
the loop, poses challenges.
Remotely Controlled and Automated Systems
The question of accountability in the case of tele- or remotely operated vehicles is
relatively straightforward. An operator controls the device and as a consequence
the actions of that device can be attributed to that operator, or indeed to his/her
commander in the context of directing action that constitutes a breach ofLOAC or
where the commander fails to act to either prevent or punish LOAC breaches.
Similarly, even automated systems will generally be employed within either a
context that is controlled by humans, directing the vehicle to a particular task, or
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one in which humans can intervene in the event that the device were to act outside
its mission or the permitted LOAC paradigm. The premise underpinning automa-
tion is that the operation of the relevant device is capable of being accurately pre-
dicted based on the programming and commands inputted.
Barring deviant behavior, on behalf of either the computer programmer or op-
erator, it can be assumed that the vehicle will generally act within the permitted le-
gal framework. Of course malfunction can never be excluded, nor can the
consequences ofambiguity on the battlefield. However, there is generally sufficient
nexus of control or operation in the cases of both remotely operated and auto-
mated vehicles such that the international criminal law can attribute accountability
for culpable behavior in cases ofLOAC violations.
Autonomous Systems
This equation becomes much more problematic in the case of autonomous sys-
tems. The very nature of autonomous systems implies that they have an artificial
intelligence capable of analyzing information, determining a course of action
based on this analysis and then executing that response, all without the interven-
tion of a human operator. The operation ofthe autonomous device creates consid-
erable challenges for the would-be LOAC violation prosecutor in terms of
establishing the relevant nexus ofculpable behavior by a human such as to give rise
to criminal liability. The tele-operator of remotely controlled vehicles or even the
command programmer for automated equipment can both be seen as having di-
rect roles in determining the actions ofthe devices they control. They are capable of
direct responsibility, even if that control is exercised at distance—sometimes a
considerable one. 57
This cannot be said of those involved with autonomous systems. Neither the
programming nor the command data inputted to these vehicles prior to their de-
ployment on a particular operation will necessarily result in a specific outcome in
response to any given set of circumstances; this is the essence ofautonomy. Absent
the aberrant behavior of either the data or command programmers, which would
be considered in the same context as for remotely or automated vehicles, it would
be almost impossible to attribute the autonomous system's behavior directly to a
particular human. That is not to say autonomous vehicles are incapable of LOAC
breaches. Indeed, even the most ardent supporters of autonomous systems do not
argue that breaches can be completely removed, just that autonomous systems can
perform better (including more ethically) than humans. 58
The notion of accountability is of course a uniquely human one. Under any sys-
tem of law the commission of a crime (such as a breach of LOAC) should give rise
to an investigation and where sufficient evidence exists, the prosecution of the
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alleged perpetrator. What happens then when the perpetrator is incapable ofbeing
prosecuted because it is a machine? Other than reprogramming or scrapping
equipment there is little point in carrying out a futile exercise of finding the rele-
vant piece ofequipment guilty of a LOAC breach. Such a scenario offends not only
the notion ofthe rule oflaw, but also the more visceral human desire to find an in-
dividual accountable. Given this, it would appear highly unlikely that a breach of
LOAC by an autonomous system is something that would go without some degree
ofhuman accountability. Indeed there is a strong argument that States should not
be able to employ such systems and rely upon the relative impunity with which
their operations might be conducted in the event that the question of accountabil-
ity fails to be resolved.
States and Commanders in the Dock
There are, of course, two alternative means of accountability: State responsibility
under human rights mechanisms and command responsibility.
To take these in order: The extent to which States will be held responsible for
what might constitute a human rights violation that is equally one under LOAC
will depend on not only the character of the conflict concerned, 59 but also the re-
spective State obligations under international human rights law. This will produce
significantly disparate effects in terms of sanctions, e.g., in the case of States who
are parties to the European Convention on Human Rights as compared to that of
those States who have obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights alone. This is largely due to the enforcement mechanisms in place
in relation to each ofthese treaty structures. While this difference may well have an
impact on the formal aspects of enforcement (e.g., court rulings and pecuniary
awards against States in the case of the former), one cannot avoid the implications
for States that flow from judgments of courts like the European Court of Human
Rights and Inter-American Court ofHuman Rights, or bodies such as the United
Nations Human Rights Council. Such pronouncements, influencing as they do in
the age ofmass communication the court ofpublic opinion, may well have a deter-
mining effect on the preparedness of States to employ autonomous systems ahead
of the creation of any corresponding permissive environment, whether this be po-
litical or social.
Perhaps one of the unintended consequences of the development of autono-
mous weapons systems is the potential that they may have to focus greater atten-
tion on civilian leadership and military commanders at the operational or strategic
level for the actions ofautonomous systems. It is useful here to remind oneself that
the increased levels of sophistication and complexity that new technology intro-
duces to the battlefield are part of a systemic approach to leveraging technology to
291
New Technology and the Law ofArmed Conflict
achieve decisive effect. As such, any future employment of autonomous systems
must be seen in this context. It would be naive, therefore, to think of circumstances
where a commander would allow the deployment ofautonomous weapon systems
in a manner where their operation was not in accordance with his or her particular
campaign design and where the purpose behind the use of these systems would not
be to achieve consistent, predictable effect.
Given the unpalatable outcome of alleged breaches ofLOAC going unpunished,
it is far more likely that in the future the concept ofcommand responsibility under
international criminal law will be seen as an appropriate recourse for attributing
accountability for LOAC breaches by autonomous systems. The arguably lower
threshold test in terms of culpability for command responsibility contained within
the Rome Statute,60 requiring merely that a commander "should have known" of
the possibility of the alleged breach ofLOAC, places in sharp focus a commander's
potential liability. This is particularly the case in circumstances where the removal
of subordinates in the command chain results in fewer individuals who might
otherwise be accorded the substantial responsibility for LOAC breaches.
It remains to be seen whether this increased risk is a "real" one or whether it is
no different than that which exists in cases where such systems are not employed. It
is, however, a consequence that has received little, if any, attention from legal ad-
visers in armed forces. It is certainly deserving ofgreater consideration. Such atten-
tion should focus not only on the technical aspects of attributing responsibility
based on the requisite elements of offenses being satisfied, but on the broader pub-
lic policy issues associated with the possibility of military operations being
conducted in a "blameless environment."
Conclusion
In one sense, the changing characters of weapons and armed conflict, seen in the
specific context of unmanned vehicles and systems, represent nothing more than
the natural evolution oftechnology in its application to the battlefield. However, in
other respects the introduction ofnew technology creates challenges for the appli-
cation ofLOAC, ifonly in the sense that what is unusual or different is often seen as
complex and difficult.
This article posed the question of whether the changing character of weapon
systems, including unmanned systems and vehicles, is such as to question the abil-
ity of LOAC to adequately cope with the introduction of new technology to the
battlefield.
Fundamental to this question is the consideration ofnew technology in the con-
text within which it is to be employed. New technology often has a symbiotic
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relationship with the evolution of new tactics and stratagems. The capabilities it
brings to the battlefield have aided in shaping new approaches to the practice ofthe
"art ofwar." It is important to remind oneselfin this respect that the tail should not
be wagging the dog. Enhanced capability and new hardware, bewildering as they
are in the scope and reach of their effects, should be seen as means to an end, not
ends in themselves.
Just as military doctrine has demonstrated its flexibility in coping with the re-
lentless development and introduction ofnew technology, LOAC has provided
—
and will continue to provide—a framework for the regulation of armed conflict.
Calls to create new standards or to interpret the law in ways that seek to regulate the
unknown, or at least the not yet known, do not stand up against an assessment of
what LOAC provides in terms of a system of law that regulates not just the intro-
duction ofnew technology, but also its application.
Useful processes, such as those forming part of the AP I Article 36 weapons re-
view, seem purpose designed not only to act as initial control valves to ensure that
military methods and means can advance in a coherent and effective manner but
also to act as red flags to possible LOAC issues associated with the employment of
new technology. It is unfortunate that too few States engage actively in the weapons
review process, an area where greater effort to comply with the law should occur.
Generally the existing LOAC rules would seem sufficiently flexible to adapt to
the deployment of new technology on the battlefield. In many respects new tech-
nology has greatly aided the application ofLOAC and contributed to an increase in
the protection of civilians. In this sense, the story is a good news one. The extant
LOAC paradigm has responded in a flexible manner, benefiting from the positive
synergies afforded by technological advances. The virtue of such a system,
however, comes with compliance rather than the creation of new standards or
responsibilities, such as CDRs, or use of the capabilities afforded by new technol-
ogy to argue that a human rights paradigm is more appropriate. Armed conflict
continues to be an unpredictable, often base affair, where significant ambiguity
prevails, notwithstanding the employment of considerable technological capabil-
ity. The benefits afforded by new technology in such circumstances are significant
ifthey can ameliorate even some ofthe suffering caused by armed conflict, but they
are by no means a panacea.
New technology creates its own challenges in the context of accountability, par-
ticularly with respect to autonomous systems. The perverse effect for States and the
senior civilian and military command echelon who promote the development and
implementation of new technology as a means of "casualty free" warfare is that
they may well find themselves with nobody to stand between the actions of such
autonomous systems and themselves when things go wrong. It is hoped that the
293
New Technology and the Law ofArmed Conflict
associated discomfiture from this realization may well act in a positive capacity to
focus minds as to the need for such new technology, and manner in which it is
employed.
Consider the mutually assured destruction scenario, which hung over the world
during the Cold War and led to the notion that nuclear weapons should be treated
as a "special case." This was largely due to the nature of such weapons, dehu-
manizing war and giving rise to massive destruction on a wide-scale basis. Autono-
mous weapons systems as an example of the changing character of weapons may
not involve such destruction; indeed one of the consequences of their use is that it
avoids such a scenario. However, an increasing reliance upon technology clearly
has the potential to dehumanize armed conflict, creating a perception oflow or no
risk and, in doing so, possibly convincing States of the viability of the recourse to
the use of force to resolve disputes.
In the face of this, LOAC continues to offer a balanced, civilizing effect as part of
a system oflaw providing a broad regulatory framework intended to afford protec-
tion to the most vulnerable. In this context, flexibility (of course coupled with
compliance) is its greatest strength. Whether the current developments in technol-
ogy will constitute a "watershed" or defining moment in the evolution of warfare
remains to be seen. What is clear is that LOAC is capable ofkeeping pace and con-
tinuing to meet its mission of protection and humanity.
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military advantage, the objective to be selected shall be that the attack on which may be
expected to cause the least danger to civilian lives and to civilian objects.
4. In the conduct of military operations at sea or in the air, each Party to the conflict
shall, in conformity with its rights and duties under the rules of international law appli-
cable in armed conflict, take all reasonable precautions to avoid losses of civilian lives
and damage to civilian objects.
5. No provision of this article may be construed as authorizing any attacks against the
civilian population, civilians or civilian objects.
46. Michael N. Schmitt, War, Technology and the Law ofArmed Conflict, in THE LAW OF
WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 42, at 137.
47. UK LOAC Manual, supra note 2, at 85. The Manual supports this contention by stating
that in assessing whether a decisionmaker has discharged his responsibilities in terms of precau-
tions in attack, "[t]his means looking at the situation as it appeared to the individual at the time
when he made his decision." When taken in conjunction with the factors listed at page 83, which
include the weapons available, it is clear that UK State practice requires a subjective judgment on
behalfofa decisionmaker taking into account any enhanced technological advantage in weapons
he may possess. There is no obligation to use such weapons; however, the fact that they were
available will count toward whether the decisionmaker took all feasible precautions.
48. See, e.g., Blum, supra note 6.
49. Id.
50. yoram dinstein, the conduct of hostilities under the law of international
Armed Conflict 126-27 (2004).
51. Schmitt, supra note 46, at 163.
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59. Human rights law will continue to apply in times of armed conflict, subject to the appli-
cation ofthe lex specialis rule in relation to LOAC or where States have made derogations under
applicable treat:
60. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998,2187 U.X.T.S. 90. Arti-
cle 21 Res r onsibility of commanders and other superiors i provides as follows:
In addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility under this Statute for crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court
(a) A military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander shall
be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by
forces under his or her effective command and control, or effective authority and con-
trol as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over
h forces, wh i
(i) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the circum-
stances at the time, should have known that the fore jommitting or about to
commit such crimes; and
(ii) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and reasonable
measures within his or her power to present or repress their commission or to sub-
mit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.
(b) With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in paragraph
i i superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court committed by subordinates under his or her effective authority* and control, as a
result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such subordinates, where:
(i) The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information which
clearly indicated, that the subordinates were comniitting or about to commit such
crimes;
The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective responsibility
and control of the superior, and
The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or
her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the
competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.
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At the conference from which this "Blue Book" is derived, I served as the
moderator of a panel entitled "The Changing Character of Tactics: Lawfare
in Asymmetrical Conflicts." This reflects an apparent assumption: that tangible
changes have occurred in the tactics now being used by States in waging armed
conflicts of an asymmetric nature.
In offering some thoughts of my own on this subject, I turn to the pivotal
questions posed to the panel. "Is this a valid assumption? And, if so, have such
changes in tactics occurred within the context of the historically accepted norms
of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), or do these tactical modifications repre-
sent a fundamental shift in the manner in which the customary and codified
LOAC is now being both interpreted and applied to these conflicts by the interna-
tional community?"
* Colonel, US Army (Ret.); Executive Director, The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and
School, US Army. The author has prepared this article in his personal capacity and does not pur-
port to represent the views of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army or The
Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School.
The Law ofArmed Conflict in Asymmetric Urban Armed Conflict
The Goldstone Report: Has There Occurred a Fundamental Interpretive
Change in the Applicability of the Law ofArmed Conflict to Asymmetric Urban
Armed Conflict Scenarios?
There currently exists a widespread assumption that a change has occurred in the
tactics now being used by States to wage asymmetric conflicts. If this is true, do
these tactics, nevertheless, continue to reflect a traditional application ofthe LOAC
to such conflicts? Or, instead, are these tactical changes being driven, in fact, by a
substantial shift in the manner in which the international community has chosen
to interpret the application of fundamental LOAC principles to such scenarios?
The focus will be on a very specific type ofasymmetric conflict—one involving a
State on the one hand and a non-State entity on the other—and, even more specifi-
cally, asymmetric armed conflict between a State and a non-State entity in essen-
tially, if not exclusively, an urban environment. Why is the question focused so
narrowly, and why do I consider this subject to be one that has recently taken on
increasing importance?
Certainly, it is true that, for almost a decade, US and coalition forces have been
involved in ongoing and seemingly unending conflicts increasingly waged in
densely populated urban areas. Both Iraq and Afghanistan have seen extensive
fighting occur in urban settings as the US and its coalition partners have con-
fronted both State and various non-State entities in the form of the Taliban and el-
ements of al Qaeda in these theaters of operation. In this age of "persistent
conflict," the chances are great that the United States will continue to see its forces
consistently having to deal with such fighting environments. In brief, asymmetric
State/non-State urban conflicts—and, importantly, all of the LOAC issues associ-
ated with such conflicts—have been a part of the international landscape for an
extended period of time.
Given this reality, then, why is it that I now believe it to be an imperative that the
United States and other States that may well find themselves involved in these types
of conflicts fully examine the matter of whether a fundamental shift has occurred
in the manner in which some of the most well established principles of the LOAC
will be applied to an armed force's future use of force against a non-State entity in
an urban setting? Again, why now?
The answer to this question resides in the form of something called the Gold-
stone Report. 1 Many are familiar with this report. It would appear, however, that
little consideration has been given to its contents in the context of the matter at
hand—its potentially adverse impact on the future applicability ofthe LOAC to the
types of conflict in issue.
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The Goldstone Report, issued in September 2009, is the product of the United
Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, established, interestingly
enough, by the President ofthe UN Human Rights Council in April 2009. Its man-
date was "to investigate all violations of international human rights law and inter-
national humanitarian law that might have been committed at any time in the
context of the military operations that were conducted in Gaza during the period
[between] December 27, 2008 and January 18, 2009, whether before, during or
after." 2 The military operations being referenced were, of course, those of the Israeli
Defence Force's (IDF's) Operation Cast Lead, taken primarily in response to mor-
tar and rocket attacks launched against Israel by the Palestinian organization
Hamas from within Gaza (some 12,000 attacks in the previous eight years). 3
The four-member Goldstone mission was headed by Justice Richard Goldstone,
a former judge ofthe Constitutional Court ofSouth Africa and former president of
the international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The
other three appointed members were a professor of international law at the Lon-
don School ofEconomics and Political Science, an advocate of the Supreme Court
of Pakistan, and a former officer in Ireland's Defence Forces.4
From the very outset of its work, the mission stated that it would interpret its
mandate as requiring that it place the civilian population of the region at the center
of its concerns regarding violations of international law, 5 an interpretive decision
that was to prove to be of no small consequence, particularly from the standpoint
of the appropriate applicability of LOAC. Also key to the mission's approach was
its determination that, in keeping with its mandate, it was required to consider any
action that might be deemed a violation of either international human rights law or
international humanitarian law6 (a popularized, but duplicative and misleading
term said to incorporate both the customary and codified LOAC).
This latter determination is a matter of particular concern, as it serves to assert
the historically controversial, and, I would submit, erroneous, contention that hu-
man rights law applies coequally with the LOAC during periods ofarmed conflict.
That is, the assertion is that the LOAC is not lex specialis—that it is not that body of
law that exclusively regulates the methods and means of conducting conflict. In-
deed, a number of the mission's allegations of offenses said to have been commit-
ted by the IDF are based exclusively on presumed violations ofhuman rights law
—
not the LOAC.
If left unchallenged, this particular contention alone would represent a substan-
tial shift in the potential legal obligations and responsibilities ofcombatants on any
battlefield and in any form of conflict, and could portend, as well, a significant en-
hancement of the potential criminal liability of such individuals. They could now
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be charged with largely undefined "human rights" violations, rather than viola-
tions of the well-established customary or codified LOAC.
Setting aside this particular issue, this attempt to conflate the LOAC with human
rights law, let me turn, in more detail, to an examination of the manner in which
the mission chose to apply some of the most basic provisions of the LOAC, itself.
And, with an apology to those who are fully conversant with this body of law, in
order to assess the mission's "unique" application of this law to the conflict in
Gaza, it is useful to review what have been long regarded as universally recognized
LOAC principles/precepts binding on every State in the international community.
These are:
1. "Military necessity (advantage)." This principle authorizes those use-of-
force measures, not otherwise forbidden by the LOAC, required to ac-
complish a mission. The important caveat, here, of course, is that this
principle must be applied in conjunction with the other customary
LOAC principles, as well as with more specific constraints contained in
the codified LOAC.
2. "Distinction/discrimination." This principle requires that combatants
be distinguished from non-combatants and that military objectives be
distinguished from protected property and protected places—that is,
civilian property and protected places such as cultural, medical and reli-
gious sites.
3. "Proportionality." This principle serves as a balancing fulcrum, weighing
the competing principles of "military necessity" and "distinction" when
making a targeting decision. The proportionality test
—
"the anticipated
loss of life and damage to property incidental to an attack must not be
excessive in relation to the 'concrete' and 'direct' military advantage 'ex-
pected' to be gained" 7—introduces the idea of a "reasonable com-
mander" making proportionality determinations, and is akin to the
"reasonable man" test. That is, would a "reasonable commander," i.e., a
commander of ordinary sense and understanding, given the facts known
to him at the time, have been justified in taking the action in issue?
4. "Unnecessary suffering." The last of the four basic customary LOAC
principles requires an armed force to minimize "unnecessary suffering."
In essence, this applies to the legality of the types ofweapon systems and
ammunition used, as well as to the legality ofthe methods used to employ
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such weapons and ammunition. Certain weapons/munitions are per se
unlawful—projectiles filled with glass, lasers specifically designed to
permanently blind unenhanced vision and hollow-point ammunition.
For purposes of this discussion, it is also important to recall that, as
noted, even lawful weapon systems can be used in an unlawful manner.
That is, the use of a weapon must comport with the lawful "methods" of
conducting conflict. 8
One last point must be considered before moving to an examination of the
manner in which these most fundamental principles of the LOAC were applied by
the Goldstone mission to Operation Cast Lead. To what types of armed conflict
does the LOAC apply? The answer to this question is found in Common Articles 2
and 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 9
Article 2 defines international armed conflicts as "all cases of declared war or
any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Con-
tracting Parties [to this Convention], even if the state of war is not recognized by
one of them"—that is, State-on-State conflict.
Article 3 applies the LOAC to conflicts not ofan international character, defined
as conflicts "not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of
the High Contracting Parties [to this Convention] ." That is, they are "internal con-
flicts"—revolutions, rebellions, insurrections—occurring within the territorial
boundaries ofa State, ones involving a non-State entity (insurgents) attempting to
displace the constituted government of a State by force.
With this as background, let's examine just several examples of the manner in
which the Goldstone mission applied the LOAC to actions taken primarily by the
IDF in Gaza. The purpose, here, will be to assess whether the mission's determina-
tions—and concomitant allegations of LOAC violations—do, in fact, evidence
both a departure from the way in which the most basic principles of this law have
historically been interpreted and a fundamental shift in the manner in which such
principles will be applied in the future, particularly in the context of asymmetric
State/non-State urban conflict. Also ofimportance is the consideration ofwhether
these allegations represent, either implicitly or explicitly, a move toward poten-
tially enhanced criminal liability for State participants in such conflicts and
whether in turn this has effected—or is effecting—a change in the tactics used to
wage these types of conflicts.
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IDF Attacks against Hamas "Government" Buildings and Gazan Authorities,
Specifically the Gazan Police
The government of Israel (GOI) has contended that the buildings targeted were an
integral part of the Hamas "terrorist infrastructure" in that they housed those ele-
ments of Hamas engaged in directing the ongoing armed attacks against Israel and
that the Gazan police were merely an arm of the Hamas military forces. 10 In con-
trast, the Goldstone mission determined that the buildings in issue were not used
in a manner that made an "effective" contribution to military action and that,
accordingly, IDF attacks on these buildings constituted a deliberate attack on
civilian objects in violation of the customary rule of the LOAC that requires
that attacks be limited strictly to military objectives. It further concluded that
such attacks had resulted in a "grave breach"—the extensive destruction of civil-
ian property not justified by military necessity carried out both unlawfully and
wantonly—of the LOAC. 11
With respect to the IDF attacks on Gazan police personnel, the Goldstone
mission determined that, while there may have been certain elements of the
Gazan police who were also members ofHamas armed groups and accordingly po-
tential combatants, when attacked these police personnel were not taking a "direct
part in hostilities" and thus had not lost their civilian immunity from direct attack.
The mission further concluded that the IDF attacks on the police facilities failed to
strike an acceptable balance between the direct military advantage expected to be
gained, that is, the killing of those policemen who may, in fact, have been members
ofHamas military groups; and the loss of civilian life, that is, those other policemen
who may not have been members of such military groups, as well as members of
the public who may simply have been in the vicinity of such attacks. 12
Even a cursory assessment of the Goldstone mission's stated reasoning regard-
ing this matter reveals what appears to be both a misinterpretation and misapplica-
tion of the LOAC principles of military necessity, distinction and proportionality.
The same can also be said of the manner in which the mission chose to apply the
concept of "direct participation in hostilities" to Hamas police personnel who, by
their status alone, could arguably have been targeted as combatants. Thus, to deem
the IDF operational decisions in question as a "deliberate attack on civilian ob-
jects" and a "grave breach" of the LOAC reflects a deliberate intent on the part of
the mission to proffer an interpretation of these LOAC concepts that departs sig-
nificantly from their historical application. Left unchallenged, the mission's find-
ings would potentially constitute a fundamental shift in the way in which these
most basic ofLOAC principles will be applied in the future to all forms of conflict.
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The Obligation of the IDF to Take Feasible Precautions to Protect Both the
Civilian Population and Civilian Objects in Gaza
In the context of this issue, the mission focused specifically on the obligation of
the IDF to provide "effective" prior warnings of its attacks undertaken in Gaza.
While the mission acknowledged that significant efforts had been made by the IDF
to issue such warnings—radio broadcasts, the dropping of over 2,500,000 leaflets
and the making of over 165,000 phone calls to specific buildings that were to be
targeted 13—it concluded that this was not enough. In the view of the mission, such
warnings were simply not effective because some of both the prerecorded phone
messages and leaflets lacked the required specificity14 (absent a discussion ofwhat
such specificity might entail). And, in examining the IDF practice of firing
warning shots from light weapons that hit the rooftops of designated targets in
which civilians previously had been warned of an impending attack—as a final
warning—it concluded that this, too, not only did not serve as an "effective"
warning, but, instead, constituted an attack against civilians who chose to remain
in the targeted buildings. 15
Once again, the mission's interpretation of the actions that must be taken to
provide an "effective" warning to civilians of an impending attack flies in the face
ofthe codified LOAC. Such warnings can be only general in nature. There is no re-
quirement that they be specific as to the time and location of an attack. 16 The mea-
sures taken by the IDF in issuing warnings to the civilian population within Gaza
went far beyond anything legally required. The mission's reasoning on this matter
reflects an ignorance—or intentional misstatement—of the applicable law.
Attacks by the IDF Resulting in Loss of Life and Injury to Civilians
The mission examined multiple incidents involving IDF actions that resulted in
civilian casualties and civilian property loss. It prefaced its legal conclusions with
the recognition that, for all armies, decisions involving the concept of "propor-
tionality"—weighing the military advantage to be gained against the risk of civil-
ian casualties—would present genuine dilemmas. Having noted this, however, it
concluded that, in applying these customary LOAC principles to every IDF action
assessed, each IDF use offeree, regardless ofany mitigating circumstances or oper-
ational considerations that may have been involved, had been indiscriminate in
nature and, in multiple cases, a deliberate, intentional attack on the civilian popu-
lation and civilian infrastructure. As such, the mission contended, these attacks vi-
olated the LOAC; some were grave breaches ofthe Fourth Geneva Convention (the
1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War); and, in certain cases, they also constituted a violation ofthe right to life ofthe
Palestinian civilians killed—that is, they were a violation of human rights law. 17
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The GOI has challenged these mission findings, setting forth, in detail, the opera-
tional considerations that were at play at the time of the incidents in issue, and as-
sessing the actions of the IDF, in each instance, in the context of both codified and
customary LOAC principles. 18
A review of the information provided by the GOI would lead to the conclusion
that, while individual IDF commanders might be second-guessed regarding certain
targeting and weapon decisions made during the course ofan ongoing operation
—
and some IDF mistakes were made, and acknowledged—an objective LOAC
analysis of the events in issue would not result in a finding that the IDF engaged in
deliberate and indiscriminate attacks against the civilian population of Gaza. In
view ofthe information available to the Goldstone mission, its allegations ofwillful
killings of protected persons by IDF personnel, giving rise to individual criminal
responsibility, reflect a complete misinterpretation or intentional distortion of the
applicable LOAC norms.
The IDF's Use of Certain Weapons
The Goldstone mission, while noting that white phosphorus 19 is not proscribed
under the LOAC, made the determination that the IDF was "systematically reck-
less" in using this substance in densely populated, built-up areas. Accordingly, it
concluded that serious consideration should be given by the international commu-
nity to banning its use in such settings.
The mission also focused on the IDF's use of flechettes: thousands ofvery deadly
darts generally contained in tank shells. When a shell is fired, and detonates, these
darts are sprayed over a three-hundred-by-one-hundred-meter area. Given the
nomenclature of this munition, the mission opined that flechettes are an area
weapon of an indiscriminate nature, and were, therefore, particularly unsuitable
for use in urban locations where civilians are present. 20
These mission statements are noted in order to alert those government repre-
sentatives who deal with such matters ofthe fact that the mission has essentially de-
clared the use of flechettes in certain operational settings as illegal per se. The
"appropriate" use of such munitions may thus well appear on a forthcoming
agenda of the International Committee of the Red Cross.
In choosing to apply the LOAC, as well as human rights law, in the manner
noted above, to IDF actions taken in Operation Cast Lead, the mission concluded
that the IDF had committed over thirty violations of these legal regimes, to include
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and that, most significantly, in doing
so, the IDF had intentionally targeted both the Gazan civilian population and in-
frastructure. Given its findings, the mission demanded that the GOI investigate, try
and punish those individuals found to be responsible for the commission of the
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offenses that it had documented. This is in keeping with the concept of
"complementarity," the right of a State to investigate and, if necessary, punish
members of its armed forces who have engaged in violations of the LOAC. How-
ever, of particular importance, the mission further recommended that, should the
GOI be unable or unwilling to take these actions, these offenses should then be re-
ferred to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and/or made subject to the exer-
cise of universal jurisdiction. 21
The mission then immediately proceeded to provide its own answer to the mat-
ter of whether the GOI was, in fact, willing or able to undertake the investigatory
and potential prosecutorial actions the commission deemed necessary. It made the
following determination:
International human rights law and humanitarian law require states to investigate and,
if appropriate, prosecute allegations of serious violations by military personnel. Inter-
national law has also established that such investigations should comply with standards
of impartiality, independence, promptness, and effectiveness. The mission holds that
the Israeli system of investigation does not comply with all of these principles.22
The mission also concluded that
there are serious doubts about the willingness ofIsrael to carry out a genuine investiga-
tion in an impartial, independent, prompt, and effective way. The mission is also ofthe
view that the Israeli system overall presents inherently discriminatory features that
make the pursuit of justice for Palestinian victims very difficult.23
In essence, then, the mission adjudged the GOI's application of the concept of
complementarity in this particular situation and found it lacking. Such a conclu-
sion would appear to serve as a unilateral mission determination that it was a fore-
gone conclusion that its allegations of GOI violations of both the LOAC and
human rights law would be submitted to the ICC and the exercise of universal
jurisdiction.
In making such a determination, the mission evidences either an apparent fail-
ure to understand fully the requirements ofcomplementarity or a decision to apply
these requirements in such a way that even the world's most developed military in-
vestigatory and prosecutorial systems could not meet the standards imposed. 24 Re-
gardless of its motives, the mission's cursory dismissal ofGOI efforts to investigate
and prosecute alleged LOAC violations occurring in the context of Operation Cast
Lead as inadequate does not serve as an authoritative interpretation of the
complementarity concept.
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Largely unnoticed, but of substantive importance to those States which consis-
tently engage in the types of conflicts in issue, is the fact that, since the issuance of
the Goldstone Report, its contents have been endorsed in both a February 2010 UN
Human Rights Council report of a special rapporteur on the "human rights situa-
tion in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories"25 and most recently on
April 14 in a UN Human Rights Council resolution dealing specifically with the
report. Very significantly, the resolution called upon the General Assembly "to
promote an urgent discussion on the future legality of the uses of certain muni-
tions as referred to in the report of the United Nations Independent International
Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, drawing, inter alia, upon the expertise
of the International Committee of the Red Cross." 26 These UN endorsements of
such flawed legal analysis are indeed daunting.
Conclusion
In closing, and in an attempt to formulate a basis for what I believe to be a necessary
discussion concerning whether the Goldstone Report reflects a fundamental shift
in the manner in which some of the most basic principles of the LOAC will be ap-
plied to future asymmetric State/non-State urban armed conflict, I pose the follow-
ing questions:
1. Does the manner in which these types of conflicts are characterized dic-
tate the extent to which the LOAC applies to such military operations? In
the case of Operation Cast Lead, the conflict was unique in nature. It can
be argued that it was neither a Common Article 2 nor a Common Arti-
cle 3 conflict; that is, it was neither international nor internal in nature.
Yet, clearly, it was the view of the Goldstone mission—as well as the in-
ternational community as a whole—that certain aspects of the LOAC
dictated the conduct of the parties involved. Are the findings of the mis-
sion, then, to be applied in the future to all forms of conflict in which op-
erations are conducted in an urban environment, e.g., US assaults on
Taliban urban strongholds in Afghanistan? If not, in what manner are
the specific aspects of the LOAC—both codified and customary—to be
applied to asymmetric State/non-State urban conflict?
2. Does the Goldstone Report reflect a consensus within the international
community that the LOAC is no longer the exclusive legal regime that
controls the means and methods ofwaging conflict—that is, that certain
aspects of human rights law now play a coequal role?
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3. In view ofthe Goldstone Report, has an identifiable shift occurred in the
manner in which basic LOAC principles are now to be applied to target-
ing decisions made in the context of urban conflict? That is, when bal-
anced on the fulcrum of "proportionality," does the principle of
"discrimination/distinction"—the protection of the civilian population
and civilian property—now disproportionately outweigh the principle
of "military advantage/necessity"?
4. Are there lawful weapon systems (white phosphorus, flechettes and clus-
ter bomb units) that are, nevertheless, so indiscriminate in nature that,
for the protection of the civilian population and civilian property, they
should be barred from use in urban conflict?
5. And, as an associated question: in view of a perhaps evolving perceived
need to give added weight to the protection of the civilian populace and
civilian property in urban conflict, should a State that possesses precision
weapons and munitions be required to use such?
6. The issue of "dual targeting"; that is, to what extent might a State target
non-State entity personnel and facilities used by such personnel when
they may serve both civilian and military purposes? In Gaza, for example,
this would include the Gazan police, their facilities and the facilities of
the Hamas leadership.
7. This issue, in turn, raises the exceptionally controversial matter of the
criteria to be used in determining whether an individual associated with
a non-State entity is "directly" participating in hostilities—and thus sub-
ject to being targeted.
8. The extent to, and the manner in, which a State must issue a warning to
an urban civilian population at large, or to individual civilians, of a pend-
ing attack on a general area or a specific facility?
9. What are the LOAC obligations of a non-State actor, if any? How might
the international community hold a non-State actor responsible for both
compliance with, and violations of, these obligations?
1 0. How does a State cope with the intentional use ofthe civilian population,
civilian property and protected places by a non-State entity for the pur-
pose of gaining a military advantage?
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1 1
.
What is the status to be accorded non-State combatants seized in the
course of a State/non-State conflict? For what offenses might they be tried
and in what type ofjudicial forum? All ofthese issues are, ofcourse, related
to any form ofconflict in which "unlawful combatants" might participate.
1 2. And, finally, the Goldstone mission concluded that the GOI had failed to
meet the international law standards required for a lawful exercise of the
principle of complementarity, that right of a State to try members of its
military forces for alleged violations of the LOAC. How is an assessment
as to whether a State has met the requirements of complementarity to be
made? And what body—or bodies—are empowered to make such a judg-
ment, and a concomitant decision/recommendation that the alleged
LOAC violations in issue be referred to the ICC or subjected to the exer-
cise of universal jurisdiction?
As noted, these questions go to the central issue ofwhether the Goldstone Report
evidences a growing consensus within the international community that there has
occurred a fundamental shift in the manner in which some of the most basic princi-
ples of the LOAC—and, the mission would contend, human rights law as well
—
should be applied to asymmetric State/non-State urban conflict. And, ifapplicable to
this form of conflict, why not to every form of conflict waged in an urban environ-
ment? Moreover, if this is, in fact, the case, does this change portend an enhanced
risk of potential criminal liability for the members of a State's armed forces who are
called upon to make critical decisions in the midst of battle?
Commentators may soon begin to contend that the Goldstone Report currently
"occupies the field" with regard to these issues. For those who would differ with
this assessment, I would submit that the time has come for an informed discussion
and a clear statement of disagreement with the Goldstone mission's interpretation
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A principal strategic tactic ofthe Taliban . . . is eitherprovoking or exploiting
civilian casualties.
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates 1
I. Introduction
Although he does not use the term "lawfare," Secretary Gates' observation
reflects what is in reality one of the most common iterations of lawfare in
today's conflicts. Specifically, the Taliban are aiming to achieve a particular military
effect, that is, the neutralization of US and allied technical superiority, especially
with respect to airpower. To do so they are, as Secretary Gates indicates, creating
the perception of violations of one of the fundamental norms of the law of armed
conflict (LOAC), that is, the distinction between combatants and civilians.
While "provoking or exploiting civilian casualties" is clearly a type of lawfare, it
is by no means its only form. Although the definition has evolved somewhat since
its modern interpretation was introduced in 200 1, 2 today I define it as "the strategy
of using—or misusing—law as a substitute for traditional military means to
achieve a warfighting objective." 3
As such, it is ideologically neutral, that is, it is best conceptualized much as a
weapon that can be wielded by either side in a belligerency. In fact, many uses of
legal "weapons" and methodologies avoid the need to resort to physical violence
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and other more deadly means. This is one reason, for example, that the United
States and other nations seek to use sanctions before resorting to the use of force
whenever possible.
Another illustration would be the use of a contract "weapon" during the early
part of Operation Enduring Freedom to purchase commercially available satellite
imagery of Afghanistan. 4 This approach was equally or, perhaps, more effective than
other more traditional military means might have been in ensuring the imagery did
not fall into hostile hands. Additionally, most experts consider the re-establishment
of the rule oflaw as an indispensable element ofcounterinsurgency (COIN) strategy.
Finally, few debate that the use of legal processes to deconstruct terrorist financing
is an extraordinarily important part of countering violent extremists.
In short, there are many uses ofwhat might be called "lawfare" that serve to re-
duce the destructiveness of conflicts, and therefore further one ofthe fundamental
purposes of the law of war. All of that said, others have given the concept a rather
different meaning. Some couch it in terms ofwhat is alleged to be the "growing use
of international law claims, usually factually or legally meritless, as a tool of war." 5
Similarly, the privately run Lawfare Project openly acknowledges it concentrates
"on the negative manipulation of international and national human rights laws"
for purposes, it asserts, that are "other than, or contrary to, that for which those
laws were originally enacted."6
Some go even further. In 2007 respected lawyer-writer Scott Horton expressed
concern that unnamed "lawfare theorists" purportedly consider that attorneys
who aggressively use the courts in the representation of Guantanamo detainees
and other terrorism-related matters "might as well be terrorists themselves."7
More recently, much discussion of lawfare has centered on legal maneuvering as-
sociated with the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation. For example, some individuals
and organizations see lawfare as "the latest manifestation in the sixty-year cam-
paign to isolate the State of Israel." 8
In any event, these sometimes hyperbolic permutations on lawfare theories are
not that espoused by this article. Among other things, it is certainly not the view of
this writer that any party legitimately using the courts is doing anything improper.
Instead, this brief article will focus more narrowly on the role of law in contempo-
rary conflicts, principally that in Afghanistan.
It is true, as Secretary Gates' comment suggests, that lawfare in the Afghan
context has typically taken the form of the manipulation of civilian casualties to
make it appear that US and allied forces have somehow violated legal or ethical
norms. Thus, it could be said that lawfare itself is an asymmetrical form of war-
fare, one that is value-based and that seeks to outflank, so to speak, conventional
military means.
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Regardless, from this writer's perspective, the use of the term "lawfare" was al-
ways intended as a means of encapsulating for non-lawyer, military audiences the
meaning oflaw in today's war. It was not intended to fit neatly into some political
science construct. Rather, the sobriquet of "lawfare" was meant to impress upon
military audiences and other non-lawyers that law is more than just a legal and
moral imperative; it is a practical and pragmatic imperative intimately associated
with mission success. In that respect, the growth of the term seems to have had
some positive results.
II. Lawfare Today: Airpower and Civilian Casualties
Perhaps no aspect ofwhat this writer would characterize as lawfare is more promi-
nent than the restrictive rules of engagement imposed upon allied forces in Af-
ghanistan in an effort to win "hearts and minds" by limiting civilian casualties.
These restrictions go far beyond what LOAC requires, and are a classic example of
efforts to "improve upon" LOAC via policymaking that insufficiently appreciates
unintended consequences that can have, at the end of the day, decidedly counter-
productive results. As a noncommissioned officer explained to columnist George
Will in June of 2010, the rules of engagement in Afghanistan are "too prohibitive
for coalition forces to achieve sustained tactical success." 9 And other troops fight-
ing there have raised similar concerns.
Airpower in particular has been cast—wrongly in my view—as a villain with re-
spect to the civilian casualty issue. The Army and Marine Corps' COIN Field Man-
ual (FM) 3-24, 10 for example, discourages the use of the air weapon by claiming
that "[b]ombing, even with the most precise weapons, can cause unintended civil-
ian casualties." 11 Of course, any weapon "can" cause civilian casualties, 12 so it is not
clear why air-delivered munitions should be singled out for "exceptional care," as
FM 3-24 demands.
More important, the data show that ground operations can be vastly more dan-
gerous to civilians than airstrikes. A study by the New England Journal ofMedicine
found that fewer than 5 percent of civilian casualties in Iraq during the 2003-8 time
frame were the result of airstrikes. 13 Regarding Afghanistan, a 2008 Human Rights
Watch study of airstrikes found that it was the presence of troops on the ground
that created the most risk to civilians, as the "vast majority of known civilian
deaths" came from airstrikes called in by ground forces under insurgent attack. 14
Even more recently, a National Bureau ofEconomic Research study found that
only 6 percent of the civilian deaths attributed to International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) were the result of airstrikes. In fact, traffic accidents with ISAF vehicles
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were two and a half times more likely to be the cause of the deaths of Afghan
women and children than were airstrikes.
Nevertheless, ground commanders have insisted that civilian deaths could be
curtailed with more troops. Army Brigadier General Michael Tucker suggested as
much when he told USA Today in late 2008 that "[i]f we got more boots on the
ground, we would not have to rely as much on [airstrikes]." 15 Unsurprisingly,
therefore, when General Stanley McChrystal assumed command in Afghanistan in
June of 2009, he immediately issued orders that significantly restricted the use of the
air weapon, 16 and shortly thereafter called for a "surge" of mainly ground forces. 17
It should be said that even before General McChrystaPs orders the coalition's
ability to use the air weapon was complicated by NATO's own public pro-
nouncements that distorted the understanding of the law ofwar, with tragic con-
sequences. 18 Specifically, in June of2007 NATO declared that its forces "would not
fire on positions if it knew there were civilians nearby." 19 A year later its statement
was even more egregious, when a NATO spokesman preened that "[i]f there is the
likelihood of even one civilian casualty, we will not strike, not even if we think
Osama bin Laden is down there."20
This statement was not only insensitive to Americans cognizant ofthe horror of
the bin Laden-inspired 9/11 attacks; it also works counter to the basic purposes of
LOAC. Of course, zero casualties are not what LOAC requires; rather, it only de-
mands that they not be excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated.
The law is this way for good reason: if "zero casualties" were the standard, it would
invite adversaries to keep themselves in the company of civilians to create a sanctu-
ary from attack. The Taliban heard NATO's invitation and did exactly that. 21
In any event, ifthe intent ofthe June 2009 airpower restrictions was to save civil-
ian lives, it did not succeed. Although civilian deaths from the actions of NATO
forces did decline,22 overall civilian deaths in Afghanistan nevertheless reached an
all-time high in 2009. 23 And civilian deaths soared 31 percent in 2010 over 2009's
record-breaking figures. I would suggest that an obvious (albeit unintended) result
of forgoing opportunities to kill extremists via airstrikes is that they live another
day to kill more innocents.24
This may be why the UN reported on June 19, 2010—about a year after General
McChrystal's order—that security in Afghanistan has "deteriorated markedly" in
recent months.25 Moreover, in terms of"winning hearts and minds," analyst Lara M.
Dadkhah raises the interesting point worth pondering in a February 2010 New
York Times op-ed that the "premise that dead civilians are harmful to the conduct
of the war [is mistaken, as] no past war has ever supplied compelling proof of that
claim."26 That is proving to be the case in Afghanistan.
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To his credit, General McChrystal did admit in December 2009 that there was
"much about Afghanistan that [he] did not fully understand."27 In that respect, his
assumption that seems to underlie his order—that civilian deaths inevitably work
against the perpetrators' cause—may be one of the things he did not correctly un-
derstand. For example, Ben Arnoldy of the Christian Science Monitor reports that
the Taliban—not NATO forces—were responsible for the majority of civilian
deaths in 2009. 28 Even though those deaths reflect a 41 percent increase over 2008,
Arnoldy says that "there is little indication these Taliban indiscretions have back-
fired on the movement so far."29
Consider as well the Afghan reaction in September of 2009 when General
McChrystal sought to apologize for the bombing of a hijacked oil tanker near
Kunduz that allegedly killed seventy-two Afghans. The Washington Post reports
that when General McChrystal began to apologize, a local "council chairman,
Ahmadullah Wardak, cut him off' with demands for a tougher approach.30
"McChrystal," the Post recounts, "seemed to be caught off guard [by Wardak' s re-
proof]" as Wardak asserted that the allies have been "too nice to the thugs." 31
Jeremy Shapiro, a Brookings Institution scholar who served on a civilian assess-
ment team for General McChrystal, analyzes Wardak's remarks as saying that ifthe
coalition is going to be a genuine provider of security for the people, that means:
"
[Y] ou'll do what is necessary to establish control, and the very attention that the
coalition pays to civilian casualties actually creates the impression among many Af-
ghans that [coalition forces] in fact are not interested in establishing control and
not interested in being the provider of security."32 Shapiro concedes that the
Afghan government has "highlighted" the civilian casualty issue but argues that it
is doing so "because it serves to demonstrate [its] independence from the coalition
and gives [it] leverage with the coalition." 33 To his surprise, Shapiro says, local of-
ficials in his experience "tend actually not to be too concerned" with the civilian
casualties.34 In short, he concludes that while the civilian casualty issue "clearly
resonates very strongly [in the United States] and in Europe ... [it is] not clear
that Afghans actually see this as a key issue."35
A Gallup poll released in February 2010 provides further data as to Afghan per-
ceptions. Although the question of airstrikes was not directly addressed, it did
show that beginning in June of 2009 (coinciding with the new restrictions on
airpower) through the end of the survey period in late 2009, Afghans' approval of
US leadership in Afghanistan declined, as did their support for additional troops.36
Obviously, the restrictions on airpower did not have the hoped-for "hearts and
minds" effect. Further complicating the issue is the fact that, like those of Afghan
civilians, coalition casualties also reached an all-time high in 2009. 37 And these dis-
turbing casualty trends are continuing into 2010; by the end of September the
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number of coalition casualties exceeded the record-breaking high of 2009. 38 Thus,
however well-intentioned the airpower restrictions may have been, evidence of
their efficacy is not apparent.
The deleterious effect on operations is unmistakable, as the deteriorating secu-
rity situation noted in the UN report above attests.39 At one time Taliban fighters
cowered at American airpower.40 Today, however, the Air Force Times reports that
because of the new directive, the Taliban "no longer run and hide when they see a
fighter jet overhead."41 The Times quotes an Air Force pilot as expressing frustra-
tion "when you can see them shooting at our guys" and are obliged not to attack.42
The pilot laments that the enemy knows that "we are not allowed to engage in cer-
tain situations."43
At the same time airpower technology continues to develop even more discrete
and effective ways to hunt the terrorists without the need to put thousands of
young Americans in harm's way. According to the Washington Post, "a new genera-
tion of small but highly accurate missiles" designed to limit collateral damage is be-
ing fielded for employment on remotely manned vehicles. 44 Such technology, the
Post reports, along with better intelligence, has caused the "clamor over [drone]
strikes [to have] died down considerably over the last year."45
While airpower alone is not
—
and can never be—the whole solution to today's
wars, rethinking it in the context of what today's technology can provide might
produce opportunities to fulfill the President's intent of protecting Americans
against terrorist attack in a less resource-demanding way,46 and at the same time
serve the interests of international humanitarian law's effort to ameliorate the hor-
ror of war, and especially its impact on innocent civilians.
III. Lawfare Tomorrow: The Emerging Issues
The increasing controversy concerning "drones," or, more accurately, remotely pi-
loted vehicles (RPVs), is raising some interesting legal and policy issues with
lawfare implications. By all reports, these weapon systems are extremely effective,
particularly in eroding enemy leadership cadres. Yet a variety of objections have
been offered as to their use.
Some of the attacks border on the absurd, and are reminiscent of medieval legal
debates. For example, in A.D. 1139 Pope Innocent II and the Second Lateran
Council condemned the missile warfare that was devastating Europe's knighted ar-
istocracy by calling slingers and archers "dastards" that are practicing a "deadly
and God-detested art" with their stones and arrows.47 Fast-forward to 2009, and
we find former Australian Army officer David Kilcullen condemning the missile
warfare that is devastating the terrorist aristocracy of the Taliban and Al Qaeda by
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telling Congress to "call offthe drones" in part because the militants view aerial at-
tacks as "cowardly and weak."48
It is not clear why anyone should be concerned about the sensibilities ofTaliban
and Al Qaeda militants. Although Kilcullen and others seem to view the militants
as courageous fighters seeking man-to-man fights, their use of indiscriminate im-
provised explosive devices—which grew 94 percent over the past year49—plainly
shows that they embrace remotely operated systems (albeit on the ground and not
in the air). In addition, reports indicate that the Taliban are not only intermingling
with civilians in the hopes ofbeing shielded; media reports also say they are engag-
ing in the vile practice of buying children to use as suicide bombers.50
Almost as problematic as the "cowardly" objections to advanced warfighting
systems is the emergence of the "targeted killings" debate. This has become some-
thing ofa cottage industry within the human rights establishment. Many commen-
tators seem to be frantically searching for ways to find the use ofthe highly effective
RPVs somehow improper. A good example is the recent report ofthe UN's Special
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions. 51
One ofthe most disappointing aspects ofthe report was the allegation that RPV
operators might adopt a "Playstation mentality." This wholly speculative and un-
proven allegation questioning the professionalism ofRPV operators is but one il-
lustration of the report's deficiencies. Moreover, the illogical suggestion that
military or intelligence professionals would prefer to kill a terrorist as opposed to
capturing and interrogating him is yet another indication of the report's flaws.
Yet there are issues associated with RPVs. For example, in a recent issue of
Armed Forces Journal, Peter Singer of the Brookings Institution raises issues about
the status of RPV operators by questioning the propriety of the operation of the
aircraft by other than military personnel. 52 Perhaps as interesting—or more so—is
the question of fully autonomous RPVs or other weapon systems.
As a practical matter, the current generation of RPVs generally requires a very
permissive air environment to survive. To use the systems in contested airspace
presents a variety of daunting technical challenges that must be overcome, not the
least ofwhich is the maintenance ofcontinuous contact between the vehicle and its
distant operator. Many experts believe that in the future the vehicle would have to
operate autonomously, at least part of the time.
The world has not, however, been receptive to autonomous weapons systems.
Exhibit "A" would be the near-universal ban on landmines we have today. When
one examines the history of the ban, it becomes clear that emotional arguments
predominated as opposed to tempered, rational discussions of how the weapons
might be used in ways that actually reduce the destructiveness of war. Regardless,
the experience of the landmine campaign may be something of a portent for
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policymakers to consider, as science will inevitably provide the opportunity for the
development of a whole family of partly or even fully autonomous weapons sys-
tems for use in air, land, sea and cyber domains.
IV. Concluding Observations
Any discussion oflawfare seems to invite conclusions that "the law" is somehow an
impediment to successfully warfighting, especially in an era of irregular warfare
waged by non-State actors. 53 It is true, as mentioned earlier in this article, that there
certainly will always be those who will abuse the law for perverse purposes. That
should not, however, suggest abandoning the law. Consider the thoughtful obser-
vations of Lawrence Siskind in response to the "lawfare" strategies of Hamas lev-
eled at Israel:
When al-Qaeda terrorists used jet planes as weapons to crash into skyscrapers in 2001,
the West did not abandon its airports and office buildings. Instead, it found ways to
cope with danger without making fundamental changes to its business life. The fact
that Hamas terrorists are cynically using another Western institution, the rule oflaw, as
a weapon today does not mean that Western nations should abandon it. Instead, they
must learn to adjust and cope. 54
In the twenty-first century we should expect to see further developments of
lawfare. We may not like all of its iterations, but we should never forget that legal
battles are always preferable to real battles, and modern democracies are well-
suited to wage—and win—legal "wars."
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The Age of Lawfare
Dale Stephens*
We are currently living in the age of lawfare; perhaps we always have been.
The term, in its relationship to armed conflict, was most recently popu-
larized by Major General Charles Dunlap ofthe US Air Force in 2001 l and has gen-
erated an exponential and diffuse trajectory of meaning and critique since that
time. The term "lawfare" has no real fixed definition, but has come to be generally
understood as the "use or misuse of law as a substitute for traditional military
means to achieve military objectives." 2 It has been examined in the context of do-
mestic US legal practices,3 in transnational legal incidents4 and, of course, within
the realm of public international law, particularly in the context of the law of
armed conflict (LOAC). 5 All accounts do share a conception that recognizes that
lawfare is concerned with the instrumentalization or politicization of the law to
achieve a tactical, operational or strategic effect.
The reference to the "use or misuse" of law in the Dunlap definition reveals an
essentially neutral perspective. The fact is that modern State military forces do le-
gitimately use the law to achieve military outcomes. This is done as a substitute for
the application of force and hence represents a form of lawfare so defined. This
may be manifested with, for example, a UN Charter, Chapter VII, "all necessary
* Captain, CSM, Royal Australian Navy. The views expressed in this paper are entirely those of
the author in his personal capacity and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Australian
government, the Australian Defence Force or any other body with whom the author is
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means" Security Council resolution that displaces the law of neutrality or other-
wise shapes the tactical or strategic military environment. 6 Alternatively, it may
also be manifested in a formal determination as to whether an armed conflict exists
at all, whether it is international or non-international and/or whether an opposi-
tion group is to obtain prisoner of war rights or not. In this sense, the law is
"weaponized" to achieve a desired military outcome that negates the need to apply
force to obtain the same result. Indeed, recent scholarship on this body of law has
highlighted the notion that LOAC practice itself is a process of construction,
contestation and strategic instrumentalization that usually advantages State mili-
tary forces. 7 That the existing architecture of LOAC possesses this apparent bias8
for State military forces is not surprising. Under classical views States are the sub-
jects, and not the objects, of international law. Moreover, from a policy perspec-
tive, this preference is both appropriate and necessary under the existing
international legal structure. This is to ensure the right balance between interna-
tionally recognized military and humanitarian aims in warfare is maintained and
that institutional accountability is effectively preserved.
While States engage in a type of structural lawfare to achieve military aims, the
primary focus of this article is to examine the converse situation, namely, the man-
ner in which lawfare is exercised against States. The strategic use ofthe law by non-
State groups engaged in asymmetric warfare has been recognized as a significant
tool to obtain military and political advantage. In these contexts, such groups will,
inter alia, invite the application of force against themselves or their proxies, inno-
cent civilians (as incidental injury), or ostensibly civilian objects (that have lost
their protection) that, while strictly lawful, nonetheless generate political costs
and/or moral dilemmas for the attacking force. The goal is to undermine the resolve
of State military forces by generating negative reaction by relevant constituencies
with political power.
Predictably, this type of lawfare prompts reactions concerning the "unfairness"
of legal constraints applying to one side as compared to the wanton disregard of legal
compliance by the other.9 Such asymmetric disadvantage is usually framed in
terms of a dilemma within the literature for Western "law-abiding" military forces
in meeting the threats while retaining a fidelity to the law. Lawfare is thus charac-
terized in the register of formal legality ofbeing a refuge of the weak, 10 ofbeing dis-
ingenuous by unfairly manipulating the law to achieve a relevant extra-legal and
asymmetric effect.
It is the purpose of this article to review the phenomenon of lawfare to highlight
how law is situated within the broader political, moral and social terrain of military
decision making. The reactions against lawfare disclose a number of assumptions.
Principally, the reactions against lawfare evidence a particular interpretive attitude
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to LOAC, specifically one based squarely within a positivist orientation. Positivism
remains the dominant interpretive idiom of LOAC, but it contains a number of
vulnerabilities in its theoretical structure. It is a goal of this article to identify such
vulnerabilities and to propose remedies that might be used to prompt a more self-
aware counter-lawfare response within positivism's interpretive enterprise.
A broader goal is to tackle the issue ofhow the law is actually employed within
military decision making. It will contend that while LOAC is often expressed in a
key of validity, it should also be understood in a register of legitimacy. The factors
that contribute to such an approach draw upon broader socio-legal and ethical
considerations and these will be canvassed.
To this end, it is submitted that military lawyers and operators alike regularly
synthesize legal propositions with broader political, social and moral consider-
ations when dispensing advice and embarking upon a course of action. In so doing,
this permits a more nuanced and surgical application of force that meets broader
military and political goals. In short, it allows for effective mission accomplish-
ment. It also allows for a firmer foundation in confronting lawfare and its intended
manipulation ofmoral and political reaction. This assimilation offactors that occurs
when developing legal advice is not always admitted, but it occurs nonetheless, and
should be acknowledged and discussed for what it can add to the military apprecia-
tion process.
This is not to say that the register of formal legal validity has been dispensed
with. Quite the contrary, a formal assessment of law is always the starting point in
any interpretive exercise. Rules are carefully parsed and their linguistic construc-
tion assessed against standard canons of interpretation. However, the law is more
indeterminate, language more malleable and open, than what we might imagine.
In reality, the practice ofLOAC takes place against a complex array of normative
factors. Whether reconciled as acting within the "free space" of legal discretion
permitted under positivism's structure or as a product of government-imposed
policy overlay to ameliorate a rule's strictness, or indeed some other rationale, the
result is the same. It remains true today that, at least since the Vietnam War, liberal
democratic societies are compelled to wage war through a prism of self-perceived
legitimacy. Modern military lawyers by necessity navigate this complex legal and
political topography as a matter of course. It also means that confronting lawfare
tactics head-on is not as daunting as it may at first seem.
This article is comprised of three parts. Part I will briefly examine the tenor of
claims regarding lawfare so as to situate the subsequent analysis. Part II will canvass
the dominant interpretive idiom of LOAC—namely, positivism—and will dem-
onstrate the blind spots and gaps that this methodology generates. It will outline
the remedies that are available to deal with lawfare (i.e., counter-lawfare) either
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under positivism's method or more broadly under a complementary approach of
LOAC practice within the register of legitimacy. Finally, Part III will conclude by
examining the choices and orientation military lawyers might adopt in the context
of counter-lawfare. To this end, assessment of means-ends rationality, con-
structivism and virtue ethics will be separately undertaken.
Part I. Lawfare and Its Taxonomy
The term "lawfare" has established a distinctly pejorative connotation within the pre-
vailing literature. This seems unusual, as the term itself is value neutral. It is neither
intrinsically "good" nor "bad," but rather an agnostic phenomenon. Indeed, as out-
lined in the introduction, established State military forces in the conduct ofwarfare
can deploy a form of structural lawfare.
In the contemporary environment, allegations oflawfare are routinely cited as a
tool used by insurgents or other non-State actors in actions against State military
forces. This is the version oflawfare that has become more typically associated with
the term. Hence, US Army lawyer Eric Jensen identifies that in the context ofasym-
metric warfare, an opponent will seek to exploit an adversary's weaknesses to seek
tactical or strategic advantage. Such weaknesses are not necessarily those of military
capacity, but rather are more intangible and revolve around inciting violent reac-
tion that feeds public disquiet. Thus, "[i]n this type of conflict, the disadvantaged
party must seek to use the comparatively low-tech tools at its disposal to gain the
comparative advantage." 11 Such non-State groups will openly violate the law in
order to strike at a more militarily superior though legally bound (thus restrained)
force. As outlined by Jensen, such subversion takes the form ofattacking from pro-
tected places and using protected places or objects as weapons storage sites, fight-
ing without wearing a proper uniform, using human shields to protect military
targets, using protected symbols to gain military advantage, murdering prisoners
or others who are protected and not distinguishing oneself from the general popu-
lation when taking a direct or active part in hostilities. 12
The types of incidents detailed by Jensen almost always have an exception for
the use of force by opponents. Under positive prescriptions of the law, protected
places lose their immunity when used for military purposes, 13 human shields may
not be directly attacked (at least when not voluntary) but become part of the inci-
dental injury calculation under proportionality assessments, 14 and while fighting
without a distinguishing uniform does threaten greater civilian loss due to mis-
identification, it does not prohibit State military forces from targeting those taking
a direct part in hostilities (DPH). 15
330
Dale Stephens
The point is not that legal arguments can't be relied upon in favor ofsurmount-
ing these tactics, but rather that the political and social consequences of relying
upon such exceptions can cause a negative effect. These exceptions highlight the
moral dilemmas and political and social costs faced by soldiers when engaged in
such conflict.
In this sense, it is significant that the main concern about lawfare is in fact the
broader context in which law is invoked. Hence, as Casey and Rivkin state: "The
term 'lawfare' describes the growing use ofinternational law claims, usually factually
or legally meritless, as a tool of war. The goal is to gain a moral advantage overyour
enemy in the court of world opinion, and potentially a legal advantage in national
and international tribunals." 16
It became clear during the counterinsurgency (COIN) operation within Iraq
that insurgents invariably used unlawful means to intimidate the population and
discredit the government. The whole point of using such unlawful means was
specifically to invoke an overreaction by counterinsurgent forces. Provoking vio-
lation of counterinsurgent ethics and values in reacting to an insurgency is a
means to an end, namely, discrediting the legitimacy of the host government and
the counterinsurgent forces themselves. As David Kilcullen notes, Al Qaeda in
Iraq drew the majority of its strength from the "backlash engendered by counter-
insurgent overreaction rather than genuine popular support." 17
When examined in these terms, the reaction against lawfare turns out to be less
about the law itself than about the broader question of a political and moral reac-
tion to the application of force that has the capacity to undermine military effec-
tiveness. In this context, LOAC (and its sustaining interpretive model) is not
particularly adept at providing a sufficiently calibrated response. The law is largely
framed in a binary manner. It mainly deals with categories ofpersons: combatants,
civilians and those hors de combat. It restricts attacks against military objectives 18
and prohibits attacks against those objects that are civilian. 19 It does not deal very
well with nuance or effect. Hence within this binary code, decisions are made in an
essentially "yes" or "no" manner
—
viz., this military object over there may be at-
tacked, that civilian one here may not; these civilians are a proportionate loss but
those ones are not. Issues such as whether the object to be attacked is a church or a
mosque that is being used for a military purpose have no formal relevance as a
matter oflaw. Neither does the question whether the civilians who will incidentally
die as a result of a proportionality equation are individuals who may be part of a
particular broader social network. These underlying social and political factors are
simply accorded no formal legal weight.
Notwithstanding this, attacking such objects, while lawful, will often have the
inevitable effect of galvanizing resistance by a resident population, which, in turn,
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may well undermine broader strategic goals. Similarly, whether an insurgent is a
hard-core fanatic determined to die in his or her cause or an "accidental guerilla"20
loosely swept into a broader movement is of no account as a matter of formal law;
each may be targeted under DPH criteria. While some scholars have ventured that
there may exist some level of cultural relativity in making assessments of "military
advantage" or "proportionate" loss, 21 the broad sweep of the law is predicated
upon a conception of exchangeable universal value. There exists a pretense of
mathematical certainty in making assessments of "military advantage units" versus
"civilian loss units." To this end, the appeal of universality sustains the law. It may
be enough to respond to allegations of lawfare to say that "this is the law" and what
we do is "lawful." In certain contexts and to certain audiences, such assertions may
be conclusive. In other circumstances and for other audiences, they may not be.
The reference to "the court of world opinion" identified by Rivkin and Casey
has both an international and a domestic application. As discussed above, entirely
lawful attacks within a theater of operations can result in popular resentment by
those within that battlespace that translates into practical resistance. Equally,
resistance may be manifested within domestic polities at home and can galvanize
domestic reaction and decisively undermine military capacity. Hence, as Dunlap
has observed when addressing this issue in the context of the Vietnam War:
The United States has already seen how an enemy can carry out a value-based asym-
metrical strategy. For example, one of the things that America's enemies have learned
in the latter half of the 20th century is to manipulate democratic values. Consider the
remarks of a former North Vietnamese commander: "The conscience of America was
part of its war-making capability, and we were turning that power in our favor. Amer-
ica lost because of its democracy; through dissent and protest it lost the ability to mobi-
lize a will to win." By stirring up dissension in the United States, the North Vietnamese
were able to advance their strategic goal of removing American power from Southeast
Asia. Democracies are less-resistant to political machinations of this sort than are the
totalitarian systems common to neo-absolutists.22
These lessons have been fully absorbed by military professionals, especially by
military lawyers. It has become clear that there are "good" and "bad" wars, just as
there are wars of necessity and wars of choice. 23 Public conscience on issues of
force in relation to both the jus ad helium and jus in hello has real impact. As a result,
the levels of discretion exercised under the law differ due to imposed government/
command policy restraints. While prevailing textbooks and restatements ofLOAC
present a picture of almost clinical certainty, the truth of the matter has always
been more nuanced. Law and legal interpretation are modulated. Legal rectitude is
the starting point and of course universal prohibitions are always formally
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acknowledged (i.e., not attacking civilians, respecting hospital ships, etc.), but legal
interpretation invariably accommodates implicit counter-lawfare elements at
least as a matter of policy overlay. Legitimate targets are not attacked and extraor-
dinary measures are taken to spare civilian populations from any incidental injury.
Is this approach consistent with positivism's method? Is this really a policy overlay
or does it fall within "proper" legal interpretation? As will be outlined in Part II
below, such accommodations may still be conceived as validly coming within the
structure of positivism's methodology.
Part II. Positivism, Legitimacy and Lawfare
Law and Morality
Positivism remains the dominant interpretive idiom of LOAC. As an interpretive
style, it is venerable and hardy and has withstood numerous challenges to its domi-
nance throughout the twentieth century. While regarded as too illusory by some
scholars,24 it nonetheless heralded a momentous change to international law when
embraced at the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth century. Reading accounts
of international law in the 1920s, one gets a palpable sense of positivism's great
emancipatory promise.25 While international law in the nineteenth century was
largelybound up in sovereign prerogatives and naturalist conceptions, the onset of
the twentieth century saw law harnessed for progressive causes. Positivism was the
means by which such progress was to be realized. While international courts ini-
tially resisted impositions by positive law on sovereign prerogatives,26 over time
even these nebulous rights were quietly relegated as products of an earlier era.27
The legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart in his 1962 account The Concept ofLaw prob-
ably best describes positivism's contemporary structure. 28 To Hart, positivism was
fundamentally centered on a separation thesis, that is, legal validity was not neces-
sarily tied to any moral inquiry. 29 Rather law was a combination of primary and
secondary rules that was sustained by an inner social perspective oflaw's officials. 30
The rule of recognition was the most significant secondary rule, 31 and essentially
established what was law in terms of pedigree. The rule of recognition itself was
based upon social fact. Significantly, words did a considerable amount of work
within positivism and Hart conceived of a duality of core and penumbra for fram-
ing interpretive discourse. 32 Within the core, words possessed unassailable mean-
ing. Law was thus ascertainable and largely predictable. At the border of the core,
within the narrow penumbral region, the law was less determinate and a broader
level of discretion was permitted to determine legal outcomes. Indeed, Hart al-
lowed for a policy- or legislative-type reasoning within this narrow band. 33
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The separation thesis, which sustains much of Hart's approach, was famously
outlined in an exchange with Harvard professor Lon Fuller in a series of articles
appearing in the 1957-58 edition of the Harvard Law Review. 54 In question was the
status of laws passed during the Nazi regime in Germany. Fuller invoked a form of
naturalist legal methodology to argue that such edicts could not constitute law.
Hart presented a differing view; while such laws were morally bankrupt, they
nonetheless still constituted law properly adopted in accordance with a prevail-
ing process. 35 Importantly, Hart did fully acknowledge that while they were still
deserving of the name "law," one could nonetheless rely upon personal moral
grounds not to obey such law. 36
This dichotomy reveals much about positivism that has application within
LOAC reasoning and more broadly within the context of lawfare. While it is plain
that "no sensible positivist . . . would claim that morality is never relevant or nec-
essary for legal interpretation," 37 positivism is essentially a non-directive form of
interpretation. 38 When one is resolutely within the core meaning of words (and
sentences) 39 there remains a requirement to follow the course of such wording to
its necessary end to reach an inevitable legal result. This is done notwithstanding
that what occurs may in fact appear to be "a wrong or unjust or unwise or inequi-
table or silly result."40 This differentiation between law as it "is" and what it
"ought" to be (at least within the core) has the potential to cause blind spots and
contradictions in legal interpretation. Yet, it is resolutely defended by many as the
appropriate measure of legal interpretation and has resisted inroads by alternative
legal theories. Former US Attorney General Michael Mukasey has, for example,
strenuously argued that government lawyers must ensure they only "do law." 41 He
outlines that a lawyer's primary duty is
to define the space in which the client may legally act. . . . [Tjhere will be times when
you will advise clients that the law prohibits them from taking their desired course of
action, or even prohibits them from doing things that are, in your view, the right thing
to do. And there will be times when you will have to advise clients that the law permits
them to take actions that you may find imprudent, or even wrong.42
Judge Higgins in a famous defense of this methodology reaffirmed the perspective
that the practice of law is best conceived of as the application of "neutral princi-
ples" to achieve predictable outcomes. 43
This conception is reflected in traditional approaches to interpreting LOAC.
There is usually an emphatic confidence in the literature that LOAC is comprised
of a broad core of validity. To be sure, even a provision such as the famous Martens
clause that makes a direct appeal to the "dictates of public conscience"44 has been
334
Dale Stephens
strenuously argued to be no more than an aid to interpretation of existing positive
law and certainly not a source of legal authority in its own right.45
This reliance upon pedigree of legal norms and the strong confidence placed in
the core structure of words seems a little too emphatic in the literature. Indeed,
such a patois might be read as reflecting a type ofanxiety as to the capacity oflaw to
actually restrain violence. The LOAC project was always placed between a promise
and a fear46 that law would intercede and ameliorate the excess of warfare's
violence.
Given the strong differentiation between law, morality and policy consider-
ations, at least resident within core meanings ofwords and sentences, there should
be little surprise that lawfare is derided as unfair. Compliance with the law con-
cerning the propriety of certain attacks is the formal answer to those who take issue
with the moral, social and political consequences of such attacks. Lawyers are ill
equipped to respond with anything more than extolling the virtue of compliance
with the law as it exists. Arguments in support of structural rectitude and of lin-
guistic construction are what sustain legal responses. Despite this, to relevant
publics "out there" such exquisite compliance and faithfulness may not be persua-
sive, indeed may not be worth "two straws."47 This necessarily leaves open a num-
ber of vulnerabilities to such advocacy.
It also relies upon the picture painted by Hart (and others) that the law com-
prises a large inner core ofmeaning. If, in fact, the law (especially LOAC) is less de-
terminate than what many imagine, iflanguage is so intrinsically malleable that we
can flip between the core and the penumbra with greater ease than what we antici-
pate, then many ofthe assumptions that underpin "proper" interpretive technique
become undone. However, in accepting these factors we have new challenges, but
also better opportunities to align legal advice with a greater moral and political
acuity and so may confront lawfare more instrumentally.
Core/Penumbra and the Malleability of Language
Many scholars have critiqued the semantic certainty implicit in the core/penumbra
distinction. Winter, for example, observes that Hart fails to appreciate that the cog-
nitive process of ascribing a purpose to words that we necessarily make means the
"distinction between a policy-free core and a penumbra of 'legislative' freedom
necessarily collapses."48 According to Winter, we all operate in accordance with
tacit knowledge and seek to attribute a meaning to words that will give effect to an
underlying policy. Language is by nature malleable, rendering the placement of a
firewall between open (penumbra) and closed (core) discretion an arbitrary exer-
cise. Duncan Kennedy has adeptly demonstrated that the "self-evident" placement
of words within the core or penumbra is a highly contentious exercise. Hart
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advocated that "plain cases"49 would always be easily discernible, but Kennedy ar-
gues that through "legal work" 50 we can find ourselves within either the con-
strained core or the open textured penumbra whenever we wish to exercise a more
political discretion. Either way, we can construct a desired result. In essence, Ken-
nedy concludes that determinacy is "a function ofthe worlds ofvalid norms, and of
the content of other sources, and also of their interaction with the resources and
strategies of whoever has the power to do legal interpretation." 51
The Malleability of Language and Common Article 3
The malleability of language within LOAC was amply demonstrated in the course
of the internal Bush administration debates concerning the application of Com-
mon Article 3 (CA 3) to the war in Afghanistan. Writing in January 2002, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General John Yoo determined that the conflict then under way
in Afghanistan was an international armed conflict. However, according to Yoo,
neither Taliban nor Al Qaeda detainees were accorded prisoner of war status, be-
cause Afghanistan was a "failed State" and therefore the Geneva Conventions did
not apply. 52 The question then to be decided was whether CA 3, which set a mini-
mal humanitarian standard for detainee treatment, applied as a matter of law. Yoo
determined that it did not and drew heavily upon a textual analysis of the provi-
sion. Significantly, the opinion Yoo drafted had an especially narrow determina-
tion of the application ofCA 3 of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions. Yoo opined
that CA 3 (which applies to "conflicts not of an international character") was in-
tended to apply only to a condition of civil war or "large scale armed conflicts be-
tween a State and an armed movement within its own territory."53
The opinion specifically relied upon a close textual analysis, as well as a histori-
cal account of the negotiating history and past practice of States. It concluded that
if CA 3 was to have a "cover all" reach, then it would have used "broader lan-
guage." 54 The "precise language" 55 actually used restricted it to the type of conflicts
identified.
In reply, William Taft, the Department of State's Legal Advisor, responded by
taking issue with the reading of the applicability of the Geneva Conventions,
stressing that "[t]he President should know that a decision that the Conventions
do apply is consistent with the plain language of the Conventions."56 Moreover ap-
plication of the Conventions "demonstrates that the United States bases its con-
duct not just on its policy preferences but on its international legal obligations." 57
Ultimately, President Bush determined that CA 3 did not apply dejure but "as a
matter of policy" humane treatment to the extent "consistent with military neces-
sity" 58 would be accorded to detainees. 59
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Subsequently, the executive assertion that CA 3 did not apply to the conflict
with Al Qaeda was litigated before the Supreme Court. In the 2006 Hamdan case,60
the Court held that the term "conflict not of an international character" contained
within CA 3 was used in contradistinction to "conflict between nations." Hence
the phrase "'not of an international character' bears its literal meaning"61 and, as
such, applied effectively to all armed conflicts that are not between nation-States,
thus constituting CA 3 and its minimal standards as a "cover all."
The remarkable feature of this composite line of executive and judicial reason-
ing was the reliance upon "precise," "plain" and "literal" meaning ofthe words and
yet such reliance produced widely divergent conclusions. In its terms the Yoo
opinion was a credible enough exposition of the law, yet it seemed profoundly
wrong in its recognition of a gap vis-a-vis a legal obligation to observe even mini-
mal humanitarian standards for detainees. Were Taft and the Supreme Court
better at linguistic construction and was CA 3 terminology "self-evidently" in the
core of meaning? Or perhaps was "legal work" at play? Was this rather about wise
international relations (IR) policy,62 or perhaps checking executive excess63 or per-
haps retaining a moral high ground for instrumental reasons?64
The debate about the semantic placement ofCA 3 is replicated with numerous
key terms throughout LOAC. Issues concerning the correct interpretation of "mil-
itary advantage,"65 of the "nature" of an objective that renders it liable to attack,66
ofwhether "war-fighting or war-sustaining" capability is a legitimate military ob-
jective,67 ofhow "reasonable" must be the grounds for boarding and attacking ves-
sels under the right ofvisit and search or blockade in naval warfare,68 ofthe issue of
sufficient "effectiveness" in aerial and naval blockade,69 of the application of the
precautionary principle to weapons selection (particularly by those countries pos-
sessing high-technology weaponry) 70 and, of course, what counts as "proportionate"
loss71 are all illustrative of the many interpretive issues that occupy contentious
and/or ambiguous decision making under the law. Invariably many of these mat-
ters are usually decided by recourse to "judgment." 72 Within this indeterminacy it
becomes evident that legal arguments are calibrated less in terms oflawful and un-
lawful, and more in terms of differing degrees oflawfulness. In so doing, a different
style of legal reasoning develops that is more amenable to policy influence. Perhaps
this can be reconciled with Hart's sense ofpenumbral reasoning, or perhaps it indi-
cates that the register of legitimacy (with a small dose of Holmes's predictivism) 73
provides better explanatory power for how LOAC is applied in practice, an expla-
nation that gives a sufficient basis to deal with the political and moral advantage
sought to be generated through lawfare.
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The Register of Legitimacy
Writing in 1952, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht famously observed that "if international
law is ... at the vanishing point oflaw, the law ofwar is perhaps even more conspic-
uously at the vanishing point of international law." 74 This dire warning of LOAC's
diminished relevance has in fact been breathtakingly challenged in succeeding
years and rendered meaningless. Over the past few decades there has been an "ex-
plosion" of treaties, restatements, handbooks, institutional assimilation and deep
professional military and academic investment with LOAC. This has been partly
driven by a strategy of pragmatic engagement by humanitarian voices. 75
Rather than law becoming assimilated at the "vanishing point" of international
politics, the reverse seems to have happened. LOAC and its underlying principles
have been embraced by political elites and invoked in a vernacular of legitimacy to
further broader strategic claims. Certainly from the first Gulf War onward, law
has been invoked and heralded as providing decisive support for broader cam-
paign advocacy. 76 There is no doubt now that compliance with the law forms part
ofthe political discourse as to the legitimacy ofa conflict. Witness the negative con-
sequences of the Abu Ghraib events in Iraq, 77 or even more recently, the German-
initiated tanker attack in Afghanistan,78 to identify the correlation between jus in
hello considerations and broader political and social identification with the legiti-
macy of a military campaign.
This phenomenon is being tracked within the legal literature. David Kennedy
has observed that the practice of international law, and especially that of LOAC,
has become a variegated process of input and reaction from relevant constituen-
cies. Traction of legal arguments has become measured more in terms of persua-
sion within such constituencies than technical mastery of legal construction. In
short, a register of legitimacy complements that of legality. Kennedy notes that
'[international law has become the metric for debating the legitimacy of military
action . . . [and that] law now shapes the politics of war," 79 and, further:
In the court ofworld public opinion, the laws in force are not necessarily the rules that
are valid, in some technical sense, but the rules that are persuasive to relevant political
constituencies. Whether a norm is or is not legal is a function not of its origin or pedi-
gree, but of its effects. Law has an effect—is law—when it persuades an audience with
political clout that something someone else did, or plans to do, is or is not legiti-
mate. . . . The fact that the modern law in war is expressed in the keys of both validity
and persuasion makes the professional use of its vocabulary both by humanitarian and
military professionals a complex challenge.80
In this context, ethical and political corroboration with legal rules becomes in-
evitable. We leave behind the smooth reassurance of an external judicial standard
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and enter a more dynamic though unfamiliar and contentious world—one where
law has its rightful place, but its purchase is of a variable nature. In describing this
recent phenomenon Kennedy observes:
International lawyers became less interested in whether a rule was valid—in the sense
that it could be said to be rooted in consent, in sovereignty or in the nature ofan inter-
sovereign community—than in whether it worked. International law was what inter-
national law did. The observations of sociologists or political scientists about what
functioned as a restraint or a reason became more important than the ruminations of
jurists in determining what international lawwas and was not. As one might imagine, it
became ever less possible to say in advance or with precision what rules would, in fact,
be effective as law. To do so was to make a prediction about what would, in the end, be
enforced. Acting under cover oflaw became a wager that the action's legality would be
upheld in the unfolding of state practice. Moreover, it became clear that the effective-
ness of rules depended less on something intrinsic to the rule than on aspects of
society—how powerful was its proponent, how insistent its enforcement, how persua-
sive its reasons to the broad public who would determine its legitimacy. 81
The perspective presented by Kennedy concerning the variable nature of legal
norms is representative of a wave of critical reassessment. Over the recent past
there have been a number of theories put forward that seek to rationalize the rela-
tivity of legal norms within international law. Whether predicated upon notions
of "compliance pull"82 or theories of transnational politico-legal iteration,83 they
all share recognition of a corroborative role of politics/policy as fused with con-
ceptions of legitimacy. In assessing the themes proffered, a model of the law as a
justificatory discourse84 begins to emerge, one that belies too obvious political
self-interest with appeals to a broader legitimacy. This is not to say that bad legal
arguments cannot still be distinguished from good ones. 85 It does acknowledge
though that the vernacular ofpersuasion has more resonance than appeals to ped-
igree or some kind of external validity. As one commentator has noted, legal dis-
course within the international realm is not
the search for some legal truth "out there," waiting to be discovered. It is a practice that
operates on the basis ofcommon understandings and shared beliefs about the relation-
ship governed by the rules in question. Thus interpretation of international law is the
search for an intersubjective understanding of the norm at issue.86
Critically, the point is not one of "all things considered" subjective policy
choice, but rather choice within the indeterminacy ofthe law. Such choice has been
likened to "politics within the law"87 or perhaps the "legalisation of politics."88 In
determining how choices are to be made, some commentators have pointed to the
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role of "general principles" of the law as reflected in Article 38(l)(c) of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice as providing a durable catalog. Such principles
proliferate throughout international law and often form complementary and op-
posing pairs. 89 Hence within LOAC, the principle of military necessity is counter-
poised against the principle ofhumanity, and each may be relied upon to advance a
particular interpretive perspective. Kalshoven has argued that such principles
themselves reflect particularized social, historical and ethical traditions and are
sustained by an "inner force"90 that is "moral in nature."91
The move to a frame of legitimacy and to acknowledging the power of political
persuasion as part of a justificatory process signals a significant departure from the
positivist firmament of external standards and linguistic precision. Perhaps we are
still within the positivist frame but are situated deeply within the penumbral region
described by Hart where a more freewheeling exercise of policy-like discretion is
permitted. If so, the penumbra is more than just a narrow band, but rather occu-
pies a much larger space. The type of legal practice and interpretive style currently
being theorized actually signals a reflection of the type of reasoning advanced by
the American legal realist movement of the 1920s and '30s. This movement sought
to accommodate the indeterminacy oflaw and in so doing wanted to implement a
more self-aware process oflegal reasoning92—one critically predicated upon a con-
ception of social scientific methodology that could more productively guide rele-
vant canons of interpretation.93
Counterinsurgency, Stabilization Operations and American Legal Realism
This move to a more instrumentalized form of legal reasoning has found explicit
expression in the recently published US COIN and stabilization doctrines. Legal
interpretation ofLOAC became contextualized in seeking to achieve specific political
and military outcomes. The US COIN doctrine was developed against the exigencies
of the increasing violence in Iraq in 2005-6. General Petraeus and others reviewed
counterinsurgency best practices, and thinking "outside the box" developed a
strategy for dealing with the increasingly pressing insurgency. It was in fact a blue-
print for "a strategy waiting to be implemented as everything else failed in Iraq."94
The resulting COIN manual grapples with the new realities of postmodern war
and recommends decisive change. Indeed, the introduction to the manual makes it
very clear that it intends to set a new course. Within the first paragraph, the point is
abruptly made that "[t]hose who fail to see the manual as radical probably don't
understand it, or at least understand what it's up against."95
The manual deals with a number of legal propositions and directs an interpre-
tive methodology that is decisively instrumental. These are tailor-made to attain
strategic effect within the context ofan insurgency. The doctrine contains a number
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ofparadoxes that seem counterintuitive to prevailing approaches to legal interpre-
tation. These include:
• Sometimes, the more you protect your force, the less secure you may be,96
• Some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot,97
• Sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is,98 and
• The more successful the counterinsurgency is, the less force can be used and
the more risk must be accepted. 99
It is evident that COIN doctrine knowingly places greater physical risk on coun-
terinsurgent forces. It fully concedes that choices will need to be made that will re-
sult in higher counterinsurgent casualties. These truisms necessarily test resolve as
well as public expectation. They also provide a meaningful counter to the political
and moral advantage that is sought by insurgent forces through lawfare techniques.
It turns out that political and social success in the field provides the best antidote to
lawfare susceptibility at home as well as within the relevant theater ofoperations. 100
The COIN and stability operations doctrines have proven, within Iraq at least, to
provide a reliable framework to reach that goal. General restraint and an allocation
ofparticular ethical and social value to the consequences ofviolence have provided
a more durable context for legal interpretation.
Within an insurgency, those taking a direct or active part in hostilities are osten-
sibly targetable under the DPH provisions ofLOAC. As outlined earlier in this arti-
cle, little differentiation is traditionally made between hard-core insurgents and
those who are more loosely associated with an insurgency (but who nonetheless
come within the DPH formula). There is, as previously highlighted, an assumption
of mathematical precision that underpins this approach to legal reasoning under
LOAC. In challenging this blanket legal categorization the Multi-National Force-
Iraq guidelines, reflecting the COIN doctrine, introduced a more nuanced target-
ing strategy that was based upon the question of reconcilability and modified legal
approaches. Hence the guidelines stated bluntly:
We cannot kill our way out of this endeavor. We and our Iraqi partners must identify
and separate the "reconcilables" from the "irreconcilables" through engagement, pop-
ulation control measures, information operations and political activities. We must
strive to make reconcilables a part of the solution, even as we identify, pursue and kill,
capture or drive out the irreconcilables. 101
This required a greater use of intelligence to understand deeper tribal and pro-
vincial networks and allegiances. Understanding relevant ethnography and intra-
tribal group dynamics gave a better context for instrumental thinking. It also
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meant that a substantive differentiation could be made between the hard-core in-
surgent and the "accidental guerilla" with respect to targeting. These more
nuanced approaches combine with a revised legal interpretive methodology that
seeks to promote a particular effect with respect to targeting choices.
In relation to the principle of proportionality, the COIN manual similarly sig-
nals a self-conscious variation on the manner in which this legal standard is usually
interpreted by concentrating upon political and social alienation. The manual
states:
In conventional operations, proportionality is usually calculated in simple utilitarian
terms: civilian lives and property lost versus enemy destroyed and military advantage
gained. In COIN operations, [military] advantage is best calculated not in terms ofhow
many insurgents are killed or detained, but rather which enemies are killed or detained.
... In COIN environments, the number of civilian lives lost and property destroyed
needs to be measured against how much harm the targeted insurgent could do if al-
lowed to escape. 102
The commentary notes that the principles of discrimination and proportional-
ity have an additional sociopolitical significance that must be factored into any in-
terpretive exercise under the law, stating that "[f]ires that cause unnecessary harm
or death to noncombatants may create more resistance and increase the insur-
gency's appeal—especially if the populace perceives a lack of discrimination in
their use." 103
Law, Legitimacy and Interpretive Space
In reconciling the recourse to legitimacy with legal interpretive theory, a broader
opportunity arises to grapple with lawfare—not least of which is the ability to
meaningfully address the political and moral advantage sought by non-State ac-
tors. The COIN and stability operations doctrines provide an illuminating insight
into how the calibrated application offorce can result in achieving identified military
and political effects at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. Indeed, military
journals these days disclose a fascination by military operators with the implica-
tions of force in terms of psychological, sociological and anthropological effect as a
means of fulfilling mission accomplishment goals. 104 Military lawyers have, of ne-
cessity, been part of that experience.
When we speak in the register oflegality in familiar terms ofclassic modern positiv-
ism, we must be aware ofwhat this implicates and the vulnerabilities it exposes. We
still rely upon this methodology because it retains sufficient explanatory "horse-
power" for some audiences in some circumstances. Such circumstances would, of
course, encompass formal litigation processes. They would also be more likely in a
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"State-on-State" conventional warfare context, which is the background in which
LOAC was principally developed, or even when dealing with an "irreconcilable" in a
COIN context. The disquiet that is felt by some that lawfare techniques can under-
mine military efforts seems geared to this concept and context of legal exposition.
As has been outlined, however, the register of formal legality is not well
equipped to deal with social, political or moral critiques. But this is only one con-
cept or version of interpretive valence. In a broader day-to-day context, the inter-
play between law, legitimacy, policy and politics has become well understood by
military lawyers, if not expressly, at least intuitively as a different narrative of the
law. Some might reconcile these interactions as mere policy overlay of hard law at
the core of legal meaning. Or they could perhaps be reconciled as occurring in the
(broad) penumbral region of discretion of Hart's conception of positivism, or by
invoking and assimilating American legal realist techniques (we are, after all, "all
realists now"), 105 or perhaps as forming a competing legal methodology ofnorma-
tive legal relativism and pluralism.
However these interactions are reconciled from a theoretical perspective, the
fact is that military lawyers have in practice adopted a more informed attitude to
interpretation that has kept pace with broader national and international strategies
for military action. The recent COIN and stabilization doctrines and their support-
ing interpretive legal approaches are designed precisely to counter adverse political
and social reaction in order to obtain military advantage. They represent strong el-
ements ofcounter-lawfare in their ontological premise. As will be discussed below,
departing the safe moorings ofa register oflegality for one oflegitimacy allows for a
more instrumental approach to achieving mission outcomes. Though not without
risk, it also offers the means by which lawfare techniques used by non-State actors
can be decisively met and defeated.
Part HI, Legal Choice by Military Lawyers in a Pluralist Environment
If, as I have contended, the legal framework ofLOAC generates considerable inter-
pretive space, military lawyers necessarily have a complex responsibility in recon-
ciling multiple factors when shaping their advice. Notwithstanding this challenge,
it is a theme of this article that military lawyers are well equipped to deal with
lawfare. Such skills have developed quite independently as part of the general nature
of dispensing advice within LOAC practice. The purpose of this part is to explore
the exogenous factors that underpin military legal decision making. First will be an
analysis of means-ends rationality, looking particularly at IR theories as to how
the law is used to mobilize political action. Second will be an examination of
constructivism, which seeks to demonstrate how internalization ofnormative legal
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standards can result in generating a sense of self-identity and interpretive attitude.
Finally, the part will conclude with a survey of virtue ethics, which have particular
resonance within the military ethos and can be understood as a basis for adopting
particular legal strategies of support or resistance.
Means-Ends Rationality and Politicization of Law
Public opinion is often readily acknowledged by military lawyers as having
considerable effect in driving government policy. Of course in the context of
lawfare, domestic public opinion is a decisive strategic target, yet there is little un-
derstanding ofhow law gets metabolized by advocates to prompt the type of politi-
cal mobilization that subsequently shapes opinion.
To this end international lawyers and international legal scholarship generally
exhibit what Jack Goldsmith has referred to as a "methodological unsophis-
tication." 106 Lawyers generally have a predilection to favor formal over functional
and are less interested in examining causality. 107 They tend to assume law's role in
directing policy choice as a given. Conversely, IR theory seeks to explain interna-
tional behavior more "realistically" and thus takes "theoretical, methodological,
and empirical issues more seriously, and . . . draw[s] more generously on econom-
ics, sociology, and history." 108 Generally speaking, IR scholars review international
behavior in terms of power, interests, institutions, beliefs or ideas. International
law can have normative effect within these mechanisms of influence but not in the
manner in which most lawyers possibly anticipate.
In describing how international legal norms can be invoked to initiate or sustain
political mobilization, Simmons observes that treaty ratification can be seen as an
anchor for creating domestic and international advocacy networks; hence
' [t]reaties can change values and beliefs and can change the probability of successful
political action to achieve the rights they promulgate." 109 She notes that ratification
affects elite agendas, supports litigation and has a particular capacity to mobilize
political action among epistemic communities. 110 Treaty ratification, according to
Simmons, signals not only a "costly signal of intent," but also marks a decisive step
in "domestic legitimation," thus fostering a precommitment to receptivity by a
government, increases the size of the mobilizing coalition, enhances "intangible"
resources and expands the range of political and legal compliance strategies. 111
Similarly, Keck and Sikkink catalog how treaty ratification creates channels of ac-
cess for those motivated by shared values and structured mechanisms for informa-
tion exchange. These authors present both rationalist (language of incentives and
constraints, strategies, institutions, rules) and constructivist (norms, social rela-
tions and intersubjective understandings) foundations to ground their analysis of
the mechanisms of social and political pressure that can be generated by
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politicizing legal norms. 112 Interestingly, the authors refer to "frames" of mean-
ing113 to "alter the information and value contexts within which states make poli-
cies," which in turn involve "not just reasoning with opponents, but also bringing
pressure, arm twisting, encouraging sanctions, and shaming." 114
The concept of framing provides a useful context for understanding LOAC
politicization. The issue ofbanning anti-personnel landmines, for example, which
ultimately resulted in the drafting of the Ottawa anti-personnel mines conven-
tion, 115 was originally discussed in terms of military utility and saving soldiers'
lives. When the debate was subsequently "framed" by advocates in terms of indis-
criminate effect upon civilians, there developed an unstoppable momentum for
universal banning. It is in the context of individual vulnerability to military vio-
lence that political mobilization of LOAC norms seems to be the most effective.
Keck and Sikkink note that "issues involving physical harm to vulnerable or inno-
cent human individuals appear particularly compelling" 116 for network organiza-
tion (issue of framing personified). Consistent with this observation, it is not
surprising to see that trenchant arguments of lex specialis vis-a-vis international
human rights law are usually relaxed when it comes to issues such as detainee treat-
ment. Even if the de jure extraterritorial application of human rights law is not
accepted, at least its normative underpinnings are observed through humanitarian
policy stipulations—partly as recognition ofthat public expectation that such stan-
dards will be applied.
This recognition of the use of law to press moral and political leverage from a
domestic audience is not lost on military lawyers and, of course, is relied upon as
part ofany lawfare campaign. Means-ends rationality concerning public support is
implicitly part ofthe military decision-making calculus that underpins approaches
to the law, whether consciously acknowledged or subconsciously registered. LOAC
includes tremendous license for the application of destructive power; however, its
full exercise is unlikely to be pressed. Indeed, legal assessment ofmainstream military
action is rarely undertaken to decide whether something is legal or illegal. Rather,
as previously noted, it is much more a case of deciding between various iterations
of legal justification and construing the better arguments, which may range from
merely colorable through to compelling. Deciding whether something is merely
legal, of course, does not mean that it is good policy and this is where means-ends
rationality invariably enters the equation. Questions concerning public support,
institutional reputation, ethical orientation, self-image, internal discipline and nu-
merous other inchoate factors are part of that mix. In discussing the nature of the
resistance exhibited by a number of senior US military lawyers to aspects of the
Bush administration's legal framework for the war on terror, Hatfield notes: "The
military lawyers deferred to the law as an accumulation of hard-won institutional
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wisdom. They believed the law against torture to be a reality-based warning to keep
us from being doomed to learn the same lessons (usually referred to as 'those from
Vietnam') again and again." 117
The Vietnam War and its consequences loom large in the literature. There is a
sense that something intangible was lost in that conflict and that the decades since
have been devoted to a restoration of professional ethos within the military and a
reach for renewed public trust. The specific correlation between the Vietnam conflict
and LOAC is also emphasized. In a recent article, retired Colonel David Graham
observes that events like the My Lai incident "caused great consternation and soul
searching among Americans generally," 118 and was a catalyst for initiating compre-
hensive and profound revision and prioritization of the law ofwar training within
the military. 119
If lawfare is partly predicated upon a strategy of decisively influencing public
opinion, then it is logical that lawyers should better understand applicable IR
theories that detail the pathways in which law is politicized for this very purpose.
Indeed, the incorporation ofpublic affairs officers within most chains ofcommand
evidences the general institutional recognition by the broader military of the deci-
sive power of public opinion in liberal democratic societies. Due to a number of
reasons, not the least of which is a lack of relevant social scientific training, 120 law-
yers seem reluctant to undertake an analysis oflaw's effect upon political mobiliza-
tion. These perspectives allow lawfare strategies a head start. The rationalist and
constructivist methodologies used by advocacy groups to influence political deci-
sion making should be better understood so that alternative arguments can be
meaningfully mounted in response. Similarly, the issue of "framing" LOAC issues
to mobilize public opinion in order to achieve a particular political result might be
usefully studied to better understand and anticipate different perspectives.
Constructivism and a Logic ofAppropriateness
Constructivism is an ideational theory of IR that posits that national interests are
shaped by international structures. Hence national identity is partly "constructed"
by international legal norms that create and disperse beliefs. This realization is
predicated upon the partial or full internalization of legal norms through a process
of coercion, persuasion or acculturation, 121 leading to an overall acceptance of the
normative force of international law, in this case LOAC. A "logic of appropriate-
ness" as opposed to a "logic of consequence" 122 ensues; hence it is less instrumen-
talist than other competing IR theories.
Under the constructivism mantle, psychological factors can permit "shaping" of
perspectives through a conscious or unconscious acknowledgment of global mili-
tary isomorphism. 123 Moreover, constructivism seeks to provide an answer for
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normative adherence to the tenets of LOAC. Examples of this process at work
through the constructivist lens would include the unique universality of ratifica-
tion ofthe 1949 Geneva Conventions (the only treaty series in the world to achieve
this coveted status), the de-emphasis of reciprocity as a basis for an obligation to
comply with the LOAC (famously reinforced by the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for the former Yugoslavia in the Kupreskic case) 124 and the enhancement of
legal "principles" (as opposed to treaties or customary international law which are
predicated upon State consent) based upon "elementary consideration ofhuman-
ity,"
125 morality126 and interstitial norms 127 that have achieved greater sway in legal
interpretation. Constructivism also provides an explanation for why LOAC treaty
declarations and reservations are not, in practice, fully relied upon within interpre-
tive approaches to LOAC. Additionally, as discussed above, under the means-ends
rationality concept, it goes some way to explaining why, as a matter of "policy"
overlay, a number of human rights norms within armed conflict find resonance,
especially within the field of detention operations.
Constructivism, not surprisingly, provides the most comprehensive account of
social agency among competing IR theories. Some see this as a two-step process of
initial "role playing" 128 that then leads to an internalization of norms. Goodman
and Jinks examine this further to differentiate between "persuasion," a conscious
acceptance ofthe merits ofan idea, and "acculturation," under which partial inter-
nalization occurs through the phenomena ofsociological micro-processes ofmim-
icry, orthodoxy, identification, status maximization and avoidance of cognitive
dissonance. 129
Constructivism provides an explanation for why military forces can come to
generate a level of self-identity from LOAC. Famously, during the Bush adminis-
tration debates about the dejure application ofthe Geneva Conventions to the war
in Afghanistan, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Myers, resisted
their non-application, stating that " [t]he Geneva Conventions were a fundamental
part of our military culture and every military member was trained on them. . . .
Objectively applying the Conventions was important to our self image." 130 This
sentiment is echoed by other military members who asked who "owned" the
Geneva Conventions, the civilian lawyers or the military. 131 Plainly there was a level
ofdeep cognitive dissonance that came from a perception of civilian technical legal
manipulation. Such questioning suggests a strong sense of internalization of
norms associated with the legal framework.
Constructivists also posit the view that their theory helps explain the non-use
of nuclear and chemical weapons at times when their legality was still evolving
and rationalist theories would have expected such use. 132 While these theories may
be overstated and fail to account for the types of means-end rationality arguments
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outlined above, or more generally for simple military utility, they nonetheless do
provide a credible basis to understand disposition. If, in fact, the military "owns"
LOAC as many so perceive, then normative adherence has less to do with external
legal controls than with an internal orientation of self-image. As such, arguments
of legal propriety find a receptive audience in the military and permit a more
nuanced view of the application of force. This does not deny the availability of ful-
some legal arguments to ensure complete mission accomplishment. It does, how-
ever, allow for a "base" internal attitude toward legitimacy of action that has been
accepted—one that is not oblivious to the significance of moral and social conse-
quences concerning the application of force.
Virtue Ethics
Unlike deontology or utilitarianism, which are forms of external moral guidance
"where [an] agent has to bring his will and action in line with universal moral
laws ... or to maximize the common good," 133 virtue ethics deal with a deeply
personal orientation toward living life. OfAristotelian origin, virtue ethics are con-
cerned with consistent personal examination of our own behavior. Mark Osiel
notes that "virtue is a property of our character, not our relation to others, even if
evidenced in such relations." 134 Osiel points to a form of virtue ethics as the moti-
vating factor that led a number of senior US judge advocates to resist some Bush
administration policies which were thought to undermine a particular balance in
the framework of LOAC. 135 The motivation was not necessarily based upon
means-ends rationality, or even a conscious expression of internalized legal norms;
rather they were motivated by a deeper sense of felt professional honor.
Interestingly, virtue ethics have been viewed as a more reliable basis for action
than "altruistic obligations to others and braver than self-interest." 136 Importantly,
they represent something of a reversion to an aristocratic commitment of living a
life based upon a sense of reflective equilibrium. 137 Critically, the motivation is not
premised upon any sense of (human) rights discourse, but rather a reflection of
personal integrity. Hence with respect to the Judge Advocate General's (JAG)
Corps approach to detainee operations, Osiel observes that the felt sentiment was
that "the duties we owe to those we have detained as terror suspects should best be
understood ... as an inference from the duties we owe our fellow citizens to behave
honorably, consistent with our identity as a people constitutively committed to the
rule of law." 138
The military is particularly susceptible to the agency of virtue ethics as codes
of behavior and service values are ritually emphasized in all professional military
organizations around the world. Moral courage, as much as physical courage, is
highly prized, and heuristic devices that transmit and reinforce this virtue are
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consistently deployed. As Osiel notes, one such shorthand expression is reflected
in the oft-used statement "Marines don't do that/' 139 Similarly, the line of a JAG
Corps defender of a Guantanamo detainee, "It's not about them, it's about us," 140
conveys the depth of this appeal to virtue ethics, as does the refrain "Lose Moral
Legitimacy, Lose the War" outlined within the COIN manual. 141 That this particu-
lar perspective should have explanatory power for choices made under the law is
not all that surprising. The business of warfare is brutal and deeply intimate.
Drawing upon a self-illuminated moral identity is, or should be, a necessary con-
sequence ofsuch decision making. It does necessarily inform decision making in a
manner independent from means-ends rationality and constructivist internaliza-
tion theories. Of course, targeting and other operational decision making has
become highly bureaucratized 142 and there is the sense of a loss of responsibility
through the battery of iterated routines. 143 Yet, there is always space at the strate-
gic, operational and tactical levels where independent judgment is exercised under
LOAC and it is here, within those spaces, where virtue ethics have some explana-
tory power for decision making. As such, the recognition ofvirtue ethics as a moti-
vating force within the military acts as a sort of default setting to counter lawfare
strategies that aim to ignite overreaction and violation of moral standards.
Conclusion
The typical sentiment expressed when dealing with assertions oflawfare is that it is
a pernicious tactic that exploits the vulnerabilities of "law-abiding" States. The fact
is that the practice oflaw, including LOAC, has always taken place on a highly con-
tested terrain of social and political norms. What the phenomenon of lawfare does
is highlight the perceptions ofthe limitations under the positivist framework in ad-
dressing and countering its goals. All contemporary accounts of positivism today
reveal a level of interpretive space where broader social and policy considerations
can be infused into legal interpretation. It has been a strong theme of this article
that the interpretive space is much broader than what might be imagined.
Correlatively, it is also a theme that LOAC is more indeterminate than what might
be hoped. Hence, whether reconciled as the interplay between law and policy, or
being an interpretive act within Hart's penumbral region, or representing a new
format of legitimacy, the means exist by which the goals sought in a malevolent
lawfare strategy can be decisively countered. Evidence of these opportunities al-
ready exists within the COIN and stability operations environment, but these new




In understanding the choices that are available to military legal officers when in-
terpreting and applying the law, there are a number of factors that do get included
in the decision-making calculus beyond mere textual excursus. Means-ends ratio-
nality and the role of public opinion have always been relevant considerations. In
accepting this, legal analysis should borrow from IR theory to better understand
the manner in which the law is used as part of political advocacy projects.
Constructivism provides another explanatory theory for why normative features of
the law are internalized and why there exists a strong sentiment that LOAC is
"owned" by the military. Such an understanding assists in anticipating the margins
of appreciation that may be at play when grappling with the decision-making pro-
cesses under LOAC. Similarly, virtue ethics sometimes play an unconscious
though vital part of the interpretive experience and permit a reliably professional
assessment of law's purpose in relation to military decision making.
The issue of equipoise between principles of military necessity and humanity
remains central to the interpretive endeavor of LOAC. As a fundamental touch-
stone of every interpretive exercise in any register of approach is the observations
of Professor Dinstein, who poignantly notes that
[ejvery single norm of LOIAC [the law of international armed conflict] is moulded
by a parallelogram of forces: it confronts a built-in tension between the relentless de-
mands of military necessity and humanitarian considerations, working out a com-
promise formula. The outlines of the compromise vary from one LOIAC norm to
another. Still, in general terms, it can be stated categorically that no part of LOIAC
overlooks military requirements, just as no part ofLOIAC loses sight ofhumanitarian
considerations. 144
The expression ofsuch a "categorical imperative" provides a critical foundation
for directing the trajectory of any interpretive approach. While lawfare is derided
as an unfair or malevolent means to an ulterior end, its recognition permits a
deeper appreciation of the social and political context in which law is used to un-
derpin military decision making. This requires that the inevitable moral and politi-
cal dilemmas encountered in such decision making be consciously faced if legal
advice is to be rendered meaningful. Central to this exercise is the critical need to
balance military and humanitarian considerations, always and everywhere, as a
matter of legal rectitude. It also prompts a necessary acknowledgment ofthe special
role military lawyers have in dispensing advice under the law, in whose name they
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Warning Civilians Prior to Attack under
International Law: Theory and Practice
Pnina Sharvit Baruch and Noam Neuman*
A primary goal of the modern law of armed conflict (also known as interna-tional humanitarian law) is to protect civilians as much as possible from the
violent consequences of hostilities. Accordingly, the law ofarmed conflict requires
that the parties to a conflict apply certain precautionary measures in order to mini-
mize incidental injury to civilians resulting from military attacks. One ofthese pre-
cautionary measures is the provision of warnings to civilians prior to an attack.
This article will deal with this measure, and examine both theoretical and practical
aspects of providing advance warnings of attacks.
During World War II there were instances when civilians were warned prior to
an attack. Advance warnings were also provided during other armed conflicts
throughout the second half of the twentieth century; however, the amount, scope
and specificity of warnings issued to civilians have dramatically increased in the
conflicts fought since the beginning of this century. Probably the most elaborate
and systematic warnings were issued by Israel in its conflict in Lebanon in 2006 and
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especially in its operation in the Gaza Strip in 2009. This article explores the legal
boundaries of the obligation to issue warnings to civilians prior to attack. Does the
recent practice of Israel and other States result from legal obligations or is it a re-
flection ofself-imposed restrictions? What are the elements a warning should fulfill
in order to meet the legal requirements?
Section I briefly reviews the legal framework of the obligation to give warnings
prior to an attack, its historical development and the manner with which it is dealt
in military manuals. In section II, State practice will be examined, with a focus on
Israeli practice. Based on these two sections, section III will analyze the different legal
aspects of the obligation. Finally, the article will end with our conclusion as to both
the legal and practical issues associated with advance warnings.
This article is written from the viewpoint of practitioners faced with the practi-
cal aspects of the issue at hand and is based on personal experience. Hopefully, it
will serve as a useful tool to those facing similar dilemmas, as well as to those evalu-
ating the performance of others.
I. The Duty to Give Prior Warning: The Legal Basis
A. Historical Development
The requirement to give, in certain circumstances, advance warning prior to an at-
tack that may affect the civilian population appears in the earliest codifications of
the law governing the conduct of hostilities. Thus, we find the following instruc-
tion in Article 19 of the Lieber Code of 1862:
Commanders, whenever admissible, inform the enemy oftheir intention to bombard a
place, so that the noncombatants, and especially the women and children, may be re-
moved before the bombardment commences. But it is no infraction of the common
law of war to omit thus to inform the enemy. Surprise may be a necessity. 1
Article 19 acknowledges that there may be situations when it is justified not to give
a warning, as when it is necessary to enable surprising the enemy.
The Lieber Code influenced the language of the Brussels Declaration of 1874,
which stated in Article 16 that "if a town or fortress, agglomeration of dwellings, or
village, is defended, the officer in command of an attacking force must, before
commencing a bombardment, except in assault, do all in his power to warn the
authorities." 2 Unlike the Lieber Code, the Brussels Declaration is directed to the of-
ficer in command of an attacking force and not to commanders in general. It also
specifies that the warning must be given to the "authorities." Similar language
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appears in the Laws ofWar on Land published by the Institute of International Law
in 1880 (known also as the Oxford Manual) . 3
Article 26 of the Regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention IV con-
tains wording that is almost identical to that ofthe Brussels Declaration: "The Offi-
cer in Command ofan attacking force must, before commencing a bombardment,
except in the case of an assault, do all in his power to warn the authorities."4 The
term "assault" refers to surprise attacks, regarding which there is no obligation to
warn in advance.5
Article 6 ofthe 1907 Hague Convention IX Concerning Bombardment by Naval
Forces in Time of War also refers to the duty to issue warnings prior to attacks. 6
Conversely, the draft Air Warfare Rules of 1923 did not refer to warnings, 7 which
suggests that at that period of time no similar rule existed with regard to aerial
bombardment. 8
The implementation of the obligation to issue warnings prior to an attack cre-
ated little difficulty in earlier eras when attacks likely to seriously affect the civilian
population came from artillery, usually in a siege operation. In such a context,
since the authorities of the besieged area had no practical means of protecting the
military objectives being targeted, surprise was not required and attacking troops
had little problem in giving an advance warning;9 however, when attacks through
aerial bombardment commenced early in the twentieth century, surprise was
considered a critical condition for success. As a consequence, as reflected by the
absence of a warning provision in the 1923 Air Warfare Rules, apparently no rule
existed at that time requiring warnings prior to aerial attacks. Rogers indicates that
when the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was preparing its re-
port to the Conference of Government Experts in 1971, a majority of experts felt
that the rule regarding warning "had fallen into disuse." 10
B. Current Legal Framework
Today there is widespread acceptance that the rule laid down in the 1907 Hague
Regulations reflects customary international law. 11
B.l. The 1977 Additional Protocols and the Duty to Give Warnings
The duty to give warnings prior to attack is addressed in Article 57(2) (c) ofAddi-
tional Protocol I of 1977, dealing with precautions in attack. The article provides,
"Effective advance warning shall be given of attacks which may affect the civilian
population, unless circumstances do not permit." 12 The article was adopted with
ninety votes in favor, none against and four abstentions at the diplomatic confer-
ence that negotiated the Protocol. 13 No relevant reservations were made regarding
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it.
14 This article reflects, in essence, a rule existing in customary international law. 15
We will analyze the components of the customary norm below.
Article 57(2)(c) refers only to warning of "attacks" and, therefore, does not de-
mand warnings prior to "military operations" that are not attacks. 16 It does not,
however, distinguish among land, naval and aerial attacks so long as they are car-
ried out against objectives on land. 17 As for warnings with regard to attacking ves-
sels at sea and aircraft, there are special rules that will not be discussed in this
article.
18
Additional Protocol II of 1977, dealing with non-international armed conflict, 19
does not include an obligation to issue warnings prior to an attack;20 however, the
ICRC study Customary International Humanitarian Law (CIHL) states that the ob-
ligation to issue a warning prior to attack also applies in non-international armed
conflict. 21 This article will address advance warnings only in the context of interna-
tional armed conflict; the de jure applicability of the rule in non-international
armed conflicts will not be analyzed.
The recently published manual on air and missile warfare (AMW Manual) 22
deals with the duty to issue warnings when attacking ground targets by air or mis-
sile operations in rule 37:
When the attack of a lawful target by air or missile combat operations may result in
death or injury to civilians, effective advance warnings must be issued to the civilian
population, unless circumstances do not permit. This may be done, for instance,
through dropping leaflets or broadcasting the warnings. Such warnings ought to be as
specific as circumstances permit 23
B.2. Other Obligations to Issue Warnings Prior to Attack
The law ofarmed conflict also includes an obligation to give specific advance warn-
ings before attacking persons and objects entitled to specific protection. 24 These in-
clude civilian hospitals, 25 medical units,26 hospital ships,27 civilian medical units,28
civil defense personnel and material,29 and cultural property. 30 The purpose of the
warning in these instances is to provide the enemy the opportunity to put an end to
the misuse of such personnel and objects in order to avoid the need to attack
them. 31 Accordingly, the AMW Manual stipulates that such warnings should
include a time limit within which to redress the situation to the extent that the cir-
cumstances permit.32
Reference to warnings appears also in the amended Protocol on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II to
the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons).33 Additionally, as indicated
above, there are also special rules about warning vessels and aircraft in the context
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of surface warfare at sea and of aerial operations. 34 This article will not address
these specific types of warning.
Finally, warnings usually constitute part of the rules of engagement issued to
ground forces involved in law enforcement missions. For example, while trying to
arrest a suspect, the arresting power might have a duty to warn the suspect before
using lethal force through verbal warnings and warning shots. This article will focus,
however, only on warnings during armed conflict.
C. Military Manuals
An obligation to give warnings prior to attacks appears in many military manuals,
including the most recent. 35 Examples include the following.
• The US Army's Operational Law Handbook, published in 2010, provides:
The general requirement to warn before a bombardment only applies if civilians are
present. Exception: if it is an assault (any attack where surprise is a key element), no
warning need be given. Warnings need not be specific as to time and location ofthe at-
tack, but can be general and issued through broadcasts, leaflets, etc.36
• Paragraph 8.9.2 ofthe US Navy's The Commander s Handbook on the Law of
Naval Operations, which was issued in 2007, under the heading "Warning before
Bombardment" states, "Where the military situation permits, commanders
should make every reasonable effort to warn the civilian population located in
close proximity to a military objective targeted for bombardment. Warnings may
be general rather than specific lest the bombarding force or the success of its mis-
sion be placed in jeopardy." 37
• Article 5.32.8 of the United Kingdom's The Manual of the Law ofArmed
Conflict (2004) provides:
There is a duty to give advance warning ofan attack that "may" affect the civilian popu-
lation, unless circumstances do not permit. Obviously, the point does not arise as a
matter oflaw ifmilitary operations are being conducted in an area where there is no ci-
vilian population or if the attack is not going to affect the civilian population at all. In
other cases, the warning must be given in advance and it must be effective. The object of
the warning is to enable civilians to take shelter or leave the area and to enable the civil
defense authorities to take appropriate measures. To be effective the warning must be
in time and sufficiently specific and comprehensive to enable them to do this . . . . 38
• Article 551 of Australia's 1994 Defense Force Manual provides:
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When a planned attack is likely to affect the civilian population, those making the at-
tack are required to give, if practicable, effective advance warning of the attack to the
authorities or civilian population. This requirement must obviously be applied in a
commonsense manner in light of all other factors. If the proposed action is likely to be
seriously compromised by a warning then there is no requirement to provide any
warning.39
• Article 420 ofCanada's manual Law ofArmed Conflict at the Operational and
Tactical Levels (2001) states, "An effective advance warning shall be given of at-
tacks which may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do not permit
such a warning to be given. For tactical reasons, an attacking force may not give a
warning in order to maintain the element of surprise."40
• Article 1.4 of France's LOAC Summary Note of 1992 states, "If the military
mission allows for it, appropriate warning must be given to the civilian population
to give it time to seek shelter."41
Additional examples appear in volume II of the ICRC's customary international
law study.42
IT. State Practice
This section includes under the heading "General Practice" several examples of
State practice on warnings prior to attack.43 It should be kept in mind that this is
only a brief account of these examples and does not purport to be a comprehensive
or exhaustive record of such practice. The second part, "Israeli Practice," is a more
detailed description of Israeli practice with regard to warnings prior to attack, par-
ticularly in the Lebanon War of 2006 and in the operation in the Gaza Strip in
2008-9.
A. General Practice
A.l. World War II
During World War II, warnings generally were not given prior to aerial attacks
conducted in enemy territory.44 In a US Air Force pamphlet it is explained that
practice was lax on warnings, "because ofthe heavily defended nature ofthe targets
attacked as well as because of attempts to conceal targets."45 The Air Force did give
general warnings by dropping leaflets listing cities that would be bombed. The
listed cities were indeed subsequently bombed. 46
There were, however, also examples of cases where specific warnings were given,
to include the warning given in 1945 to the German commander of Minister that
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the city was about to be bombarded if he did not surrender.47 A warning was also
given ninety minutes prior to a US attack on the Skoda armament works in
Czechoslovakia.48 Another example is the warning to the Japanese authorities be-
fore the use of the atomic bomb against Hiroshima.49
In other cases, particularly when the objective was situated in occupied terri-
tory, warnings were made by radio or by means of pamphlets. 50 There were also
cases in which aircraft flew at a very low altitude over the objective, giving civilians,
workers or townspeople time to leave. 51 It seems, however, that when warnings
were given during World War II, especially with regard to aerial attacks, this was
not necessarily done out of a sense of obligation, but rather in order to induce the
opposing belligerent to surrender or to avoid further escalation that would result
from large numbers of civilian casualties.
A.2. Korean War
During the Korean War of 1950 to 1953, warnings prior to aerial bombardments
were sometimes issued by UN forces. 52 For example, a warning was broadcast by
the United Nations Command to the civilian population of North Korea asking
residents to leave any areas where there were military targets. The warning listed
the objects that were considered military targets, including railroads, bridges and
power plants.53 In addition, United Nations Command forces often dropped leaflets
telling the enemy the towns it was about to bomb.54 According to the report of the
United States in the CIHL, the warnings given in the Korean War were general in
their terms, such as advising civilians to avoid war-supporting industries, "in order
not to alert the air defense forces of an impending attack on a specific target."55
A3. The Conflict in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)
In some cases NATO issued warnings prior to attacks during Operation Allied
Force's bombing campaign over the territory of the FRY in 1999. 56 Notwithstand-
ing this fact, in its report on the operation, Amnesty International claimed there
was "a consistent failure to give effective warning to civilians." 57
The incident which attracted the most attention concerning the issue of warn-
ings was the bombing of the building housing the television and radio station in
Belgrade on April 23. According to the final report to the prosecutor reviewing the
NATO bombing campaign,58 evidence concerning the warning given prior to this
attack is somewhat contradictory. On one hand, NATO officials in Brussels are al-
leged to have told Amnesty International that they did not give a specific warning,
because it would have endangered the pilots. 59 On the other hand, foreign media
representatives were apparently forewarned of the attack. In addition, apparently a
warning was received by Yugoslav authorities eleven days prior to the attack; as a
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result some Yugoslav officials may have expected that the building was about to be
struck. The report to the prosecutor concludes:
Although knowledge on the part ofYugoslav officials of the impending attack would
not divest NATO of its obligation to forewarn civilians under Article 57(2), it may
nevertheless imply that the Yugoslav authorities may be partially responsible for the
civilian casualties resulting from the attack and may suggest that the advance notice
given by NATO may have in fact been sufficient under the circumstances.60
According to some critics, warning the foreign journalists to stay away from the
site was not sufficient to meet the requirement ofinforming the Yugoslav authorities
of an attack. 61 In addition, it is argued that the warning to the Yugoslav authorities
was not effective since the attack took place eleven days later and by that time the
threat was no longer perceived as plausible, leading civilians to be present in the
building at the time of the attack.62
AA. NATO in Afghanistan
During the military operations in Afghanistan that began in 2001 and have
continued to the present, NATO forces have routinely issued general warnings to
the civilian population prior to attack.63 Additionally, according to different re-
ports, such as those issued by Amnesty International, in some circumstances,
NATO aircraft in Afghanistan fly close to targets or shoot warning rounds to move
civilians away from a potential target.64
A. 5. Coalition Forces in Iraq
According to reports, during Operation Iraqi Freedom coalition forces routinely
dropped leaflets from the air advising Iraqi civilians of pending attacks. 65 By the
end ofApril 2003, 3 1 ,800,000 leaflets had been dropped, according to US Army fig-
ures.66 It should be noted, however, that while some of the leaflets focused on
warning civilians to stay away from military targets,67 many were part of a psycho-
logical warfare campaign aimed at civilians and soldiers and were meant to turn
them against Saddam Hussein and his regime.68
A.6. Russia-Georgia Conflict (2008)
The Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia
issued its report on the conflict in September 2009.69 The report is comprehensive,
but it is unclear if and when warnings were given prior to attacks. The report does
refer to a few specific cases regarding warnings.
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First, the report mentions positively the warnings given by the Republic of
Abkhazia authorities to the civilian population of the upper Kodori Valley, who,
immediately before the military operation began, received many warnings on the
preparations and execution of the military operation planned in that area and
were provided with a humanitarian corridor so that they could leave the area of
hostilities. 70
The report is less content with the practice of the Georgian forces, which used
smoke grenades to warn the population before artillery shelling. The report claims
that this falls short of giving an effective advance warning, though no analysis is
provided. The report finds the fact that Georgian authorities declared a three-hour
unilateral ceasefire to allow the remaining civilians in Tskhinvali to leave the con-
flict area by moving in a southern direction does not fulfill their obligation to take
all feasible measures. This contention seems linked to the finding that when the
nighttime offensive on Tskhinvali was carried out, no general advance warning was
provided to the remaining population. 71
It is interesting to note that in that portion ofthe report where Russia's descrip-
tion of the precautions its forces took in the course of the conflict is quoted, warn-
ings are not mentioned. 72
B. Israeli Practice
B.l. Lebanon
During the operations in Lebanon in 1982 and 1996, warnings were given by Israel
to the civilian population of southern Lebanon prior to attacks through the distri-
bution of leaflets and via radio and loudspeakers, as well as by telephone calls. 73
When the Second Lebanon War broke out in 2006, Israeli authorities stressed
the importance ofwarning the civilian population to stay away from areas ofcom-
bat in order to avoid as much as possible civilian casualties.74 Different warnings
were given in different phases of the attack, as will now be described. 75
The first aerial bombardment by Israel was a surprise attack carried out on the
night of July 12, 2006. Its aim was to destroy the long-range rockets of Hezbollah.
Israel had managed in the years before the war to acquire accurate intelligence as to
the location of Hezbollah's long-range rockets (Fajar rockets), which were limited
in number and had the capability of reaching the center of Israel's most populated
areas. The opening strike in the war was directed at these storage places, which
were, for the most part, residential buildings. Prior to these attacks no warning was
given, as surprise was crucial in order to prevent the relocation of the weapons to
new, unknown locations. The main deliberations prior to the attacks focused on
the proportionality analysis, as many civilians were expected to be killed or
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wounded in these attacks. This was weighed against the substantial militaryadvan-
tage anticipated from the attack."
During the next several weeks Israel continued with its aerial operations, as well
me naval operations, and also commenced a ground operation. At this stage,
Israel gave general warnings to civilians in specific areas of southern Lebanon, ad-
vising them to evacuate the area to places north of the Litani River in order to pro-
tect themselves from impending attacks expected in those areas. 77 Additionally,
similar warnings were given to villages from which missiles were actually being
launched toward Israel and to villages and specific areas in which military objects,
such as weapon depots and Hezbollah headquarters, were located (for example, the
Dahiya district in Beirut).
The warnings were given through four main methods: leaflets dropped by air-
craft, recorded Arabic messages to telephones, messages on an Arabic-speaking
radio station broadcasting from Israel, and telephone conversations with mukhtars
(local leaders), mayors and community leaders."8 The warnings were intended to
provide civilians with a reasonable period oftime for evacuation, during the course
of which travel would be relativelv safe and strikes in the evacuation routes would
be avoided (unless the target was time sensitive, such as, for example, when rockets
were fired toward Israel and there was a need to prevent such fire from continu-
ing). In addition, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) gave general warnings advising
Chilians to avoid places in which Hezbollah operated. One such leaflet, out of
510,000 dropped on the afternoon of July 16 over Sidon, Tyre and Beirut, read as
follows (originallv in Arabic) :"
g
To the residents of Lebanon
To protect the citizens of the State of Israel, the IDF will continue its operations in Leb-
anon against Hezbollah's unbridled and continuing terrorist attacks.
For your own safety, and because of our desire to prevent harm from coming to unin-
volved civilians, you should avoid places where Hezbollah is located and from which it
operates against the State of Israel.
Such places are:
• Locations from which rockets are launched at Israeli territory
• Storehouses of ammunition and military equipment belonging to Hezbollah
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• Hezbollah centers in south Beirut and regions in south Lebanon under Hezbollah
control
• Beirut's southern suburb [Dahiya] which is the terror center
The IDF calls upon the residents of Lebanon and the Lebanese army to avoid extending
direct or indirect aid to Hezbollah elements. Anyonewho does so endangers his own life.
You should know that the continuation of terrorism against Israel will prevent you
from having a better life in the future
The State of Israel
Warnings to civilians in specific villages were repeated several times in order to
make sure that civilians were aware of the need to evacuate the area. 80 Following
the comprehensive warning campaign a vast majority of the civilian residents of
south Lebanon left and headed north, although some civilians did stay behind.81
The Israeli operation in Lebanon was subject to critical review in two reports
prepared by missions sent byUN human rights bodies (hereinafter theUN Reports
on Lebanon or the Reports). 82 One ofthe reports admitted that the warnings "cer-
tainly saved many lives, both in south Beirut and south ofthe Litani River."83 Nev-
ertheless, the Reports also included criticism of the warnings given by Israel during
the military operation. An analysis of the legal standards applied by the Reports is
made in section III.
B.2. Israeli Practice in the Gaza Strip (2000 to the Present)
In the autumn of 2000 there was an outbreak of hostilities between Israel and
Palestinian armed groups in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In the years that
followed, the IDF carried out aerial operations against targets located in these ar-
eas, such as weapon depots, military headquarters and tunnels used for smuggling
ofweapons.84
Prior to aerial operations against such targets, Israel developed a practice of giv-
ing a general warning by pamphlets to residents ofbuildings housing such military
infrastructure to stay away. In addition, specific and precise warnings by phone
were provided to the inhabitants of the location immediately prior to the attack. 85
The aim was to enable the civilians to leave before the planned attack; however, in a
few cases civilians being warned chose not to heed these warnings and instead were
even joined by others coming to shield the house from attack. This led to the addi-
tion of further steps of giving further warning by phone calls and eventually of
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firing warning shots using small munitions aimed at the roofs of the designated
targets used in such cases. 86
When the operation in Gaza commenced in December 2008, Israel was faced
with the difficult task of carrying out extensive military operations in a small
area—one of the most densely populated in the world—where there was
widespread intermingling of hostile forces with the civilian population. 87 Ac-
cordingly, in order to minimize civilian casualties as much as possible, Israel em-
ployed substantial efforts and various means to warn civilians of impending
operations. This extensive system of operations is described in an Israeli official
publication as follows: 88
First, general warnings were used, calling on civilians to stay away from sites where
Hamas was conducting combat activities. In addition, regional warnings were distributed
in certain areas, calling on civilians to leave those areas before IDF forces operated in
them. Efforts were made to include in these warnings sufficient information to the resi-
dents, including a timeframe for the evacuation and designated specific routes for this
purpose leading to safe areas. Far from having no place to flee, residents could—and
the vast majority did—move to safe locations. Finally, specific warnings were issued to
residents of particular buildings before attack.
Throughout the Gaza Operation, the IDF employed a variety ofmethods to communi-
cate warnings effectively. The warning techniques included:
• Radio Broadcasts and Phone Calls: The IDF conveyed instructions and advance
warnings to residents by local radio broadcasts with IDF announcements and by about
165,000 phone calls. This involved specific notices as well as a daily news broadcast (the
latter from 31 December onwards).
• Dropping of Leaflets: During the Gaza operation, the IDF dropped a total of some
2,500,000 leaflets of various kinds in the Gaza Strip. Some of the leaflets warned civil-
ians to distance themselves from military targets, including buildings containing weap-
ons, ammunitions or tunnels, or areas where terrorist activity was being conducted.
Other leaflets directed residents to leave a particular location and move to a safe zone
by a certain route and within a defined period of time. Such leaflets were distributed,
for instance, in the northern Gaza neighbourhood of Sajaiya.f 89 ] While warnings were
a significant tool to reduce the likelihood of civilian casualties, IDF forces did not con-
sider the distribution of leaflets alone as sufficient to presume the absence of civilians at
the relevant locations.
• Specific Warnings Before Attacks: In addition to the above, the IDF made specific tele-
phone calls just before an attack was about to take place, informing residents at risk
about the upcoming strike and urging them to leave the place. In certain instances, al-
though such warnings were made, the civilians chose to stay. In such cases, the IDF
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made even greater efforts to avoid civilian casualties and minimise collateral damage by
firing warning shotsfrom light weapons that hit the roofs ofthe designated targets, before
proceeding with the strike. These warnings were accompanied by real-time surveil-
lance in order to assess the presence of civilians in the designated military target, de-
spite the advance warnings. Accordingly, the commander in charge assessed whether
the collateral damage anticipated, including to those who chose to stay at the premises,
was not excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated. The specific warn-
ings were generally effective. Several such incidents are discussed in Section V.D(2), in-
cluding one in which all residents of a four-story apartment building safely evacuated
following a series ofwarnings, and another in which surveillance confirmed the evacu-
ation of a group of residents, although apparently one family remained despite the ex-
tensive warnings.
The Israeli report concludes that
[wjhile the warning systems implemented by the IDF did not provide a 100 percent
guarantee against civilian casualties, they were, in fact, highly effective. Aerial video
surveillance by IDF forces confirmed the departure of civilians from targeted areas
prior to the attack as a direct result of the warnings.90
One example referred to in the report is an incident in which specific warnings
were given ofthe attack on the house ofNazar Ri'an on January 1, 2009. 91 Since this
is a good illustration of the manner in which warnings were used, it is worth de-
scribing in detail.
Ri'an and members ofhis familywere killed in an aerial strike that hit their home. Ri'an
was a senior Hamas operative, but he was not the target of the attack .... Instead, the
operational goal of the strike was to destroy Hamas' central compound in the Jabaliya
refugee camp. The compound included several buildings that served as storage sites for
large quantity of sophisticated weapons. . . . [T]he IDF issued several warnings before
the attack. These included not only general leaflets and telephone calls, alerting civil-
ians to avoid facilities serving Hamas and other terrorist groups, but specific phone
calls to the residents ofthe targeted buildings, notifying them ofthe planned strike and
warning them to evacuate the premises. The IDF also fired two separate rounds of pre-
liminary warning shots with light weapons, 13 minutes and 9 minutes before the strike,
providing sufficient time for residents to evacuate. The residents evidently understood
these early warnings, as a group ofthem did leave the building, a fact confirmed by IDF
surveillance before proceeding with the strike. The IDF observed this group evacuation
and drew the reasonable conclusion that the buildings (including Ri'an's house) were
empty. Only then did the IDF launch the strike.
Following the strike, secondary explosions were visible. This confirmed that Hamas
used the buildings for weapons storage, and therefore it was a legitimate military ob-
jective according to the Law ofArmed Conflict. Only later was it discovered that Ri'an
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The measures taken by Israel to warn the civilian population during the
operation have been described by some as "probably the most extensive, and most
specific, warnings of offensive operations over such a short period in the history of
warfare."93 However, the warnings given by Israel were criticized and found insuf-
ficient in the report prepared by the Fact Finding Mission headed by Richard
Goldstone on behalf of the UN Human Rights Council (Goldstone Report).94
The Goldstone Report has been strongly criticized, mainly with regard to its
methodology, the reliability of the factual findings and the ensuing questionable
conclusions. 95 These deficiencies are also evident with regard to its analysis of the
warnings given during the operation.96 In addition, doubts have been raised con-
cerning different aspects of the legal analysis in the report, including in relation to
the standards it has set regarding the scope ofthe duty to issue warnings prior to at-
tack.97 These standards will be examined in the course of the legal analysis of the
different components of the obligation to warn in section III.
III. Analysis of the Obligation to Issue Warnings
After setting the legal framework and reviewing State practice with regard to warn-
ings given to civilians prior to attack, we will now turn to an analysis of the scope
and content of this obligation.
We will start with some general observations on the essence of the obligation to
issue warnings prior to attacks and its relationship with the other rules and princi-
ples of the law of armed conflict. This will be followed by an analysis of the aim of
the obligation to give advance warning. In this context we will discuss also the dif-
ference between a lawful warning and an unlawful threat. We will then examine the
different aspects ofwarnings that influence their effectiveness: the temporal aspect,
the recipient of the warning, the content of the warning and the method by which
the warning is issued. Next we will explore the exception to this obligation, namely,
when are circumstances such that an attacker need not issue a warning. Finally, we
will conclude this section with a short reference to the ramifications of the warn-
ings on civilians left behind.
A. The Essence of the Obligation
The obligation to give warnings prior to attack is one of the precautionary mea-
sures military forces are required to take under the law of armed conflict. The aim
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ofprecautionary measures is to avoid (or at least to minimize) the collateral effects
of hostilities on civilian persons, the civilian population and civilian objects.98
Article 57(1) ofAPI, which lays down the general rationale of precautions in at-
tack, states that "constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civil-
ians and civilian objects." In the Commentary to API it is explained that this article
"appropriately supplements the basic rule of Article 48 ... , which urges Parties to
the conflict to always distinguish between the civilian population and combatants,
as well as between civilian objects and military objectives." The Commentary goes
on to explain that "[e]ven though this is only an enunciation of a general principle
which is already recognized in customary law, it is good that it is included at the
beginning of this article in black and white, as the other paragraphs are devoted to
the practical application of this principle."99 In other words, precautions in attack
are meant to be practical means ofenabling the application ofthe principles of dis-
tinction and proportionality. The precautions are meant to ensure, as much as pos-
sible, that civilians and civilian objects are spared. This is achieved by setting duties
on commanders to do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked
are military objectives and to choose means and methods of attack with a view to
minimizing incidental injury to civilians and civilian objects by refraining from
launching attacks expected to be in breach of the principle of proportionality100
and by issuing warnings prior to attacks.
Beyond the legal aspects, there is also a practical connection between the issu-
ance of warnings and the implementation of the principle of proportionality.
Warning civilians prior to an attack enables them to evacuate the area before the at-
tack takes place or to seek shelter at the time ofthe attack. This contributes to mini-
mizing civilian casualties and to enhancing their protection. At the same time, the
fact that civilians have evacuated an area or found shelter leads to a lower number
of anticipated civilian casualties from the attack—namely, to less anticipated col-
lateral damage—and hence increases the ability to carry out a proportionate attack.
This connection between giving a warning and fulfilling the proportionality
standard leads to warnings being, on one hand, a valuable measure in reducing
harm to civilians and, on the other hand, a useful tool in the hands ofcommanders
for gaining more freedom ofaction. This does not mean that warnings are counter-
productive in terms ofenhancing the protection of civilians in armed conflict situ-
ations; on the contrary, this only reflects one of the realities of such situations,
namely, that they are not necessarily zero-sum games.
B. Aim of the Warning
As discussed above, as one of the precautionary measures prescribed by the law of
armed conflict, providing a warning prior to attack is aimed to enhance the
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protection of civilians from the harmful consequences of hostilities. The way in
which warnings contribute to this protection of the civilians is by providing them
an opportunity to protect themselves from impending attacks. Based on this aim of
the warnings, two main questions require analysis: (1) prior to which kinds of at-
tack is a warning required and (2) what is a genuine warning and when is a warning
actually a measure used to threaten or mislead the civilian population? We will
now examine each of these questions.
B.l. Prior to What Kinds ofAttack Is a Warning Required
B.l.l. Attacks Endangering Civilians. Again, the purpose of imposing a duty to
give warnings prior to attack is to enable civilians to protect themselves from the
consequences of the attack. Accordingly, all the legal instruments dealing with the
obligation to issue warnings focus on attacks which might affect civilians. This is
the case also in the military manuals. Therefore, there is no legal obligation to issue
warnings in an area where there are no civilians or when there are no civilians likely
to be affected by the attack. 101
There are, of course, many examples of cases where members of armed forces
have been warned of an impending attack. 102 This does not mean that the warning
was given as the result of a legal obligation, since other non-legal considerations
also exist, such as getting the other side to surrender, thus avoiding unnecessary
casualties to both parties to the conflict or when the aim of the operation is to cap-
ture prisoners, in order, for example, to promote a prisoner exchange. Calls to sur-
render may also be part of a psychological warfare campaign. 103
B. 1 .2. What Degree of Impact on Civilians Requires a Warning. Since the duty
to give warnings prior to attacks refers only to attacks having an impact on civil-
ians, the question arises as to what degree of impact raises this duty. Does the obli-
gation to warn civilians apply only prior to attacks that might endanger the lives or
physical safety of civilians or also when the expected results ofthe attack may affect
them in other ways?
The standard set in this regard in Article 57(2) (c) ofAPI is that the duty to warn
applies to attacks "which may affect the civilian population" (Emphasis added.) The
term "may affect" is a very broad term that arguably could also encompass damage
to property or even non-physical harm. However, according to the Commentary to
Protocol I, the function ofwarnings is "to give civilians the chance to protect them-
selves." 104 Similarly, the object ofwarnings specified in the UKManual is "to enable
civilians to take shelter or leave the area and to enable the civil defense authorities to
take appropriate measures." 105 Likewise, France's LOAC Summary Note states that
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warning must be given to the civilian population in order "to give it time to seek
shelter." 106
The emphasis on limiting the scope of the obligation to physical harm is explic-
itly stated in rule 37 oftheAMWManual, which stipulates that the obligation to is-
sue a warning is limited to attacks that "may result in death or injury to civilians."
(Emphasis added.) In theAMW Commentary it is explained:
Rule 37 does not come into playwhen a particular air or missile combat operation may
result only in damage to, or destruction of, civilian objects. Neither does it come into
play in case the attack results in mere inconveniences to civilians caused by, e.g., electri-
cal blackouts or reduced mobility due to broken lines of communications. 107
The formulation of rule 37 seems an accurate reflection of the State practice de-
scribed above, which does not include examples ofwarnings given prior to attacks
that were aimed at targets located near empty civilian objects or that caused only
inconvenience to the civilian population. 108
Evaluating whether an attack may affect civilians also raises factual questions. In
some cases there might be uncertainty as to whether civilians would be affected by
the attack. The evaluation of whether an attack should be considered as one that
"may" affect civilians is based on the information available to the person making
the decision at the time of the attack. 109 In a case of reasonable doubt, however,
warnings should be given (unless circumstances do not permit). 110
B.2. Genuine Warnings versus Threats and Deception
Genuine warnings are an important measure to minimize the harmful effect of an
attack on civilians by enabling them to protect themselves from the expected at-
tack. There are cases, however, in which the warnings are not made with a genuine
objective of protecting civilians, but rather are intended to terrorize civilians or to
mislead them. This is an unlawful use of warnings. We will first address unlawful
threats and then discuss when warnings become unlawful ruses of war.
B.2.1. Unlawful Threats. There is sometimes a thin line between lawful warnings
and unlawful threats that are intended to terrorize the civilian population. Article
51(2) ofAPI prohibits "acts or threats ofviolence the primary purpose ofwhich is
to spread terror among the civilian population"; 111 therefore warnings must not be
used as a means ofspreading such terror. 112 The defining element in differentiating
between lawful warnings and unlawful threats is the intention. Article 5 1 (2)'s pro-
hibition on terrorizing civilians refers to threats "the primarypurpose ofwhich is to
spread terror." 113 (Emphasis added.) In the Galic case, the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia emphasized that the prohibition on terrorizing
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a civilian population applies only when there is a "specific intent to spread terror
among the civilian population" and that this "was principal among the aims" ofthe
act.
114 Therefore, it does not include genuine warnings, even when worded in a
frightening way, since their "primary purpose" is to get civilians out of the area for
their protection and the principal aim of the action is not to cause terror. 115
According to the CIHL, threats that all civilians would be considered liable to at-
tack have been condemned and withdrawn. 116 By contrast, warning civilians that
anyone staying in a combat zone is endangering his or her life should not be con-
sidered a threat, but rather a mere reflection ofthe real danger facing those who re-
main behind. Warnings must be effective and, therefore, should be worded in a
way that clarifies the danger in a forceful manner. 117
A related issue regards situations of unlawful internal displacement of civilians.
According to the UN Reports on Lebanon, unlawful arbitrary displacement includes
"displacement in situations ofarmed conflict which is not warranted by the need to
ensure the security ofthe civilians involved or imperative military reasons." 118 The
UN Reports insinuate that the Israeli warnings in Lebanon were used as a means to
achieve such internal displacement.
The conclusion of the two Reports that warning civilians during battle might be
regarded as internal displacement of civilians that constitutes a violation of the law
ofwar is legally unsound since the rules forbidding deportation or forcible transfers
in times of armed conflict refer mainly to occupied territories and require a degree
of control over the population that does not exist merely by issuing warnings. 119
Moreover, as for the Israeli warnings in Lebanon, while they did lead to a massive
evacuation of areas in south Lebanon and parts of Beirut, they were, according to Is-
rael, intended to spare civilian lives. Since these warnings were followed by aerial
and ground operations in those areas that did indeed pose a risk to the civilians re-
siding there, the evacuation did protect civilians' lives. 120 It is therefore not clear on
what basis the UN Reports conclude that the Israeli intentions were not genuine. 121
B.2.2. Unacceptable Ruses of War. The API Commentary states that since the aim
of the warnings is to give civilians the chance to protect themselves from the conse-
quences of the attack, ruses ofwar regarding warnings that would deceive the pop-
ulation and nullify the proper function of warnings are unacceptable. 122 This
concerns messages conveyed to civilians cloaked as warnings about an impending
attack when there is no real intention to carry out such an attack. The rationale for
this limitation is that once false warnings are given, civilians will not trust genuine
warnings and, as a consequence, will ignore them. This would lead to defeating the
purpose of the warnings, that of giving civilians the possibility of protecting them-
selves from the consequences of the attack.
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Henderson contends that from the wording ofthe API Commentary, which uses
the term "unacceptable" and not "illegal" or "unlawful," "a distinction can be
drawn between a ruse that causes an unnecessary evacuation, and thereby limits
the effectiveness offuture warnings, which is unacceptable but not unlawful, and a
ruse that actually contributes to collateral damage, which is unlawful." 123 Clearly,
using warnings in order to purposefully endanger civilians is unlawful; however,
any use which is counterproductive to the aim ofthe warnings, that is, to enable ci-
vilians to protect themselves, should be avoided.
The limitation on ruses of war with regard to warnings does not mean, of
course, that every warning must be followed by an attack, since there are cases
where decisions change for different reasons, including operational, policy and hu-
manitarian considerations. 124 The focus is on the intention at the time the warning
was issued.
C. What Is Considered to Be an "Effective" Warning
In order to achieve the aim of the warnings, warnings must be effective. We will
now turn to an analysis of this requirement.
At the outset it must be emphasized that the effectiveness of a warning must be
viewed in light of its evaluated effect at the time of its issuance based on the assess-
ment of the available information at the time, and not in light of the results of the
warning. Therefore, even if a warning was unsuccessful in causing civilians to pro-
tect themselves, this does not necessarily mean that the warning should be deter-
mined to not have fulfilled the requirement to be effective. 125 Furthermore, there is
no precise formula ofwhat is considered an "effective warning." As Rogers puts it,
what is "effective" must be a matter ofcommon sense. 126 Similarly, the Australian
manual states that the requirement to give effective warnings must be "applied in a
commonsense manner in light of all other factors." 127
It is also important to acknowledge the inherent uncertainty of armed conflict
situations, in which circumstances are unpredictable and constantly changing. 128
This reality has implications on what is considered an effective warning. Thus, for
example, in some cases there may be uncertainty with regard to the manner in
which military operations and attacks are going to proceed. Accordingly, it is not
always clear where the fighting will take place, what targets will be attacked and
which areas will be safer than others. Much depends, of course, on the actions of
the enemy forces.
This might pose a dilemma as to whether it is preferable to issue warnings
sooner, despite the vagueness of the situation, or to wait until the situation is
clearer. In some cases, giving warnings could actually reduce the protection of
civilians. As an example, civilians are requested to evacuate an area and proceed
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toward a certain location; however, the fighting does not reach the places from
which they have evacuated or, even worse, reaches the destination to which they
have been directed. On the other hand, postponing the warning might lead to it be-
ing given at a time when it has become impossible for civilians to evacuate in an or-
derly manner. Similar dilemmas might exist with regard to the level of specificity of
the warnings; hence the choice is many times in favor of the lesser of two evils.
In analyzing the effectiveness of a warning, different factors must be consid-
ered. These are (1) the temporal aspect—when should the warning be given, (2)
the recipient of the warning—to whom is it addressed, (3) the content of the
warning and (4) the method by which the warning is issued. We will analyze each
of these factors separately; however, there is an interrelationship among them.
Therefore, the assessment as to whether a warning is indeed effective must be
made on the basis of the accumulation of all these factors, taking into account the
factual circumstances.
C.l. The Temporal Aspect—When Should the Warning Be Given
As the UKManual succinctly states it, in order to be effective a warning must "be in
time." 129 The decision as to when is the right time to issue a warning depends on
the circumstances and is related to the content of the warning. This is also pointed
out in theAMW Commentary. 130 In analyzing the issue ofthe correct time to give a
warning, a distinction may be made between two different types of warnings
—
warnings given prior to an attack on a specific target and general warnings to the
residents of a certain area. We will examine each of these types.
C.l.l. Warnings Given Prior to an Attack on a Specific Target. In order to be ef-
fective, warnings that a specific target is about to be attacked must be issued within
a reasonable time before the attack is actually launched. If a warning is issued too
close to the time ofthe attack, it might not allow sufficient time for the civilian pop-
ulation to evacuate. 131 Conversely, there may be well-founded military consider-
ations that favor not giving a warning well in advance, if, for example, to do so
would give the enemy the opportunity to remove weapons or other movable mili-
tary equipment held inside the designated target. 132 But a warning must not be is-
sued too early either, as this might lead people to believe that the threat is no longer
valid. For example, in the case ofthe attack on the Belgrade television and radio sta-
tion, eleven days passed between the warning received by Yugoslav authorities and
the execution of the attack. By the time of the attack, civilian employees, who had
emptied the building at an earlier point in time, had returned to the building be-
lieving the threat had passed. 133
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C.1.2. General Warnings. When warnings call upon civilians to evacuate a certain
area, in order to be considered effective the population must be given enough time
and opportunity to evacuate safely (unless circumstances do not permit). 134 Obvi-
ously, the amount of time needed for residents of a region or village to leave the
area is much greater than the time required for residents ofa certain street to leave,
and significantly more than what residents of a particular building need in order to
vacate it. In other words, the time that must be given for evacuation is dependent
on the scope of the area from which the evacuation is sought, the number of those
required to evacuate, the destination to which they are to evacuate, the state of the
roads leading thereto and so forth. All these considerations must be taken into
account.
On the other hand, the commander also has to weigh military concerns, such as
the manner in which enemy forces might utilize the period given for evacuation in
order to reinforce targets within the designated area, to initiate attacks from within
it or to operate in proximity to civilian convoys, using such civilians as human
shields against forceful responses.
As an alternative to evacuation, when circumstances do not permit civilians
enough time to evacuate safely, it might be preferable to just warn them to stay in-
doors and take shelter.
C.2. The Recipient of the Warning—to Whom It Is Addressed
In order for a warning to be considered effective, it must be addressed to the
appropriate recipients, namely, those who can utilize the warning in order to protect
civilians from the approaching attack. In this context two aspects will be analyzed:
when can or should the warning be addressed to the authorities of the other side
and who should receive the warning.
C.2.1. Warning the Authorities. In the historical instruments dealing with warn-
ings, beginning with the 1874 Brussels Declaration and including the 1907 Hague
Regulations, the duty is to provide a warning to the authorities ofthe other side. 135
By contrast, Article 57(2)(c) of API does not indicate to whom the warning is
given, simply stating that "effective advance notice shall be given." Most military
manuals do not limit giving of notice only to authorities of the other side, and ei-
ther refrain from mentioning the recipient of the warnings or explicitly refer to
warning the civilian population directly. 136 This is also the requirement in the
AMW Manual. 137 Direct warnings to the civilian population seems to also reflect
the current actual practice of States.
One explanation of this shift is that in the past there was usually no direct con-
nection between the armed forces of one party to the conflict and the civilians of
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the other party; thus the means of spreading the warning directly to civilians were
limited—such is often not the case today. The change might also represent another
reflection of the shift in the law ofarmed conflict from its focus on inter-State rela-
tions to protection of civilians. 138
Notwithstanding this shift in the law, even today warnings to the authorities would
sometimes suffice if they are effective. 139 This is demonstrated by the conclusion of
the prosecutor reviewing NATO's bombing campaign in the former Yugoslavia,
who seems to accept that notifying the Yugoslav authorities of the impending at-
tack on the Belgrade television and radio station may have been sufficient to fulfill
the warning requirement. 140 The determination as to whether warning the author-
ities would suffice relies on their ability to reach the relevant civilian population in
an effective manner. 141 Accordingly, as Rogers explains, a warning to the authori-
ties hundreds of miles away and cut off from the proposed attack would not be
considered effective. 142
C.2.2. Who Should Receive the Warning. When a warning is given directly to the
civilian population, the question arises to what part of the population it must be
addressed. According to the AMW Commentary, there was disagreement among
the Group of Experts that drafted it over the question of whether the duty to issue
warnings is limited to warning civilians located in close proximity to the target. 143
In some ofthe military manuals there is reference to such a limitation, 144 though in
others there is not.
In our view, limiting the duty to give warning to only warning those in "close
proximity" to the target is too restrictive. Rather, the determination ofwho ought
to be warned should rest on the anticipated harm under the circumstances of the
attack. In this regard, we think the AMW Commentary provides a good standard,
namely, that the warning must reach the civilians likely to suffer death or injury
from the attack. 145 Thus, if accurate smaller munitions are used, civilians in the
next street need not be warned, while ifwidespread heavy bombing is anticipated,
civilians located in a larger area who might be killed or injured as a result of the at-
tack should receive warning. This does not mean that any civilian who might be
somehow affected by an attack must be warned, as discussed above when the aim of
the warnings was addressed.
As with the determination about the right time to give the warning, the decision
on who should be the recipient ofthe warning depends on the circumstances and is
related to the content ofthe warning. Thus in the Gaza operation a general warning
was issued in the first phase to almost all the civilians in the Gaza Strip, calling on
them to stay away from sites where Hamas was conducting combat activities. Later,
regional warnings were given to civilians living in certain areas, calling on them to
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leave these areas, and specific warnings were given prior to attacks on individual
buildings to the residents ofthose buildings, warning them to leave the location be-
fore the attack. 146 Another example ofthe connection between the content and the
recipient of the warnings is the warning given by coalition forces in southern Iraq
during Operation Iraqi Freedom to repair workers that communications links be-
ing repaired would be attacked. 147
This exemplifies how the proper recipients ofthe warning are determined based
on the circumstances ofthe attack against which they are being warned. When it is
a specific planned attack on a defined location, the warning is addressed to those
who might be directly affected by the attack. When it is an attack on certain objects
or infrastructure, it is directed toward those in close proximity to such objects, and
when it is a wide-scale operation, such as an anticipated ground operation or mas-
sive air raid, it is given to residents of large areas, even though some ofthem might
not eventually be affected by the ensuing attack. 148
C.3. The Content of the Warning
In discussing the content of the warning several aspects deserve analysis. These are
the clarity of the warning, the specificity of the warning, the need to repeat warn-
ings and the inclusion of instructions to civilians.
C.3.1. The Clarity of the Warning. In order to be considered "effective," a warn-
ing must be sufficiently specific and comprehensive so as to enable civilians to
protect themselves from the impending attack. 149 An obvious example is that a
warning in a language the population does not understand will not be considered
effective. 150
It must be acknowledged, however, that there may be objective difficulties in is-
suing very clear and definite warnings and that sometimes warnings will inevitably
be vague as a result of the inherent uncertainty of situations that occur during
armed conflict. Understanding the uncertainty of the situation is also important
when assessing after the fact the clarity of the warnings. Some of the criticism of
Israeli practices and those of other States seems to overlook this reality. Assessing
the clarity of a warning must be done without the benefit of hindsight and in light
of the information available to the commanders at the time of the decision to give
the warning. For example, with regard to the operation in Gaza, Israel has been
criticized for what some described as unclear and confusing warnings. 151 The
Goldstone Report stresses that "[t]he effectiveness of the warnings has to be as-
sessed in the light of the overall circumstances that prevailed and the subjective
view of conditions that the civilians concerned would take in deciding upon their
response to the warning." 152 In other words, the report implies that since civilians
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face an uncertain situation, the warnings ought to be more accurate and clear. 153
Shany sees this as yet another example of the report's "human rights-dominated
approach to an armed conflict situation," which focuses on the rights of the indi-
vidual civilian—and on his or her viewpoint—without giving due weight to the
military concerns of those involved in the conflict. 154
Ultimately, although the underlying aim of warnings is to enable civilians to
protect themselves, the determination of the extent of clarity and accuracy they
must fulfill in order to be considered effective cannot disregard the realities of the
situation and the concerns and constraints of the military forces involved.
C.3.2. The Specificity of the Warning. Rule 37 of the AMW Manual states
that warnings ought to be "as specific as circumstances permit." 155 According to
theAMW Commentary, this means that they should not be vague, but "be as spe-
cific as circumstances permit to enable the civilian population to take relevant pro-
tective measures." 156 The UK Manual requires warnings to be "sufficiently
specific" in order to enable civilians to take shelter or leave the area. 157 It is not easy,
however, to determine how specific and direct warnings ought to be. 158 One ques-
tion in this regard is whether a general warning is enough or is there a legal obli-
gation to provide specific warnings to the particular civilians who maybe harmed
by the attack.
General warnings may consist, for example, of a blanket alert delivered by leaf-
lets or by broadcasts advising the civilian population to stay away from certain mil-
itary objectives. 159 Sometimes a warning can contain a list ofthe objectives that will
be attacked. 160 General warnings would usually not include any specific informa-
tion regarding the attack.
Specific warnings aimed at civilians present in a more concrete target (such as a
certain building) would usually involve providing more details regarding the geo-
graphical boundaries of the area to be affected and a description of the time of the
expected attack in order to enable the civilians to leave or seek shelter. In addition,
they might also include precise details of the impending attack.
According to the US manuals warnings might be general and do not have to in-
clude specific details regarding the attack. The Operational Law Handbook states,
"Warnings need not be specific as to time and location of the attack, but can be
general and issued through broadcasts, leaflets, etc." 161 In the CIHL, US officials are
quoted as stating that a "blanket warning" may suffice. 162
In his article on precautions in attack, Queguiner acknowledges that the ques-
tion of whether an abstract warning is enough, or whether a particular warning
must be given before a specific attack that may affect the civilian population, does
not have a clear-cut answer. He goes on to submit, however, that "the level of
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precision required will depend on the general objective pursued; the attacking
party will have to ensure the immunity of the civilian population and civilian
property, while also taking into account its own military interests in each strate-
gic context." 163 It seems, however, that this standard exceeds what is required by
the current rules of the laws of armed conflict. There is no obligation to "ensure
the immunity of the civilian population' nor is there usually any practical way of
fulfilling such a high standard.
On the other hand, warnings must be effective, namely, they must give relevant
information to civilians who might be affected by the attack, thus enabling them to
protect themselves as much as possible from the impending attack. 164 Therefore,
specific warnings might be required if not providing them would mean that civil-
ians have not received the information necessary to take protective actions. This
seems to be the meaning of the standard set by theAMW Manual and by the UK
Manual, as discussed above.
In this regard, the degree to which a warning must be specific and detailed is de-
pendent on the context and circumstances of the situation. Relevant factors in-
clude the timing of the warning in relation to the attack, the available modes of
issuing the warning, 165 the objective of the warning, the amount of control the
forces have in the area, the severity ofthe situation, the urgency ofthe attack and so
forth. In addition, in determining what details to include in a warning, consider-
ation must also be given to the risk posed to mission accomplishment and to the se-
curity ofthe forces. 166
As previously discussed, during the Gaza operation, general warnings were is-
sued in the first phase of the operation calling on civilians to stay away from sites
used by the Hamas forces. Next, regional warnings were provided in certain areas,
calling on civilians to evacuate those places prior to IDF operations therein, and
then specific warnings were given a short time prior to attacks on individual build-
ings, giving their residents time to leave the buildings. 167 Interestingly, in spite of
these comprehensive warning procedures, the Goldstone Report finds these warn-
ings to be insufficient. 168 Schmitt criticizes this conclusion and stresses that these
warnings were extensive and specific in an unprecedented manner. 169
A question arises whether the extensive nature and specificity ofthe warnings is-
sued by Israel in Lebanon and particularly in the Gaza operation reflect a legal obli-
gation with regard to the scope of the obligation. As addressed in section III.A,
issuing warnings might have an effect on the proportionality of an attack and, as a
consequence, on the freedom of operation of forces. Therefore there might be an
incentive to give specific warnings even when to do so is not derived from a legal
obligation. Moreover, for moral or policy considerations 170 even a proportionate
outcome of an attack might not be sufficient, leading to stricter limitations on the
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use of force 171 and also, possibly, to the issuance ofmore extensive warnings. These
kinds of extralegal considerations played an important role in the Israeli conduct
during its military operations. 172 They led to a decision to give extensive warnings
beyond what may be considered as legally required under the laws of armed con-
flict in order to minimize civilian casualties. One must also bear in mind that Israel
had close contact with, and relatively good intelligence regarding, the Gaza Strip,
which enabled it to give such specific warnings as telephone calls to the inhabitants
ofhouses planned to be attacked. 173 It was these unique circumstances that enabled
Israel to carry out such extensive methods of warnings.
It would seem wrong, therefore, to deduce from the Israeli practice in Gaza that
the various methods of providing warnings and their specificity represent an im-
plementation ofa legal obligation. This conclusion is reinforced when the elements
necessary for the formation ofa rule ofcustomary law are considered. Since there is
no known previous practice of such extensive warnings, there was clearly no exist-
ing customary rule requiring them. Israel's practice alone cannot create a new legal
norm, since widespread practice is necessary. Moreover, as has been indicated,
Israel was also driven by moral and policy considerations; therefore the element of
opinio juris is also missing. 174
C.3.3. Repetition of Warnings. Another question that arises is whether, after a warn-
ing has been given, there might still be a duty to issue further warnings in order to
minimize civilian casualties.
An illustrative example appears in the European Union report on the conflict in
Georgia with regard to the Georgian attack on Tskhinvali. Georgia is criticized be-
cause, following a general warning and a three-hour unilateral ceasefire to allow
the remaining civilians of Tskhinvali to leave the conflict area, there was no addi-
tional general advance warning given to the remaining population when the offen-
sive on Tskhinvali was carried out that night. 175 The authors of the report do not
specify what the content of a second warning should have been, but it may be as-
sumed they meant this would be a warning aimed at enabling those left behind to
seek shelter at the time of the attack.
In his article on precautions, Queguiner also refers to this question. He ac-
knowledges that States usually fulfill the duty to warn "by issuing a general warning
to the civilian population" and that "the attacking commander does not have to is-
sue multiple warnings of the danger incurred by a civilian population that is lo-
cated near a clearly defined military objective that has been declared as such." 176 He
contends, however, this "does not exempt the attacking commander from giving
further, more precise warning whenever possible or necessary." 177 Queguiner gives
an example of a target which is "an infrastructure that is essential for public service
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and is staffed almost permanently by civilians." 178 In such a case, he concludes that
the warning will, depending on the circumstances, have to be more specific. He
explains:
It is obviously impossible for a party to the conflict to accept an interruption in pub-
lic services just because an enemy has designated these services as a legitimate military
objective. In order to spare the civilian population working at the site, a more precise
warning must be issued as early as possible. 179
In order to determine whether a warning should be repeated we must return to
the aim of the requirement to provide warnings, that is, to give civilians an oppor-
tunity to protect themselves from the ensuing attack. Therefore, if a general warn-
ing is sufficient to achieve this aim, there would be no legal requirement to issue
further warnings. However, in cases where the general warning has left the civilian
population without a reasonable understanding of how to protect itself, or when
the content of the warning has changed, an additional warning might be required,
subject to military considerations.
The case of the attack on Tskhinvali seems to represent an example of such a
case. In that case a general warning to evacuate was given, but since that warning
did not indicate when the attack was to take place, an additional warning addressed
to those civilians left behind might have been required, ifcircumstances permitted,
in the period immediately prior to the attack. The rationale of each warning is dif-
ferent: the first is general and aimed at getting civilians to evacuate the area; the sec-
ond is more specific and is given closer in time to the attack in order to allow those
remaining behind to take shelter against the approaching attack.
In Queguiner's example, the first warning is a general warning to stay away from
certain locations. An additional, more specific warning would not necessarily be
required with regard to such locations unless the target has a special nature that at-
tracts civilians, such as a public service facility or a place that civilians regard as a
possible shelter (schools, etc.); then an additional warning might be necessary.
Moreover, it is worth noting that in both examples there is still a need to fulfill the
distinction and proportionality requirements. Even if an additional warning
would not be considered as being required by the law, its absence might lead the at-
tack to be deemed disproportionate.
C.3.4. Instructing Civilians. A further question with regard to the content of the
warnings is whether they must include specific instructions explaining to affected
civilians what they should do in order to protect themselves from attack.
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When civilians are warned to evacuate a certain area they might be advised of
the direction they should take or the routes they should follow. The question still
remains whether there is a legal obligation to provide such and other guidance. Ac-
cording to one of the UN Reports on Lebanon, military forces issuing a warning
"should take into account how they expect the civilian population to carry out the
instruction and not just drop paper messages from an aircraft." The report asserts
that warnings must be very elaborate and give civilians "clear time slots for the
evacuation linked to guaranteed safe humanitarian exit corridors that they should
use." 180 The Goldstone Report finds that in order for a warning to civilians to be
considered effective, "it must clearly explain what they should do to avoid harm
and ... [a] s far as possible . . . state the location to be affected and where the civil-
ians should seek safety." 181
Determining that a warning must be that specific does not seem to reflect exist-
ing legal requirements 182 nor represent current State practice. Moreover, none of
the military manuals includes such a duty and the US manuals actually emphasize
that warnings may be general. 183 Furthermore, according to the law ofarmed con-
flict the party subject to attack bears the responsibility for taking precautions
against the effects of the attack. 184 This is reflected in Article 58 of Additional Pro-
tocol I, which provides, "The Parties to the conflict shall, to the maximum extent
feasible . . . take the other necessary precautions to protect the civilian population,
individual civilians and civilian objects under their control against the dangers re-
sulting from military operations." 185
The purpose of Article 58 is to place on the defending party the main responsi-
bility of taking the defensive measures necessary to protect its civilians against at-
tacks. The law of armed conflict does not impose an obligation on the attacking
side to deal with this aspect of the safety of civilians of the opposing party. 186 This
also comports with practical considerations—the attacking party usually does not
have adequate knowledge of the relevant services and infrastructure to issue de-
tailed instructions to the civilians of the opposing party.
It is not surprising that the claim that warnings should include instructions to
civilians of the other side is raised by human rights bodies. Such a requirement is a
clear reflection ofhuman rights standards which put the emphasis on the rights of
civilians vis-a-vis the armed forces ofthe parties to the conflict and which have a dif-
ferent rationale than that ofthe law ofarmed conflict. 187 The proper relationship be-
tween human rights law and the law ofarmed conflict is one ofthe most contentious
topics in the field of international law today and is not addressed in this article. 188
Having said that, we recognize that in order to fulfill the aim of enabling civil-
ians to protect themselves from attack, there might be situations in which warnings
need to include some guidance and instruction as to how civilians should act
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following receipt of the warnings. Such circumstances may exist when, without
such information, the warnings would not give the civilians sufficient understanding
ofwhat they need to do in order to protect themselves and the attacking side has the
ability of clarifying the situation without compromising its military concerns.
CA. The Method by Which the Warning Is Issued
Warnings can be given by radio and television broadcasts, by telephone calls and
even by Internet announcements, 189 or by dropping or distributing leaflets (and, of
course, by a combination of all these methods). 190 Sometimes they can be given by
word ofmouth, when ground forces are operating 191 or where territory is occupied
by the enemy. 192 In some cases, warnings may be given by aircraft flying low over
the objective. 193 The possibility of giving warnings from the air depends on which
party has control of the airspace and what air defenses are in place. 194 The AMW
Commentary states that " [w] arnings need not be formal in nature. They may be is-
sued either verbally or in writing, or through any other means that can reasonably
be expected to be effective under the circumstances." 195
A question arises whether warnings can be made by using warning shots. As
above examples illustrate, there have been instances when this method has been
used. 196 In theAMW Commentary it is acknowledged that " [i]n some situations the
only feasible method ofwarning may be to fire warning shots using tracer ammu-
nition, thus inducing people to take cover before the attack." 197 We agree with this
assertion though we do not believe it is necessarily limited to tracer ammunition
since inducing civilians to take shelter might also be achieved with regular ammu-
nition and tracer ammunition might not always be available.
Warning shots are commonly used in law enforcement situations, such as in in-
stances where they are necessary in order to get a suspect to surrender to arrest after
verbal warnings have been disregarded. 198 Though this is a different kind ofwarn-
ing than that discussed in this article, it does share a similar rationale of giving a
clear warning prior to the use of force in order to avoid, if possible, physical harm.
Therefore, in our view, the widespread use ofwarning shots in law enforcement sit-
uations reinforces the lawfulness of using warning shots from the air or from
equivalent platforms as a method of warning civilians prior to attack.
Israeli practice, as previously discussed, included the use of warning shots as
part of the specific warnings given to the occupants of a particular target. This was
done in cases where prior warnings, through phone calls and other means, were
not heeded. These warning shots were fired using small munitions that hit the
roofs of the designated targets. 199
In the Goldstone Report this method, termed "roof-knocking," is criticized.
The report argues that roof-knocking "constitutes a form of attack against the
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civilians inhabiting the building" and that "an attack, however limited in itself,
cannot be understood as an effective warning in the meaning of article
57(2) (c)." 200 The correctness of this claim requires further analysis.
First, as has been illustrated, State practice and military legal manuals include
warning shots as a legitimate method of issuing warnings. Moreover, even ifwarn-
ing shots are considered "an attack," it is incorrect to view them as an attack
"against civilians," because they are not fired at civilians, since the objective of
their use is to avoid harm to civilians. In this regard, as Schmitt notes, it is impor-
tant to bear in mind that since the object of the warning shots is a military objec-
tive201 (otherwise the whole attack fails the distinction principle), the "attack"
performed by the warning shots is aimed at a lawful target and the presence of
non-combatants therein is at most a matter of proportionality, not one of directly
attacking civilians. 202
D. The Exception—When Not Issuing a Warning Is Justified
As specified in Article 57(2) (c) ofAPI, as well as in rule 37 oftheAMWManual and
most military manuals, warnings are not required if "circumstances do not per-
mit."203 It should be noted, however, that some manuals use different formulations
and provide that warnings should be given "if the military mission allows" 204 or
"when the tactical situation permits."205 This exception reflects the understanding
that sometimes the existing circumstances preclude giving a warning prior to at-
tack. The analysis ofthe exception will be divided into two parts as follows: the situ-
ations covered by the exception and general considerations in applying the
exception.
D.l. The Situations Covered by the Exception
The exception does not comprise a numerus clausus of situations, but depends
on the particular prevailing circumstances at the time of the decision. However,
the presence of circumstances that justify not issuing an advance warning would
usually be determined based on one of the following rationales: mission accom-
plishment, force protection, speed of response or practical impossibility. We will
now briefly examine each of these considerations.
D.l.l. Mission Accomplishment. The fact that warnings are not required with
regard to surprise attacks was recognized in the earliest articulations of the rules
addressing warnings. 206 The 1907 Hague Regulations provide that no warning need
be given in cases of "assault," with "assault" being understood as referring to surprise
attacks. The rationale of not imposing a duty to warn in such attacks is that these
attacks require surprise in order to accomplish the mission. Dinstein comments
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that "surprise is one ofthe main staples ofwarfare, not onlywhen an assault is con-
templated."207 He finds that "[t]he practice of states shows that the desire to
achieve surprise may frequently preclude warnings in non-assault situations."208
Article 57(2) (c) ofAPI has less restrictive wording, not limiting the exception to
cases of "assault." Hays Parks remarks that the article relaxed the warning require-
ment that appeared in the Hague Regulations, while simultaneously aligning it
with the customary practice of nations in the twentieth century. 209
The exception covers cases where the success of the military operation is con-
tingent on the element of surprise,210 such as in instances when the target is trans-
portable and might move or be moved away if a warning is issued in advance.211
An illustrative example of an attack requiring surprise was the Israeli attack on
the long-range rockets carried out in the first stages of the war in Lebanon in
2006.212 Warning in advance of these attacks would have enabled moving the
rockets to different, unknown locations, thus preventing the achievement of the
operational end.
The focus of this exception is on the effect giving an advance warning will have
on the chances of success of the military operation. A question may arise whether
the exception applies onlywhen surprise is essential for the success ofthe operation
or whether it also applies when surprise only contributes to fulfillment of the
mission. The API Commentary refers to cases in which giving advance warning prior
to an attack is inconvenient213 since the element of surprise "is a condition of its suc-
cess."214 The ICRC's CIHL uses the term "essential to the success of an opera-
tion."215 TheAMW Commentary talks ofan operation "predicated on the element of
surprise."216 The UKManual refers to cases "where the element of surprise is crucial
to the success of the military operation."217 The US Operational Law Handbook
uses the phrase "where surprise is a key element."218 The Australian manual refers
to an action that "is likely to be seriously compromised by a warning." The opinion
of a US legal advisor in 1995 quoted in the CIHL refers to use of the element of
surprise in an attack on enemy military forces in order "to increase its chance for
successful accomplishment ofthe mission."
219 Queguiner, when analyzing the excep-
tion, indicates that it includes cases where giving a warning prior to attack would
result "in annihilating—or at least seriously compromising—the military opera-
tion's chances of success."220
It is difficult to deduce an exact legal standard that justifies not giving a warning
for reasons of mission accomplishment. It seems safe to say that lack of surprise
does not have to lead to a total unquestionable failure of the mission and that it
would suffice if the prospect of success was "seriously compromised." It would
seem insufficient, however, for surprise just to be convenient for the attacking
forces, and the formulation of "increase the chances of success" seems too broad.
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As in other cases, there is no clear-cut formula and the evaluation as to whether
there is sufficient justification for not providing a warning in order to retain the el-
ement of surprise would have to rely on reasonableness, taking into account the
circumstances of the situation.
D.1.2. Force Protection Considerations. This exception, which provides warnings
need not be issued when "circumstances do not permit," allows the taking into ac-
count of the safety of attacking forces,221 such as in circumstances when issuing a
warning will enable enhancement of the target area's defenses in a way that will in-
crease the risk to the attacking forces. 222 An example of when warnings were not
provided due to force protection considerations is the explanation given by NATO
authorities, according to Amnesty International, with regard to NATO operations
over Kosovo, in which warnings were not given, due to the risk to the aircrews. 223 In
this regard, warnings are more feasible when one side has air or tactical suprem-
acy—hence giving advance warning creates less risk to the attacking aircrews. 224
Admittedly, there is a close relationship between mission accomplishment and
force protection and sometimes a warning would compromise both, such as when
it could enable the opposing side to shoot down the attacking aircraft prior to the
attack, however, these are separate considerations. Thus, for example, in a case
when a warning might lead to removal of military equipment from the target, the
warning would compromise mission accomplishment but does not necessarily af-
fect force protection. On the other hand, if it is a fixed target warning in advance
might lead to a threat to attacking forces on the way back from the attack, but
might not affect the success of the mission.
Here again it may be asked what level of threat to the forces justifies not giving
advance warnings. According to the UKManual it is permitted not to issue a warn-
ing "where the safety of attacking forces would be compromised." 225 The US naval
handbook refers to preventing forces from being "placed injeopardy" 226 The opin-
ion of the US legal advisor in 1995 quoted in the CIHL refers to use of the element
of surprise in order to "reduce risk to the attackingforce
"227 Without entering into
the intricate discussion of the appropriate weight force protection considerations
should have in the proportionality analysis in general,228 for the purpose of warn-
ings it seems that this is undoubtedly a central consideration. As with mission ac-
complishment, it would seem correct to conclude that not every remote risk to
forces would justify not giving a warning. However, the level of risk to the safety of
forces that would justify not giving a warning might arguably be less than the level
of risk to mission accomplishment required in order to refrain from giving a warn-
ing. This can be exemplified in the wording of the UK Manual dealing with the ap-
plicability ofthe exception, which uses the term "crucial" with regard to the effect a
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warning might have on the success ofthe mission, and the much more lenient stan-
dard of "be compromised" with regard to safety of the forces.229
D.1.3. Speed of Response. Another instance where circumstances would permit
not giving warnings is when the situation does not allow time to give warnings, due
to the necessary speed of response. 230 One such situation is when troops are at-
tacked and are required to respond to the attack.231 In such circumstances, they ob-
viously do not have time to issue an advance warning.
Another kind of case is that involving time-sensitive targets (TSTs)—a TST is
"[a] target requiring immediate response because it is a highly lucrative, fleeting
target of opportunity or it poses (or will soon pose) a danger to friendly forces."232
An obvious example ofsuch a target is a rocket about to be launched.233 Such cases
should be differentiated from the earlier-discussed surprise and force protection
considerations. Those categories deal with preplanned attacks in which the justifi-
cation not to give a warning can be contemplated in advance at the planning stages.
In cases of TSTs or counterfire situations, the fact that an advance warning is not
given is inherent in the situation since there is no time to give such a warning prior
to the attack.234
D.1.4. Practical Impossibility of Giving a Warning. Another category of cases fall-
ing within the exception is when there is no reasonable possibility of issuing an ef-
fective warning, such as when there is no way to convey the warning due to a lack of
means of communication. This seems to be a straightforward justification for not
issuing a warning; it simply cannot be done.
D.2. General Considerations in Applying the Exception
A few general considerations deserve mention with regard to the implementation
of the exception to the obligation to provide warnings.
First, in some cases circumstances prevent giving specific warnings but it might
still be possible to give a more general warning.235 This brings us back to the discus-
sion on the extent warnings must be specific and acknowledges that this depends,
among other factors, on military considerations. For example, if there is an inten-
tion to attack places being used to house weapons, specific warnings might lead to
the removal ofthe weapons and hence to compromising the success ofthe mission.
However, general warnings may still be possible, informing in general terms to stay
away from places used to store military equipment.
Second, it must be stressed once again that the determination as to whether the
exception applies is made by the commander in light ofthe relevant circumstances
and based on the information available to him or her at the time ofthe decision. 236
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Third, the decision not to issue a warning, even when falling within the excep-
tion, might have an impact on the possibility of carrying out the attack. As has been
discussed, the fact that a warning has not been given prior to an attack, even ifjusti-
fiably, may affect the proportionality analysis due to the fact that civilians who may
have left had a warning been issued remain in the area, thus leading to increased
collateral damage. In these circumstances, while not issuing a warning is justified,
the absence of a warning would lead to the attack failing the proportionality test,
therefore being deemed unlawful.
As an example, beneath a civilian residence there is a large weapons depot that is a
legitimate target, but giving a warning prior to attack could lead to the weapons be-
ing removed; therefore it would be justified not to give such warning. If, however, the
number of civilian casualties anticipated from such a surprise attack is viewed as ex-
cessive in relation to the military advantage expected from destroying the weapons,
the attack would be considered disproportionate. In such a case, commanders may
decide to issue a warning, taking into account that some weapons would be re-
moved, but assessing that the advantage of destroying the weapons left behind (al-
beit smaller than the advantage gained from destroying all the weapons) would
then be proportionate because of the much lower number of civilian casualties
since civilians would have had the opportunity to leave the building prior to attack.
In this context, the suggestion made in the Goldstone Report that when evaluat-
ing whether circumstances permit not issuing a warning, a balancing process is re-
quired in order to determine "whether the injury or damage done to civilians or
civilian objects by not giving a warning is excessive in relation to the advantage to
be gained by the element of surprise for the particular operation" 237 deserves com-
ment. In other words, the report suggests a proportionality analysis that weighs the
potential incremental military advantage gained from not providing a warning
against the potential increased damage to civilians or civilian objects that may oc-
cur in the absence of a warning. Schmitt explains that this does not represent the
existing legal requirements of the law ofarmed conflict, and that the report is con-
fusing the warning requirement with the principle of proportionality. 238 Schmitt
clarifies "that an attacker is already required to assess the proportionality of a mis-
sion as planned; the issuance of warnings would be a factor in that analysis, as
would other factors such as timing ofthe attack, weapons used, tactics, life patterns
of the civilian population, reliability of intelligence, and weather. A subsequent
proportionality analysis would consequently be superfluous."239
E. The Ramifications—How to Regard Those Not Heeding the Warning
It is incontrovertible that following warnings civilians remaining in the zone ofop-
eration retain their civilian status. 240 The AMW Commentary emphasizes that
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" [a]n effective warning does not make an unlawful attack lawful, nor does it divest
the attacker from its other obligations to take feasible precautionary measures."241
Accordingly, civilians not heeding warnings to evacuate an area must be taken into
account in the proportionality analysis. Nevertheless, on a practical level, if follow-
ing warnings civilians evacuate a given area, then most of those remaining are
fighting elements. This allows the attacker more freedom of action since, as dis-
cussed in III.A, this influences the implementation of the principle of proportion-
ality, namely, the balance between the military advantage to be gained and the
collateral damage anticipated from the attack.
Another aspect is the risk that the warning would lead, not to civilians evacuat-
ing the area, but to civilians gathering on, or in proximity to, the intended target in
order to shield it. This raises controversial questions on the issue of voluntary
human shields242 and as to whether a commander might refrain from giving a
warning when it is reasonably believed that such a warning would lead to civilians
gathering in the planned target and hence would increase the danger to civilians in-
stead of mitigating such peril. This article addresses neither of those questions.
IV. Conclusion
The duty to give civilians warning prior to attack is not new; however, its imple-
mentation has become more widespread and the scope and level ofwarnings given
have increased in recent years. This is yet another reflection ofthe growing empha-
sis on protection for civilians and the avoidance, as much as possible, of civilian
casualties. This emphasis is driven by legal, moral and policy considerations.
When State practice is viewed in this regard, Israeli practice, especially during the
Lebanon conflict in 2006 and the Gaza operation of 2008-9, stands out. The scope
and specificity ofwarnings given in these conflicts were unprecedented. Neverthe-
less, human rights institutions have found these warnings to be insufficient.
In order to analyze the components of the duty to give warnings one must first
identify the aim ofthe obligation. Warnings are aimed at enabling civilians to pro-
tect themselves from the impending attack; hence no warning is needed when no
civilians are anticipated to be physically harmed by the attack. The factual determi-
nation ofwhen an attack may affect civilians in a way that requires a prior warning
is based on the circumstances of the situation. In this context, understanding the
uncertainties of armed conflict situations is important in order to appreciate and
address the dilemmas faced by commanders. This understanding is also important
for anyone wanting to make a fair after-the-fact evaluation ofthe fulfillment of the
duty to issue a warning.
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Warnings as a lawful measure to enhance the protection of civilians during
armed conflict must be differentiated from unlawful threats aimed at terrorizing
the civilian population and from unlawful ruses of war. The defining factor is the
intention of the act. Even if warnings might indeed cause fear and apprehension,
this does not make them unlawful unless their primary intention is to terrorize or
mislead the population.
In order to achieve the aim of enabling civilians to protect themselves from at-
tack, warnings must be effective. To be effective, warnings must fulfill various
requirements.
First, from the temporal aspect, warnings must be given in a timely manner, not
too close in time to the attack nor too early. When civilians are advised to evacuate
a certain area, warnings must give them enough time to evacuate safely. If this is
not possible, civilians should be cautioned to stay in place and take shelter instead
of attempting to evacuate the area.
Second, with regard to recipients of warnings, in the past authorities of the
other side were those to be warned. Although this is still a possibility, today warn-
ings usually should be given directly to those civilians who might be affected by
the attack.
Third, in order to be considered effective the content of the warning must be
clear and sufficiently specific, although the required level of specificity is not easily
determined. There could be cases when it would be necessary to repeat a warning
more than once. In this context the Israeli practice of often providing multiple
warnings of increasing specificity should not be regarded as setting a legal stan-
dard, due to the special circumstances of its operations and the significant policy
considerations that were the basis of this practice. There is neither enough State
practice nor opiniojuris on which to base a customary rule with regard to specificity
and number of warnings required. It is also highly doubtful that a legal obligation
exists to notify civilians of the actions—evacuation, route to take, staying in place,
etc.—they are to take upon receiving a warning. This seems, however, to be the
expectation of human rights bodies, as exemplified in the reports prepared by
those bodies on Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon.
Fourth, as to the method of the warning, there are different options available,
ranging from leaflets and radio broadcasts to specific telephone calls. Warning
shots may also be an option in certain cases, though there are those who disagree
this is an appropriate method of giving warnings.
Once the components ofthe rule on warnings have been identified, the question
of exceptions to the rule arises. Such exceptions include cases when surprise is nec-
essary to achieve the goal of the mission, as well as cases where warnings would en-
danger the forces. In addition, warnings are not required prior to attack in
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circumstances when there is no time to give such warnings, as a result ofthe nature
of the attack, or for reasons making it impossible to provide warnings, such as in
instances when no means of communication is available.
One of the concerns raised with regard to warnings is that after advising civil-
ians to evacuate a certain area, military forces might consider anyone who did not
evacuate as forfeiting civilian status and becoming a lawful attack objective. This,
of course, is not the case and civilians who have not left the area must be taken into
account in the proportionality analysis. Nevertheless, successful warnings that
lead to most civilians leaving a combat area do allow military forces more freedom
of action in the knowledge that less civilian collateral damage is expected. In today's
asymmetrical battlefield, when fighters intermix with civilians and civilian locali-
ties are used as bases of operation, causing civilians to evacuate an area is one of
the useful means available of minimizing civilian casualties. In that regard, warn-
ings have become an important tool in promoting the protection of civilians on
the one hand, while enhancing military freedom of action on the other. This dem-
onstrates that the rules of the law of armed conflict are not necessarily a zero-sum
game and warnings, as well as other precautionary measures, can be beneficial for
all sides involved.
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86. This kind ofwarning was nicknamed "roof-knocking." For a description, see Operation
in Gaza: Conduct of the Operation, supra note 84, f 264. In practice this method was rarely used
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To the Residents of the Sajaiya Neighbourhood
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tion of this leaflet and by no later than 6 hours after the distribution of this leaflet.
These instructions are in force until further notice. Adherence to IDF instructions has
prevented unnecessary casualties in the past.
Please continue to follow IDF instructions for your own safety.
IDF Command
Id. at 99 n.225.
90. Id., 1265.
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was warned in advance since a ground operation was planned in this area. When the ground
operation commenced several days after the warning, IDF troops came under fire and when they
returned fire the mill was hit by tank shells. No additional specific warning was given since this
was not a preplanned target. STATE OF ISRAEL, GAZA OPERATION INVESTIGATIONS: AN UPDATE
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mill. This might indicate that the ordnance was planted there in order to incriminate Israel.
State of Israel, Gaza Operation Investigations: Second Update fflf 141-45 (2010),
available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/1483B296-7439-4217-933C-653CD19CE859/
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making after-the-fact judgments.
97. For example, one commentator states: "In sum, on the issue of warning, the Goldstone
Report badly distorts IHL's [international humanitarian law's] balance between military neces-
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100. DINSTEIN, supra note 5, at 138.
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105. UK Manual, supra note 38, J 5.32.8.
106. CIHLS II, supra note 13, at 402,^438.
107. AMW COMMENTARY, supra note 1 1, at 133, H 4.
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quired in such situations, although the Goldstone Report does link the obligation to issue a
warning to the duty to minimize death or damage to civilians or "damage to civilian objects."
Goldstone Report, supra note 94, 1 527. The report does not elaborate what is meant by the refer-
ence to such damage in this context. See also IAN HENDERSON, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF
TARGETING: MILITARY OBJECTIVES, PROPORTIONALITY AND PRECAUTIONS IN ATTACK 188
(2009), in which it is suggested that the term "affect" "should be interpreted narrowly to mean
directly affected in the sense of injured or killed, as well as property damage." The author does
not explain this reference to property and stresses elsewhere that there is no obligation to issue
warnings before attacking civilian objects. Id. at 185.
109. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, 1 58 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003) ("In determining whether an attack was proportionate it is
necessary to examine whether a reasonably well-informed person in the circumstances ofthe ac-
tual perpetrator, making reasonable use of the information available to him or her, could have
expected civilian casualties to result from the attack."). This standard—namely, that of "the in-
formation available to the person making the decision"—is used with regard to the implementa-
tion of the principle of proportionality; it also seems appropriate with regard to the
implementation of the requirement to give effective warnings when circumstances permit. See
also Frits Kalshoven & Liesbeth Zegveld, Constraints on the Waging of War: An
Introduction to International Humanitarian Law 109 (3d ed. 2001); Parks, supra note
8, at 156; ROGERS, supra note 5, at 109-1 1.
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the attack. Critics of this decision contend that the obligation to warn also exists in cases when
there is doubt as to whether civilians are present; therefore refraining from giving a warning
would have been justified only if the officer was absolutely sure that there were no civilians near
the trucks. Constantin von der Groeben, Criminal Responsibility ofGerman Soldiers in Afghani-
stan: The Case of Colonel Klein, 1 1 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 469, 484 (2010).
111. This article represents customary international law. See, e.g. ,AMW MANUAL, supra note
18, rule 18; AMW COMMENTARY, supra note 1 1, at 102-3; CIHLS I, supra note 14, at 8 (rule 2).
See also Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Judgment, If 104 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the for-
mer Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2006).
112. AMW COMMENTARY, supra note 1 1, at 134, TJ 14.
113. In the US Navy's handbook, the prohibition is limited to situations where spreading ter-
ror is the "sole" purpose of the attack. Commander's Handbook, supra note 18, If 8.9.1.2. In the
AMW Commentary on rule 18, it is indicated that the majority of the Group of Experts did not
agree with this limitation and believed the prohibition referred to activities in which the "sole or
primary" purpose of the attack is that of spreading terror among the civilian population. AMW
COMMENTARY, supra note 1 1, at 102.
1 14. Galic, supra note 111, ^ 104.
115. DlNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 126, emphasizes that "it is the intention that counts, and not
the actual outcome of the attack." See also API COMMENTARY, supra note 12, at 618; William J.
Fenrick, Symposium: Justice in Cataclysm Criminal Trials in the Wake ofMass Violence: Attacking
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Lebanon does not seem justified. As mentioned earlier, the report prepared on behalf of the UN
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Litani River." UN Mission to Lebanon and Israel, supra note 82, ^ 36.
1 18. UN Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon, supra note 75, H 206; UN Mission to Lebanon
and Israel, supra note 82, J 66. The latter report refers to the Guiding Principles on Internal Dis-
placement, principle 6, which restates ICCPR Article 12, and to customary international human-
itarian law. Id., ^ 66 n.81.
119. James G. Stewart, The U.N. Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon, 5 JOURNAL OF
International Criminal Justice 1039, 1054 (2007).
120. Id. The author notes that the commission "appears not to have considered whether por-
tions of the displacement resulted from lawful evacuations or from civilians choosing to leave
the region for fear of lawful hostilities."
121. In this regard it may be noted that the UN reports admit that the warning saved many
lives. See supra text accompanying note 83.
122. API COMMENTARY, supra note 12, at 687,T|2225. See also DlNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 144.
123. HENDERSON, supra note 108, at 188.
1 24. The Goldstone Report seems to set a questionable standard in asserting that " [a] credible
warning means that civilians should be in no doubt that it is intended to be acted upon, as a false
alarm or hoax may undermine future warnings, putting civilians at risk." Goldstone Report, supra
note 94, ^ 528 (emphasis added). As Schmitt rightfully puts it: "For operational (or perhaps even
humanitarian) reasons, some attacks are always canceled. No ground exists in international
humanitarian law for charging the attacker with responsibility for countering the population's
reaction to the fact that warned attacks did not take place." Schmitt, supra note 57, at 828.
125. This comports with the general understanding that those making decisions on precau-
tions have to reach decisions on the basis of their assessment of the information that is available
to them at the relevant time. See supra note 109.
126. ROGERS, supra note 5, at 100.
1 27. CIHLS II, supra note 1 3, at 40 1 , J 43 1 . According to the Goldstone Report, the effective-
ness of a warning depends on three considerations—the clarity of the message, the credibility of
the threat and the possibility for those receiving the warning to take action to escape the threat.
Goldstone Report, supra note 94, ^ 51 1.
128. Parks, supra note 8, at 182-83, 201; ROGERS, supra note 5, at 1 17.
129. UK MANUAL, supra note 38, J 5.32.8.
130. AMW COMMENTARY, supra note 1 1, at 133, U 9, which states:
As for timing, an imprecise warning issued well in advance of the attack may be more ef-
fective than a precise warning immediately preceding it. Similarly, a warning issued well
in advance of the attack—reaching only a certain part of the civilian population—may
be more effective than one reaching the entire civilian population, which is issued just
prior to the attack.
131. UK MANUAL, supra note 38, If 5.32.8.
1 32. Queguiner, supra note 9, at 808; Rowe, supra note 56, at 1 54. An example is the attack on
the house of the Abu Askar family in the Gaza Strip. According to the Goldstone Report, Abu
Askar received a telephone warning only seven minutes prior to the attack, though the report
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acknowledges that all the residents ofthe building (around forty people) managed to evacuate on
time and no one was hurt in the attack. Goldstone Report, supra note 94, KU 501, 656-57. The
Israeli investigation showed that the house was used to store weapons and ammunition, includ-
ing Grad rockets. Gaza Investigations Report First Update, supra note 96, fflf 175-82. The warn-
ing given allowed enough time for all the residents of the building to safely evacuate on the one
hand, without the weapons being moved out of the building on the other hand.
133. Bring, supra note 62, at 46-47; Queguiner, supra note 9, at 808-9. See supra section
II.A.3.
134. See discussion on the Lebanon War supra notes 77 and 78 and accompanying text. In its
report on Sri Lanka, Human Rights Watch gives the example ofan attack on Mutur on August 2,
2006. A Muslim community leader was warned that an attack would take place within an hour,
but because electricity had been cut offhe had no way of getting the notice to all the residents on
time. Human Rights Watch, Improving Civilian Protection in Sri Lanka n (2006),
available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2006/09/ 1 9/improving-civilian-protection-sri-lanka.
135. See supra section LA.
136. The manuals which include specific reference to the civilian population as recipients of
the warnings include, inter alia, those of Belgium, Croatia and France. The Australian manual
specifies that warnings should be given to the "authorities or civilian population." An exception
is the Italian international humanitarian manual of 1991, which requires warning "the local au-
thorities." CIHLS II, supra note 13, at 401-2
fflj
432, 436, 438, 431, 440, respectively.
137. AMW MANUAL, supra note 18, at 122 (rule 37).
138. See Theodor Meron, The Humanization ofHumanitarian Law, 94 AMERICAN IOURNAL
of International Law 239, 245 (2000).
139. ROGERS, supra note 5, at 100.
140. See supra text accompanying note 60. Israel too issued warnings to local authorities in
Lebanon, though this was done in addition to the warnings to civilians and not instead of such
warnings. See supra text accompanying note 78.
141. An interesting question is what happens when the authorities are duly warned and have
the ability to pass the warning to the civilians but do not, in fact, warn them. This raises the ques-
tion of the scope of the responsibility of one side to the conflict to the civilians of the other side.
That question will not be dealt with here.
142. ROGERS, supra note 5, at 100. HENDERSON, supra note 108, at 188, cites an example from
Operation Desert Storm, explaining that since the coalition purposefully disrupted the ability of
the Iraqi authorities to communicate with the civilians, a warning to the central authority would
not amount to an effective warning to civilians, especially those in remote regions.
143. AMW COMMENTARY, supra note 1 1, at 133, U 5. There was also disagreement on a related
question of the geographic extent to which the warning must apply. Id., ^ 8.
144. See Commander's Handbook, supra note 18, f 8.9.2. Italy's LOAC Elementary Rules
Manual ( 1991 ) states: "When the mission permits, appropriate warning shall be given to civilian
populations endangered by the direction of attack or by their proximity to military objectives."
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formulation, id., ^ 436; Ecuador's Naval Manual (1989) states: "When circumstances permit,
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146. Operation in Gaza: Conduct of the Operation, supra note 84, J 263.
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148. Such situations, which are not rare in armed conflict, must be differentiated from cases
when warnings are given without any intention to attack. These might amount to unlawful ruses.
See supra text accompanying notes 122 and 123.
149. UK MANUAL, supra note 38, U 5.32.8.
150. ROGERS, supra note 5, at 100; AMW COMMENTARY, supra note 1 1, at 133, H 12.
151. The Goldstone Report notes that Israel declared in the midst of the operation that it
would attempt to improve the clarity of warnings. Goldstone Report, supra note 94, fflj 524-25.
The report indicates this proves that the "circumstances almost certainly permitted much better
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of the uncertainty which existed in the initial stages of the operation.
152. Id., ^542.
153. In this context, Yuval Shany notes that "[t]he committee refers to the dangerous and
confusing circumstances prevailing in Gaza during the operation, not to lighten the burden im-
posed on the Israeli military as the language of article 57(2) seems to suggest, but rather to under-
score Israel's duty to provide clearer warnings." Yuval Shany, Human Rights and Humanitarian
Law as Competing Legal Paradigms for Fighting Terror (Hebrew University International Law
Research Paper No. 23-09, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id= 1504 106 (then One-Click Download hyperlink).
1 54. Id. In this regard, see also Kenneth Watkin, Controlling the Use ofForce: A Rolefor Human
Rights Norms in Contemporary Armed Conflicts, 98 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1, 32-33 (2004); Naz K. Modirzadeh, The Dark Sides ofConvergence: A Pro-civilian Critique
ofthe Extraterritorial Application ofHuman Rights Law in Armed Conflict, in THEWAR IN IRAQ:
A LEGAL ANALYSIS 349, 362-67 (Raul A. "Pete" Pedrozo ed., 2010) (Vol. 86, US Naval War Col-
lege International Law Studies); Francoise J. Hampson, Is Human Rights Law ofAny Relevance to
Military Operations in Afghanistan?, in THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN: A LEGAL ANALYSIS (Michael
N. Schmitt ed., 2009) (Vol. 85, US Naval War College International Law Studies).
155. AMW MANUAL, supra note 18, rule 37.
156. AMW COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 133,^1 10.
1 57. UK MANUAL, supra note 38, ^ 5.32.8.
158. DlNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 144; Queguiner, supra note 9, at 807.
1 59. CIHLS I, supra note 14, at 65; CIHLS II, supra note 1 3, at 409, ffl| 483, 485, for a statement
on the US position.
160. API COMMENTARY, supra note 12, J 2225.
161. Operational Law Handbook, supra note 36, at 21. See also USAF Pamphlet, supra
note 37, at 5-11; Commander's Handbook, supra note 18, ^ 8.9.2.
162. CIHLS II, supra note 13, at 409, 1 483.
163. Queguiner, supra note 9, at 808.
164. UK MANUAL, supra note 38, 1 5.32.8.
165. These two factors appear in the AMW Commentary. AMW COMMENTARY, supra note
11, at 133,H7.
166. See infra section III. E. 1.1-2.
167. Operation in Gaza: Conduct of the Operation, supra note 84, J 263.
168. Goldstone Report, supra note 94, J 536.
169. Schmitt, supra note 57, at 828.
170. For an example of circumstances in which policy reasons may impact targeting deci-
sions, see Commander's Handbook, supra note 18, H 8.3.2. As for moral considerations, we will
not enter into a discussion of the complex relationship between moral and legal aspects that oc-
cur during armed conflict.
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of force by coalition forces in Afghanistan. Michael N. Schmitt, Targeting and International
Humanitarian Law in Afghanistan, in THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN: A LEGAL ANALYSIS, supra
note 154, at 307, 312-14. See also Laurie Blank & Amos Guiora, Teachingan Old DogNew Tricks:
Operationalizing the Law ofArmed Conflict in New Warfare, 1 HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY
JOURNAL 45, 67-68 (2010).
172. See, e.g., DANI HALOUTZ, STRAIGHTFORWARD 424-25 (2010) (in Hebrew). The author,
who was the Israeli Chiefof Staffduring the Second Lebanon War, notes that during the conflict in
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the high number of casualties and the ensuing reactions against Israel led to a decision by the
Israeli Prime Minister to limit Air Force attacks for the subsequent forty-eight hours. See also
RAPPAPORT, supra note 76, at 203-4.
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vant to the evaluation of the effectiveness of the warnings, including the extensive preparations
for the operation, intimate knowledge of Gaza, sophisticated intelligence, access to telephone
networks and domination of the airspace. Goldstone Report, supra note 94, f 509.
174. See also Schmitt, supra note 171, at 328-29.
175. Report on Georgia Conflict, supra note 69, fflf 347-48.




180. UN Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon, supra note 75, J 157.
181. Goldstone Report, supra note 94, TJ 530.
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183. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 36, at 21; USAF Pamphlet, supra note 37, at
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more concrete warnings. Report to the Prosecutor on NATO Bombings, supra note 58, 1 78.
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Civilians, 39 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 81, 89-90 (2006).
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187. In this regard, see, for example, the Isayeva case, in which the European Court ofHuman
Rights criticized a Russian operation in Katyr-Yurt in Chechnya. The Court analyzed the attack
using human rights law applicable to law enforcement situations and concluded that the Russian
military in the planning stage did not make serious calculated arrangements for the evacuation of
civilians "such as ensuring that they were informed of the attack beforehand, [determining] how
long such an evacuation would take, [determining] what routes evacuees were supposed to
take," etc. The Court found this to be a violation of Article 2 (the right to life) of the European
Convention on Human Rights. Isayeva v. Russia, App. No. 57950/00, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep.
ffl|
185, 187, 191 (2005). For an analysis, see William Abresch, A Human Rights Law of Internal
Armed Conflict: the European Court ofHuman Rights in Chechnya, 16 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF
International Law 741 (2005).
188. See, e.g., articles cited supra in note 154. See also Modirzadeh, supra note 154, at 349.
189. AMW COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 134,1 13.
190. UK MANUAL, supra note 38, If 5.32.8.
191. Id.
192. ROGERS, supra note 5, at 1 15.
193. API COMMENTARY, supra note 12, If 2224.
194. Id., If 2224; AMW COMMENTARY, supra note 1 1, at 133, 1f 9.
195. AMW COMMENTARY, supra note 1 1, at 134, If 15.
196. See also the manuals of Kenya and of Nigeria in CIHLS II, supra note 13, at 403, 1fl[ 442,
447.
197. AMW COMMENTARY, supra note 1 1, at 133, J11.
198. See, e.g., CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE
General's Legal Center & School, I Legal Lessons Learned from Afghanistan and
IRAQ 107-8 (2004), availahie at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/clamo-vl.pdf. With regard
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"nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose
total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, of-
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203. See supra sections I.B.I and I.C. Italy's IHL Manual of 1991 includes an exception "in
case of military necessity." CIHLS II, supra note 13, at 402, If 441.
204. France's LOAC Summary Note of 1992, id. at 402, 1f 438. See also the manuals of Italy, id.,
11 441, and Madagascar, id. at 403, If 443.
205. Kenya LOAC Manual (1997), id. at 403, 1 442. See also the manuals of Nigeria, id., If 447,
and Togo, id. at 404, 1 452.
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210. UK MANUAL, supra note 38, If 5.32.8; API COMMENTARY, supra note 12, Tf 2223; AMW
COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 133, J 6; CIHLS I, supra note 14, at 64; OPERATIONAL LAW
HANDBOOK, supra note 36; DINSTEIN, supra note 5, at 144; Queguiner, supra note 9, at 807. The
Goldstone Report also acknowledges that surprise in the initial strikes might justify not giving an
advance warning. Goldstone Report, supra note 94, 1 510.
211. HENDERSON, supra note 108, at 186.
212. See supra text accompanying note 76.
213. Henderson suggests that a better term than "inconvenient" would be "disadvantageous."
HENDERSON, supra note 108, at 186.
214. API COMMENTARY, supra note 12, | 2223 (emphasis added).
215. CIHLS I, supra note 14, at 64 (emphasis added).
216. AMW COMMENTARY, supra note 1 1, at 133, 1 6 (emphasis added).
217. UK MANUAL, supra note 38, 1 5.32.8; Belgium's 1983 manual also uses the term "crucial
element for the success of the attack." CIHLS II, supra note 13, at 401, 1 432.
218. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 36, at 21. South Africa's manual of 1996 also
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mander's Handbook, supra note 18, f 8.9.2. Yugoslavia's YPA Military Manual of 1988 uses simi-
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222. AMW COMMENTARY, supra note 11, at 133,^f 6.
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Amnesty International Report, supra note 57, at 17.
224. ROGERS, supra note 5, at 115. Henderson notes that it is not enough that the other side
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HENDERSON, supra note 108, at 187.
225. UK MANUAL, supra note 38, J 5.32.8 (emphasis added); Ecuador's Naval Manual of 1989
uses similar wording. CIHLS II, supra note 13, at 402, ^ 437. See also Aide-Memoire for IFOR
Commanders (1995) of the Netherlands. Id. at 403, 1 445.
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to issuing general warnings instead of specific warnings, but is also relevant in determining when
no warning will be given.
227. CIHLS II, supra note 13, at 409, J 484 (emphasis added).
228. See, e.g., Noam Neuman, Applying the Rule of Proportionality: Force Protection and Cu-
mulative Assessment in International Law and Morality, 7 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 79 (2004); Benvenisti, supra note 186, at 89-90, 93-97; Michael N.
Schmitt, Fault Lines in the Law of Attack, in TESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN Law 277, 296-98 (Susan Breau & Agnieszka Jachec-neale eds., 2006). See also
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229. UK MANUAL, supra note 38, ^ 5.32.8.
230. CIHLS I, supra note 14, at 64. In CIHLS II, supra note 13, at 407, U 473, the report of the
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231. UK MANUAL, supra note 38, 1 5.32.8.
232. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Mili-
tary and Associated Terms 374 (as amended through Dec. 31, 2010), available at http://
www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jpl_02.pdf.
233. Another example is enemy combatants identified by opposing military forces. See the
analysis ofvon der Groeben, supra note 1 10, at 485, discussing the possibility of an attack aimed
at Taliban fighters.
234. The example of the attack on the el-Bader flour mill demonstrates this difference be-
tween preplanned attacks and "immediate" targets. See supra note 96.
235. UK MANUAL, supra note 38, f 5.32.8; Commander's Handbook, supra note 18, | 8.9.2;
USAF Pamphlet, supra note 37, at 5-1 1.
236. ROGERS, supra note 5, at 100, 1 10.
237. Goldstone Report, supra note 94, ^ 527.
238. Schmitt, supra note 57, at 827-28.
239. Id. Schmitt also points out that warnings must be issued even if the collateral damage ex-
pected in the absence of a warning would not be excessive in relation to the anticipated military
advantage and even if they are unlikely to minimize harm to civilians and civilian objects (as in
the case of regularly unheeded warnings). Thus, the position proffered in the report paradoxi-
cally sets a lower humanity threshold than required by international humanitarian law.
240. CIHLS I, supra note 14, at 65. The UN Reports on Lebanon also emphasize that the re-
sponsibility to distinguish between combatants and civilians is not discharged by warning civil-
ians that they will be targeted. Civilians are not obligated to comply with warnings given and "a
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241. AMW Commentary, supra note 11, at 134,^1 16.
242. A good analysis is found in Michael N. Schmitt, Human Shields in International Humani-
tarian Law, 47 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 292 (2009).
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The issue oflegal scrutiny ofoperations is ultimately a synthesis ofmany indi-
vidual developments in the conduct and monitoring of operations
generally. Over the last two or three decades in particular, the practice of operations
law has evolved in response to an intricate web of related developments—in the law
itself, or in its interpretation; in technology (in terms ofboth conduct ofoperations
and monitoring of operations); and in the capacities of accountability agents. The
consequence is, quite naturally, significantly greater scrutiny. There are few nations
currently engaged in International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations in
Afghanistan, for example, that have not faced the very public dissection and de-
construction oftheir legal responses to discrete operational incidents. This is most
certainly not a development to be lamented; indeed it is to be greatly lauded. But
this overwhelmingly positive development should not disguise the tensions—and
flaws—that can result from rapid evolution in any ecosystem. In this short intro-
duction to the changing character of legal scrutiny, I will briefly overview three
particular factors in this evolution—the enablers oflaw, technology and the capac-
ities of accountability agents—and make some short general observations on the
potential implications of this evolution for military operations. My focus is upon
the effects of these developments on public legal scrutiny, rather than the internal
* Associate Professor, College of Law, Australian National University.
The Changing Character ofPublic Legal Scrutiny ofOperations
or organic legal scrutiny that for most States has long been an integrated compo-
nent of the conduct of military operations.
Enablers: Law
Clearly, greater definition or certainty in the law applicable to any given military
operation is a positive development. This should not disguise, however, the in-
alienable fact that greater ultimate precision in the law comes at the price of uncer-
tainty during the evolutionary process of establishing and implementing those
interpretations while simultaneously conducting operations in which that newly
minted law or interpretation or guidance is clearly applicable and is being applied. As
other articles in this volume clearly attest, there is no settled view—nor even a pre-
dominant view—among and between academics, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), inter-governmental organizations, the International Committee of the Red
Cross and individual States on the scope and application of the concept of targetable
members of an organized armed group in the context of non-international armed
conflicts. 1 Yet this substantive legal concept is evolving as it is applied in opera-
tions such as those of ISAF in Afghanistan. Clearly, developments in the way this
concept is interpreted and applied are not yet finalized or settled. Actions and inci-
dents are nevertheless being held to account against the concept—in its myriad
forms and interpretations—contemporaneously with the wider general debate as
to what is, precisely, the correct interpretation and application. The obvious—but
highly significant and operationally challenging—consequence is that an NGO,
for example, will analyze an operational incident against one interpretation of the
evolving law or appreciation of the law, whereas a State may well be analyzing the
same incident in light of a different interpretation and differing State practice in
relation to the very same law. Clearly, the scope for differential appreciation, con-
fusion and antagonism is plainly evident.
The notion of direct participation in hostilities, and the subdivision of this con-
cept into ad hoc and organized armed group components, is but one of the more
obvious current manifestations of this phenomenon. Whether an improvised-
explosive-device maker killed in an attack was killed in accordance with the law of
armed conflict (LOAC) (that is, as a targetable member of an organized armed
group) or murdered (a civilian who was not within the targetable envelope) is a
fundamental fracture point.
Another example, in relation to collateral damage mitigation and weapon-
eering, may similarly assist in illustrating this point. It was recently reported that a
US Army field artillery regiment in Afghanistan had developed a method of miti-
gating potential collateral damage when undertaking fire support missions by
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using less-explosive training ammunition during the "adjustment phase."2 As the
report makes clear, however, this is a "moral and strategic choice within a counter-
insurgency environment." 3
It is important to emphasize that this innovation is a contextual—not univer-
sal—amendment to what is to be considered as feasible in relation to precautions
in attack and collateral damage mitigation. The potential exists, however, for one
party in a debate to assert, with strong reasoning, that this innovation should now
become the norm across all operations. Another party to the debate may well wish
to emphasize, on the basis of equally sound reasoning, that this innovation is a
choice available only in limited situations and a choice that is dependent upon ter-
rain, ballistic conditions, availability, strategy and so on.
The message is clear, however: the significantly broader availability of detailed
information and the vastly expanded opportunities for debate as to "the law" by
reference to that information have increased the depth, scope and occurrence of
public legal scrutiny of operations. The reverse side of this development is that the
language of the applicable law—most particularly LOAC—can be very publicly
misused so as to provide an aura of incontestability or authority to an otherwise
weak statement or analysis. Stating an opinion, without proper analysis, that a par-
ticular effect was "disproportionate" carries with it very strictly defined and signifi-
cant legal context and implications, even ifthe user ofthe term was employing it in
a colloquial, ethical or moral sense.
A second aspect of the evolution of law as a component of increasing legal
scrutiny of operations is the role of law itself in terms of the manner in which that
scrutiny is conducted. Public debates on operational incidents are today generally
conducted within a legal framework: the language used is drawn from the law (al-
beit specific terms or concepts are occasionally improperly used or explained,
sometimes undermining the ultimate quality of the analysis, and thus the scrutiny);
the investigative and enforcement paradigms utilized are bounded by law; and the
consequences are often expressed in terms of the law. It is notable, for example,
how interpretation of the applicable law—and the legal framework—dominated
public debate (in political, media and civil society arenas) in Australia and the
United Kingdom in the lead-up to operations in Iraq in 2003.4 Similarly, the most
accessible and public resort to complaint in relation to operational incidents is in-
creasingly through and via the law.
This is evident on several levels. On a limited, very individual level, one example
is the significant recent media attention surrounding litigation commenced by a
British army sniper against the UK Ministry ofDefence (MoD) for failing to ensure
that his identity was protected after he gave an interview (that was approved and
monitored byMoD officials who had told him his identity would be protected) . He
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and his family have since been required to relocate as they were assessed to be at
high risk of kidnap or targeting by militants. 5
On a broader scale, law and legal process have also been used to invite wider
public scrutiny of operations through public interest channels able to access the
mechanisms of judicial review. On the basis of publicly available information and
other information originally released to her by the MoD, Maya Evans—described
in some media as "an anti-war activist"—was able to agitate for judicial review of
ten specific detainee transfers (from UK forces serving within ISAF to Afghan gov-
ernment authorities) so as to ensure that detention operations in general were
subject to additional public legal scrutiny.6 This is, very clearly, a positive develop-
ment: authoritative and public legal determinations on detailed matters of direct
operational concern, where those determinations are made on the basis ofaccurate
information and with contextual appreciation, will generally generate more di-
rectly and operationally useful guidelines and instructions. Similarly, authoritative
determinations that generally endorse current practice and legal risk mitigation
strategies (as was the case in this litigation), while perhaps not as newsworthy as
condemnatory decisions, are nonetheless often as useful as such condemnatory de-
cisions. It is sometimes as edifying and important to the practice ofoperational law
to know what we are getting right as it is to know what we have got wrong.
Enablers: Technology
Technology functions as a similarly bivalent force in the evolution oflegal scrutiny of
operations. On one level, technology in operations raises myriad questions about
contemporaneous or simultaneous legal scrutiny, most particularly in relation to
means and methods of warfare and precautions in attack. One example is the fact
that public perceptions as to both the efficacy of precision-guided munitions
(PGMs) and their ubiquity in modern operations are often at odds with opera-
tional reality. This disjuncture is thoroughly problematic in terms of legal scrutiny.
Regardless of best intentions, it must be accepted that non-State accountability
agents who analyze weapons incidents may—or equally may not—be applying an
accurate understanding of the capabilities, limitations, employment parameters
and effects of such weapons or of their place in broader systems of assessment,
weaponeering and targeting. All of these factors will influence the effect of a dis-
crete weapon in any given context, and all ofthese factors—as increasingly publicly
available information—can be built into (and misapplied in the course of) signifi-
cantly more detailed alternative legal assessments and scrutiny. Perhaps the most
telling recent example was the public misappreciation of at least some incidents
during the Kosovo conflict where debate over launching weapons from altitude,
418
Rob McLaughlin
insofar as it related to precision-guided munitions and the altitudes associated with
increased accuracy of some PGMs, clearly evidenced well-intentioned but ulti-
mately inaccurate legal assessments by some accountability agents. 7
Technology also plays a significant role in terms of the quantity and—but not
always positively—quality ofinformation available to both commanders and scru-
tinizers of operations. One example is the detailed analysis by Human Rights
Watch (HRW) of a US and Afghan forces engagement in Azizabad in Afghanistan
on August 21-22, 2008. In a letter to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, HRW in-
vestigators reported, on the basis of their assessment ofwhat the technology could
do and thus what it should have told US forces about events in the village, that
[i]t is, therefore, questionable that the close proximity of insurgent forces to civilians
was "unknown" to US and Afghan forces; if it was unknown, then the quality ofUS in-
telligence was shockingly poor
Given what could be expected to have been known about the large civilian population in the
village at the time, conducting airstrikes over several hours that destroy or damage 12 to
14 houses in the middle ofthe night makes high civilian casualties almost inevitable.8
As is a risk with all assessments completed in hindsight, the factor that comes to
dominate when a tragedy occurs maynow appear glaringly obvious and thus be at-
tributed significant weight in assessing both the aftermath and apportionment of
blame. At the time, however, it may have been but one factor among a multitude of
noisy competing pieces ofinformation, each ofwhich would have been colored by
differential quality tags and unknown levels of perishability, and subject to the
compressed time frames of operational decision making. The piece ofinformation
in question may not, at the time the decision was actually made, have held such a
dominant place in the lexicon surrounding the incident. Not all mistakes are the
result of intentional disregard, recklessness or negligence. Sometimes mistakes are
simply the result of decisions that were at the time legitimately made (and thus of
continuing lawfulness) from within a swirl of information of highly variable and
occasionally unknown quality and corroboration. Mistake does not necessarily
equal illegality.
Technology, with respect to legal scrutiny, also has significant effects in terms of
post-incident monitoring and assessment, two of the core components of legal
scrutiny. These effects operate on several different levels. First, technology—from
mobile phones with digital video recording capabilities to the ubiquity of access to
the Internet in operational zones, and the availability ofinformation and ease ofin-
formation sharing across the Internet—clearly makes legal scrutiny of operations
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significantly faster, more omnidirectional and more informed than at any time in
the past. Footage of an incident recorded by a bystander on a mobile phone can be
uploaded to the Internet within minutes and can be viral within minutes after that.
Within hours, footage of an incident can be the subject of both informed and ill-
informed legal scrutiny, the latter necessitating a response. Of course, more "in-
formed" in terms of raw material forming the basis of assessment does not neces-
sarily mean more "informed" in terms of analysis; that is a function of the law and
the analytical process applied.
Access to information and comment, and the ability to in turn make further
comment—regardless of its accuracy, quality, purpose or contextual worth
—
immediately available to millions of people can drive a scrutiny agenda down a
myriad of paths, thereby opening the potential for irrelevant or minimally relevant
factors or concerns to dominate or derail a debate or scrutiny project. Military and
governmental public affairs bureaucracies are slower and less agile than many of
the other actors in the ideas and influence marketplace, a logical consequence of
both clearance requirements and the predilection for prior clarification and cor-
roboration. The consequence, however, is that while operational public affairs
mechanisms are generally proactive with respect to "good" news (or rather, are of-
ten the first and only media to report such stories), they are generally seen as merely
responsive to "bad" news.
An example of how media-driven legal scrutiny can herd such scrutiny down
situationally inconsequential or irrelevant paths might be illustrated by some media
reporting of the Australian Director of Military Prosecution's decision to prefer
charges against three Australian soldiers in relation to a civilian casualty incident in
Afghanistan. One issue that came to dominate the debate (for a period of time at
any rate) was International Criminal Court (ICC) cognizance of, and jurisdiction
over, the matter. While it was clear in press reporting that the charges were laid in
accordance with Australian domestic law and after a Service Police investigation,
an "obiter" comment by a respected Australian international law academic that
merely reiterated that Australia has certain obligations under the Rome Statute9 sud-
denly saw the non-existent issue of overt ICC "pressure" become the focus of media-
based legal scrutiny and reportage for a week. "International obligations may be
compelling the prosecution ofAussie troops," asserted one newspaper. 10 However,
it was clear—even on the facts as reported by the media—that the matter would be
inadmissible before the ICC because Australia had appropriately investigated.
Quasi-legal opinion that the decision to prosecute may have been taken to ensure
the ICC could not intervene was not only ill-informed and irrelevant; it was mani-
festly wrong at law. In accordance with its own statute, the ICC's attention, ifany, is
assuaged, regardless of any subsequent decision as to prosecution, at the point the
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relevant State has properly conducted and considered an investigation, as Australia
had done in this instance.
It was also clear, quite apart from the issue of complementarity, that the "grav-
ity" requirement for enlivening ICC jurisdiction was not met in this case. 11 This,
however, did not stop the public media-led legal scrutiny of the matter from pro-
ceeding down a deep and irrelevant rabbit hole, with resultant public misunder-
standings of the role and jurisdiction of the ICC as a potentially enduring
consequence.
Second, as noted previously, technology and the agility of non-State monitors
and scrutinizers (who, as also noted previously, are often significantly more agile,
flexible and quicker off the mark than more bureaucratic public affairs mecha-
nisms) often combine to ensure that incidents are placed within the public domain
in very short order. The consequence is that operational bureaucracies are increas-
ingly forced to publicly respond well in advance ofhaving collated and analyzed the
available information. Whereas additional and alternative scrutiny was previously
something that generally occurred after the reporting, investigation, assessment
and results implementation process had been completed and communicated, the
additional and alternative scrutiny process is increasingly multistaged: scrutiny
based upon initial reports, scrutiny at the investigative stage, scrutiny at the assess-
ment phase, scrutiny at the consequences stage (e.g., trials) and scrutiny at the
implementation of the lessons-learned stage.
A recent example is apparent in one ofthe many threads ofscrutiny activity that
arose out of the October 2010 WikiLeaks disclosure ofmany thousands of classified
documents relating to the Afghanistan conflict that had been prepared between
January 2004 and December 2009. One public interest legal group wrote the UK
Minister ofDefence recommending investigation "as suspected war crimes" of in-
cidents disclosed in the WikiLeaks documents. These documents disclose, the
group asserts, the need for further legal scrutiny of "the killing of at least 26 civil-
ians and the wounding of a further 20 by British forces." 12 Legal scrutiny is thus
now occurring, divisibly and in detail, at every procedural stage ofan incident's legal
life—from initial reporting, to investigation, to judicial consideration, to
outcomes and consequence implementation. Again, this is not an evolution to be
decried; it carries with it great potential for increased transparency and accountabil-
ity. But it also carries with it the potential for misinformation, inaccurate assess-
ments and misguided responses at multiple fracture points in an incident's legal
journey, each of these inevitably coloring, shaping and informing the next sub-
stage of scrutiny. This is a very different proposition from public reportage and
opinion based on the invariably more considered and reflective legal scrutiny and
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analysis that can accompany an open judicial hearing in which evidence is thor-
oughly tested, contextualized and weighed as it is being publicly disclosed.
Enablers: Capacities ofAccountability Agents
The third element of the troika of enablers that are playing a significant role in the
evolution ofpublic legal scrutiny ofoperations is that some non-State accountabil-
ity agents have become much more professional—and thus effective—in their ap-
proach to incidents, and much better equipped to conduct additional and
alternative investigations. Academics and public interest law groups with a focus
on litigation have long brought their analytical skills to bear on specific incidents
but have traditionally been hamstrung by the availability of detailed information.
But, as has been discussed, as information scarcity becomes less the norm, the
opportunities for such academics and public interest law groups to engage with
specific incidents in much greater detail and with significantly greater fidelity has
grown apace. 13
Similarly, the general stock-in-trade ofmanyNGOs was for many years limited by
information and capacity to general comments or press statements. Today, however,
the increased and improved professionalism, access, resourcing and specialization
ofsome NGOs have enabled them to become highly influential non-State actors in
the field of legal scrutiny of operational incidents. 14 Second-order issues such as
scrutiny on reputation, and creating impetus for policy change as a means of
achieving effects on operations—effects that can be achieved on the basis of report-
age and opinion as opposed to detailed legal investigation and analysis—are no
longer necessarily the focus of some better resourced, connected and informed
NGOs. These accountability agents are now focusing more extensively upon
achieving direct and discernible results in terms of legal processes and conse-
quences by inquiring into issues with much greater granularity and utilizing more
rigidly (if not always accurately or correctly) applied legal frameworks as the para-
digms within which they inquire, analyze and conclude. This allows these account-
ability agents to create opportunities for more direct and timely change. Being told
that your policy is wrong is a less legally significant issue—and is likely to prompt a
less immediate result—than being told that you are in breach of the law.
Consequences?
Although the enablers outlined above are but three of many that are driving the
changing nature of legal scrutiny of operations, they do point the way to three the-
matic conclusions as to the future shape of this evolution. The first, which is no
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surprise, is that the language of additional and alternative scrutiny of operational
incidents will continue to be dominated by law and legal paradigms. Engaging with
and analyzing the high volume of disparate and hybrid pieces of information that
are increasingly available to alternative accountability agents, such as NGOs, the
media and academics, are difficult in the absence of an organizing principle and
framework. Perhaps much more readily than purely policy analysis, law provides a
universally recognized (ifnot always universally agreed upon) framework, supple-
mented by detailed rules and processes, against which that information can be
marshaled and applied. Further, legallybased scrutiny projects bring with them the
potential for substantially more urgent and direct responses and consequences
than many forms of policy pressure exerted with respect to the same issue. Being
told, in detail, how and why your use of force breaches the law is much more likely
to prompt an immediate response than being told why your approach to the use of
force is wrong from a policy perspective.
Second, military operations are ever-increasingly intelligence led and effects
based. The natural consequence is that militaries not only have the capacity to
generate greater levels of information on discrete targets or on discrete opera-
tional incidents, but are in fact driven by law, strategy and doctrine to do so. This
development clearly opens discrete incidents to deeper additional or alternative
scrutiny because each incident is treated more rigorously as an individual circum-
stance, thereby generating greater levels ofdetail and thus greater opportunities for
detailed legal scrutiny. It also opens the path for new levels of legal scrutiny into
ever more narrowly defined issues such as the reliance a commander placed upon
individual pieces of information. It will become increasingly possible—at the very
least through the cross-referencing capabilities of Internet searching—for scruti-
nizes to arm themselves with information that will allow them to engage not just
with the law as it relates to a particular piece of intelligence that a commander may
have relied upon, but with the law that relates to the manner by which it was col-
lected, the process by which it was analyzed and the source from whence it was
drawn. This is already the case with the markedly increased potential for additional
and alternative legal scrutinizers to analyze particular weapons-use incidents.
It is also becoming an accepted fact of operational life that such legal scrutiny of
intelligence itself is now routinely possible on the basis of publicly available infor-
mation: scrutiny as to the motives and background of individual sources of intelli-
gence (warlord, sympathizer or user of the military force as a proxy in his/her own
vendettas?); as to the legal status of the process by which that intelligence was col-
lected (telecommunications intercepts, biometrics, paid human agents?); and the
availability ofother information that enhances or degrades the quality ofthat intel-
ligence. It is also entirely possible that post-incident scrutinizers are able to easily
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find and apply—and thus assume a commander's knowledge of—additional
information to which that commander may not have actually had access.
The third consequence of this evolution in the legal scrutiny ofoperations is that
it is no longer just about what is investigated; it is about who investigates, when and
where they investigate, how they investigate, that body of law used to investigate,
and that body of law (or which States' particular interpretation of the law) used to
measure the results. That is, the dimensions of additional and alternative legal
scrutiny have now spread well beyond simple engagement with the incident itself.
It is a statement of the obvious that additional and alternative legal scrutiny proj-
ects will continue to broaden in focus so as to engage with any ancillary or related
issue where there is a legal framework that is readily applicable and information
that is readily available.
Conclusion
The changing nature of legal scrutiny of operations generally, and of operational
incidents more particularly, is not to be decried. It is vital that militaries and States
acknowledge and accept that this is ultimately a positive development in the evolu-
tion oftransparency and accountability in operations. It is also important that mil-
itaries and States understand that this evolution will continue regardless. However,
the obligations created by this evolution are not all one way. Certainly States will
continue to test and adjust their processes in order to respond to this development
by developing quicker public affairs mechanisms, through increasing transparency
in releasing their own investigation or inquiry findings in relation to certain
incidents, and by engaging in detailed rebuttals of additional and alternative legal
scrutiny reports where appropriate. But this development also places obligations
upon these additional and alternative legal scrutiny agents in terms of their own
engagement with information, analysis and the law. With power comes responsi-
bility, and legal scrutiny is nothing if not powerful.
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It is well-documented that the way the Bush administration chose to conduct its
conflict against al Qaeda caused a significant rift between the United States and
European States. US policies that authorized the use ofrenditions, secret detention
facilities and harsh interrogation techniques created diplomatic tension between
the United States and many of its European allies, making it harder to focus on
other bilateral and multilateral issues and at times diminishing law enforcement
and intelligence cooperation. 1 Many ofthese European reactions and decisions were
discretionary, taken by the political branches of European countries in response to
pressure from their electorates and human rights groups. One might reasonably
think, therefore, that some of the changes introduced by the Obama administra-
tion related to the conflict with al Qaeda—the three January 2009 executive orders,
for instance—would have started to close that rift.2
But something remarkable—and surprisingly unremarked upon—has been
happening since 2001 that is both widening and securing the permanence of this
transatlantic divide. Courts on both sides of the Atlantic are deciding cases
brought by individuals who are contesting the way States have been fighting
armed conflicts with non-State actors (such as the Taliban and al Qaeda, as well as
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Litigating How We Fight
armed groups in Iraq). With the exception of individual claims related to the law-
fulness of detention at Guantanamo, the US government has won the vast major-
ity of its cases, with the courts often declining even to reach the merits of the
claim. 3 In contrast, European States (with the United Kingdom leading the way)
have lost virtually every case on these issues that has come before their courts or
before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). These cases are having a
systematic effect on States' decisions about how to conduct themselves in armed
conflict. It therefore is in the interests of policymakers and warfighters to under-
stand this trend.
Part II of this article examines the wide spectrum of cases in which States or
State officials have been sued for their alleged conduct related to non-international
armed conflicts. Part III assesses the real-world implications for the judicial deci-
sions in each area, not only for the specific litigants but also for government policy
and operations more generally. Part IV considers possible explanations for the diver-
gent outcomes of these cases and offers some thoughts about how States might try
to manage these developments in the future.
II. Suing States over How They Fight
Virtually every aspect of the way in which the United States and European States
are fighting conflicts against non-State actors—including detention, the use of
force during occupation, the transfer of detainees from one State to another and
the use of intelligence and intelligence agencies—has been challenged in court. 4
These cases stem primarily from the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, though
some flow from the US conflict with al Qaeda outside of those theaters and allega-
tions about US activities, such as renditions, in the course of that latter conflict.
This Part examines four categories of claims asserting unlawful actions by States:
unlawful detention, unlawful treatment, unlawful transfers and illegality in intelli-
gence activities. Each section focuses first on US cases and then turns to other
States' cases, most often cases brought in the United Kingdom.
Claims of Unlawful Detention
US Cases
It is useful to sort into three general categories claims brought by detainees against
the United States alleging that they are being unlawfully detained. First, detainees
have challenged the executive branch's general authority to detain al Qaeda and
Taliban fighters under the laws of war. US courts have upheld the executive's au-
thority in this area. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court upheld the legality of
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detention of individuals engaged in hostilities against the United States in Afghani-
stan, while requiring the US government to provide the individual detainee in
question with a process by which to contest the factual basis for his detention. 5
Likewise, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court affirmed that the United
States was in an armed conflict with al Qaeda and did not question the legality of
Hamdan's detention as a member of al Qaeda (though it concluded that the military
commission before which the United States planned to try him was unlawful).6
Second, detainees have sought to have federal courts, not just the executive
branch, review the legality of their detentions. The United States, which has argued
against the extension of review to courts, has lost these cases. The chain of cases
that resulted in the Supreme Court's holding that constitutional habeas corpus
applies to detainees held at Guantanamo includes Rasul v. Bush and Boumediene
v. Bush. 7
The Boumediene decision resulted in a third category of cases: detainees at
Guantanamo have brought habeas petitions challenging the specific factual bases
for their detentions. The United States is defending almost two hundred habeas
cases brought by those who remain at Guantanamo, and has lost a number ofcases,
even as the courts continue to uphold the basic scope ofthe government's claimed
detention authority.8 Much ink has been spilled about the unprecedented nature of
judicial review of the propriety of a person's detention during an armed conflict.
Indeed, the fact that the federal district courts hearing these cases are struggling
with what rules to apply to this review illustrates the novel nature ofthe courts' role
in this type of decision making and the non-traditional nature of the armed
conflict. 9 The outcomes of these cases have been mixed: the courts (to date) have
denied detainees the writ of habeas in about sixteen cases, and have granted it in
thirty-seven cases. 10 As a result, the United States has transferred a number of de-
tainees to their countries of nationality or other locations, and in other cases con-
tinues to seek homes for those ordered released.
In Boumediene, the Supreme Court evaluated three factors to determine the
reach of the writ of habeas in the wartime detention context: "(1) the citizenship
and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process through which that sta-
tus determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and
then detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the
prisoner's entitlement to the writ." 11
One question left unresolved by Boumediene was whether the right of habeas
corpus might extend to detainees held in US custody in locations other than
Guantanamo.
In May 2010, the D.C. Circuit answered this question in the negative in the
Maqaleh case, at least with regard to certain detentions in Afghanistan. 12 The court
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applied the three Boumediene factors to determine whether the writ would run to
the detention in Afghanistan by the United States of three non-Afghan detainees
who alleged that the United States apprehended them outside of Afghanistan. The
Maqaleh court concluded that the writ did not run to those detainees, holding that
"under both Eisentrager and Boumediene, the writ does not extend to the Bagram
confinement in an active theater ofwar in a territory under neither the defacto nor
dejure sovereignty of the United States and within the territory of another dejure
sovereign." 13 In reaching this conclusion, the court expressed concern about an in-
terpretation of the Suspension Clause that would "create the potential for the ex-
traterritorial extension of the Suspension Clause to noncitizens held in any United
States military facility in the world, and perhaps to an undeterminable number of
other United States-leased facilities as well." 14 The court thus determined that it
lacked jurisdiction to hear the detainees' claims. 15 This holding—in a case in which
the detainees were not Afghan nationals and in which they alleged that they were
not apprehended in Afghanistan—suggests that it is even more unlikely that US
courts would conclude that habeas would extend to detainees such as Afghan
nationals apprehended in Afghanistan during the current conflict.
While it is possible to imagine a future US detention facility that falls between
Guantanamo and Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan on the spectrum of the
Boumediene factors, for now it appears as though Guantanamo detainees are sui
generis in being alien wartime detainees entitled to federal court review of their de-
tentions. Courts thus have left it to the executive branch to determine whether,
outside of Guantanamo, a particular individual's detention during armed conflict
is lawful.
UK Cases
The UK case of al-Jedda, another case about the legality of a detention during non-
international armed conflict, stands in some contrast to Maqaleh. 16 The ECtHR
held a merits hearing on June 9, 2010, so its ultimate disposition remains uncertain.
However, the UK House ofLords decision is worth considering both for its holding
and because it illustrates the complicated expansion of the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR) 17 into warfighting for States parties to that Convention.
The larger implications for that expansion are discussed in Part III.
The UK armed forces in Iraq detained Mr. al-Jedda, a dual British-Iraqi na-
tional, for several years as a "security internee." Al-Jedda challenged his detention,
claiming it violated ECHR Article 5, which defines the situations in which a State
lawfully can deprive a person of his liberty, and which does not include security de-
tention. 18 The UK government pursued two main lines of argument. First, it
argued that al-Jedda's detention was attributable not to the United Kingdom but to
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the UN, which had authorized a multinational force to take action in Iraq. Second,
it argued that his detention was authorized by UN Security Council Resolution
1546 (UNSCR 1546), which contemplated detention "for imperative reasons of
security," 19 and that the Resolution therefore qualified al-Jedda's rights under
ECHR Article 5 (and under the UK's Human Rights Act (HRA), which imple-
mented the ECHR in UK law).
The House ofLords rejected the UK's first argument but accepted—in part—its
second. The Law Lords determined that Article 103 ofthe UN Charter, which pro-
vides that a State's obligations under the Charter prevail over any other of the
State's international obligations, qualified the UK's obligations under ECHR Arti-
cle 5.20 However, the Lords made clear that UNSCR 1546 did not supplant Article 5
entirely. One lord's opinion stated, "[T]he UK may lawfully, where it is necessary
for imperative reasons of security, exercise the power to detain authorised by
UNSCR 1546 and successive resolutions, but must ensure that the detainee's rights
under article 5 are not infringed to any greater extent than is inherent in such de-
tention."21 Another lord noted that the scope ofUNSCR 1546 and the way the Res-
olution might interact with Article 5's requirements were not clear and that the
issue would remain for decision in future proceedings. 22 Three ofthe five Lords ex-
pressed discomfort with security detention generally; one suggested that the
United Kingdom bring al-Jedda back to the United Kingdom and another favored
criminal proceedings, viewing security detention only as a fallback. (Both of these
positions are in tension with the view under the law ofwar that security detention
in the location in which the conflict is occurring is acceptable.)
The House ofLords thus considered that it had jurisdiction to review al-Jedda's
claims, in contrast to the D.C. Circuit in Maqaleh. Further, while it upheld al-
Jedda's detention as lawful, it held that UNSCR 1546 qualifies the applicability of
ECHR Article 5, but only to the extent necessary to give effect to the obligations in
UNSCR 1546. In other words, Article 5 continues to apply to the UK's security
detentions to the greatest extent possible consistent with the Resolution. It remains
to be seen whether the ECtHR will take a similar or more expansive view of the ex-
tent to which the UK's obligations under the ECHR must govern its treatment of its
detainees during armed conflicts outside UK territory. 23
Claims of Unlawful Detainee Treatment
Another category of claims against States fighting non-international armed con-
flicts is claims that detainees in these States' custody suffered mistreatment at the
hands of State officials, either directly or as a result of policies approved by the
officials.
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US Cases
Individuals detained as suspected members of al Qaeda or the Taliban have
brought a number of cases in US courts seeking declaratory reliefand damages for
their alleged abuse while in US custody. Some have tried to sue US government of-
ficials, while others have tried to sue US contractors. 24 None has succeeded to date;
further, the courts have resolved the cases in a way that has avoided addressing the
underlying substantive claims.
In Rasul v. Rumsfeld, four former Guantanamo detainees sued former Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and ten other senior military officials, seeking dam-
ages for their detention and alleged mistreatment while in that facility.25 They
claimed that they were subjected to beatings, sleep deprivation, extreme tempera-
tures, forced nudity, death threats and interrogations at gunpoint. Their claims al-
leged violations of the US Constitution and international law, including the 1949
Geneva Conventions. In 2008, the D.C. Circuit dismissed the case; the Supreme
Court granted certiorari, vacated and remanded for further consideration in light
of Boumediene.26 On remand, the D.C. Circuit again dismissed the case, holding
that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. 27 In addition to holding
that " [n]o reasonable government official would have been on notice that plaintiffs
had any Fifth Amendment or Eighth Amendment rights," the court also expressed
its view that "the Court in Boumediene disclaimed any intention to disturb existing
law governing the extraterritorial reach of any constitutional provisions, other
than the Suspension Clause." 28 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in 2009.
Likewise, in Arar v. Ashcroft, Maher Arar sued the former Attorney General and
other US officials, claiming that they had violated the Torture Victims Protection
Act and Arar's Fifth Amendment rights by authorizing his removal to Syria with-
out appropriate process and with the knowledge that the Syrian government would
detain and torture him. 29 The Second Circuit, sitting en banc, declined to create a
new Bivens damages remedy against the government officials allegedly responsible
for his transfer. The Second Circuit described the diplomatic, foreign policy, classi-
fied information and national security implications of allowing damage claims for
harms suffered during renditions as among the "special factors" counseling against
the extension of a Bivens action to this type of activity. 30 The court concluded,
[W]e decline to create, on our own, a new cause of action against officers and employ-
ees of the federal government. Rather, we conclude that, when a case presents the in-
tractable "special factors" apparent here, ... it is for the Executive in the first instance to
decide how to implement extraordinary rendition, and for the elected members of
Congress—and not for us as judges—to decide whether an individual may seek com-
pensation from government officers and employees directly, or from the government,
for a constitutional violation. 31
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The court thus deferred to the political branches in assessing whether and how to
create such a remedy.
In this context, it is worth mentioning Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. While that case was
about the legality ofthe military commissions created to try Mr. Hamdan, and not
about his treatment in detention, the Supreme Court's decision that Common Arti-
cle 3 ofthe Geneva Conventions applied to the US conflict with al Qaeda had a direct
effect on the rules governing the US government's treatment and interrogation of
al Qaeda (and Taliban) detainees. One might therefore view this case as an example
that runs counter to the primary thesis of this article, because a US court waded
into an issue that forced it to examine what rules the executive branch must apply
to military operations during an armed conflict. However, it is possible to view the
case as one whose core issues were squarely of the type that courts usually adjudi-
cate: the interpretation of two US statutes (the Uniform Code of Military Justice
and the Detainee Treatment Act) and the parameters of a fair trial, with the hold-
ing's implications for broader treatment issues an important second-order effect.
Indeed, even though the US government asked the courts to abstain from consider-
ing the merits of the case, its primary argument was that the courts should abstain
until the military justice process ran its course, not that the issue was a political
question inappropriate for judicial review.32
UK Cases
In contrast, the UK courts allowed a comparable case of alleged detainee abuse in
Iraq by UK forces to proceed, with Her Majesty's Government (HMG) conceding
that the ECHR applied to an Iraqi detainee who had been killed while in its cus-
tody. In al-Skeini v. Secretary ofStatefor Defence, family members of six Iraqi civil-
ians killed in Iraq brought cases against HMG.33 In each case, a member ofthe UK
armed forces had killed the individual at a time when the United Kingdom was an
occupying power in Basra, Iraq. Five ofthe individuals were killed duringUK patrols
or raids on houses; the sixth, Baha Mousa, was detained and beaten to death in UK
custody. The Iraqis' claims were based on the UK's HRA, a law that requires those
bringing cases under the law to show that the UK government acted in a manner
incompatible with an ECHR right of the claimant or deceased. 34 The individuals
claimed that the UK's actions violated its procedural obligations under Articles 2
(right to life) and 3 (right not to be subjected to torture) ofthe ECHR (and the cor-
responding parts of the HRA) to investigate violations thereof. 35
The UK government argued that the HRA did not apply to UK government ac-
tions outside its borders.36 With regard to Mr. Mousa, however, the UK government
conceded that, while he was in UK detention, Mr. Mousa was within its jurisdic-
tion for purposes of applicability of the ECHR. 37 Because the United Kingdom
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conceded this, the al-Skeini court did not discuss the issue in any depth. Several
scholars have noted the uncertainty as to the precise basis for the House of Lords'
holding regarding Mousa; it "was apparently premised on some special jurisdic-
tion that the United Kingdom was said to have over its military prisons abroad, not
on the fact of direct physical control over Mr Baha Mousa." 38 In any event, this
concession by the UK government suggests that the United Kingdom will treat
future overseas detentions during armed conflict or peacekeeping operations as
being covered by the ECHR unless there is a specific UN Security Council resolu-
tion in place that would "trump" the UK's ECHR obligations. 39 As with al-Jedda,
the ECtHR is hearing the al-Skeini case, so the case's ultimate outcome remains
unresolved.
Claims of Unlawful Detainee Transfers
In another series of suits filed in regard to conduct taking place during non-
international armed conflicts, detainees have asked courts to enjoin their transfers
from the custody ofthe State holding them to the custody of another State. Detain-
ees who had been in US (and Canadian) custody have lost their cases; based upon
the approach of the UK courts and the ECtHR to date, the detainees who are or
were in UK custody seem likely to win theirs.
US Cases
In 2006, two US nationals held by Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) filed peti-
tions for habeas corpus in US court, asking the court to block their transfer by
MNF-I to Iraqi officials (who had issued arrest warrants for them).40 The Supreme
Court, hearing their consolidated cases as Munaf v. Geren, considered "whether
United States district courts may exercise their habeas jurisdiction to enjoin our
Armed Forces from transferring individuals detained within another sovereign's
territory to that sovereign's government for criminal prosecution."41 The Court
concluded that, although US courts had statutory habeas jurisdiction over the indi-
viduals (presumably because they were US citizens), those courts could not grant
the remedy sought.42
Although not the sole basis for its holding, the Court took into account the fact
that the individuals were captured in the context ofan ongoing conflict. The Court
considered other cases in which the United States had transferred US citizens to
foreign countries for trial and remarked:
Neither Neely nor Wilson concerned individuals captured and detained within an ally's
territory during ongoing hostilities involving our troops. Neely involved a charge of
embezzlement; Wilson the peacetime actions ofa serviceman. Yet in those cases we held
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that the Constitution allows the Executive to transfer American citizens to foreign
authorities for criminal prosecution. It would be passing strange to hold that the Exec-
utive lacks that same authority where, as here, the detainees were captured by our
Armed Forces for engaging in serious hostile acts against an ally in what the Govern-
ment refers to as "an active theater of combat." . . . Such a conclusion would implicate
not only concerns about interfering with a sovereign's recognized prerogative to apply
its criminal law to those alleged to have committed crimes within its borders, but also
concerns about unwarranted judicial intrusion into the Executive's ability to conduct
military operations abroad.43
Thus, the Court concluded that it could not enjoin US armed forces from transfer-
ring individuals detained within Iraq's territory to the Iraqi government for crimi-
nal prosecution.
Guantanamo detainees have been no more successful in suing to block their
transfers to other countries. In a case known as "Kiyemba II," the D.C. Circuit held
that Munafcontrolled to bar courts from granting writs of habeas corpus to block
transfers of detainees from the United States to foreign countries, even when those
being transferred would face continued detention or prosecution under the receiv-
ing country's laws. 44 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in 20 10. 45 Federal
judges thus lack the authority to block, even temporarily, the transfer of a detainee
from Guantanamo to another country. This allows the US government to decide
without judicial interference where and when to send detainees, as long as the
United States acts consistently with its own policy not to transfer a detainee to a
place where he is more likely than not to face torture.46 US courts thus remain wary
in this context of conducting inquiries into the legal process or treatment that an
individual will face upon transfer, while leaving open the possibility that they
would do so if it were manifest that the individual would be tortured iftransferred.
Canadian Case
On facts similar to Munaf, Canada's courts took a similarly skeptical view about the
propriety of blocking transfers from a detaining State to a territorial State, at least
where an agreed treatment framework was in place. In 2007, Amnesty Interna-
tional sued Canada to prevent Canadian troops in Afghanistan from transferring
detainees to the Islamic Republic ofAfghanistan (IRoA). It was claimed that IRoA
mistreats detainees, which means that such transfers violated Canada's constitu-
tion. A Canadian federal judge concluded in 2008 that Afghan detainees were not
entitled to protection under the Canadian Charter and dismissed Amnesty Inter-
national's claim.47 The Canadian Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that the
Canadian forces lacked "effective control" over Afghan territory; that the Canadian
Charter therefore should not apply to that territory; that IRoA had not consented
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to the application of the Canadian Charter over Afghan nationals; and that instead
the Canadian government and IRoA expressly identified international law as the
law governing treatment of detainees in Canadian custody. 48
UK Cases
The ECtHR has been far less deferential to the laws and prerogatives of foreign sover-
eigns and to the diplomatic judgments ofthe ministries of States parties, including
—
but not limited to—situations in which a State seeks to transfer to another country
a detainee picked up in a non-international armed conflict.
Al-Saadoon v. United Kingdom offers a current example. 49 Although the UK
government won the case in its domestic courts, the case came out the opposite
way from Munaf, on similar facts, in the ECtHR. 50 The UK courts deemed it lawful
for the United Kingdom to transfer to Iraqi authorities for trial two Iraqi murder
suspects. 51 The individuals faced the death penalty under Iraqi law and sued to
block their transfer from UK custody, claiming that it would violate the ECHR pro-
hibitions against the death penalty and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.
The UK Court of Appeal concluded that the individuals were not within the UK's
jurisdiction for purposes of the application of the ECHR, considering an interna-
tional arrangement between the United Kingdom and the government of Iraq re-
garding the allocation of legal and physical custody of detainees. 52
The individuals appealed to the ECtHR, which held that the transfer breached
the ECHR. 53 The Court first concluded (in its opinion on the admissibility of the
case) that the applicants were within the jurisdiction of the ECHR. 54 On the merits,
the Court held that the death penalty could be considered inhuman and degrading
and contrary to Article 3 of the Convention and that there were substantial
grounds for believing that there was a real risk of the applicants' being sentenced
to death and executed. 55 (The United Kingdom had not sought death penalty as-
surances from Iraq.) Although HMG argued that it had no option but to respect
Iraqi sovereignty and transfer the applicants who were Iraqi nationals held on
Iraqi territory to the custody of the Iraqi courts when so requested, the Court was
not satisfied that the United Kingdom had done all it could have to secure the ap-
plicants' rights under the Convention, including by trying to negotiate death pen-
alty assurances with the Iraqi government. 56 In contrast to the US Supreme
Court's deference to the Iraqi legal system and Iraq's decision to prosecute some-
one alleged to have broken Iraqi law, the ECtHR stated, "There was no obligation
under either Iraqi domestic law or international law which required either for the
applicants' cases to be referred to the Iraqi criminal courts or for them to be reclas-
sified as criminal detainees." 57 The Court concluded unanimously that there had
been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention over the UK's objections that "a
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finding that a Contracting State was under an obligation to secure the Convention
rights and freedoms when acting territorially and outside the regional space ofthe
Convention gave rise to real conceptual, practical and legal difficulties."58
The Court's ruling makes clear that a European country cannot transfer a person
in its custody to another government's custody where there are substantial grounds
for believing there is a real risk of the person's being subjected to ill-treatment, even
during an armed conflict and even where the transferring government is holding
the individual in another State's territory and seeking to transfer the individual to
the custody of the territorial State. It is particularly notable that the ECtHR con-
cluded that the transfer was unlawful even where the detainees at issue were Iraqi
nationals (rather than the nationality of the forces holding them, that is, British).
Further, the ECtHR ordered the UK government to undertake particular diplo-
matic steps, despite the UK government's unambiguous assessment that doing so
would have an adverse diplomatic effect. Thus, unlike the courts in Munaf and
Kiyemba II, the ECtHR concluded that it had jurisdiction to hear the underlying
allegations and reached a decision on the substance of those allegations.
Finally, in a case involving the conflict in Afghanistan, the United Kingdom
faced a suit by former UK detainees in Afghanistan challenging a UK policy per-
mitting transfers of detainees to the Afghan National Directorate of Security
(NDS).59 The detainees claimed that they were subjected to torture after they were
transferred, and that their transfers therefore violated ECHR Article 3.60 The UK
court concluded thatHMG could continue to transfer detainees to two NDS facili-
ties if it met a number of conditions, but could not transfer detainees to a third
NDS facility.61 Again, in contrast to the decisions of US courts in Munaf and
Kiyemba II, the UK court concluded that it had jurisdiction to hear the underlying
allegations and reached a decision on the merits based on an in-depth probe of
those allegations. Although theUK court concluded that at least some UK transfers
could continue and was more deferential to diplomatic judgments by HMG than
the ECtHR, it seems likely that the claimants will appeal the decision first within
the UK court system and subsequently to the ECtHR (if they continue to lose in
UK courts).
Claims about Illegality in Intelligence Activities
Yet another category of litigation has raised hard questions for courts: litigation in
which the heart of the case implicates classified intelligence information or relates
to the activities of intelligence agencies. At times, this means that the litigation may
implicate intelligence relationships between States, which are by definition highly
sensitive. Of particular interest in this category of litigation is the direct interplay




Two recent cases in US courts bear mention: el-Masri v. United States and Mohamed
v. Jeppesen Dataplan.62 The US executive branch invoked the "state secrets" privi-
lege as a way to avoid litigating both cases. When the US government invokes that
privilege, the head ofthe agency whose activities are at issue files an affidavit stating
that the litigation, if allowed to proceed, might disclose information that could en-
danger national security.
In el-Masri, the plaintiff sued the former director of the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), three aviation companies and unnamed intelligence agents, alleging
that the CIA detained him in Macedonia and flew him to a detention facility in
Afghanistan where he was abused, before the CIA realized it had detained the
wrong person and released him. El-Masri claimed this violated the US Constitution
and international norms prohibiting arbitrary detention and cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment.63
The Fourth Circuit dismissed the case, concluding that even though US govern-
ment officials had discussed the rendition program publicly at a high level ofgener-
ality, secret information formed "the very subject matter" of the program.
Specifically, the court noted that the state secrets privilege attaches and may bar the
entire proceedings where "there is a reasonable danger that [the information's]
disclosure will expose military (or diplomatic or intelligence) matters which, in the
interest of national security, should not be divulged" and where "the circum-
stances make clear that privileged information will be so central to the litigation
that any attempt to proceed will threaten that information's disclosure."64 The
court concluded:
[W]e must reject El-Masri's view that the existence ofpublic reports concerning his al-
leged rendition (and the CIA's rendition program in general) should have saved his
Complaint from dismissal. Even ifwe assume, arguendo, that the state secrets privilege
does not apply to the information that media outlets have published concerning those
topics, dismissal of his Complaint would nonetheless be proper because the public in-
formation does not include the facts that are central to litigating his action. Rather,
those central facts—the CIA means and methods that form the subject matter of El-
Masri's claim—remain state secrets.65
The Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari in 2008.
In Jeppesen, the Ninth Circuit, in a closely decided en banc opinion, took the
same approach to the privilege. Five foreign nationals sued a subsidiary of Boeing,
claiming that the subsidiary provided planes, flight planning and logistical support
to the CIA to render individuals to "black sites," knowing that they would be mis-
treated by US and foreign officials. The United States intervened, invoking the state
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secrets privilege and arguing that the court must dismiss the entire action. An affi-
davit by former CIA Director Hayden stated, "Disclosure of the information cov-
ered by this privilege assertion reasonably could be expected to cause serious—and
in some instances, exceptionally grave—damage to the national security of the
United States and, therefore, the information should be excluded from any use in
this case."66 The US government and the defendants relied on precedent holding
that "a suit predicated on the existence and content ofa secret agreement between a
plaintiffand the government must be dismissed on the pleadings because the Very
subject matter' of the suit is secret."67
A Ninth Circuit panel rejected that view, concluding that it was not appropriate
to stop the lawsuit at its outset, but the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the
state secrets privilege required dismissal of the plaintiffs' case.68 In discussing its
role in evaluating the claim ofthe privilege, the court struck a balance between def-
erence to the executive branch and the need to provide some objective review of
the invocation of the privilege. It stated,
In evaluating the need for secrecy, "we acknowledge the need to defer to the Executive
on matters of foreign policy and national security and surely cannot legitimately find
ourselves second guessing the Executive in this arena." But "the state secrets doctrine
does not represent a surrender ofjudicial control over access to the courts." Rather, "to
ensure that the state secrets privilege is asserted no more frequently and sweepingly
than necessary, it is essential that the courts continue critically to examine instances of
its invocation."69
Thus, in the face ofhighly controversial alleged US government activity, two cir-
cuit courts have taken a reasonably broad reading ofthe state secrets privilege, dis-
missing the cases at the pleading stage at the request of the US executive branch to
avoid revealing in litigation sensitive evidence that would impact national security.
UK Cases
UK courts, by contrast, have been less sympathetic to the government's interests in
protecting intelligence information, a fact that seems likely to affect UK policies
moving forward. This is illustrated by recent decisions in three cases: a case
brought against the UK government by a UK resident, Binyam Mohamed, to ob-
tain information about his alleged treatment by the United Kingdom and United
States; cases brought by Mohamed and several other former Guantanamo detain-
ees seeking damages from the UK government; and a case brought by Mohamed
and others against Jeppesen UK.
The Binyam Mohamed litigation to obtain intelligence information was proce-
durally complex.70 In 2008, Mohamed, then detained at Guantanamo and charged
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in a military commission, sued the UK government to obtain any information it
had received from the United States about his detention and interrogation. He
claimed that he was detained in Pakistan, mistreated there, then moved by the
United States to Morocco and Afghanistan, mistreated there, and ultimately sent to
Guantanamo. He also claimed that the UK intelligence agencies knew where he
was, provided to US intelligence officials questions to ask him, and received inter-
view reports from the United States. Mohamed's stated goal of obtaining the infor-
mation was to allow him fully to defend himself in the military commission.
Although the US government subsequently dropped the military charges
against Mohamed and shared the relevant material in redacted form with
Mohamed's habeas attorneys, a UK court ultimately ordered HMG to disclose cer-
tain secret information to his lawyers, and the press then sought to obtain that in-
formation. In 2009, the court concluded that the intelligence documents detailing
Mohamed's treatment should not be published, based in part on "threats" by the
United States to withhold from the United Kingdom future intelligence sharing.
To that end, the court redacted seven paragraphs in its judgment that described the
information the United Kingdom received from the United States regarding
Mohamed's treatment during interrogation. That court subsequently reconsid-
ered its decision, ordering the seven paragraphs to be made public.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal agreed, notwithstanding HMG's assertion that
"the intelligence relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States
is by far the most significant relationship the United Kingdom has from the point
of view of internal security and the protection of broader international interest" 71
and that revealing the intelligence information from the United States would be
"profoundly damaging to the interests" of the United Kingdom. 72 Indeed, the
United States itself, under both the Bush and Obama administrations, had as-
serted that the release of this information would adversely affect the intelligence
relationship. 73 The basis for the Court ofAppeal's decision was its view that the in-
formation contained in the seven paragraphs already was public; it concluded that
the United States had conceded that it had mistreated Mohamed, based on lan-
guage in a public habeas decision reflecting that Mohamed had alleged torture and
that the United States had not contested those allegations. 74 The Court ofAppeal
also cited the importance of "open justice," 75 evidenced a skepticism that the
Obama administration really would withhold important intelligence information
from a close ally76 and stated its own view that the information in the seven para-
graphs would not undercut the UK's national security77 in concluding that the
paragraphs should be made public.
This decision is notable for at least three reasons. First, it illustrates the use of
one State's courts to obtain information for use in another State's courts. Second, it
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highlights a willingness byUK courts to look behind the UK government's national
securityjudgments, even when the government has made clear its strong beliefthat
a particular judgment will affect its ability to obtain future intelligence from its
most important ally and that ally has made explicit on the record its views about the
release of the information. Third, it illustrates that decisions in US habeas cases
may have implications for foreign litigation. As noted above, all three Court ofAp-
peal judges were influenced by their belief that the United States had, by choosing
not to challenge Mohamed's allegations of mistreatment in another Guantanamo
detainee's habeas case, effectively conceded that he had been tortured, thus making
it far less important to preserve the secrecy of the seven paragraphs describing
Mohamed's treatment.
The ongoing Jeppesen litigation reveals a similar interplay between litigation in
US and UK courts. As noted above, Mohamed and four other defendants sued
Jeppesen Dataplan in a US court. They also are suing a related subsidiary, Jeppesen
UK, in a UK court. In July 2009, Jeppesen UK agreed to let the civil case brought by
Mohamed go to trial. 78 Mohamed's counsel believe that, as a result, confidential in-
formation about his alleged rendition will become public, which likely will prove
relevant to the US litigation.
Some of the same detainees filed a civil lawsuit against the United Kingdom,
seeking compensation for the alleged complicity ofUK authorities, including MI5
and MI6, in their torture and unlawful detentions. The UK government filed a re-
sponse asking whether, in principle, the UK common law was sufficiently flexible
to enable a court hearing on civil claims for damages to rely on a process whereby
there would be parallel open and closed pleadings, disclosure, witness statements
and hearings. The trial would be partly open and partly closed, as would the judg-
ment. In the open elements ofthe proceedings, claimants' counsel would represent
them in the normal way; for the closed elements, special advocates with security
clearances would protect their interests but could not discuss the classified infor-
mation with the claimants. In May 2010, the UK Court ofAppeal held that such a
closed procedure was not available in principle, in large part because
the principle that a litigant should be able to see and hear all the evidence which is seen
and heard by a court determining his case is so fundamental, so embedded in the com-
mon law, that, in the absence of parliamentary authority, no judge should override it,
at any rate in relation to an ordinary civil claim, unless (perhaps) all parties to the claim
agree otherwise.79
The United Kingdom sought permission to appeal to the UK Supreme Court.
Although HMG's filings are not yet public, the United Kingdom presumably saw
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itself as faced with an impossible choice between, on the one hand, withholding
many documents that the United Kingdom would like and need to use to counter
the allegations of misconduct by its officials and therefore allow the court to try the
case fairly, and, on the other, disclosing all ofthose documents and thereby causing
damage to the UK's national security interests. The UK government's other op-
tion—to seek public interest immunity certificates for as many as 140,000 docu-
ments—would have been incredibly time-consuming and seemed totally
impractical. 80 Given the conundrum in which it found itself, it is not surprising
that the United Kingdom announced in November 2010 that it settled the case
with Mohamed and six other former Guantanamo detainees, reportedly for mil-
lions of pounds. 81 In addition, the UK plans to seek a "judicial inquiry" about its
possible role in facilitating US renditions. 82 Any revelations in that inquiry seem
likely to lead to further litigation (in both UK and US courts), unless the inquiry's
findings remain confidential.
Canadian/Swedish Cases
Canada took a very different approach than the United States in dealing with alle-
gations that its government contributed to the transfer of Mr. Arar to Syria, where
he claims he was tortured. A judicial inquiry in Canada concluded that the United
States expelled Arar to Syria based on false assertions from the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police to US officials that Arar was linked to al Qaeda. Canada paid Arar
C$10.5 million to settle his litigation and the Prime Minister issued him an apol-
ogy. 83 Likewise, Sweden paid three million kronor to Ahmed Agiza, an individual
allegedly handed over by Sweden to the CIA and rendered to Egypt, where he was
mistreated. 84 Although the United States has come under pressure to compensate
Arar too, it has declined to do so.
III. Real-World Effects ofLitigation Wins and Losses
Having reviewed the types of cases that individuals have brought and seen the
sharp divergences in the outcomes of litigation in the United States and European
States, one must ask: Does the litigation matter? Have the outcomes of these cases
had a real effect on how these States fight conflicts? The answer is a clear yes, both
for the States that are parties to the litigation, and for third States.
Claims of Unlawful Detention
Litigation regarding unlawful detention has had an impact on both the United
States and European States, though the impact is not the same for each group. As
an immediate matter, courts have ordered the United States to transfer a number
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of detainees as a result ofthe Guantanamo habeas litigation. The litigation has had
other, less direct effects as well. First, it has forced the judicial branch to opine on
the scope ofpeople whom the United States legally may detain, a decision that, be-
fore Boumedieney largely was in the hands of the executive. The developing habeas
caselaw thus narrows the executive branch's discretion, at least with regard to those
detained at Guantanamo and arguably with regard to anyone the United States is
detaining pursuant to the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force.85 That
said, the district courts have only narrowed slightly the US government's asserted
definition ofwho it can detain at Guantanamo.86
Second and relatedly, the litigation appears to have affected—at least on paper
—
the type of person the United States is choosing to detain in Afghanistan. Subse-
quent to the US filing on March 13, 2009, in which the government proffered its
view of the scope of its detention authority over Guantanamo detainees, the
Department of Defense modified its detention policy in Afghanistan to track that
definition. 87 It is unclear the extent to which this change has affected whom the
United States is detaining in Afghanistan, however.88 Third, the fact that the judi-
ciary has upheld the continued detention ofsome at Guantanamo maybe having a
positive effect in that it illustrates to those who are highly skeptical ofthe executive
branch's arguments about whom it is detaining that another branch of govern-
ment, seen as more neutral, is affirming the legality of some of the detentions.
For the United Kingdom and other States parties to the ECHR, the scope oftheir
ability to conduct security detentions during armed conflict and the procedures
that they must provide to those they detain remain unsettled. There does not ap-
pear to be public information about how the United Kingdom has implemented
the holdings of al-Skeini and al-Jedda on the ground, perhaps in part because the
United Kingdom is no longer detaining anyone in Iraq. However, the al-Jedda de-
cision makes it quite likely that the United Kingdom and other European States
will push hard to obtain UN Security Council resolutions in advance ofusing force
abroad. Further, European States may begin to seek specific authorization to de-
tain (rather than a more general authorization to take "all necessary measures"), to
make plain that the right to conduct security detentions is authorized under a par-
ticular UN Charter Chapter VII resolution. Obtaining a Security Council resolu-
tion could at least narrow the scope of application ofhuman rights law to activities
in armed conflict, but it will not obviate the need for the United Kingdom (and
possibly other States parties to the ECHR) to consider ECHR requirements, partic-
ularly given the admonitions ofseveral Law Lords that at least part ofECHR Article
5 remains intact in the face of UNSCR 1546, which authorized States to take all
necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance ofthe security and stability of
another country. Another option would be for States parties to derogate from
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ECHR Article 5, as authorized by ECHR Article 15, though a State that decided to
do so would face high political costs.
Presumably ECHR States parties also will consider carefully whether—and
how—to act in accordance with other ECHR rights, such as the right to life and the
right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment (either by the ECHR
State party that initially detains the person or by another State to which the first
State transfers the person), during armed conflict and peacekeeping operations.89
Even if States conclude that they do not have legal obligations to apply the
ECHR in most overseas situations—a view that generally would be consistent with
the language in Bankovic v. Belgium—they may begin to do so as a matter of policy
and prudence. For example, it might be that the transfer rule that the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) established in Afghanistan (that is, that ISAF
forces would transfer detainees to the Afghan government within 96 hours of de-
taining them) was crafted by ISAF States with an eye toward ECtHR Article 5
caselaw. (In Brogan v. United Kingdom, the ECtHR concluded that a particular de-
tention by the United Kingdom—in which UK officials held a person for 103 hours
without bringing him before a judge or releasing him—violated ECHR Article 5.90
Those crafting the 96-hour rule may have been trying to estimate a pre-court
detention length that the ECtHR would find acceptable.)
These considerations—and the ability of individuals affected by armed conflict
to bring cases directly against the governments for alleged violations ofdomestic or
international law—mean that European States increasingly are inclined to take a
more cautious approach to detention. European ISAF forces are choosing to detain
few enemy fighters, and some States ultimately ceased to detain any, even while
their troops remained present in Afghanistan.91 This poses problems for force pro-
tection and intelligence collection, and places practical burdens on forces. The
most obvious problem with a very cautious use of detention is that it leaves many
individuals known to be hostile to ISAF forces—including those caught shooting
at or bombing those forces or Afghan civilians—free to engage in the same kind of
conduct over and over. This makes the already dangerous job of an ISAF soldier
even more dangerous, and it arguably delays the ability of ISAF forces to provide
security to Afghans, something most ISAF States agree is an important element of
reconstruction. A reluctance to detain inadvertently can provide incentives to kill
rather than capture—not a desirable outcome from an intelligence or counterin-
surgency point of view. The 96-hour rule also hinders intelligence collection. This
is not to suggest that ISAF and Afghan authorities should not pursue the goal of
prosecuting individuals to the extent possible, but it is to suggest that concerns
about litigation in this context are adversely affecting ISAF's work.
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Claims of Unlawful Treatment
As noted above, US courts have not handed victories to plaintiffs who sued govern-
ment officials based on allegations that those officials had a hand in their mistreat-
ment. Thus, these cases have had little practical effect on the US government,
though of course events such as the detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib and other revela-
tions ofdetainee mistreatment shone a harsh spotlight on US detention practices and
resulted in both legislation (such as the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005
)
92 and execu-
tive orders (such as Executive Order 13491,93 drafted to ensure that all US employees
and agents treat detainees in a manner consistent with Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions).
In contrast, a case such as al-Skeini seems likely to have a significant impact on
the UK government. The concession by the UK government that the ECHR applies
to its detention facilities in foreign war zones suggests that the United Kingdom
may be inclined to treat all future overseas detentions during armed conflict or
peacekeeping operations as being covered by the ECHR. Some questions remain
unanswered, such as whether the ECtHR's caselaw on what constitutes "cruel, in-
human, or degrading" detention conditions in the United Kingdom sets a baseline
for conditions at UK overseas detention facilities and, per the Soering principle, for
conditions in the facilities to which the United Kingdom seeks to transfer someone.94
At the very least, the ECHR's requirement that a State party conduct an "indepen-
dent and impartial" investigation into an alleged violation ofthe ECHR would attach
to any alleged violations that took place in UK detention facilities abroad.95
Claims of Unlawful Transfer
The real-world impact of the transfer litigation in US courts is minimal. In view of
Munafand Kiyemba II, the only principle with which the United States must comply
when transferring a detainee picked up in a non-international armed conflict is
one that the United States already follows: it cannot transfer a person when it is
more likely than not that he will be tortured.96 The other aspects of a transfer—the
identity ofthe receiving State, the conditions under which the person will be trans-
ferred and the timing of transfer—are left to the executive branch.
Even though Canada won its Afghan transfer litigation, the case arguably still
had a chilling effect on Canada's actions during armed conflict. From November
2007 to February 2008, pending Amnesty International's request for an interim in-
junction against transfers, Canada chose not to transfer detainees to the Afghans,
presumably relying instead on short-term, ad hoc detention arrangements.97 A top
Canadian general stated publicly that if Canada lost the Amnesty International
case, Canadian troops would have been unable to detain combatants and would have
been forced to hunker down in secure bases. This would effectively have ended
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Canada's contribution to the ISAF mission and would have taken a significant
NATO troop contributor off the battlefield.98 Even after its win in the litigation, the
Canadian government's Afghan detention policy remains under significant political
pressure in light of allegations that the government knew that IRoA mistreated de-
tainees at the time that Canada handed its detainees to IRoA. Opposition members
of the Canadian Parliament have held hearings and are demanding access to
unredacted versions of relevant military records." In view of this intense public
scrutiny, it seems safe to assume that Canadian forces in Afghanistan are choosing
to detain few, if any, individuals on the battlefield out of concern that their troops
will have nowhere to transfer the detainees. The litigation thus appears indirectly
to have had a significant impact on Canadian detention policy.
Litigation has had an even more direct impact on UK detention policy. The
death penalty appears to be the third rail for the ECtHR, such that any transfers of
detainees who might realistically face the death penalty are certain to be deemed
unlawful by that court. This suggests that any State party in that situation will seek
death penalty assurances from the receiving State, even if the transferring State's
judgment is that it is unlikely to be able to obtain such assurances. Coupled with
concerns about mistreatment oftransferred detainees, as in the Evans case, it seems
almost certain that as transfers get harder, States will reduce the number of individ-
uals they detain in the first place. 100 It also means that States are placing additional
weight on their ability to monitor a detainee after he is transferred, something they
will not always be able to secure. Indeed, the Evans court placed explicit conditions
on the UK's ability to continue to transfer detainees to certain NDS facilities; these
conditions include that
(i) all transfers must be made on the express basis . . . that the UK monitoring team is to
be given access to each transferee on a regular basis, with the opportunity for a private
interview on each occasion; [and] (ii) each transferee must in practice be visited and in-
terviewed in private on a regular basis. 101
It seems fair to say that this transfer litigation has caused the United Kingdom to be
far more circumspect in detaining belligerents or civilians taking direct part in hos-
tilities in Afghanistan, and thus directly has impacted the way the UK conducts it-
self on the battlefield.
Claims about Intelligence Activities
It is difficult to predict the real-world implications if Binyam Mohamed succeeds
in his case against Jeppesen Dataplan. If a court found the company liable for
Mohamed's alleged mistreatment during part ofhis time in detention (and implied
446
Ashley S. Peeks
a relationship between Jeppesen and the US government), it presumably would
have a chilling effect on other contractors who are deciding whether to perform
particular activities for the US government. It is difficult to sayhow much ofa chill-
ing effect it would have, though. If the Supreme Court granted certiorari and
Mohamed won his case against Jeppesen in the United States, it seems very likely
that the UK courts would take that into account in the litigation before them. Like-
wise, ifhis UK litigation against Jeppesen results in any disclosure of confidential in-
formation about the rendition program, that would make it easier for his US lawyers
to use that information in US court and avoid the state secrets privilege by claiming
that the information already was public. 102
The litigation by Mohamed seeking access to US intelligence reports in the
UK's possession has the potential to affect intelligence sharing between the United
States and the United Kingdom. In a letter to the United Kingdom, former State
Department Legal Adviser John Bellinger wrote, "We want to affirm the public
disclosure of these documents is likely to result in serious damage to US national
security and could harm existing intelligence information-sharing arrangements
between our two Governments." 103 The Obama administration affirmed that
view. 104 In the wake ofthe release of the seven paragraphs, a White House spokes-
man stated, "We're deeply disappointed with the court's judgement because we
shared this information in confidence and with certain expectations. As we
warned, the court's judgement will complicate the confidentiality of our intelligence-
sharing relationship with the United Kingdom, and it will have to factor into our
decision-making going forward." 105 Because the two governments are unlikely to
say more publicly about how and the extent to which intelligence sharing may be
affected, it is difficult to assess the actual impact of the case. One might expect,
though, that intelligence officers of each government now may be aware that the
information they exchange with each other might be at risk of release to a court
(and eventually to the public), especially in legally contentious areas such as those
discussed here.
The Jeppesen litigation, the damages litigation against the United Kingdom by
former Guantanamo detainees and the Binyam Mohamed treatment litigation all
stem from allegations that the United Kingdom assisted the United States in ren-
dering and detaining individuals believed to be fighting the United States. As a gen-
eral matter, this seems likely to heighten the UK's caution when cooperating with
the United States on sensitive issues, because the political, financial and resource-
related costs for the United Kingdom have been high, even if the plaintiffs ulti-
mately lose their cases. At a time when intelligence cooperation among allies is crit-
ical, this is an unfortunate development.
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Penumbral Effects
In addition to the specific real-world implications that flow from each set of litiga-
tion, there are a few other ways in which this type of litigation will affect how States
fight armed conflicts, particularly (but not exclusively) for European States.
First, this litigation sets precedent that litigants will use in future litigation asso-
ciated with non-international armed conflicts. Unlike decisions made exclusively
by the executive branches of governments, court decisions such as those in the
United Kingdom bind the government, not just in the specific cases before the
courts, but also in factually similar situations in the future. Of course, decisions in
the ECtHR create precedent not just for the State involved in the suit, but also for
all other States parties to the ECHR.
Second, the sheer quantum of litigation creates penumbral concerns about op-
erating in "gray areas" where the legal rules are not black and white. This may cause
European States to take the opposite approach from the one made famous by then-
Deputy Director ofNational Intelligence Michael Hayden, who stated, "We're going
to live on the edge. . . . My spikes will have chalk on them. . . . We're pretty aggres-
sive within the law." 106 Knowledge that courts have been reasonably sympathetic to
the extension of human rights rules to armed conflict cannot but cause States to
think hard when considering establishing a policy that may not be consistent with
human rights principles, even if it is consistent with the law of war.
Third, ifone State in a military coalition such as NATO loses a case and is forced
to change its policy, that almost certainly will affect the operations and policies of
other States within that coalition, as well as non-coalition States involved in the
conflict. For example, if a court concludes that State A, which is fighting a conflict
against non-State actors in State B, may not transfer detainees in its custody to
State B, State A is likely to have to rely on its coalition partners (or State B) to detain
individuals in the first instance. Thus, a litigation loss by one coalition partner may
affect another partner that itselfhas won similar litigation. Therefore, it is in the in-
terest of those challenging State practices during armed conflict to litigate in as
many fora as possible in order to increase the likelihood of success and of having a
policy and operational impact greater than the actual litigation victory.
IV. Reasonsfor Divergence and Future Steps
Part II identified a series of cases and a trend within US courts to limit litigation
about decisions made by the United States (as well as other States and contractors)
during armed conflict, in contrast to a trend within UK courts and the ECtHR to
allow such litigation and to review (and often deem unlawful) the decisions and ac-
tions taken by the United Kingdom during armed conflict (or during activities
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related to the US conflict with al Qaeda). This Part considers possible reasons for
this divergence. 107
Reasons for Diverging Outcomes in US and European Cases
One possible reason for the divergence is the strong tradition of deference in the
US system to the executive in areas of national security and armed conflict. 108 Bol-
stered by doctrines such as the political question and act of state doctrines and the
rule of non-inquiry, courts generally have hesitated to step into certain areas that
are likely to have a direct impact on foreign policy decisions by the executive
branch. While the UK courts have used a doctrine of "justiciability" that is similar
to the US political question doctrine, it appears that in the past few years UK courts
have taken a more robust approach to judicial review ofexecutive national security
decisions. For example, in A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, the
House of Lords held that the legal regime that permitted the United Kingdom to
detain certain terrorist suspects without trial was inconsistent with the ECHR. 109
As one scholar has written, "The decision appears to presage a new judicial bold-
ness regarding national security—a sphere in which scrutiny by British courts has
traditionally been blunted by a self-imposed custom ofjudicial deference to the ex-
ecutive branch." 110 This stands in contrast to the traditional view ofUK courts that
they should not
set aside administrative decisions save where they were aberrant or totally "unreason-
able"—a doctrine ofjudicial self-restraint that bit with particular force when national
security was at stake. The extent to which the [Human Rights Act] frees British courts
from these shackles by encouraging the use of the more intensive proportionality test
favored by the European Court ofHuman Rights has been the subject of considerable
controversy. Courts and commentators have expressed quite diverse views as to how
much deference should be extended to the policies of the executive and legislature by
courts charged with determining whether a given measure breaches an ECHR right. 1 1
1
A second, related element that is fostering this divergence is the way in which
the United States and European States approach their international human rights
obligations. The US executive branch consistently has taken the position that the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 112 does not apply
extraterritorially. US courts accordingly have not sought to extend the application
ofthe ICCPR to US activity overseas. (Nor have courts determined that the treaty is
self-executing.) Indeed, given how cautious US courts have been in extending con-
stitutional rights extraterritorially, it is no surprise that the ICCPR has not served
as a mechanism for US litigants to persuade courts to apply human rights princi-
ples to US activity abroad, including during armed conflict.
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Conversely, all States that are members of the Council of Europe (including all
European Union States) are parties to the ECHR, which essentially serves as a "bill
of rights" for these States, and which applies during both peacetime and war-
time. 113 As has been discussed throughout this article, the ECHR contains an en-
forcement mechanism—the European Court ofHuman Rights—which hears and
decides cases brought by individuals against States parties (as well as by States
against other States). Decisions from the ECtHR (and from domestic European
courts interpreting the ECHR), including those discussed above, are a critical
—
and underreported—factor affecting the rules by which Europeans have fought
and will fight—conflicts. If European historical and political concerns about
armed conflict serve as a "pushing" mechanism away from conflict, the ECHR
serves as a "pulling" mechanism toward the increasing application ofhuman rights
rules to warfighting. In the view of one scholar who has written on this issue, "Eu-
ropean governments increasingly have to take into account the possible effects of
the European Convention on military operations both at home and abroad." 114
Indeed, section 2(1) of the UK's Human Rights Act requires UK courts, when
considering a question that arises in connection with an ECHR right, to consider
relevant ECtHR caselaw. 115 Although ECtHR decisions do not constitute formally
binding precedent for UK courts, "the fact that a complainant unable to get a rem-
edy at the domestic level can take the matter to Strasbourg increases the pressure
on UK courts to produce outcomes consistent with European jurisprudence." 116
The HRA thus may account for reduced judicial deference in UK courts in areas
that traditionally did receive deference, such as national security decisions.
Others are more skeptical that the ECHR has played a major role in affecting Eu-
ropean warfighting. In this view, actions by European governments and their
armed forces are driven as much by a fear of triggering criminal law prohibitions,
including murder, torture and other offenses derived from their International
Criminal Court obligations, as by a concern about litigation in the ECtHR. Fur-
ther, some believe that using human rights principles to fill in gaps in the laws of
war may help win hearts and minds, and thus better achieve the States' military
goals. Yet others believe that certain European States use the applicability of the
ECHR as an excuse not to undertake certain lawful, though politically unpopular,
activities, even though they may not be overly concerned about actually losing a
case before the ECtHR. It may even be the case that some government officials
hope, through the application of human rights rules, to make conflict harder to
fight, and thus to stem the frequency of conflict.
A third reason that the US government may prevail more often in its courts is
because the United States has a vibrant ongoing debate about national security is-
sues, with loud and persuasive voices on both sides of the political spectrum (as
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well as in the middle). Judges considering these types of cases have been exposed to
the whole range of arguments about why certain national security decisions are
sensible or indefensible. Although these arguments may not factor directly into a
judicial decision, atmospherics matter. Indeed, one might point to a wide range of
views among the federal judges considering detention cases (and identify a divide
loosely along partisan lines) as an illustration ofthe breadth ofjudges' positions on
national security-related issues. In contrast, the United Kingdom (and other States
in Europe) appear to have fewer politicians, journalists and academics making
compelling public arguments about the importance of a robust national security
policy; the louder voices come from the human rights community. Judges, being
human, are influenced by what they do—and do not—hear. Thus, it may be the
case that the UK court decisions, which of late have tended to favor human rights
arguments over national security arguments, stem in part from the atmospherics
in the country, which largely are set by those who prioritize civil liberties over na-
tional security arguments. 117
Ways to Mitigate the Divergence
It is beyond cavil that the type oflitigation described above is having a very real im-
pact on how States are fighting conflicts. For those who have brought and won
their cases against States, this impact is all for the good. For States losing the cases,
this impact can be detrimental, particularly where the judicial decision insuffi-
ciently takes into account operational realities of armed conflict and thus leaves
States with no acceptable options. (This is not to suggest, however, that State offi-
cials should bear no accountability if they violate the law, as is discussed below.)
What steps might these States take to minimize the occurrence of this litigation
(and maximize their ability to win cases when litigation arises)?
A good first step would be for States' political leadership to make the national
security arguments clearly and persuasively to their judges, parliamentarians and
the European publics. For European governments to gain greater support for de-
fense missions, they need to better educate their publics about why the current mil-
itary missions are important for European security. To date, they have been slow to
do so. For example, it took two years for German Chancellor Angela Merkel to give
a speech to the German parliament about Afghanistan (and Germany's role in
ISAF) or to visit Afghanistan. 118 Of course, it is the European parliaments that ulti-
mately must fund military expenditures, and that can offer constructive support or
open criticism of European participation in ISAF and other operations. European
cabinets should ensure that their parliamentarians are sufficiently briefed on vari-
ous threats; parliamentary concerns are a major reason that the German govern-
ment, for instance, has limited its presence and role in Afghanistan. Yet many
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domestic parliaments do not have access to important intelligence information.
France, for instance, lacks a parliamentary intelligence oversight committee. 119
Even in States in which parliaments have not served as major stumbling blocks to
European participation in coalitions, parliaments that are well-educated about the
threats can serve as another bridge between the government and the public.
Another step—and an important one for the US government—would be to rec-
ognize the interconnectedness of this litigation and the fact that a State's national
security policy decisions now have an impact that extends beyond that State's
courts. The US and European governments should avoid, to the greatest extent
possible, surprising each other with changes in laws or with high-impact court de-
cisions. The best way to do this is to hold early consultations with close allies on
pending legislation or court cases that could affect how that State conducts itself
during armed conflict. For instance, Canada convened a meeting of ISAF partners
to describe a court case it faced regarding detention in Afghanistan. One can imag-
ine any of a number of other existing fora in which relevant State officials could
hold such discussions.
A final step—and one that will require further study—is to consider whether
certain principles drawn from counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine offer ways to
minimize litigation in the future. For example, one source of problems in the
transfer litigation is the weakness of the host government, which results both in
subpar detention facilities and in a weak domestic law enforcement system that is
unable to prosecute those who engage in detainee abuse. The US COIN manual
emphasizes the importance of building up the domestic institutions of the State
under challenge from insurgents. 120 Doing so—creating better detention facilities,
better-trained guards and stronger prosecution systems—would improve the con-
ditions into which the United States and European States hope to transfer detain-
ees, and thus would reduce litigation in the transfer realm. Further, it should be
apparent to all States participating in ISAF that any legal violations or abuses com-
mitted by their troops are likely to come to light and are almost certain to under-
mine their COIN operations. 121 With fewer actual (as opposed to falsely claimed)
violations, the quantum of litigation should fall as well. Finally, COIN doctrine
recognizes that ex gratia or solatia payments, made in sympathy or recognition of
someone's loss during a conflict, may advance the cause of the State undertaking
COIN. 122 These payments, which are distinct from claims payments, may serve to
diminish the impetus to bring legal claims against the State undertaking COIN.
States should consider other non-judicial mechanisms by which to hold them-
selves accountable. The mechanisms should be able to reflect operational realities
in wartime, including the need to preserve intelligence relationships, while ensur-
ing that the executive branches do not operate unchecked. These might include
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internal investigations by entities such as inspectors general, which are housed
within an agency, but independent from its leadership. These investigations could
produce classified and unclassified versions of reports, as well as recommenda-
tions, where appropriate, that individuals wronged by governmental conduct be
compensated. These might also include inquiries led by retired esteemed individu-
als such as retired federal judges (which appears similar to what the United King-
dom is considering in establishing an inquiry about its role in renditions). Ifseen as
credible and fair, these types of investigations could also stanch the flow of
litigation.
At the same time, an increased effort by the United States and European States
to embed journalists and otherwise document their own compliance with the law,
as well as to draw attention to violations of the law by non-State actors, may affect
the outcomes of specific cases and may also improve for States the wider atmo-
spherics surrounding the cases that non-State actors are bringing.
V. Conclusion
These cases illustrate that litigation is having an impact on how States currently
fight, and on how they will fight in the future. This is not to argue against all judicial
involvement in issues that implicate national security. It is to suggest, though, that
such involvement should be measured and cautious; court judgments, while often
addressing genuine problems with certain aspects of warfare, sometimes are
crafted in ways that are overly abstracted from the choices that the losing govern-
ments have to make. Nor is this to suggest that executive branch decisionmakers
should not have to comply with laws, regulations and related restrictions, or should
not face criminal sanctions when their behavior warrants it. It is to suggest the need
for the judiciary to act with restraint in this area, and to suggest that in some cases
there maybe non-judicial mechanisms that are better tailored to thread the needle
between oversight and accountability, on one hand, and the need to preserve the
confidentiality of certain types of decision making and policies, on the other.
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Asymmetric Warfare: How to Respond?
Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg*
Introduction
Demands for a reform of the law of armed conflict are often justified by
claiming that the "novel" phenomenon ofasymmetric warfare has proven
the inadequacy of that body of law. Allegedly, the law of armed conflict is charac-
terized by a post-Westphalian approach, that is, its underlying concept is one of
symmetric warfare between belligerents that will abide by its rules only because
they expect their opponent to also abide (the principle ofreciprocity). In asymmet-
ric warfare reciprocity is said to have become obsolete and the allegedly "new"
threats brought about by that "novel" phenomenon call for an adaptation of the
law of armed conflict.
It will be shown in this article that asymmetric warfare is far from being unprec-
edented, and that either the law ofarmed conflict has been adapted to address past
forms of asymmetric warfare or, in other instances, adaptation has been unneces-
sary despite the asymmetries. Accordingly, the calls for "new" law, if not un-
founded, are, at a minimum, premature. It is conceded, however, that it has
become increasingly difficult to cope with certain forms ofasymmetry; therefore it
is ofthe utmost importance to develop strategies that enable States and their armed
forces to adequately respond to asymmetric warfare.
Finally, this article will focus on situations ofarmed conflict, whether ofan inter-
national or ofa non-international character. Cross-border—or so-called spillover
—
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effects in a non-international armed conflict neither change the character of the
armed conflict nor pose insurmountable problems. 1 If, for instance, non-State actors
engaged in a non-international armed conflict seek refuge in a neighboring State,
this does not necessarily mean that they will be immune from attack.
There may be situations, however, that do not qualify as an armed conflict even
though armed forces are engaged in military operations against "asymmetric actors."
While the law of armed conflict will not be applicable in such circumstances, this
does not mean that public international law is silent on the matter. For instance,
counter-piracy operations are governed by the law of the sea or, as in the case of
piracy off the coast of Somalia, by applicable UN Security Council resolutions. 2
Very often international human rights law—though contained in a regional con-
vention—will play an important role. 3 Counterterrorism operations may also be
based on UN Security Council resolutions or on the inherent right of self-defense.4
It needs to be emphasized with regard to the latter, however, that States have not
yet agreed upon the criteria that give rise to the right. Because of the variety of re-
gimes that maybe applicable, the armed forces deployed to counterterrorism oper-
ations all too often lack the legal clarity and legal security that are of vital
importance for the success of contemporary military operations.
I, Forms ofAsymmetric Warfare
Some of the past efforts to define asymmetric warfare have not been very helpful in
identifying the underlying problems. For instance, asymmetric warfare used to be
defined as "a conflict involving two states with unequal overall military and eco-
nomic resources." 5 In reaction to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 the definition has
been modified. Asymmetric warfare is now defined by one author as "leveraging
inferior tactical or operational strength against [the] vulnerabilities of a superior
opponent to achieve disproportionate effect with the aim of undermining [the op-
ponent's] will in order to achieve the asymmetric actor's strategic objectives."6
While this definition has the advantage of not being limited to inter-State armed
conflicts, it has not added much, insofar as almost all armed conflicts have been
asymmetric.
Asymmetries in warfare include asymmetries of power, means, methods, organi-
zation, values and time. 7 Asymmetry can be participatory, technological, normative,
doctrinal or moral. 8 In that sense, wars have always been characterized by at least
one form of asymmetry. For instance, any armed conflict involving the United
States will by definition be asymmetric because of the technological superiority of
the US armed forces. The same holds true for any armed conflict involving non-
State actors, be they partisans, resistance fighters, rebels or terrorists. Moreover, it
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must not be forgotten that in any war or armed conflict there is a considerable
element of surprise that makes it impossible to predict its course or outcome. The
enemy may employ methods, strategies or tactics not envisaged and that aim at the
opponent's vulnerabilities. Asymmetry, therefore, is not a "novel" phenomenon as
some would characterize it but an intrinsic characteristic of any war.9
It therefore seems that the term "asymmetric warfare," which is by no means a le-
gal term of art, is nothing but a description of a fact of life. In this context, it is,
however, important to bear in mind that warfare, particularly in Western societies,
is perceived from a post-Westphalian perspective—that is, as armed hostilities
predominantly conducted under State control and between combatants in which
civilians and civilian objects are largely spared from violence and destruction.
From the outset of its development in the middle of the nineteenth century, the
modern law of armed conflict has been based on that approach. It must also be
noted that, to a certain extent, the law of armed conflict recognizes—or implicitly
accepts—the different forms of asymmetry. Still, the law's underlying concept is
that ofsymmetric warfare in which the use offorce is limited to lawful targets and is
premised on the belief that the parties to the conflict will abide by its rules.
The development of the law of armed conflict has resulted in abolishing the
prevalence ofmilitary necessity over considerations ofhumanity ("Kriegsrasongeht
vox Kriegsmanier") by establishing an operable balance between the two that, while
placing limits on the means and methods of war, does not make warfare impossi-
ble. 10 This approach has been, still is and will continue to be challenged by the con-
duct of hostilities in contemporary armed conflicts that are characterized by an
increasingly structured and systematic deviation from the law. There is a growing
"tendency for the violence to spread and permeate all domains of social life. This is
because the weaker side uses the community as a cover and a logistical base to con-
duct attacks against a superior military apparatus." 11 Hence, in asymmetric
warfare,
the weaker party, recognizing the military superiority of its opponent, will avoid open
confrontation that is bound to lead to the annihilation of its troops and to defeat. In-
stead it will tend to compensate its inadequate arsenal by employing unconventional
means and methods and prolonging the conflict through an undercover war of attri-
tion against its well-equipped enemy. 12
In summary, the term "asymmetric warfare" is to be understood as applying to
armed hostilities in which one actor/party endeavors to compensate for its mili-
tary, economic or other deficiencies by resorting to the use ofmethods or means of
warfare that are not in accordance with the law ofarmed conflict (or of other rules
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of public international law). It is important to stress that the motives or strategic
goals of asymmetric warfare, while important to understand, are irrelevant from a
legal point of view. Finally, the definition of asymmetric warfare here proposed
does not mean that other forms of asymmetries are neglected.
//. Applying the Lex Lata
It needs to be emphasized from the outset that the law of armed conflict has never
been modified with a view to compensate for technological dissimilarities between
the parties to the conflict. For instance, Russia and the United Kingdom endeavored
to outlaw the submarine as a means of naval warfare because it posed a consider-
able threat to their superior surface forces. Those efforts were in vain. 13 Develop-
ments in weapons technology have at best been an incentive for a modification of
the law with a view to meeting humanitarian considerations. 14 (Although there are
times when one cannot avoid the impression that humanitarian considerations are
a pretextual argument for the true intention of abolishing war through the laws of
war (correctly characterized as "lawfare" 15 ).)
On the other hand, the law ofarmed conflict has been adapted to address certain
forms of participatory asymmetries. For instance, many of the atrocities commit-
ted during the Second World War were justified as legitimate responses to the con-
duct of asymmetric warfare by the opposing belligerent, inter alia, by partisan
attacks. That led to the killing of hostages and other innocent civilians, or to the
wanton destruction of villages in territory occupied or under the control of the
German Wehrmacht. The law of armed conflict has been progressively developed
in order to eliminate such conduct in future armed conflicts.
Hence, the law of armed conflict accepts asymmetries in warfare, be they tech-
nological or doctrinal, and it reacts to such asymmetries only if there is a necessity
of preserving minimum standards ofhumanity or of "alleviating as much as possi-
ble the calamities ofwar." 16 Moreover, the law of international armed conflict aims
to maintain the public character ofwarfare by indirectly reserving the right to harm
the enemy to a privileged group of actors. 17
Normative and Moral Asymmetries
Normative and moral asymmetries, while sometimes posing considerable political
and/or operational problems, are, in principle, irrelevant from the perspective of
the law of international armed conflict.
This especially holds true with regard to the legality or illegality of the resort to
the use of armed force under thejws ad bellum. According to the principle of equal
application, the law of international armed conflict applies to every situation
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amounting to an international armed conflict irrespective ofthe political or strate-
gic goals pursued and irrespective of the legality of the resort to armed force by ei-
ther of the belligerents. 18 Therefore moral or normative asymmetries are, in
principle, irrelevant, although they may have considerable political and strategic
impact.
This also holds true for a resort to the use ofarmed force authorized or mandated
by theUN Security Council. As emphasized in the 1999 UN Secretary-General's Bul-
letin, the "fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law . .
.
are applicable to United Nations forces when in situations of armed conflict they
are actively engaged therein as combatants, to the extent and for the duration of
their engagement." 19
Moreover, the causes for a resort to the use ofarmed force have no impact on the
scope ofapplicability ofthe law ofarmed conflict. There have been suggestions that
military operations aiming at the protection of human rights are governed by
stricter legal limitations than "regular" armed conflicts.20 State practice, such as in
the context of the Kosovo campaign, provides insufficient evidence to establish
that such suggestions have a basis in existing law.21
Other normative asymmetries may have an impact on the law ofarmed conflict.
Such normative asymmetries occur ifthe parties to an international armed conflict
are not bound by the same treaties. As in general international law, law of armed
conflict treaties only apply to States parties unless a State not party to a given treaty
expressly accepts and applies it.22 Absent such a declaration, the hostilities will only
be governed by customary international (humanitarian) law.
Treaties do not, however, become inapplicable ifmembers ofan alliance are not
bound by the same treaties. The ensuing potential interoperability problems, that
is, States within an alliance operating under different legal obligations, are often
solved by a "matrix" solution. Thus, if a certain task involves conduct that would
violate a treaty obligation ofsome alliance members, the force commander will en-
trust that task to units of States not bound by the treaty restrictions. The legality of
such conduct has been recognized by Article 21(3) of the 2008 Convention on
Cluster Munitions, which provides: "Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1
of this Convention and in accordance with international law, States Parties, their
military personnel or nationals, may engage in military cooperation and opera-
tions with States not party to this Convention that might engage in activities pro-
hibited to a State Party."23 Finally, States may differ on the interpretation ofa treaty
by which they are equally bound or of a rule of customary international humani-
tarian law. Again, the problem of interoperability is very often solved by either
national caveats or by other procedural safeguards, such as the "matrix" solution.
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Asymmetric Actors (Participatory Asymmetries)
It has been rightly stated that one of the characteristics of asymmetric warfare (as
understood here) is that the "dividing line between combatants and civilians is
consciously blurred and at times erased."24 This inevitably results in attacks against
the civilian population and individual civilians, or even in conduct amounting to
prohibited perfidy. Such conduct is far from new. The existing law of armed con-
flict is based on the experience of past armed conflicts and has, in principle, pre-
served the general distinction between protected civilians on the one hand and, on
the other hand, persons who, either as combatants or as members of organized
armed groups or as civilians, take a direct part in hostilities.
International Armed Conflict
Unfortunately, the adaptation of the law of international armed conflict to the
changed realities ofwar has not always been satisfactory. This especially holds true
for Article 44(3) of 1977 Additional Protocol I (AP I), which diminishes the obliga-
tion of combatants to distinguish themselves from the civilian population.25 That
provision does not constitute customary international law and its scope of applica-
bility is limited to situations of "internationalized armed conflicts" in the sense of
Article 1 (4) of the Protocol. 26 However, it certainly provides a degree of protection
to members of organized armed groups who intentionally disregard its minimum
requirements. 27
Apart from that, the law of international armed conflict is rather clear: persons
directly participating in the hostilities who qualify neither as combatants nor as
members ofany ofthe other privileged groups28 do not enjoy combatant immunity
or, when captured by the enemy, prisoner ofwar status. As far as civilians are con-
cerned, this has been expressly recognized by Article 51(3), AP I: "Civilians shall
enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they take
a direct part in hostilities." Of course, the exact meaning and scope of the concept
of direct participation in hostilities is far from settled.29 The same holds true with
regard to the legal status of civilians directly participating in hostilities. Some con-
tinue to consider them as civilians protected under the Fourth Geneva Conven-
tion30 who may, however, be attacked (for such time they are directly participating
in hostilities) and punished for their conduct. 31 Others consider them "unlawful
combatants" who are protected by neither the Third Geneva Convention on the
treatment of prisoners of war nor the Fourth Geneva Convention. 32
The law of international armed conflict provides a rather elaborate set of rules
responding to participatory asymmetry and offers an operable solution to most of
the problems encountered in recent international armed conflicts. While there is
no prohibition of entrusting persons other than combatants with the commission
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of acts harmful to the enemy, those persons not enjoying combatant immunity di-
rectly participating in hostilities must understand that they enjoy no protection
under the law ofarmed conflict beyond the minimum standards laid down in Arti-
cle 75 ofAP I and in Common Article 3 of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions.
Accordingly, members of organized armed groups that do not belong to a party
to an international armed conflict but who directly participate in hostilities do not
pose an insurmountable legal problem. They may either be considered as civilians
directly taking part in the hostilities, who, for the duration oftheir direct participa-
tion, are liable to attack and who maybe prosecuted after capture, or, alternatively,
the organized armed group to which they belong is a party to a non-international
armed conflict that exists side by side with the international armed conflict. In the
latter instance, the members of such a group—at least if and as long as they per-
form a "continuous combat function" within the organized armed group33—are
legitimate targets who enjoy neither combatant immunity nor prisoner ofwar status
after capture.
Non-international Armed Conflicts
Non-international armed conflicts are asymmetric by nature, particularly if reg-
ular armed forces are engaged in hostilities against organized armed groups of
non-State actors. Since, however, the concept of "combatant" does not apply to
non-international armed conflicts the applicable law is not built on the legal status
ofthe actors. It is important to note in this context that the very existence ofa non-
international armed conflict presupposes that there exists at least one organized
armed group engaging in armed hostilities against the government or against an-
other organized armed group. Hence, members of an organized armed group do
not qualify as civilians. This is widely accepted.34
There is, however, one unresolved issue relating to those members of an orga-
nized armed group who do not perform a "continuous combat function." While
some prefer to consider them civilians,35 others are unwilling to differentiate ac-
cording to an individual's function within the group. 36 The least common denomi-
nator is that members of an organized armed group performing a "continuous
combat function" in a non-international armed conflict do not enjoy general pro-
tection and are liable to attack. Of course, the State party to a non-international
armed conflict is not prevented from prosecuting them if captured under its
domestic criminal law.
In non-international armed conflict civilians enjoy general protection. They
may lose that protection, however, ifthey deliberately decide to take a direct part in
the hostilities. Accordingly, Article 13(3) of the 1977 Additional Protocol II pro-
vides: "Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Part, unless and for
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such time as they take a direct part in hostilities." This is declaratory of customary
international law. 37
Intentional Violations of the Law
Although not without difficulties, as has been shown, participatory and normative
asymmetries can be coped with under the existing law; however, the core of the
problem posed by asymmetric warfare is intentional violation of the law of armed
conflict by asymmetric actors.
General Aspects
Asymmetric actors in armed conflict either intentionally violate the principle of
distinction or endeavor to incite their opponent to act in violation of that "intrans-
gressible principle" 38 of the law of armed conflict.
The law ofarmed conflict provides a rather clear response to any form of asym-
metric warfare that aims at blurring the principle of distinction, whether by way of
disguising as civilians, by abusing civilian objects for military purposes or by direct
attacks against the civilian population or individual civilians. Still, the problems in
practice persist. If it is not feasible to identify enemy combatants or members ofen-
emy organized armed groups because they appear to be civilians, a decision not to
attack may result either in suicide or, even worse, in prohibited direct attacks
against the civilian population. Of course, combatants who do not distinguish
themselves properlywhen engaged in hostilities do not enjoy combatant immunity
or prisoner of war status when captured. While they may be prosecuted for their
conduct, this is considered by many military commanders to be an insufficient
response to their practical problems.
Similar problems exist with regard to the principle of proportionality. The law
ofarmed conflict does not prohibit attacks that result in the incidental loss of civil-
ian life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects. Such "collateral damage" is
a violation of the law ofarmed conflict only if it is excessive (in contrast to "exten-
sive") in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. 39 In
view of that prohibition, and in view of the media's attention to any civilian losses
in armed conflict, an asymmetric actor will seek either to provoke the opponent
into an attack causing excessive collateral damage or to make the public believe
that an attack has been disproportionate. Systematic violations of the principle of
distinction entail the considerable risk that the opponent applies different stan-
dards for the assessment of proportionality. "If such tactics are systematically em-
ployed for a strategic purpose, the enemy may feel a compelling and overriding
necessity to attack irrespective of the anticipated civilian casualties and damage."40
Still, the prohibition on excessive collateral damage is clear. Considerations of
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military necessity do, of course, play an important part, especially with regard to
the determination of the anticipated military advantage. However, military neces-
sity as such does not justify a deviation from the well established humanitarian
standards of the law of armed conflict.41
Moreover, asymmetric actors will in many cases deliberately act contrary to
their obligation to take feasible precautions in attack, particularlyby using civilians
or civilian objects as shields or by transferring military objectives into densely pop-
ulated areas. Despite the obvious illegality of such conduct, the opponent will be
prevented from attack ifthe attack is expected to result in excessive collateral dam-
age. Here the law of armed conflict itself introduces an element of asymmetry by
privileging unlawful conduct.
Finally, a further problem exists with regard to the obligation of the attacker to
do everything feasible to limit attacks to lawful targets and to avoid, ifpossible, and,
in any event, to minimize excessive collateral damage.42 It would go too far to con-
clude that parties to a conflict that possess advanced weapons systems are under an
absolute obligation to only make use of sophisticated and highly discriminating
weapons. The fact that such weaponry is available does not necessarily mean that
less sophisticated weapons may no longer be employed. Sophisticated and ad-
vanced weapons are expensive and they may, therefore, be reserved for attacks on
more important targets. It must be recognized, however, that
advanced militaries are held to a higher standard as a matter oflaw because more pre-
cautions are feasible for them. As the gap between "haves" and "have-nots" widens in
21st century warfare, this normative relativism will grow. In a sense, we are witnessing
the birth of a capabilities-based IHL regime.43
The consequence is that to a certain extent the standard of feasibility privileges the
weaker side ofan armed conflict, thus adding another form ofnormative asymme-
try into the law of armed conflict.
Use ofProhibited Weapons
The law of armed conflict and arms control law, which are increasingly merging
into a single regime labeled "humanitarian arms control/' provide a well estab-
lished set ofrules that either prohibit the use ofcertain weapons or restrict their use
in certain circumstances.44 In asymmetric warfare the weaker party may be in-
clined to disregard such prohibitions or restrictions and to justify a deviation by
citing the superiority of the opponent.45 Moreover, as pointed out by the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross, "it is evident that if one Party, in violation of
definite rules, employs weapons or other methods of warfare which give it an
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immediate, great military advantage, the adversary may, in its own defence, be in-
duced to retort at once with similar measures."46 Such justifications have, however,
no basis in existing law. The fact that a party to an armed conflict is confronted
with a superior enemy does not justify the use of a means of warfare whose use is
prohibited under the law of international and non-international armed conflict.
Therefore, the threat of imminent defeat is not sufficient grounds for resorting to
the use of prohibited means of warfare.
Unfortunately, the International Court of Justice in its Nuclear Weapons advi-
sory opinion held that the use of nuclear weapons is contrary to the law of armed
conflict unless the "very survival of a State is at stake."47 It is obvious that this hold-
ing may be improperly used to justify a violation of the rules and principles of the
law ofarmed conflict. It needs to be emphasized, however, that the Court's finding
has no basis in the law of armed conflict. If the survival argument has any rele-
vance, it may be to the jus ad bellum.
Prohibited Methods of Warfare
One feature of asymmetric warfare is suicide bombings; another is the use of "hu-
man shields." With regard to the former, it is important to note that the law of
armed conflict does not prohibit suicide attacks unless they are conducted by re-
sort to perfidious means and/or methods.48
The law is different with regard to the use ofhuman shields. Article 51(7) ofAP
I, in prohibiting the use of the "presence or movements of the civilian population
or individual civilians ... to render certain points or areas immune from military
operations, in particular in attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to
shield, favor or impede military operations," reflects customary international
law.49 The law ofarmed conflict provides a possible—though not undisputed—so-
lution to cope with the issue ofhuman shields by distinguishing between voluntary
and involuntary human shields.
Civilians, whatever their motives, who voluntarily serve as human shields may
be considered as taking a direct part in hostilities for the duration ofsuch participa-
tion, thereby losing their protected status under the law of armed conflict. 50 De-
spite arguments to the contrary, involuntary human shields retain their status as
civilians. 51 Accordingly, attacks against a shielded military objective will be prohib-
ited if the incidental losses among involuntary human shields are excessive in rela-
tion to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. 52 It needs to be
emphasized in this context that
the appraisal of whether civilian casualties are excessive in relation to the military ad-
vantage anticipated must make allowances for the fact that, by dint of the large (albeit
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involuntary) presence of civilians at the site of the military objective, the number of
civilian casualties can be expected to be higher than usual.53
However, the distinction between involuntary and voluntary human shields will,
in many cases, not provide an operable solution in practice because it is virtually
impossible to determine whether a person has deliberately and freely decided to
serve as a human shield or is being forced to so act.
Moreover, while the law ofarmed conflict may not prohibit a proportionate at-
tack against a shielded lawful target, it will prove a most difficult task to defend the
death of a considerable number of civilians politically. In asymmetric warfare, the
weaker party often consciously and systematically turns to the practice of using
human shields in order to exploit the political and moral dilemma in which the
attacker will find itself. Thus, while the law purports to offer a solution, in most in-
stances it will not assist in overcoming those dilemmas.
Preliminary Conclusions
Doubts have been expressed as to whether asymmetric warfare can "still be grasped
by and measured against the concept ofmilitary necessity, for the complexities and
intangibility of such scenarios escape its traditionally narrow delimitations."54
These doubts particularly extend to responses to the actions of non-State actors
who intentionally and systematically deviate from well established standards ofthe
law of armed conflict. Their opponents may be induced to reemphasize consider-
ations ofmilitary necessity that may result either in a more liberal interpretation of
the law ofarmed conflict or in its irrelevance because it is considered an unfair ob-
stacle to the success of military operations.
Of course, reciprocity is an important factor in maintaining the continued ef-
fectiveness ofthe law ofarmed conflict. Ifone party to an armed conflict intention-
ally and systematically disregards its rules and principles in order to achieve a
military or political advantage, the opponent's readiness to continue to comply
with the law may steadily decrease. There are, however, solutions to the problem.
On the one hand, the law of armed conflict is flexible enough to respond to an
asymmetric actor's conduct. While it is true that such responses put a heavier bur-
den on the law-abiding party to the conflict, the values underlying the law ofarmed
conflict and the achievements ofthe past 150 years should not be given up too eas-
ily. While it is conceded that the growing asymmetries in warfare have the potential
ofshaking the very bases ofthe law ofarmed conflict, this does not mean that there
is a need for an adaptation of the law to the "new realities" of armed conflict.
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III. Possible Responses to Asymmetric Warfare
Although it must be admitted that complying with the law has become increasingly
difficult, the law of armed conflict provides solutions to the threats posed by the
current versions ofasymmetric warfare. Moreover, the emergence of international
criminal law has added a further and quite powerful enforcement mechanism for
ensuring compliance with the law of armed conflict. It may be questioned, how-
ever, whether non-State actors will understand that, despite their inferiority in
arms and military technology, they would ultimately profit from compliance with
the law ofarmed conflict. If intentional violations of the law are part and parcel of
an overall strategy, it would be quite naive to believe that asymmetric actors would
be deterred from such violations by either lawful responses or criminal
proceedings.
For that reason, it is also doubtful whether "incentives" to non-State actors
would ultimately result in compliance with the law of armed conflict. Proposed
amnesties, reconciliation procedures, truth commissions and similar measures
have not necessarily proven to contribute to an increased effectiveness ofthe law of
armed conflict during active hostilities. In certain circumstances they may serve as
an operable tool to reestablish peace and security in post-armed conflict societies.
As reality shows, however, such steps have not prevented egregious atrocities from
occurring during armed conflicts. Additionally, the law ofarmed conflict is far too
important to be sacrificed on the altar of political expediency. Any form of impu-
nity would run counter to the very object and purpose of the law of armed
conflict—and of international criminal law.
Once faced with the challenge ofresponding to asymmetric warfare, States must
be prepared to invoke the law of armed conflict in two respects.
The first is strict application of the law vis-a-vis asymmetric actors. This in-
cludes, but is not limited to, treating them as combatants. For instance, some States
respond to asymmetric threats by resorting to "targeted killings" (also labeled "ex-
trajudicial killings") of individuals suspected ofbeing involved in unlawful attacks
against government forces, civilians or civilian objects. It must be borne in mind
that under the law ofarmed conflict there is no general prohibition oftargeted kill-
ings. If the targeted individual qualifies as a combatant, including as a member of
an organized armed group who is "performing a continuous combat function," or
as a civilian directly participating in hostilities, he or she may be attacked. There is,
however, disagreement whether there is an obligation to rather capture than kill
the individual if that is a feasible alternative. 55 Of course, the political price to be
paid is frequently considered to be too high, creating an unwillingness on the part
of many governments to consent (or resort) to targeted killings.
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Second and closely related to the first aspect, governments should be proactive
in explaining to the general public and to all concerned political actors their under-
standings of the law of armed conflict, both in general and in its application to a
given concrete situation. It is therefore important to have an up-to-date military
manual that reflects the current state ofthe law ofarmed conflict as it is understood
by the government. Given the adoption ofnew treaties, developments in custom-
ary international law and new interpretations of existing treaties, it is not sufficient
to simply publish a manual once; it must be updated to reflect changes in the law.
For instance, the manual of the German armed forces was published in 199256—
nearly two decades ago. Because it does not provide answers to legal questions aris-
ing, for instance, in the context of the conflict in Afghanistan, it has become in-
creasingly difficult to identify the German government's position on the current
state of the law of armed conflict. Consequently, it is rather easy for certain actors
pursuing a political agenda to claim that the German armed forces operating in
Afghanistan have violated the law.
In this context, it must not be forgotten that one feature of asymmetric warfare
is the use—or rather abuse—of the media and of public opinion. It is therefore
crucial to provide prompt and reliable information. The German armed forces, af-
ter an attack on Taliban fighters and two tanker trucks in September 2009, had to
learn in a quite painful manner that a time-consuming and unstructured investiga-
tion will fuel further speculation as to what actually occurred and will only assist
the enemy, either directly or indirectly.
The air attack on the trucks and the Taliban fighters who were in the immediate
vicinity was conducted in accordance with the law of armed conflict. The fighters
were lawful targets because they were members of an organized armed group per-
forming a "continuous combat function." Because there were reasonable grounds
for assuming that the trucks—and the fuel they carried—would be used for attacks
against civilians and International Security Assistance Force personnel, they had
become lawful military objectives by either their use or intended purpose. At the
time ofthe decision to attack the trucks and the Taliban fighters, the commanding
officer rightly relied on the information available to him.
The reconnaissance photographs showed about 70 individuals attempted to free
one of the trucks that had become stuck in a river. According to a human intelli-
gence source who had been very reliable in the past, the people surrounding the
trucks were Taliban fighters. Recognizing his obligations under the law of armed
conflict, the German officer who authorized the attack decided to only use two
five-hundred-pound bombs in order to spare a nearby farm and village. Shortly af-
ter the attack it was reported in some media reports that as many as 142 people had
been killed. In these initial reports, the statuses of the people allegedly killed or
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injured was uncertain; some spoke of "Taliban and civilians," others of "predomi-
nantly civilian casualties." Other reports stated that the majority of civilians killed
or injured were innocent persons from the nearby village who were only trying to
acquire fuel for their personal needs.
On April 16, 2010, the Office of the Public Prosecutor decided to dismiss all
criminal proceedings against the German officers involved. The report on which
that decision was based reveals that at the time of the attack there had been reason-
able grounds to assume that the individuals surrounding the trucks were Taliban.
While the public prosecutor could not rule out the presence of civilians, the report
indicated that ifsome were civilians, at least some ofthose had directly participated
in the hostilities. In any event, there was no convincing evidence of a large number
of civilian casualties. Even if there had been civilian casualties, the report contin-
ues, there would be no violation ofthe law ofarmed conflict because the incidental
losses and injuries were not excessive in relation to the military advantage antici-
pated. Unfortunately, the report was classified because it contained sensitive mili-
tary information. It was not until October 2010 that an unclassified version was
made available to the public. By that time public opinion had already been influ-
enced by unfounded allegations ofviolations ofthe law ofarmed conflict. The gen-
eral perception has not been altered since the release of the report because neither
the Office of the Public Prosecutor nor the Federal Ministry of Defence has
proactively disseminated it.
It is, of course, understood that thorough investigations are important in order
to be credible and in order to protect the members ofthe armed forces allegedly in-
volved in a violation ofthe law ofarmed conflict. Still, the media field should not be
left to those who, in disregard of their lack of information (and all too often exper-
tise), pursue their political ends by claiming violations of the law. A delayed gov-
ernment response will often be considered as evidence of secrecy.
History has shown that reports of national authorities entrusted with the inves-
tigation of alleged violations ofthe law ofarmed conflict by their own forces will in
many instances be received with suspicion; therefore States engaged in military oper-
ations should be prepared to entrust investigations to an independent fact-finding
entity whose functions are to conduct a thorough investigation and provide reli-
able and trustworthy information to government decisionmakers and the public.
In that regard, governments, whether Additional Protocol I formally applies or
not, should be encouraged to make use ofthe fact-finding commission under Arti-
cle 90, AP I, or, alternatively, agree on another investigatory body composed of





Asymmetric warfare clearly constitutes a challenge to the international legal order
and to its underlying values. While it does not justify a deviation from the well es-
tablished rules and principles of the law of armed conflict, it is necessary to
strengthen that law by all means available. Because asymmetric actors will not
abandon the options opened by a deliberate violation of the law of armed conflict,
incentives to non-State actors to bring about compliance will very often prove
futile. Despite the potential political implications, the application of military force
in accordance with the law ofarmed conflict is the first way to respond to the threats
posed by asymmetric warfare. This, however, must be accompanied by a proactive
and credible information policy. Additionally, thorough investigation/fact-finding
by a neutral and respected international commission of the actions of the non-
State actors would be an effective step that could contribute to repressing such
conduct.
A further step is criminal prosecution, under either domestic or international
criminal law, of those who violate the law. While some may object, often citing the
frequently heard cliche that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom
fighter," holding accountable those who violate the law is the only promising ap-
proach to deterring those who choose to violate the law. Amnesties or reconcilia-
tion efforts may have proven successful in limited instances; it is doubtful,
however, whether they have had—or will have—a lasting effect. Rather, they may
prove to be an incentive for asymmetric actors to continue to pursue or even
increase their unlawful conduct.
These conclusions do not, however, relieve States from their obligation vis-a-vis
their armed forces to clarify the applicable law for situations not amounting to an
international or non-international armed conflict. Moreover, governments ought
to thoroughly scrutinize and evaluate the challenges posed by asymmetric warfare
and take the necessary measures to reduce their vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities
—
whatever their nature—will always be an interesting target for asymmetric actors,
whether they are enemy States or non-State actors, e.g., terrorists.
Notes
1. See, e.g., YORAM DlNSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
International Armed Conflict 27 (2d ed. 2010).
2. Cf. Tullio Treves, Piracy, Law ofthe Sea, and the Use ofForce: Developments offthe Coast of
Somalia, 20 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 399 (2009); Wolff Heintschel von
Heinegg, Repressing Piracy andArmed Robbery at Sea - Towards a New Legal Regime?, 40 ISRAEL
Yearbook on Human Rights 219 (2010).
477
Asymmetric Warfare: How to Respond?
3. See, e.g., Douglas Guilfoyle, Counter-Piracy Law Enforcement and Human Rights, 59
International & Comparative Law Quarterly 141, 152 etseq. (2010).
4. Cf. Christian J. Tarns, The Use of Force against Terrorists, 20 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL Law 359 (2009); Claus KreS, Some Reflections on the International Legal Frame-
work Governing Transnational Armed Conflicts, 15 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW
245, 248 etseq. (2010).
5. Thaza V. Paul, asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers 20
(1994).
6. Kenneth E. McKenzie Jr., What Is Asymmetric Warfare?, in THE REVENGE OF THE
Melians: Asymmetric Threats and the Next QDR 2 (2000), available at http://www.au.af
.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ndu/mcnair62.pdf.
7. Toni Pfanner, Asymmetrical Warfarefrom the Perspective ofHumanitarian Law and Hu-
manitarian Action International Review of the Red Cross 149, 151 (2005).
8. Michael N. Schmitt, Asymmetrical Warfare and International Humanitarian Law, in
International Humanitarian Law Facing New Challenges 11,16 (WolffHeintschel von
Heinegg et al. eds., 2007).
9. On the element of surprise, see CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, On War 198-201 (Michael
Howard & Peter Paret trans, and eds., Princeton Univ. Press 1984) (1832); on ruses, see id. at
202-3.
10. See DlNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 4 et seq.
11. Herfried Munkler, The Wars of the 21st Century, 85 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE
Red Cross 7, 20 (2003).
12. Pfanner, supra note 7, at 153.
13. See Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, The International Legal Framework ofSubmarine Op-
erations, 39 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 331, 340 etseq. (2009).
14. In this regard, consider the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Dec. 3, 2008, 48
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 357 (2008), or the Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel
Mines (Convention on the Prohibition ofthe Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer ofAnti-
Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211).
15. For an analysis of lawfare, see Charles J. Dunlap Jr., Law and Military Interventions:
Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st Century Conflicts (Carr Center for Human Rights,
John F. Kennedy School ofGovernment, Harvard University, Working Paper, 2001), available
at http://www.ksg.harvardedu/cchrpW
.pdf.
16. St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time ofWar, of Explosive Projectiles
Under 400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29-Dec. 11, 1868, reprinted in 1 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
International Law 95 (Supp. 1907).
17. Under the law of international armed conflict, there is no prohibition of employing
other than combatants; however, the privileges (prisoner of war status and combatant immu-
nity) are reserved to combatants proper.
18. Cf. DlNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 3.
1 9. The Secretary-General, Bulletin on the Observance by United Nations Forces of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law §1.1, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13 (Aug. 6, 1999).
20. Daniel Thiirer, Der Kosovo-Konflikt im Lichte des Vblkerrechts: Von drei - echten und
scheinbaren - Dilemmata, 38 ARCHIV DES VOLKERRECHTS 1,11 (2000).
21. See Christopher Greenwood, The Applicability of International Humanitarian Law and
the Law of Neutrality to the Kosovo Campaign, in LEGAL AND ETHICAL LESSONS OF NATO'S
478
WolffHeintschel von Heinegg
KOSOVO CAMPAIGN 35 (Andru E. Wall ed., 2002) (Vol. 78, U.S. NavalWar College International
Law Studies).
22. See, e.g., Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs ofWar on Land art. 6,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2227 [hereinafter Hague Convention No. IV]; Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Inter-
national Armed Conflicts art. 96(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional
Protocol I].
23. This has also been recognized in PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT
RESEARCH, COMMENTARY ON THE HPCR MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO
AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE Rules 161-64 (2009) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE HPCR
Manual].
24. Pfanner, supra note 7, at 153.
25. See Yves Sandoz, Article 44 - Combatants and prisoners ofwar, in COMMENTARY ON THE
Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
TH[ 1697-1724 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987).
26. Knut Ipsen, Combatants and Non-Combatants, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 79, 89 etseq. (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 2008).
27. Stefan Oeter, Comment: Is the Principle of Distinction Outdated?, in INTERNATIONAL
Humanitarian Law Facing New Challenges, supra note 8, at 53, 59 et seq.
28. See Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs ofWar on Land, annexed to Hague
Convention No. IV, supra note 22, art. 1; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War art. 4A(l)-(3), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
29. see nils melzer, international committee of the red cross, interprets
Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International
HUMANITARIAN LAW 41-64 (2009), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/
icrc_002_0990.pdf [hereinafter INTERPRETATIVE GUIDANCE]; Michael N. Schmitt, Humanitarian
Law and DirectParticipation in Hostilities by Private Contractors or Civilian Employees, 5 CHICAGO
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 511 (2004-2005); DlNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 146 et seq.;
Commentary on the HPCR Manual, supra note 23, sec. F.
30. Convention Relative to the Protection ofCivilian Persons in Time ofWar, Aug. 12,1 949,
6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC-IV].
31. Interpretative Guidance, supra note 29, at 65-68.
32. Yoram Dinstein, The System of Status Groups in International Humanitarian Law, in
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW FACING NEW CHALLENGES, supra note 8, at 145, 149.
33. INTERPRETATIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 29, at 33-36.
34. See, e.g., MICHAEL N. SCHMITT, CHARLES H.B. GARRAWAY & YORAM DINSTEIN, THE
MANUAL ON THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WITH COMMENTARY f 1.1.2
(2006), reprinted in 36 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2006) (Special Supplement).
35. INTERPRETATIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 29, at 20-26.
36. For that and other reasons, a number of experts who had participated in the process
withdrew their names from the list of experts.
37. See COMMENTARY ON THE HPCR MANUAL, supra note 23, at 1 17.
38. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, |
79 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion].
39. Additional Protocol I, supra note 22, art. 51 (5) (b).
40. Robin Geifi, Asymmetric Conflict Structures, 88 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED
CROSS 757, 766 (2006).
41. A.P.V. Rogers, Law on the Battlefield 4 (2d ed. 2004).
479
Asymmetric Warfare: How to Respond?
42. Additional Protocol I, supra note 22, art. 57(2).
43. Schmitt, supra note 8, at 42.
44. For an in-depth analysis, see WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, WEAPONS AND THE LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT 41 etseq. (2009).
45. Geifi, supra note 40, at 758.
46. international committee of the red cross, reaffirmation and development
of the Laws and Customs applicable in Armed Conflicts 83 (1969).
47. Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, supra note 38, J 97.
48. Schmitt, supra note 8, at 32.
49. See also GC-IV, supra note 30, art. 28 ("The presence of a protected person may not be
used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations").
50. See DlNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 153.
5 1
.
Schmitt, supra note 8, at 27.
52. Additional Protocol I, supra note 22, art. 51(5)(b).
53. DlNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 155.
54. Geifi, supra note 40, at 770.
55. See INTERPRETATIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 29, at 77-82. See also NILS MELZER,
Targeted Killing in International Law 394 etseq. (2008).







Concluding Remarks: LOAC and Attempts to
Abuse or Subvert It
Yoram Dinstein*
This has been another intellectually stimulating conference. By now, there is a
high level of expectations as regards each and every Newport conference.
The series ofannual gatherings has become de rigueur for any serious military law-
yer or academic specializing in thejus ad helium, thejus in hello or the law ofthe sea.
The topics explored in the Newport conferences vary from one year to another. A
decade ago, all eyes were focused on the air campaign in Kosovo. After 9/11, the
"war on terrorism" and its innumerable corollaries loomed large. Then came the
hostilities in Afghanistan and Iraq, and their aftermath. But, while no two Newport
conferences are alike, "it's the same always different." What is the same is the road
that we are all traveling on together. What is different—over a stretch of time
—
pertains to the particular bumps on that road, the new detours caused by fallen
rocks and construction in progress, not to mention the need to constantly watch
out for slippery conditions.
As a "recidivist" concluding speaker in the Newport conferences, I usually
choose a number of diverse themes emerging from the exchanges ofviews to dwell
on. This time, allow me to concentrate on a single (albeit two-pronged) topic. To
me, there is a troubling aspect ofthe presentations and the deliberations that I no-
tice (and not for the first time). This relates, as it were, not to the music but to the
* Professor Emeritus, Tel Aviv University, Israel.
LOAC and Attempts to Abuse or Subvert It
tone: not the presentations or interventions in debates by themselves, but the
manner in which they are made. I am rather taken aback by the fact that, when mil-
itary lawyers who practice the law ofarmed conflict (LOAC) take the floor, they in-
variably sound on the defensive. Defensive about what and why?
The answer, first and foremost, is that we have to defend our shared societal val-
ues against the barbarians who are pushing in at the gates of civilization. Of course,
there have always been barbarians exerting force at the gates of civilization. The
Roman Empire held off the hordes of the ancient barbarians for many centuries.
But one must never feel complacent. After all, in time, the relentless pressure of the
ancient barbarians did overwhelm the Roman Empire. If we want to ensure that
our own defenses are not breached by the modern barbarians (i.e., rogue States and
organized armed groups of non-State actors whose modus operandi is terrorism),
we must vigilantly verify that they are maintained in good shape.
It is necessary to take into account that in modern times the onslaught of the
barbarians has become more insidious because they have adopted lawfare as one of
the most effective weapons wielded against us. "Lawfare" is an expression popular-
ized in the last decade by Charlie Dunlap (who is here with us). Lawfare is to be un-
derstood as a means of warfare, and indeed as a countermeasure against military
reverses. Since the modern barbarians are unable to win discrete battles against the
technologically superior armed forces arrayed against them, they try to win the war
by using lawfare. What the barbarians do is use—and generally abuse—legal argu-
ments to foil any military success that may be scored by the armed forces of civi-
lized nations.
The notion of winning war by lawfare may appear to be far-fetched. Yet, we
must not underrate the potency of lawfare as a weapon of mass destruction—in
this case, a weapon of mass disinformation—attuned to the peculiarities of the era
in which we live. Allegations ofbreaches ofLOAC by our troops (usually magnified
in propaganda to the scale of "atrocities") tend to drive a wedge between our mili-
tary community and the civil society. When the public perception is that "atroci-
ties" have been perpetrated by our troops, no victory in the field can repair the
psychological damage done to the cause for which we are fighting.
The Vietnam conflict has shown that a civilized country such as the United
States can win military battles, yet lose a war only because public opinion at home
turns against it. Post-Vietnam, it is folly to lose sight of mood swings in public
opinion: polls indicating opposition to a war may determine its political outcome
(which is the only outcome that counts in the final analysis) no less—perhaps even
more—than actual defeats sustained in military encounters.
Lawfare was not a major consideration at the time ofVietnam, but it has become
so today. This is a new development that has come about at or around the dawn of
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the twenty-first century. Whatever its precise origins, the new element brought
into play is that legal arguments can be effectively canvassed to corrode the
indispensable home-front support for a given war. This is done by condemning
as unlawful the means and methods ofwarfare resorted to by our troops. In partic-
ular, lawfare seems to strike the right chord with the public when it hammers skill-
fully on the sensitive issue of civilian losses (and damage to civilian objects)
incidental to attacks executed by our armed forces against lawful enemy targets.
The subject is encapsulated in the commonly used phrase "collateral damage."
The most fascinating dimension of lawfare, as practiced against us today, is the
profound irony of the entire situation. On one side, you have the modern barbari-
ans who are conducting hostilities in an utterly lawless fashion: not only do they ig-
nore LOAC; they trample it underfoot. Specifically, the barbarians do not hesitate
to kill civilians (including a sacrifice of their own civilians) on a large scale. In fact,
they slaughter civilians on a large scale recklessly and even in a premeditated
fashion.
On the other side, you have civilized nations. Generally speaking, civilized na-
tions abide by LOAC. They do so notwithstanding the complications resulting
from the diametrically opposite conduct of the enemy. Indeed, despite many
temptations, LOAC has not been relaxed to allow civilized nations more elbow
room when confronting the barbarians. If anything, in the last few decades
LOAC—as accepted and practiced by civilized nations—has become more rigor-
ous than ever.
It goes almost without saying that instances ofbreaches ofLOAC do occur even
where civilized armed forces are concerned. However, (i) relatively speaking, these
instances are few and far between (although they are usually well-publicized in the
media); and (ii) there is in place a highly developed military justice system that is en-
trusted with the strict enforcement of LOAC and the winnowing out of offenders
(many participants in the present conference represent that system). We also spend
enormous human and financial resources in disseminating LOAC and instilling its
directives into the troops through constant training at all command levels.
The long and the short of it is that the civilized armed forces—on the whole
—
have a laudable record of implementation of LOAC, whereas the barbarians have
an appalling one. This is where the true "asymmetry of warfare" is manifested in
modern times. But here is the puzzling aspect of that asymmetry. One would have
expected that the civilized side would go on the legal offensive, charging the enemy
with recourse to methods ofbarbarism that contravene every cardinal principle of
LOAC. Instead, while we keep relatively silent, the barbarians mount a legal offen-
sive against us through lawfare. Unfazed by their own show of open disdain for
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LOAC, they dare to accuse us ofcontravening it. They behave as free riders, and yet
they literally get away with murder—indeed, mass murder of civilians.
How do we respond? Not with the outrage that might have been expected. The
prevailing tone in the present conference—as in similar gatherings—has been de-
fensive and even apologetic. It appears that the barbarians have managed to get
under our skin, and we suffer from irrational pangs of a guilty conscience. As a
consequence, command echelons on our side often bend over backward in the ap-
plication of LOAC. What has come to light in the course of the conference is that,
in Afghanistan, airstrikes essential to mission accomplishment—and legally
unimpeachable—have been scrapped, so as to avoid altogether lawful collateral
damage to civilians. We have also heard about the Israeli army resorting to the baf-
fling practice of issuing, prior to attacks against lawful targets, many thousands of
individual warnings to enemy civilians on their cellular phones. Just think of the
logistical effort invested, undertaken without any legal rhyme or reason, in such
an operation.
As we have repeatedly been told in the present conference, "this is not about
them, it's about us." But what does our odd defensive behavior truly show about
us? Ifwe sound as ifwe were in the wrong in circumstances where we are actually in
the right, this is not due to any intrinsic societal values. It is due to an uncalled-for
guilt complex, based on a specious sense that perhaps our technological superiority
has led us to conduct hostilities in a manner that is incompatible with LOAC.
In reality, technological superiority (epitomized by precision-guided muni-
tions, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and a host of other sophisticated tools of
warfare) has led civilized armed forces to pay greater—rather than lesser—attention
to the detailed constraints ofLOAC. Attacks are now more surgical than in the past,
information about what is going on "on the other side of the hill" is increasingly
collated in real time, and so forth. Yet, we are simply not giving ourselves a break.
One can sincerely say that "we have met the enemy and it is us." As far as I am
concerned, the moral of the story is that we should undergo some sort of mental
therapy. Otherwise, civilization may not outlast the modern barbarians.
I would like to address the central theme of lawfare: viz., enemy civilian losses.
Civilized nations adhere tenaciously to the cardinal LOAC principle of distinction
between combatants and civilians. What this principle denotes is that every feasible
precaution must be taken in wartime to ensure that innocent enemy civilians will
be spared from injury by exempting them from attack. I use the phrase "innocent
civilians" in order to distinguish genuine civilians from those who masquerade as
civilians but take a direct part in hostilities, thereby losing the exemption from at-
tack for such time as they are doing so (a stretch oftime which is quite controversial
in its length as the oral discussion in the present conference has demonstrated).
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The exemption from attack embraces also civilian objects, namely, all objects that
are not military objectives (as defined negatively in Article 52 of 1977 Additional
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions). 1
By following the principle of distinction in the course ofhostilities, civilized bel-
ligerent parties, in principle, kill enemy civilians—or destroy civilian objects
—
only when the losses (to human beings) or damage (to property) constitute collat-
eral damage. Admittedly, human errors and technical malfunctions do occur occa-
sionally. But, otherwise, solely lawful targets are selected for attack. Nevertheless,
civilians—and civilian objects—are inevitably subject to harm when present or lo-
cated in or around these targets, because this is deemed collateral damage.
It is frequently glossed over (especially in the media) that LOAC takes some
collateral damage to enemy civilians virtually for granted as an inescapable
consequence of attacks against lawful targets. Such damage is the case owing to
the simple fact that lawful targets cannot be sterilized: some civilians and civilian
objects will almost always be in proximity to combatants and military objectives.
Hence, a modicum of collateral damage to civilians cannot possibly be avoided
unless a battle rages in the middle of the ocean or the desert (where no civilians or
civilian objects are within range of the contact zone in which the belligerent par-
ties are conducting attacks against each other).
Far from imposing an all-embracing prohibition on collateral damage to en-
emy civilians and civilian objects, LOAC expressly permits it as long as (in the
words of Additional Protocol I) it is not expected to be "excessive," compared to
the military advantage anticipated. 2 This is the core ofthe principle ofproportion-
ality (the word "proportionality" itself is not mentioned as such in the Protocol).
And "excessive"—we have to keep reminding ourselves—is not synonymous with
"extensive." 3 Extensive civilian casualties (and damage to civilian objects), even
when plainly expected, may be perfectly lawful when reasonably determined to be
non-excessive (on the basis of the information at hand at the time of action) once
weighed against the military advantage anticipated.4
The study of these expectations and anticipations is not an exact science, and
much depends on the perceived "value" ofthe military objective targeted in the cir-
cumstances prevailing at the time. There are numerous question marks that re-
main unresolved in the implementation of the principle of proportionality. Yet,
the principle itself is not contested by any civilized member of the international
community.
Of course, war is hell. LOAC has not undertaken a mission impossible of
purporting to eliminate the hellish consequences of war. What LOAC basically
strives to do is reduce these consequences. To reiterate the language of the 1868
St. Petersburg Declaration (one of the very first LOAC treaties on record), what
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LOAC strives at is "alleviating as much as possible the calamities of war." 5 Collat-
eral damage to civilians and civilian objects, too—when it cannot be avoided alto-
gether—has to be minimized in accordance with the principle of proportionality.
Not everybody likes the down-to-earth attitude that LOAC takes vis-a-vis war-
fare. Indeed, in recent years, a new major problem has arisen. The clear and present
danger of the barbarians in front remains unabated. But, in the meantime, another
menace has evolved in the back. This menace comes from the human rights zealots
and do-goodniks, whom I shall call "human rights-niks" for short. Far be it from
me to suggest that every human rights scholar or activist necessarily comes under
this rubric. In fact, we have in our midst some genuine scholars in the arena of
human rights (preeminently, Francoise Hampson) for whom I have the greatest
respect. But all too often today we encounter the unpleasant phenomenon of hu-
man rights-niks who, hoisting the banner of human rights law, are attempting to
bring about a hostile takeover of LOAC. This is an encroachment that we must
stoutly resist.
The human rights-niks in the back are by no means to be confused with the bar-
barians in front: far from endorsing methods of barbarism, the human rights-niks
would prefer a non-violent solution to every conflict. Nevertheless, the danger that
the human rights-niks pose is equally acute, since they threaten to pull the legal rug
from under our feet. They thus aid and abet the lawfare ofthe enemy by leaving the
civil society with the impression that we are acting (or reacting) in a manner that is
incompatible with the loftier aspirations of the law.
Inter alia, human rights-niks would like to revolutionize the field by introduc-
ing a normative system of warfare characterized by zero collateral damage to civil-
ians. To accomplish that, they would like to disallow attacks against lawful military
targets, if these entail some collateral damage to civilians or civilian objects. Since
(as indicated) such collateral damage is bound to happen, this would imply the
banning of almost all attacks against enemy combatants and military objectives.
The legal revolution that human rights-niks wish to engender relates to the
broad spectrum of norms that govern the conduct of hostilities. Human rights-
niks tacitly accuse us of applying the wrong legal system by following LOAC in-
stead of human rights law. They would like to see human rights law applicable in
wartime as much as in peacetime: not side by side with, but in lieu of, LOAC. This
kind of approach often resonates with the lay (and basically uninformed) public at
large, if only because lots of people cannot tell "human" apart from "humanitar-
ian" when LOAC is referred to (as it recurrently is) as "international humanitarian
law." After all, it is the humanitarian impulse that propels both human rights law
and international humanitarian law (aka LOAC).
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The trouble is that, ifwe were to do what the human rights-niks want us to do,
hostilities would become impracticable. That is to say, all forms of warfare would
be beyond the pale. Many human rights-niks do not hide that this is what they
truly—and ultimately—want. They are animated by genuine motives of pacifism
(echoed even in one ofthe questions posed during the questions-and-answers time
in our own conference), and they believe that LOAC stands in their way. What they
fail to grasp is that, while war may be nobly wished away, it is not a phenomenon
that is likely to disappear as long as there are barbarians who force it on the civilized
world. And it is impossible to fight a war ifwe are not ready to shed blood. LOAC is
doing what it can to ensure that bloodletting is confined to combatants, leaving in-
nocent civilians out ofthe circle of fire. Still, zero collateral damage to civilians (or
civilian objects) is not a hardheaded scenario in war, and LOAC recognizes that
naked truth.
When the position is examined objectively, it becomes obvious that LOAC is the
only effective dike against "total war." Without LOAC, civilian casualties in war-
time will not be reduced: they will escalate. If human rights law were to replace
LOAC—ifno feasible options ofconducting hostilities were left to belligerent parties
in war—ultimately no rules would survive, inasmuch as the legal paper-constraints
would simply be ignored by the clashing armies. Therefore, the genuine option
that must be exercised is not between LOAC (characterized by pragmatism and
common sense) and human rights law (untainted in its pristine purity). It is be-
tween LOAC and lawlessness. And just as we strenuously reject lawlessness as prac-
ticed by the barbarians, we must not allow lawlessness to be inflicted on our own
side out of a misguided belief in some notional primacy—in the wrong context
—
ofhuman rights precepts.
Many people think that the best solution to the problem is a compromise of
sorts, reflected in the dual application ofboth LOAC and human rights law (side by
side with one another) in an armed conflict. This may sound ideal, except that, for
several reasons, such duality is neither necessary nor even possible in multiple
contexts.
The first plank ofthe argument is that, empirically, LOAC has withstood the test
of time. LOAC has progressed for a long period of time: much longer than human
rights law (which is a product of the post-World War II era). The evolution of
LOAC is a product of close cooperation among military personnel, lawyers and
diplomats. The whole system is generated and shaped by the special demands of
armed conflict, and is predicated on a calibrated balancing act between the require-
ments of military necessity and humanitarian considerations. Largely speaking,
only human rights-niks believe that LOAC has proved unequal to its task.
489
LOAC and Attempts to Abuse or Subvert It
Interestingly enough, the human rights-niks object even to Additional Proto-
col I—an instrument adopted in 1977 through the pressure of developing coun-
tries—which (although binding on most countries in the world) is not accepted as
such by the United States and quite a few other countries. Even the United States
regards some provisions of the Protocol (including those cited by me here) as de-
claratory of existing customary international law. But there is a "Great Schism" (as
I like to call it) regarding the status of a host of other stipulations of the Protocol.
All the same, even detractors of diverse portions of the Protocol will not contend
that it has crossed the red line from LOAC into human rights law.
The second plank of the argument is that the dissonance between LOAC and
human rights law is not categorical. Some relevant legal norms of LOAC and hu-
man rights law are actually identical (see the example of torture in the next para-
graph). But, where differences and variations exist, that does not necessarily mean
that human rights law is more "advanced." It must not be overlooked that most
human rights are subject to built-in limitations (such as national security),6 and
—
above all—to outright derogations in wartime. 7 By contrast, LOAC—crafted spe-
cifically by and for the challenges of wartime—is not subject to any similar
limitations or derogations.
For sure, there are some exceptional human rights which are non-derogable. 8
But, ifyou take the leading example—to wit, the prohibition of torture—you find
that, not coincidentally, the very same prohibition constitutes an integral part of
LOAC.9 So why do we need human rights law?
The third plank of the argument is that, even from a humanitarian perspective,
LOAC must not be automatically categorized as inferior to human rights law. Cer-
tain norms of LOAC are more stringent than the parallel rules existing in the do-
main ofhuman rights law in peacetime. To cite the two most obvious illustrations:
(a) The use of riot control agents (primarily, tear gas) as a method ofwarfare
is banned by the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, yet is expressly
permitted for law enforcement purposes. 10 The concern underlying this
rule is not to loosen the core prohibition ofthe employment ofchemicals
(gas warfare) in battle. 11 However, the result is clear: non-lethal chemical
agents can be part of the arsenal when quelling riots, although not in
combat.
(b) The employment of expanding soft-nosed bullets is forbidden pursuant
to LOAC (on the ground that they cause unnecessary suffering), 12 but
—
due to their greater stopping power—they have become almost standard
issue to anti-terrorist special law enforcement units in peacetime.
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When all is said and done, I do not deny that human rights law has a role to play
in armed conflict. First, there is a natural complementarity of the two branches of
international law in non-international armed conflicts (both in light of the special
circumstances ofa "civil war" and by dint ofthe historical fact that the applicability
ofLOAC in such conducts is a fairly recent occurrence and there are still significant
gaps in the law). Second, even in inter-State armed conflicts, LOAC is sometimes
silent (a leading example is the issue ofthe summary trial and possibly execution of
deserters). 13 1 think that whenever there is a lacuna in LOAC (in the setting of either
an international or non-international armed conflict), it must be filled by human
rights law.
Still, the thrust of the matter is that where LOAC is not silent—and when there
is no correspondence between LOAC and human rights law—there is no way out
ofhaving to choose between the two. In such situations, the rule is straightforward:
LOAC prevails over human rights law as the lex specialis in armed conflict. 14 This
central principle has been acknowledged more than once by the International
Court of Justice. 15 It is the incontrovertible lex lata today.
Human rights-niks are plainly not happy about this state of affairs. What they
would like to do is change the law by moving the signposts. There are many indica-
tions of such attempts. None is more invidious than the allegation that we have
heard here about targeted killing of enemy combatants by drones (i.e., UAVs)
amounting to "extrajudicial killings."
Personally, I find this allegation ludicrous. What death inflicted on enemy com-
batants in wartime does not amount to an "extrajudicial killing"? Apparently, in
their pipe dream, some human rights-niks replace the battlefield by an imaginary
courtroom scenario in which enemy soldiers are charged with the commission of
crimes (although it is not clear what these crimes are, considering that the mere
participating in battle in wartime is not a crime per se). In this fictitious court-
room, individual soldiers are apparently summoned to face charges and undergo
judicial proceedings with due process guaranteed. If capital punishment ensues,
the killing ceases to be "extrajudicial." Criminal prosecution, conviction and pun-
ishment (even the death penalty) thus replace the prosecution of hostilities by
military formations on the ground, at sea or in the air.
Well, in the real world (as distinct from the dreamworld ofhuman rights-niks),
armed clashes in wartime occur not in a chimerical courtroom but in battle: any
exchanges between the parties consist of fire traded between military units. Only
those who breathe the rarefied air of the United Nations headquarters—removed
from any vestiges ofreality—can come up with the perception ofwartime violence as
an "extrajudicial killing." The more one considers the ramifications ofthe bizarre at-
tempt to bring "judicial killings"—and their antinomy of "extrajudicial killings"
—
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into the vocabulary of war, the more one is disposed to the conclusion that it be-
longs in some sci-fi adventure in a faraway galaxy.
Once we return to this planet, with its artillery barrages and airstrikes—causing
colossal casualties to enemy combatants only because they are enemy combatants
in wartime—it becomes evident that all hostilities are conducted "extrajudicially."
That being the case, if death to enemy combatants can be inflicted "extrajudicially"
wholesale, why can it not be done in retail? And if it can be executed by manned
military aircraft, why can it not be carried out by military UAVs?
I am not saying that present-day LOAC is perfect or that it should remain static.
There are, of course, bones of contention in LOAC: some more profound (I have
already referred to the "Great Schism" relating to Additional Protocol I) and others
less intense. All these issues have to be addressed, and there are countless fora (for-
mal and informal) in which discussions—sometimes heated—take place about the
road and the road bumps to which I have alluded.
The point that I am trying to drive home is that we—as practitioners ofLOAC
and academics traveling the same road—must do whatever we can to prevent the
hostile takeover ofLOAC by the human rights-niks. This is quintessential because
what the human rights-niks would like to bring about is not merely a shift in em-
phasis but a regime change: a legal regime change that will revolutionize the field
by making hostilities impossible to engage in effectively.
Notwithstanding the existence of powerful non-governmental (NGO) lobbies,
which endorse the approach ofthe human rights-niks, I do not believe that there is
any reason for defeatism within our ranks. International law is not created by human
rights-niks or by NGOs. It is created by States through treaties and custom. The
general practice of States demonstrates that LOAC is alive and well, and that States
do not support the attempt to subvert it through the adoption ofhuman rights law
tenets.
Some of us in this room (Charlie Dunlap, Charles Garraway, Mike Schmitt,
Dale Stephens, Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg and I), as part of a larger Group of
Experts under the aegis ofHPCR (Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict
Research at Harvard University), have just finished the preparation of an air and
missile warfare manual, 16 which had a NATO launch in Brussels in March 2010.
We have toiled for the last six years, in the course ofwhich we have consulted infor-
mally (bilaterally, regionally and multilaterally) with dozens ofgovernments. I rec-
ommend that you take a look at the resultant document (which, together with a
detailed commentary, 17 runs for more than three hundred pages). The manual
consists of 175 black-letter rules adopted by consensus. By itself, the consensus is
an extraordinary achievement, bearing in mind that it reflected the views ofdozens
of experts from Canada to China, from Geneva (the International Committee of
492
Yoram Dinstein
the Red Cross) to Washington, DC. But what I want to spotlight is the extensive in-
formal consultations with governments, even in countries (such as Russia) that
were not represented in the Group of Experts.
As the commentary on the manual discloses, the consensus on the black-letter
rules was not always easy to arrive at, and often a compromise between conflicting
views had to be worked out. But let me assure you that the text ofthe air and missile
warfare manual, as adopted, is couched in pure LOAC language. That is exactly
what every government consulted wanted. The chatter of the human rights-niks
was not heard at any time during the deliberations with those who actually formu-
late and implement international law.
My advice to this gathering is, therefore, threefold:
(a) Keep up the good work on the application and interpretation of LOAC.
(b) Keep poachers off the grass.
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Editors' Note: In order to most accuratelyportray the events ofthe conference, the bio-
graphical data in this appendix reflect the positions in which the authors were serving
at the time of the conference, as setforth in the conference brochures and materials.
Professor Robert M. Chesney is the Charles I. Francis Professor in Law at the
University of Texas School of Law, where he teaches courses relating to US national
security and constitutional law. Professor Chesney recently served in the Justice
Department as an advisor to the Detention Policy Task Force created pursuant to
Executive Order 13493, and writes frequently on topics concerning domestic and
international laws relating to the capture, detention, trial and disposition of per-
sons in the context ofcombat and counterterrorism operations. He is a member of
the Advisory Committee of the American Bar Association's Standing Committee
on Law and National Security, a senior editor for the Journal ofNational SecurityLaw
& Policy, an associate member of the Intelligence Science Board, a non-resident
senior fellow of the Brookings Institution, a term member of the Council on For-
eign Relations and a member of the American Law Institute. His forthcoming
scholarship includes a book examining the evolution of military detention prac-
tices in Iraq between 2003 and the present and another exploring the evolving role
of the judiciary in national security affairs. Professor Chesney also operates a
national security law LISTSERV for practitioners, scholars, journalists and stu-
dents, with approximately nine hundred subscribers from around the world.
Ms. Ashley S. Deeks served as the Assistant Legal Adviser for Political-Military Af-
fairs in the US Department of State's Office ofthe Legal Adviser until June 2010. In
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the Department of State, she worked on issues related to the law ofarmed conflict,
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with al Qaeda. She also provided advice on intelligence issues. In previous posi-
tions at the State Department, Ms. Deeks advised on international law enforce-
ment, extradition and diplomatic property questions. From May to December
2005 she served as the Embassy Legal Adviser at the US Embassy in Baghdad, during
Iraq's constitutional negotiations. She received several State Department Superior
and Meritorious Service Awards. Ms. Deeks was a 2007-8 Council on Foreign Re-
lations (CFR) International Affairs Fellow and a Visiting Fellow in residence at the
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Center for Strategic and International Studies. During her fellowship, she explored
the different approaches by the United States and European States to armed con-
flict and the laws of war, as well as issues related to detention, cluster munitions
and the use of diplomatic assurances. She also authored a CFR Special Report enti-
tled "Avoiding Transfers to Torture." She has written several articles on the Iraqi
constitution, and has served as an adjunct professor at Georgetown Law Center.
After graduating from the University of Chicago Law School, she clerked for Judge
Edward Becker on the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. She is a term mem-
ber of the Council on Foreign Relations.
Professor Yoram Dinstein is Professor Emeritus of International Law at Tel Aviv
University (Israel). He is a former President of the University, as well as former
Rector and former Dean of the Faculty of Law. Professor Dinstein served two ap-
pointments as the Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law at the Naval
War College. He was also a Humboldt Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Inter-
national Law at Heidelberg (Germany), a Meltzer Visiting Professor of Interna-
tional Law at New York University and a Visiting Professor ofLaw at the University
of Toronto. Professor Dinstein is a Member of the Institute of International Law
and has written extensively on subjects relating to international law, human rights
and the law ofarmed conflict. He is the founder and Editor ofthe Israel Yearbook on
Human Rights. He is the author of War, Aggression and Self-Defence, now in its
fourth edition (2005), and The International Law ofBelligerent Occupation (2009).
His latest book is The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law ofInternational Armed
Conflict (2d edition, 2010). Professor Dinstein is frequently cited by the Supreme
Court of Israel. He has also been cited by judges of the International Court of Jus-
tice, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the House of
Lords and the Supreme Court of Canada.
Major General Charles J. Dunlap Jr., US Air Force (Ret.), is a Visiting Professor of
the Practice ofLaw at Duke University Law School and also serves as the Associate
Director of its Center on Law, Ethics, and National Security. He is a graduate of St.
Joseph's University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Villanova University Law
School. He is also a distinguished graduate of the National War College. General
Dunlap served on active duty for more than thirty-four years as an Air Force judge
advocate. Immediately prior to retirement, he was serving as Deputy Judge Advo-
cate General, Headquarters US Air Force, Washington, DC. In addition to assign-
ments at various locations in the United States, General Dunlap served in the
United Kingdom and Korea, and deployed for various operations in the Middle
East and Africa, including short stints in support ofOperations Enduring Freedom
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and Iraqi Freedom. Totaling more than 120 publications, his writings address a
wide range of issues, including the law, airpower, counteTinsurgency, cyber power,
rivil
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military relations and leadership. General Dunlap speaks widely on legal and
national security issues, and his articles have appeared in a variety of publications
ranging from the Washington Post to the Stanford La*' Review.
Professor Charles Garraway CBE retired in 2003 after thirtyyears in theUKArmy
Legal Services, initially as a crimin al prosecutor and then asan adviser on the law of
armed conflict and operational law. In that capacity, he represented the Ministry of
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the First Review Conference for the 1981 Conventional Weapons Convention, the
negotiations on the establishment of an International Criminal Court and the
Diplomatic Conference that led to the 1999 Second Protocol to the 1954 Hagpe
Convention on Cultural Property. He was also the seniorArmy lawyer deployed to
the Arabian Gulf during the 1990-91 Gulf conflict. Since retiring, Professor
Garrawav spent three months in Baghdad working for the Foreign Office on transi-
tional justice issues and six months as a senior research fellow at the British Insti-
tute of International and Comparative Law. He was the 2004—5 Charles H
Stockton Professor ofInternational Law at the NavalWar College. He is currently a
Visiting Professor at King's College London and an Associate Fellow at the Royal
Institute of International Affairs
I
Chatham House ) in both its International Law
and International Security programs. In 2006, he was elected as a member of the
International Humanitarian Fact Finding Commission, established under Article
90 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Professor
Garraway is a member ofthe teaching faculty at the International Institute ofInter-
national Law, San Remo, Italv and has lectured extensively on the law of armed
conflict and international criminal iustice. He is a widely published author.
Colonel David E. Graham, USArmy (ReL), is the Executive Director ofThe Judge
Advocate General* s Legal Center and School, US Army TTAGLCS >. He is a graduate
oi Texas A&M L'niversity | BA , The George Washington L'niversity > [A i~ i ~s. e
University oi Texas School ofLaw ( JD . He is also a Distinguished Graduate : : die
National War College (1993). Colonel Graham has over thirtvvearf : exrene-je
as an Army iudge advocate. He has an extensive background in both international
and operational law, with a mix of assignments in the L'nited States, Europe, Latin
.America and the Middle East. During his last eight years on active duty, he served
as the Chief of International Operational Law, Office ofThe Iudge Advocate Gen-
eral, Department of the Army. Mr. Graham has a long-standing relationship with
the Legal Center and School, where he served as a professor, a departmentheadand
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Academic Director, as well as the Director of the Center for Law and Military Op-
erations. Colonel Graham is a published author in multiple legal and professional
journals, and has lectured extensively in both US and international fora on interna-
tional and operational law topics.
Professor Francoise J. Hampson is Professor of Law, Department of Law and a
member of the Human Rights Centre at the University of Essex. Professor
Hampson was an independent expert member of the UN Sub-Commission on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights from 1998 to 2007. She previously
taught at the University of Dundee. She has acted as a consultant on humanitarian
law to the International Committee of the Red Cross and taught at staff colleges or
equivalents in the United Kingdom, United States, Canada and Ghana. She repre-
sented Oxfam and Save the Children Fund (United Kingdom) at the Preparatory
Committee and first session of the Review Conference for the Certain Conven-
tional Weapons Convention. Professor Hampson has successfully litigated many
cases before the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg and, in
recognition of her contribution to the development of law in this area, was
awarded Human Rights Lawyer of the Year jointly with her colleague from the
Centre, Professor Kevin Boyle. She has taught, researched and published widely in
the fields of armed conflict and international humanitarian law and on the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights. She is currently working on international law
issues relating to private military/security companies and is a member of the inde-
pendent panel appointed by the International Court of Justice to examine the con-
duct of the parties to the conflict in Lebanon in 2006.
Professor Dr. Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg is Professor of Public Law, especially
public international law, European law and foreign constitutional law, at the
Europa-Universitat Viadrina in Frankfurt (Oder), Germany. From October 2004
until October 2008 he was the dean of the law faculty of the Europa-Universitat
and since October 2008 has served as the university's Vice President. Prior to his
association with the Europa-Universitat, he served as Professor of Public Interna-
tional Law at the University of Augsburg. In the academic year 2003-4 he was the
Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law at the US Naval War College.
He had been a visiting professor at the Universities of Kaliningrad (Russia), Almaty
(Kazakhstan), Santiago de Cuba (Cuba) and Nice (France). He was the Rapporteur
of the International Law Association Committee on Maritime Neutrality and was
the Vice President of the German Society of Military Law and the Law of War.
Since 2007 he is a member of the Council ofthe International Institute ofHumani-
tarian Law in San Remo, Italy. Professor Heintschel von Heinegg was among a
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group of international lawyers and naval experts who produced the San Remo
Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, and in 2002 he
published the German Navy's Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Op-
erations. Professor Heintschel von Heinegg is a member of several groups of ex-
perts working on the current state and progressive development of international
humanitarian law. He is a widely published author of articles and books on public
international law and German constitutional law.
Captain Rob McLaughlin, Royal Australian Navy, is currently Associate Professor
ofLaw at the Australian National University. Previously, he was Director ofOp-
erations and International Law in the Department ofDefence Legal Division and
Director, Naval Legal Service. His previous appointments include as counsel assist-
ing the Chief ofDefence Force Commission of Inquiry into the loss ofHMAS Syd-
ney IIy and service as the Strategic Legal Adviser, the Fleet Legal Officer and
Executive Officer ofHMAS Wollongong. He joined the Australian Defence Force
(Army Reserve) in 1986 as a rifleman, and was commissioned into the Navy in
1990 as a seaman officer, serving in patrol vessels, landing craft, frigates and de-
stroyer escorts, before subspecializing in submarines. He served as Chief of Mari-
time Operations for the United Nations Transitional Administration in East
Timor Peacekeeping Force in 2001-2, and as the Plans Officer and Legal Officer to
the Naval Task Group Commander in Iraq in 2003. He is a graduate ofthe Univer-
sity ofQueensland and holds a master of arts (history) degree from Brown Univer-
sity. Captain McLaughlin obtained his LLB degree at the University ofQueensland,
an LLM (international law) degree at the Australian National University and M.Phil,
(international relations) and PhD degrees at Cambridge University.
Professor John F. Murphy is professor of law at Villanova University School of
Law. In addition to teaching, Professor Murphy's career includes a year in India on
a Ford Foundation Fellowship; private practice in New York City and Washington,
DC; and service in the Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for United Nations Af-
fairs, US Department of State. He was previously on the law faculty at the University
of Kansas and has been a visiting professor at Cornell University and Georgetown
University. From 1980 to 1981 Professor Murphy was the Charles H. Stockton Pro-
fessor ofInternational Law at the Naval War College. He is the author ofnumerous
articles, comments and reviews on international law and relations, as well as the
author or editor of various books or monographs. Most recently, he has authored
The Evolving Dimensions ofInternational Law: Hard Choicesfor the World Commu-
nity (2010). His casebook (with Alan C. Swan), The Regulation of International
Business and Economic Relations (2d edition, 1999), was awarded a certificate of
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merit by the American Society of International Law in 1992. Professor Murphy has
served as a consultant to the US Departments of State and Justice, the ABA Stand-
ing Committee on Law and National Security, and the United Nations Crime Bu-
reau, and has testified before Congress on several occasions.
Lieutenant Colonel Noam Neuman is a senior officer in the Military Advocate
General's Corps ofthe Israel Defense Forces (IDF). During his career, he has served
in the International Law Department as the head of the Security and Operational
Branch (2004-9). Prior to that assignment, he served in the Office of the Legal
Advisor for the Gaza Strip (1994-2003), including as the Deputy Chief Legal Advi-
sor for the final four years. He has specialized in issues relating to international and
operational law, and has advised military commanders on the law ofarmed conflict
and the law of occupation. Lieutenant Colonel Neuman is a graduate of the Israel
National Defense College and the IDF Command and Staff College. He also holds
the degrees ofMA (with honors) in political science from Haifa University; LLM
from The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School, Charlottesville, Vir-
ginia; MA (with honors) in philosophy from Bar Ilan University; and LLB, also
from Bar Ilan University.
Professor Raul A. "Pete" Pedrozo is an associate professor of international law in
the International Law Department of the Naval War College. In 2009, he retired
from the US Navy as a captain in the Judge Advocate General's Corps. He gradu-
ated from the Ohio State University College of Law and has an LLM in interna-
tional and comparative law from Georgetown University Law Center, where he
received the Thomas J. Bradbury Award for the highest academic average in his
graduating class. As a judge advocate, Professor Pedrozo served in the following as-
signments: Naval Legal Service Office, Guam; Assistant Force Judge Advocate, US
Naval Air Forces Atlantic Fleet; Staff Judge Advocate, Commander Carrier Group
TWO/CTF 60 (embarked USS Coral Sea); Staff Judge Advocate, US Naval Station
Panama Canal/Commander, US Naval Forces Southern Command; Naval Justice
School staff; Law ofthe Sea Branch Head, Navy JAG International and Operational
Law Division; Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Assis-
tant Judge Advocate General, Navy JAG International and Operational Law Divi-
sion; Force Judge Advocate, Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command; and
Staff Judge Advocate, US Pacific Command. He was also Staff Judge Advocate for
Task Force SEMPER FI (Operation Just Cause) and Legal Advisor to the US con-
tingent to the UN Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia.
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Dr. Nicholas Rostow has a long history ofhaving served in senior federal and state
government positions and holding academic posts. From 2001 to 2005, Dr. Rostow
served as General Counsel and Senior Policy Adviser to the US Permanent Repre-
sentative to the United Nations. His other federal government positions included
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to Presidents Ronald Reagan and
George H.W. Bush, Legal Adviser to the National Security Council under National
Security Advisers Colin L. Powell and Brent Scowcroft, Counsel and Deputy Staff
Director of the House Select Committee on Military/Commercial Concerns with
the People's Republic ofChina (the Cox Committee) and StafTDirector ofthe Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence. Dr. Rostow held the Charles H. Stockton Chair
ofInternational Law at the US Naval War College in 2001. He has also taught at the
University of Tulsa College ofLaw and the Fletcher School ofLaw and Diplomacy
of Tufts University. He earned his BA, summa cum laude, from Yale in 1972, his
PhD in history in 1979 and his JD, also from Yale, in 1982. His publications are in
the fields ofdiplomatic history, international law and issues ofUS national security
and foreign policy.
Professor Michael N. Schmitt holds the Chair of Public International Law, Dur-
ham University in the United Kingdom. He was previously Dean ofthe George C.
Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Ger-
many, where he had served as Professor of International Law since 1999. From
2007 to 2008, he occupied the Charles H. Stockton Chair of International Law at
the Naval War College. Before joining the Marshall Center faculty, Professor
Schmitt served as a judge advocate in the US Air Force for twenty years. During his
military career, he specialized in operational and international law, and was senior
legal adviser to multiple Air Force units, including units conducting combat opera-
tions over northern Iraq. He is the General Editor of the Yearbook ofInternational
Humanitarian Law and serves on the editorial boards ofthe International Review of
the Red Cross, Journal ofInternational Peacekeeping, the Journal ofMilitary Ethics,
Connections, Journal ofInternational Humanitarian Legal Studies and the Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law Series. The author of many scholarly articles on law and
military affairs and contributing editor for multiple volumes of the Naval War
College's International Law Studies series, Professor Schmitt's works have been
published in Belgium, Chile, Germany, Israel, Italy, Norway, Peru, Sweden and
Switzerland.
Professor Pnina Sharvit Baruch is a professor on the faculty of the Tel Aviv Univer-
sity Law School, where she teaches public international law. Professor Sharvit Baruch
retired from the Israel Defense Forces as a colonel in 2009 after serving twenty
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years in the International Law Department, over five years of which she was the
head of the department (2003-9). In this capacity, she was the senior legal advisor
responsible for advising the Israeli leadership (both military and political) on a
wide variety of issues related to international law, including, among others, the
Middle East peace process, occupation law and the law ofarmed conflict. Beginning
in 1993 Professor Sharvit Baruch served as a legal advisor and member of Israel's dele-
gations to the peace negotiations with both Syria and the Palestinians. She participated
in most of the negotiation sessions and summits, including those in Paris, Cairo,
Wye River Plantation, Taba and Shepherdstown. In recent years she was involved
in advising commanders and government decisionmakers on issues relating to the
law of armed conflict. She also participated in international expert meetings and
conferences on this issue, focusing on the practical questions of applying the law of
armed conflict in asymmetric warfare scenarios. Professor Sharvit Baruch holds LLB
{magna cum laude) and LLM (magna cum laude) degrees from Tel Aviv University.
Captain Dale Stephens, CSM, Royal Australian Navy, commenced his SJD degree
studies at Harvard Law School in February 2009. His doctoral dissertation is titled
"The Role of Law in Military Decision Making." In 1989 Captain Stephens ob-
tained his law degree from Adelaide University, South Australia, and joined the
Royal Australian Navy that same year. He has occupied numerous staff officer ap-
pointments throughout his career, including Fleet Legal Officer, Director ofOper-
ational and International Law, Director of the Military Law Centre and Director of
Naval Legal Services. In 1999 he deployed to East Timor as legal advisor to the naval
component element of International Force East Timor Headquarters. He subse-
quently deployed to East Timor again in 2000/2001 as the ChiefLegal Officer ofthe
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor Peacekeeping Force
Headquarters. In 2003 he was awarded a Conspicuous Service Medal (CSM) for his
service as Fleet Legal Officer during Operation Falconer, which related to Austra-
lia's contribution to the war in Iraq. In 2005/2006 Captain Stephens undertook a
deployment to Iraq as the principal legal advisor to the Australian National Force
Commander and was responsible for providing advice in relation to Australian
Defence Force operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. He completed a second
tour of Iraq in December 2008 as Chief, International Law in the MNF-I Staff
Judge Advocate Office. In 2004, Captain Stephens completed a master of laws
degree at Harvard Law School and taught at the US Naval War College in 2004-5.
He is a member of the Editorial Board of the Australian Yearbook ofInternational
Law and has published widely in Australian and international law journals on mat-
ters relating to operational law.
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Colonel Darren M. Stewart OBE, British Army, is the Director of the Military De-
partment ofthe International Institute ofHumanitarian Law, San Remo, Italy. He
has extensive experience working in the area ofinternational humanitarian law. He
has served on operations with the British Army in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Northern
Ireland (as Chief Legal Adviser for British forces in the province), the Middle East
and Afghanistan (where he was the Chief Legal Adviser for the International Secu-
rity Assistance Force). Colonel Stewart has also worked as a legal adviser with
NATO (SHAPE) and the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (as Chief Legal Adviser).
Professor Sean Watts is an assistant professor of law at Creighton University Law
School, where he teaches constitutional law, federal courts, federal habeas corpus,
international criminal law and military law. Additional teaching experience in-
cludes service as a lecturer at the University of Virginia School of Law and at The
Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School, US Army. He has also provided
law ofwar instruction at a wide range of domestic and international governmental
agencies and educational institutions. His primary research interest is legal
regulation of evolving forms of warfare. Prior to teaching, Watts served as a US
Army officer for fifteen years in legal and operational assignments, including chief
of claims, trial defense counsel, chief of international and operational law, Funded
Legal Education Program student, tank company executive officer and tank
platoon leader. Watts was recently awarded Creighton Law School's Outstanding
Faculty Member ofthe Year and the American Society of International Law's 2010
Francis Lieber Military Prize for his essay "Combatant Status and Computer Net-
work Attack."
Professor Matthew C. Waxman is associate professor of law at Columbia Law
School, where he specializes in international law and national security law. He is an
Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a member of the
Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and Law. Professor Waxman
previously served at the US Department of State, as Principal Deputy Director of
Policy Planning. His prior government appointments include Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs, Director for Contingency Planning and
International Justice at the National Security Council, and special assistant to Na-
tional Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice. He is a graduate ofYale College and Yale
Law School, and studied international relations as a Fulbright Scholar in the
United Kingdom. After law school, he served as law clerk to Supreme Court Justice
David H. Souter and US Court of Appeals Judge Joel M. Flaum. Professor
Waxman's publications include The Dynamics ofCoercion: American Foreign Policy
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